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Preface 
 
This book is a collection of all the papers and essays published in the 
Special Issue “Reconsidering Meaning in Life: A Philosophical Dialogue 
with Thaddeus Metz,” Journal of Philosophy of Life, Vol.5, No.3, 2015. 
“Meaning in life” or the “meaning of life” is one of the most discussed 
topics in the field of philosophy of life. The Journal of Philosophy of Life 
has so far published several papers which deal with the issue of “meaning 
in life” as their main subject. Looking back in history, philosophers, 
religious figures, and novelists in every part of the world have discussed 
this topic ardently and passionately from ancient times to the present day. 
More recently, philosophers in the English speaking world have begun to 
study this topic in the field of analytic philosophy. 
In 2013, philosopher Thaddeus Metz published a monumental book 
entitled Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study with Oxford University Press. 
Fortunately, Professor Metz has been a member of the editorial advisory 
board of the Journal of Philosophy of Life from its inception. I asked him to 
be a guest editor of a special issue dedicated to his book. We called for 
papers in the summer of 2014, and in October this year, we published 
eleven peer-reviewed articles and two essays in the Journal. You can read 
all of them and a reply by Metz in this single book.  
While the main purpose of the papers is to analyze and criticize 
arguments made by Thaddeus Metz, from their discussions we can extract 
fruitful insights and suggestions for further development of the 
philosophical analysis of meaning in life in general. I believe this volume 
provides new and fresh approaches to the study of meaning in life in a 
diversified world.  
  
 
Masahiro Morioka 
Professor, Waseda University 
Editor-in-chief, Journal of Philosophy of Life 
October 31, 2015. 
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Précis of Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study 
Thaddeus Metz 
Distinguished Research Professor, University of Johannesburg 
 
 
In Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study (Metz 2013), my overarching 
aims are to articulate a novel theory of what would make a human person’s 
life meaningful and to argue that it is more justified than competitors to be 
found in the analytic philosophical literature from the past 100 or so years.  
This project inherently brings with it certain limitations. In focusing on 
the meaning of an individual’s life, I set aside the issue of what, if anything, 
might confer meaning on the human race in general. In evaluating theories 
of meaning in a person’s life, I address fundamental principles that 
purportedly capture what all meaningful conditions have in common, and 
so do not explore particularist, phenomenological, strictly first-personal or 
other philosophical approaches that one might adopt. In considering 
principally analytic texts, i.e., those in the English-speaking, 
Anglo-American philosophical tradition, I do not thoroughly discuss those 
in other traditions such as the Continental or East Asian. Finally, in 
reflecting mainly on philosophical works, I bracket considerations of how 
research in other fields such as psychology or religion might be revealing. 
Given such a focus, I found more than enough authors, works and ideas 
with which to grapple in Meaning in Life. About half of the contributions to 
this special issue of the Journal of Philosophy of Life have elected to stay 
within the parameters of my project; they use the same sort of lens that I 
employ, but see something different from what I do. Here I am thinking of 
the articles by Peter Baumann, David Matheson, Jason Poettcker, Yu Urata, 
Hasko von Kriegstein, Nicholas Waghorn, Mark Wells and Fumitake 
Yoshizawa. 
However, one major rationale for this special issue of the Journal of 
Philosophy of Life was to encourage the reflective exploration of issues of 
meaning through a different lens altogether. Such an approach 
characterizes the contributions of Christopher Ketcham, Minao Kukita, 
Masahiro Morioka, James Tartaglia and Sho Yamaguchi, all of whom, 
except for Tartaglia, work within the East Asian philosophical tradition.  
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Usually these latter critics maintain not merely that their lens is 
different and merits use alongside mine, but also that it is better and should 
be used instead of it. In my reply to these contributors, I argue that this 
stronger view is implausible, and that, at best, they offer a lens that would 
usefully supplement, but that should not supplant, the one that I employ. I 
do not defend the claim that would be the mirror image of the one these 
critics make, viz., that only my, theoretical-analytic way of approaching 
issues of meaning is appropriate. At this stage of my thought, I am pluralist 
about methodology, maintaining that it would be useful to view meaning 
through a variety of lenses. 
 
* * * 
 
In the rest of this overview, I provide a sketch of the three major parts 
of Meaning in Life, reviewing just enough to make sense of the rich debates 
that follow. This special issue of the Journal has advanced reflection about 
meaning, and done so in some truly deep and interesting ways. I am 
honoured and heartened that my book was the occasion for such additions 
to the stock of knowledge. 
In the first major part of Meaning in Life I analyze the category of 
meaningfulness in a way that is intended to be largely neutral amongst 
competing theories of what meaningfulness essentially is insofar as it is 
exhibited to a certain degree in a human person’s life. Specifically, I define 
what most in Anglo-American philosophy mean by the phrase “meaning in 
life” and cognate terms, indicate what the bearer of this value is, and 
differentiate meaningfulness from happiness, subjectively construed. 
With regard to definitional matters, I ultimately maintain that a pluralist, 
family resemblance model is most defensible at this point. According to 
this view, talk of “meaning in life” is about ideas such as purposiveness, 
transcendence, aptness of emotions such as admiration and esteem, and 
narrative properties. While each of these ideas captures a large array of 
theoretical work in the relevant literature, no one of them captures 
everything on its own.  
I next consider what the bearer of life’s meaning is, i.e., what it is about 
a life that can be meaningful or meaningless. Is it only the life as a 
patterned whole, merely the parts of a life considered in themselves, or 
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both? I conclude in favour of the latter, mixed view; I maintain that there 
are two independent dimensions of meaning in life, namely, certain parts of 
a person’s life at a certain time, such as a particular action, project or stage 
(e.g., adolescence) and then also the person’s life considered in its entirety. 
A complete judgment of the degree of meaning in a person’s life, which 
would ground a comparison with the lives of others, must weigh up both 
dimensions and add them together in some way.  
In the rest of part one, I compare and contrast the goods of pleasure and 
meaning, focusing most on highlighting important differences between 
them. I contrast pleasure and meaning with respect to six value-theoretic 
factors, amongst them: what the logical sources of these values are in 
contrast to their bearers, how luck can play a role in their realization of the 
values, and which attitudes are appropriate in response to them. I conclude 
by suggesting that a pleasant life is plausibly to be identified with a happy 
one, which means that happiness and meaningfulness are two distinct 
goods that can each contribute independently to making a life 
choice-worthy.  
In the next two major parts of the book, I focus on spelling out and 
evaluating a wide array of theories of life’s meaning, basic accounts of 
what all the meaningful conditions of a life have in common. I assess 
theories largely in terms of the extent to which they entail and plausibly 
explain intuitions salient in the Anglo-American philosophical literature, 
particularly as they concern the meaningfulness of the good (morality, 
beneficence), the true (knowledge, wisdom) and the beautiful (art, 
creativity).  
Specifically, in the second part, I criticize supernaturalist theories of 
meaning in life, according to which either God or a soul (or both), as 
typically conceived in the monotheist tradition, is necessary for life to be at 
all meaningful. I spend considerable time focusing on the most influential 
version of supernaturalism, according to which meaning in a person’s life 
consists of her fulfilling God’s purpose.  
I provide reasons to doubt arguments in favour of purpose theory, and 
also claim to offer a novel reason to doubt the view itself. According to this 
latter argument, in order for God to be necessary to confer meaning on our 
lives, God would have to be qualitatively different from, and higher than, 
anything that could exist in the natural world. And this means that God 
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would have to be a person who has properties such as simplicity and 
atemporality, properties that are difficult to reconcile with purposive 
agency, which appears to be essentially complex and temporal.  
I also proffer arguments against any supernaturalism, not just the 
purposive version of it. The most original objection is that many of those 
who adopt supernaturalism hold views that are in tension with each other. 
On the one hand, they claim to know that some lives have meaning in them, 
but, on the other, they do not claim to know that anything supernatural, 
such as God or a soul, actually exists. Supernaturalists might have faith in 
the latter, but that is of course not conclusive evidence of their existence, 
which most implicitly maintain they have about the presence of meaning in 
people’s lives.  
In the third part of Meaning in Life, I present a new naturalist theory 
that I contend improves upon extant versions of naturalism, the broad view 
that a life in a purely physical world could be meaningful. I first provide 
counterexamples to a wide range of existing naturalist views, including the 
theories that a life is meaningful just insofar as it is creative, promotes 
welfarist or perfectionist consequences in the long run, or connects with 
organic unities beyond itself. 
I then advance my favoured view at this stage, the fundamentality 
theory, which is roughly the idea that a life is (particularly) meaningful 
insofar as exercises reason in a robust, sophisticated way and orients it 
towards basic conditions of human existence, ones that are largely 
responsible for or explain much else about it.  
Just as H2O is fundamental to water, and being a CEO is fundamental 
to the operations of a firm (on which see Metz 2015), so there are certain 
properties of human life that are fundamental to (i.e., roughly, account for 
much of) various dimensions of it. For example, space-time, gravity and 
light are fundamental to the environment in which human beings live; 
communication, socialization and labour are fundamental to the 
development of the human species; practical reasoning and community are 
fundamental to the course of a human society; and character is fundamental 
to the way a particular one of us lives (an additional dimension that I did 
not discuss in the book, but see Metz 2014).  
By my theory, great meaning in a life comes from using rationality to 
positively engage with these kinds of “deep” facets of human life. 
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Sometimes that is a matter of discovering or learning what they are; other 
times it is a matter of protecting them; and still other times it is a matter of 
expressing respect for or appreciation of them. 
I do not claim that the fundamentality theory is perfect, as it stands. 
However, I continue to be inclined to think that it is the best springboard 
for future reflection. It, better than existing rivals in the literature, captures 
intuitions about the good, the true and the beautiful as central to meaning, 
intuitions that are salient in the Anglo-American philosophical literature, 
which I have principally addressed so far.  
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Metz on the Pure Part-Life View of Meaning 
Hasko von Kriegstein* 
 
Abstract 
According to the pure part-life view the meaning in our lives is always borne by particular parts of 
our lives. The aim of this paper is to show that Thaddeus Metz’s rejection of this view is too quick. 
Given that meaning is a value that often depends on relational rather than intrinsic properties a pure 
part-life view can accommodate many of the intuitions that move Metz towards a mixed view. 
According to this mixed view some meaning is borne by parts of our lives and some by our lives as 
a whole. The arguments in this paper suggest, however, that even if a pure part-life view is to be 
rejected, a mixed view that incorporates a whole-life aspect is not going to be any more plausible. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Thaddeus Metz’s Meaning in Life is a magisterial treatment of this important 
topic as it is discussed in contemporary analytic philosophy. Early on in the 
book Metz discusses whether the bearers of meaning are whole lives, parts of 
lives, or both.1 He argues for the last of these options rejecting the pure 
whole-life view, and the pure part-life view in order. Having done so he briefly 
raises some puzzles regarding the whole-life aspect of his mixed view without 
fully resolving them. In closing his discussion of the bearers of meaning Metz 
cautions the reader that, in keeping with the majority of the literature, he will 
focus on part-life aspects and largely set aside issues regarding meaning borne 
by whole lives.2 Thus, by his own lights, Metz’s book is somewhat incomplete: 
it fails to engage thoroughly with one way in which our lives can bear meaning. 
In this short article I suggest that this incompleteness is merely apparent. I 
argue that Metz’s rejection of the pure part-life view is too quick and that pure 
part-lifers can accommodate the intuitions that drive Metz to adopt his mixed 
view. Moreover, insofar as a pure part-life view has trouble accommodating 
these ideas adding a whole-life aspect does not help. I suggest that a properly 
                                                     
* Postdoctoral researcher, Centre for Moral and Political Philosophy, The Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel. Email: haskovonkriegstein[a]gmail.com 
1 Cf. Metz (2014), Chapter 3. 
2 Metz (2014), 58. 
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developed pure part-life view is less vulnerable to the problems that Metz raises 
for the whole-life aspects of his view. Thus, while I reject Metz’s mixed view on 
the bearers of meaning, my proposal would strengthen his overall project. Some 
of the loose ends he leaves become easier to tie up, and his almost exclusive 
focus on the way in which the parts of a life can contribute to its meaning is 
fully justified; for there is nothing else to discuss. 
The paper proceeds as follows. I begin with a brief summary of Metz’s 
discussion of the bearers of meaning (section 2). Next, I draw attention to 
resources at the disposal of the pure part-life view not fully considered by Metz, 
show how these resources help to accommodate the judgements that drive Metz 
to reject the view, and provide independent reasons why a pure part-life view 
would want to employ these resources (section 3). I then put these resources to 
use by reevaluating the considerations that Metz puts forward in support of his 
mixed view (section 4). Finally, I briefly discuss how this improved pure 
part-life view dissolves one of the puzzles that Metz raises for his own view 
(section 5).   
 
2. Metz on the Bearers of Meaning 
 
Metz begins his discussion of the potential bearers of meaning by drawing 
the distinction between a whole-life view and a part-life view thus: 
 
What I call ‘pure whole-lifers’ maintain that the only bearer of meaning is 
an entire life composed of certain relationships between its parts. 
Typically, they maintain that what can make a life meaningful is solely a 
function of the narrative structure among the parts, viz., a story or 
biography characterizing one’s existence that admits of aesthetic 
properties... In contrast, ‘pure part-lifers’ maintain that the only bearer of 
meaning is a part of a life ‘in itself’, usually a spatio-temporal segment 
such as the fulfillment of a desire or the performance of an activity.3 
 
He admits to not having a fully developed account of what is to count as a 
part of a life. While he suggests that developing such an account would be a 
worthwhile endeavour, he proposes to make do with the intuitive notion of a part 
                                                     
3 Metz (2014), 37. 
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as a ‘subset of a person’s existence’, a phrase which he intends to cover a liberal 
range including ‘mere slivers of space-time’ as well as lengthy periods such as a 
person’s adolescence.4 
Having drawn this distinction (and after distinguishing it from a couple of 
other distinctions), Metz turns to rejecting arguments in favour of a pure 
whole-life view. He finds that there seem to be clear cases in which parts of a 
life are meaningful or meaningless; for example, finding a cure for cancer seems 
to confer meaning while a period of time spent torturing babies for fun appears 
to be meaningless. Metz surveys some theoretical reasons for overruling the 
intuitive verdict about cases like that and finds them lacking. As I agree with 
him on that count and the pure whole-life view is not my concern in this paper, 
there is no need to go into any more detail here. 
Metz’s argument against the pure part-life view is much shorter and consists 
of a list of ways in which a life can be meaningful not in virtue of any part of it, 
but rather in virtue of how such parts are related. Metz identifies five types of 
patterns that he thinks make for a meaningful life above and beyond the 
meaning that can be found in its parts.5  
First, he suggests that variety makes for a more meaningful life. 
 
Even if the parts of a very repetitive life were quite meaningful in 
themselves, most would sacrifice some meaning in the parts in order to 
avoid repetition in the pattern and thereby enhance the importance of the 
whole.6 
 
Metz illustrates this idea with the movie Groundhog Day in which the Bill 
Murray character relives the same day over and over and, after a while, 
continues to fill the day with more and more meaningful activities. While the 
day is very meaningful towards the end, it does seem that repeating this day 
until the end of his life would leave the character with a less meaningful life 
than if he moved on to different things. 
Second, Metz suggests that a life that gets better through time is more 
                                                     
4 Cf. Metz (2014), 39. 
5 My presentation of this list of patterns slightly diverges from Metz’s. He seems to think that what I 
call the fourth kind of pattern is an instance of the third. On the other hand, he treats the ideas of bad 
parts causing good and bad parts causing goods in a particular way as distinct patterns while I lump 
them in together. 
6 Metz (2014), 50. 
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meaningful than one that deteriorates. Metz’s third suggestion is that a life is 
more meaningful if its bad or meaningless parts later cause good or meaningful 
ones. To learn from one’s mistakes makes life more meaningful than to make 
mistakes and learn independently of them; to make good use of that learning is 
even more meaningful; and some ways of doing so confer more meaning than 
others. Fourth, Metz believes that a life’s posthumous influence can confer 
meaning on it. Finally, he mentions the idea that a life can have meaning in 
making for a compelling and original story. 
Having listed these ways in which the patterns of our lives can make a 
difference to their meaningfulness, Metz sees only one option for the friends of 
the pure part-life view: to bite the bullet on all of them.  
 
Pure part-lifers must reply that our judgements about these relational 
features are confused, such that when we judge there to be more meaning 
for these reasons, what is actually motivating us is the implicit supposition 
that there would be a greater sum of meaningful parts.7 
 
But there is another option. A pure part-lifer may concede the force of (some 
of) the examples and maintain that, while it is true that meaning obtains in virtue 
of these relational features, this additional meaning nevertheless accrues to the 
parts of a life rather than to the life as a whole. Thus the part-lifer is not forced 
to deny the impact of relational features but could try to accommodate them. 
Indeed, I believe that a thoughtful version of the pure part-life view would 
already have the resources to accommodate relational features. In fully working 
out their view, then, pure part-lifers could approach Metz’s list with an open 
mind. Of some of the features they might actually want to deny that they confer 
additional meaning. But they do not have to say this about all of them; some of 
these features can be accommodated within a pure part-life framework. How 
exactly this works is what I turn to next. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
7 Metz (2014), 51. 
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3. Parts and Their Meaning 
 
3.1 Extrinsic Final Value 
 
To have meaning in one’s life is valuable for its own sake. Thus, meaning is 
what is often called a final good.8 It has also been common for a long time to 
refer to such values as intrinsic goods. While this usage of the term ‘intrinsic’ 
remains common currency in many contexts, it is now widely recognized as 
inaccurate. Beginning with Christine Korsgaard’s influential paper ‘Two 
Distinctions in Goodness’ ethicists have increasingly come to accept that the 
distinction final/non-final value (instrumental value being the most salient 
example of the latter category) cuts across the distinction between intrinsic and 
extrinsic value. The former distinguishes things that are being (or ought to be) 
valued for their own sake from those that are valued (merely) for the sake of 
something they are suitably related to. The latter distinguishes things that are 
valuable in virtue of their intrinsic properties from those that have value (partly) 
in virtue of their relational properties.9 
Part of the reason why people have traditionally used the term ‘intrinsic’ to 
denote what we now call ‘final’ is that, following G.E. Moore, it was assumed 
that final value could only ever accrue to something in virtue of its intrinsic 
properties.10 Thus, the distinction between final and intrinsic value would be 
one without a difference.11 But the arguments of Korsgaard and others have 
convinced many people that this is not so, or that it can at the very least be 
reasonably doubted.12 Shelly Kagan, for instance, provides a number of cases 
that he takes to be instances of extrinsic final value. Among the items he 
considers is the pen Lincoln used to sign the Emancipation Proclamation.13 This 
pen, he claims, has final value (is good for its own sake) in virtue of its 
instrumental history which is, of course, a relational property of the pen. 
Similarly, he claims that certain things can be finally valuable in virtue of their 
                                                     
8 Cf. Metz (2014), 62. 
9 Cf. Rabinowicz/Roennow-Rasmussen (2000) for a particularly clear articulation of these 
cross-distinctions. 
10 Cf. e.g. Moore (1922). 
11 Cf. Rabinowicz/Roennow-Rasmussen (2000), 34. 
12 Cf. Kagan (1992), O’Neill (1992), Hurka (1998). Cf. Zimmerman (2001) for an argument to the 
effect that the Moorean view equating intrinsic and final value is substantially correct. 
13 Kagan (1992), 285. 
 6
uniqueness which is a paradigmatically relational property.14 
The import of this brief discussion for the question at hand should be clear. 
If it is possible for final value to obtain in virtue of relational properties, the 
defender of the pure part-life view may claim that the meaning that is added to a 
life through various patterns is nevertheless a value that the parts have. Parts of a 
life, on this view, are meaningful (partly) in virtue of their relational properties. I 
will now turn to why I believe this move to be particularly plausible in the 
context of meaning. 
 
3.2 Meaning as a (Mainly) Extrinsic Value 
 
Metz is well aware of the possibility of extrinsic final value. Indeed, in his 
discussion of the value-theoretic differences between pleasure and meaning he 
claims that pleasure’s final value is intrinsic whereas actions conferring meaning 
on a life often do so in virtue of their relational properties. 
 
For example, consider creative behaviour. Imagine in one case that it is 
the result of substantial education, training, and effort, whereas in another 
case it is the consequence of taking a pill. Or imagine in one case that 
creative behaviour results in a novel art-object that others appreciate, 
whereas in another one it does not. In both pairs of cases, it is natural to 
say that we could have the same creative activity but differential meaning, 
because of how it was brought about and what its results were.15 
 
This seems exactly right to me.16  
Consider also that the very phrase ‘meaning of life’ points to an essentially 
relational concept. When we use the term ‘meaning’ in other contexts we refer 
straightforwardly to a relation. To say that a sentence or a symbol is meaningful 
is simply to say that it stands in a certain relation to something else. While Metz 
is right that it would be a mistake to assume that ‘meaning’ connotes the same 
concept in ‘meaning of (or in) life’ as in the context of language, it is surely no 
accident that we refer to this particular value with a term that has such strong 
                                                     
14 Kagan (1992), 282. 
15 Metz (2014), 67. 
16 It may be worth noting that meaning is in this respect different not only from pleasure but also from 
the Kantian conception of moral worth. 
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relational connotations.17 When we say that a life was meaningful we do not say 
that it was a symbol for something else. But we do, I believe, mean that at least 
some parts of the life stood in significant relations to things or events outside 
themselves. 
Again, Metz will need no convincing here. His account of the concept of 
meaning in life 18  as well as his favourite conception of it 19  are clearly 
formulated in terms that put relational properties front and centre. But if a part 
of my life can be (and typically is) meaningful in virtue of its relational 
properties, what reason is there to reject a pure part-life view of the bearers of 
meaning? After all, we could simply say that the bearers of meaning are always 
parts of a life but that these parts are sometimes meaningful in virtue of their 
relations to other parts.  
 
3.3 Locating Values 
 
To answer the question just posted it will be helpful to appeal to Metz’s 
distinction between the bearer of a value and its source.  
 
I have claimed that a pleasant life consists of certain experiences that are 
good for their own sake, while a meaningful life is (substantially) made up 
of certain actions that are good for their own sake. Experiences and 
actions are in what these values respectively inhere, and they are to be 
contrasted with the source of these values, i.e., on what the values 
logically depend in order to inhere.20 
 
Put in these terms a pure part-life view could claim that meaning inheres 
always in a part of a life but that the source of this meaning (what its inherence 
logically depends on) can be a relation between the meaningful part and some 
other part. In order to resist such a move, Metz’s arguments against the pure 
part-life view are insufficient. While he argues that certain patterns can enhance 
the meaning of a life, he nowhere gives us a reason to believe that this additional 
value inheres in the life as a whole, rather than in some part of it. What we need 
                                                     
17 Cf. Metz (2014), 21-2. 
18 Cf. Metz (2014), 34. 
19 Cf. Metz (2014), 222. 
20 Metz (2014), 66. 
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is an argument not about the source of meaning but about its bearer (or location). 
This question regarding the location of extrinsic final value has not been 
widely explored. The most direct and thorough discussion to date can be found 
in Thomas Hurka’s ‘Two Kinds of Organic Unity’.21 Hurka’s discussion starts 
with Moore’s famous principle of organic unities according to which the (final) 
value of a whole does not have to be equal to the sum of the value of its parts.22 
Hurka points out that there are two ways of interpreting that claim. Moore’s own 
interpretation is that the parts remain just as valuable inside a whole as outside 
of it, but that the whole itself bears additional value. This is what Hurka terms 
the ‘holistic’ interpretation. On the other hand, there is the ‘conditionality’ 
interpretation according to which the value of the parts itself changes when they 
are part of a given whole. 23  While Hurka admits that both of these 
interpretations can in all cases reach identical verdicts about the overall value of 
a whole, he argues that they have different value theoretic implications that 
allow for a choice between them.24 Importantly, he insists that this choice is best 
made on a case by case basis rather than by appeal to general philosophical ideas 
about the metaphysics of value that would rule out one or the other 
interpretation.25 
Hurka presents two criteria for choosing between a holistic and a 
conditionality interpretation of a given organic unity. First, he asks us to 
consider whether the whole or a part appears to be the appropriate object of 
evaluative attitudes. Say that A by itself has little or no value but that the whole 
comprised of A and B has considerably more value than B. Hurka argues that in 
some situations with such a structure it will seem more natural to say that we 
should be pleased about A, and in some situations it seems more appropriate to 
be pleased about A+B. As it happens the examples he gives to illustrate these 
two options are both on Metz’s list of patterns that confer meaning on life. 
Hurka thinks that when we consider posthumous achievement we should think 
that what we should be pleased about are the (ultimately successful) actions of 
the achiever, rather than the whole comprising both the action and the success.26 
                                                     
21 Hurka (1998). 
22 Cf. Moore (1903), 28. 
23 Cf. Hurka (1998), 300-5. 
24 Cf. Hurka (1998), 299-300. 
25 Cf. Hurka (1998), 320. 
26 Cf. Hurka (1998), 306. In support of this claim Hurka argues that it helps to make sense of the idea 
that people have self-interested reasons to care about their posthumous achievements. If the value was 
not located in the person’s life but in the whole comprising their activities and events after their life, it 
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By contrast when we consider the idea that it is more valuable for a life to get 
better rather than worse, it seems that what we should take pleasure in is the 
progression from bad to good rather than either of these parts (apart from the 
pleasure we should take in the good part’s independent goodness). 
A second criterion for choosing between the holistic and the conditionality 
interpretation has to do with whether the parts that comprise the whole are to be 
treated symmetrically or asymmetrically. The former suggests a holistic, the 
latter a conditionality interpretation. The example of a life getting better seems 
to call for symmetric treatment of the parts. It would be arbitrary to say either 
that the good parts are better because they were preceded by the bad, or that the 
bad parts are better because they were followed by the good. The parts are 
related symmetrically rather than as enabler and enabled. By contrast, consider 
the Kantian idea that happiness is good only if it is combined with a good will 
which itself is unconditionally good. Here there is a clear asymmetry between 
the parts of the whole ‘happiness plus virtue’ and the extra value seems to accrue 
to happiness which would have no value otherwise (while virtue had its supreme 
value all along).27 
  
3.4 Three Strategies for Defending the Pure Part-Life View  
 
The preceding discussion has brought into focus a strategy for defending a 
pure part-life view not considered by Metz. The pure part-lifer can concede that 
the way that the parts of a life are patterned contributes to its meaning, while 
arguing that this meaning is nevertheless located in the parts rather than the life 
as a whole. That being said, the part-lifer may, of course, also take the route that 
Metz suggests to be her only option: to deny that some of the suggested patterns 
suggested actually enhance the meaning of a life. A third strategy not yet 
discussed takes aim at a mixed view like Metz’s that includes whole lives as 
potential bearers of meaning, without providing direct support for a pure 
part-life view. This strategy consists in claiming that, even if there is meaning 
that does not seem to inhere in a particular part of a life, the life as a whole is 
even more implausible as a candidate location for that meaning. 
I think that pure part-lifers would do best to employ a mix of all three of 
these strategies in resisting a mixed view that includes a whole-life element. I 
                                                                                                                                                                     
becomes somewhat mysterious how such a value is one that is of special concern to the agent. 
27 Cf. Hurka (1998), 308-9. 
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cannot fully develop a pure part-life view here. But I will briefly indicate for 
each of the items of Metz’s list of patterns what I take to be the most promising 
response on behalf of the pure part-live view. 
 
4. The List of Patterns Revisited 
 
4.1 Variety 
 
The thought that ‘variety is the spice of meaning’ is certainly initially 
attractive but the longer I think about it the less clear it seems to me what this is 
actually supposed to mean. It does not help that Metz’s example involves the 
movie Groundhog Day. The problem with the example is that it suggests a way 
in which lack of variety reduces the meaningfulness of our lives that does not 
speak against a pure part-life view at all. For the most natural interpretation of 
the example is that a lack of variety would make for a life that is boring for the 
one who lives it (this, I take it, is the main reason why the Bill Murray character 
is so relieved when the world finally moves on again). As Metz seems to 
acknowledge at various places, boredom is what he calls ‘anti-matter’, i.e. the 
kind of thing that reduces meaning in life (even if it is not incompatible with 
it).28 But this thought is easily accommodated within a pure part-live view. 
Whenever there is boredom in a part of a person’s life, this part has negative 
meaning (or less meaning than it otherwise would). There is no need to locate 
meaning in life as a whole.  
Thus, despite what his example suggests, this cannot be what Metz has in 
mind. Rather it has to be that the absence of variety in itself makes for a less 
meaningful life, even if the person never got bored of what they are doing. Once 
the absence of boredom is stipulated, however, I find variety’s claim to 
meaningfulness much less compelling. Would we really want to say of a doctor 
who spends her entire life curing malaria without ever getting bored or blasé 
about it that her life would have been more meaningful if instead she had 
invested some of her time in other meaningful activities (such as appreciating 
exquisite art or, even, curing yellow fever)? I find myself inclined to answer no 
to this question. I will concede that a person with more variety in their life will 
probably make for a more interesting conversation partner (and thus better 
                                                     
28 Cf. Metz (2014), 62; 174; 196. 
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friend); but I find it hard to believe that this could be a criterion for how 
meaningful their life is. 
I am not quite ready to dismiss variety, however. One interpretation that I 
have not considered yet is that a more varied life would make for a more 
compelling life story. Maybe that is what Metz has in mind. The idea of a 
compelling life story is its own entry on Metz’s list, however. And so I will leave 
variety behind for now. 
 
4.2 Improvement 
 
The idea that a life that starts out poorly and becomes better as it goes is 
more meaningful than one that displays the opposite pattern is hard to 
accommodate within a pure part-life view. Indeed, as we saw in section 3.3 it is 
this very example that Hurka uses to illustrate his claim that sometimes a 
holistic interpretation that locates the value in a whole rather than its parts is 
sometimes superior to the rival conditionality interpretation. 
However, Hurka’s claims are about value in general, rather than meaning in 
particular. And I for one find no plausibility in the claim that a life’s improving 
rather than deteriorating enhances its meaningfulness. It may be worth noting 
here that both authors Metz cites in support of this claim (Michael Slote and 
Frances Kamm) make their claims, like Hurka, in terms of the generic goodness 
of a life rather than its meaning.29 I think that the claim that improvement 
makes for a better life is somewhat plausible when we think about well-being. 
Having a bad childhood followed by happy sunset years may well be better for 
us than the opposite. But would we really want to say that Kant had a more 
meaningful life than Hume simply in virtue of and because he wrote his great 
philosophical works later in life? I think not. 
Things are different, however, when we consider the related idea that 
meaning is gained when bad or meaningless parts of our life lead to good or 
meaningful ones. To this I turn next. 
 
4.3 The Bad Causing the Good 
 
Metz illustrates this idea with a case of a person who spends a period of time 
                                                     
29 Cf. Slote (1983); Kamm (2003). 
 12
as a prostitute in order to finance her drug habit. This appears to be a 
paradigmatically meaningless part of this person’s life. However, as time goes 
by she overcomes her addiction and begins to work as a counsellor for people in 
similar situations (this part of her life is meaningful). The suggestion here is that 
she is a good counsellor precisely because she went through the earlier 
meaningless period, presumably because she has first-hand knowledge of what 
the life of her clients is like.30 
I think that denying that there is additional meaning here is not a plausible 
move. Thus, the pure part-lifer should hold that, while indeed a life with this 
pattern is more meaningful than one that has analogously meaningless and 
meaningful parts that are unrelated, this additional meaning is to be located in 
the parts. Or, in Metz’s terms: while the pattern is the source of the meaning, the 
parts are its bearers. 
Thinking back to Hurka’s second criterion the pure part-lifer may seem to be 
in dire straits. Hurka suggested, remember, that a holistic view should be 
favoured when it seems arbitrary which of two parts of a whole we should think 
to be more valuable in virtue of the other part’s co-presence. This is plausibly 
the case here. We might say that the period of drugs and prostitution is less 
meaningless (somewhat meaningful?) because of what it later led to. Or we may 
say that the period as a counsellor is more meaningful in virtue of what caused it. 
I do not think that either of these statements is inherently more plausible than the 
other, and picking between them would be arbitrary in exactly the way that 
Hurka objects to. 
However, this test is inconclusive. And I think that Hurka’s first criterion 
favours a part-life ascription of the meaning. It seems to me that in thinking 
about this case both the good and the bad period are appropriate objects of our 
attitudes. Unlike in Hurka’s example involving a simple progression from bad to 
good the two descriptions I gave in the last paragraph are symmetrical because 
they are both plausible. It does actually seem that being redeemed in the way 
described confers meaning on the very period of prostitution that would 
otherwise have been (more) meaningless. And it also seems right that the later 
period seems more meaningful for having the background that it does. Thus, the 
pure part-life view can plausibly claim that the additional meaning in cases like 
this inheres in both the redeemed and redeeming parts rather than in the pattern 
                                                     
30 Cf. Metz (2014), 46-7. 
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itself. 
But suppose this move fails to convince. Those who want to include a 
whole-life component would still not be out of the woods. For against them the 
pure part-lifer could use the third strategy adumbrated above and demand that 
they show that it is indeed the whole life of the prostitute/counsellor that is 
bearing this meaning. Especially given Metz’s liberal understanding of ‘part’ the 
pure part-lifer may reasonably claim that the meaning that comes from the 
pattern of redemption inheres, if not in the redeemed and the redeeming part, in 
the part that consists of both of these periods. The fact that we are able to talk 
about the meaning of these two parts and the pattern connecting them, without 
knowing anything else about our protagonist’s life, seems a fair indication that it 
is not her whole life that bears the meaning in question but simply these two 
episodes. 
 
4.4 Posthumous Effects 
 
In debates about well-being it is a very controversial question whether 
events after one’s death can have an effect on how good a life went for the 
person living it. Many people take it to be obvious that the answer to this 
question has to be no.31 But such worries would seem clearly misplaced when 
the value at issue is meaning. Here is Metz: 
 
And, still more, many in the field believe that posthumous influence 
would confer meaning on one’s life. Many of us seek to make ripples 
from the splash of our lives that would continue once we have gone under. 
Sundry ripples might be children, books, paintings, tombstones, buildings, 
or memories. Better that 5000 people benefit from and recognize one’s 
accomplishments now and another 5000 also do so in the next generation 
than that 10,000 do so now but none does so posthumously. Or so I 
presume the reader will agree.32 
 
One may quibble over the question whether posthumous influence is more 
meaningful than analogous influence during one’s life (as implied by the quote). 
But what is truly puzzling about this passage is that it appears in the context of 
                                                     
31 Cf. e.g. Sumner (1996), 127. 
32 Metz (2014), 50. 
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motivating the inclusion of the whole-life component in Metz’s position on the 
bearers of meaning. 
How exactly a life is to be delineated is not a trivial question. Whether 
something is part of my life or related to it is often not easy to decide. But one 
constraint on answering this question is surely to respect the fact that death is the 
end of life. That is to say that anything happening after one’s death is not part of 
one’s life (though it may be intimately related to it in all kinds of ways). Thus, 
posthumous effects of one’s life are something that cannot be accommodated 
without allowing for extrinsic final value – regardless of whether one has a 
part-life or a whole-life view. And once this point is made clear it seems to me 
that the examples of ‘ripples’ that Metz gives all lend themselves to a part-life 
treatment. If people still read Toni Morrison’s books, this makes her writing of 
those books meaningful rather than her life as a whole (Martin Heidegger’s 
work may be an even stronger case in point). Analogous things can be said, I 
believe, about painting, raising children, and constructing buildings. 
I conclude that the case of posthumous effects demonstrates two things. First, 
it is not promising to think of meaning as solely an intrinsic value. As discussed 
in section 3.2, meaning is a final value that will often depend on relational 
properties. But secondly, for whatever difficulties a pure part-life view may have 
in capturing the meaning bestowed by events and patterns that cannot be clearly 
be attributed to any particular part of a life, adding a whole-life component is an 
unpromising solution. We will return to this point in section 5. 
 
4.5 A Compelling Story 
 
The last item on Metz’s list of meaning-bestowing patterns is that a life is 
meaningful if it “makes for a compelling and ideally original life-story.”33 Now, 
what exactly this comes to is an issue that Metz leaves for another day: 
 
I still lack a general and basic account of how to distinguish compelling 
life-stories from ones that are not so hot.34 
 
This makes it somewhat difficult to evaluate the proposal. But there are a 
few things that can be said. First, Metz’s view cannot be that a life could be 
                                                     
33 Metz (2014), 235. 
34 Metz (2014), 235. 
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meaningful simply in virtue of it being the case that one could write a biography 
of the person that would make for a compelling read. The reason for this is that 
the kinds of things that make for what Metz calls anti-matter, i.e. things that 
deprive a life of meaning may be very interesting to read about. One could write 
a compelling biography of, say, Hannibal Lecter; but Metz would not want to 
count Lecter’s life as meaningful. Similarly, I suggested earlier that being 
someone that it would be interesting to have a conversation with cannot 
plausibly be the hallmark of a meaningful life. What we can learn from having 
to reject both of these interpretations of what makes for a compelling life-story 
is that a life is not meaningful (in the sense of finally valuable) simply in virtue 
of being interesting for an outside observer. 
A more promising way of thinking about what lies behind the metaphor of a 
compelling life-story is in terms of a life that is setting a good and inspirational 
example for others. In keeping with the ideas discussed in sections 4.3 and 4.4 
we would probably want to say that more meaning is generated if that example 
is actually being followed. But even if nobody does follow it there might be 
some meaning in a life in virtue of it being the kind of life that should be 
inspiring people. This interpretation would also provide an explanation why a 
life is less meaningful if it is “merely an accidental repeat, let alone an 
intentional copy, of someone else’s.”35 For such a life would be following an 
example rather than setting one. We might also think that a life that is fun to 
learn about (maybe partly in virtue of the variety it includes) would be more 
likely to inspire others. Thus, we would have an explanation of why a 
meaningful life is often the possible object of a compelling biography. 
Obviously, much more would need to be said here. But, like Metz, I will leave 
this for another occasion. 
Supposing, however, that something like the sketch in the last paragraph is 
the best way to make sense of the idea that a compelling life-story makes for a 
(more) meaningful life, I again, see no reason why this meaning should be 
thought to accrue to the life as a whole rather than to those parts that are 
inspiring. Of course, sometimes what is inspiring will be patterns like the ones 
discussed in the past couple of sections. But as we have seen there, these 
patterns are not best construed as being features of life as a whole. Thus, this last 
item on Metz’s list cannot supply any fresh reason to reject a pure part-life view. 
                                                     
35 Metz (2014), 51. 
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If anything, it could give added force to a reason generated by a different 
pattern. 
 
5. The Ground of Narrative Structure 
 
I claimed early on that this paper would propose a friendly amendment to 
Metz’s view. I have so far focused on the amending part. I should like to 
demonstrate that the amendment is indeed a friendly one. So, before I conclude, 
let me briefly consider how my argument all but dissolves a puzzle that troubles 
Metz and that he finds himself unable to deal with to his own satisfaction. 
Witness the following passage. 
 
To see the problem, consider the most straightforward proposal about 
what grounds narrative structure in a human person’s life: 
 
(GNS 1) A narrative structure is constituted by every spatio-temporal 
moment of one’s life. 
 
If (GNS 1) were true, no life-story would be a good read, or would 
otherwise exhibit the kind of coherence that is characteristic of a narrative 
structure. It would have to include daily mention of eight hours of sleep. A 
good third of the hours spent every day are not only terribly boring, but 
also fairly constant over the course of one’s life. Imagine a novel a third of 
which were pages with ‘zzzzzzzz’ on them, perhaps generously peppered 
with ‘snore’; the whole would be marred.36 
 
Metz then considers a number of ways of excluding moments where one is 
not conscious as well as ‘dead time’ (such as time brushing one’s teeth or 
dusting the living room) to end up with the suggestion that whether and to what 
degree a life has a meaning-conferring narrative structure should be based on 
“only those spatio-temporal moments of one’s life of which one is aware beyond 
the dead time that is average for human beings.”37 He is not fully satisfied with 
the suggestion, however, for two reasons. First, this view does not account for 
the fact that the narrative structure can be influenced by both things outside of 
                                                     
36 Metz (2014), 52. 
37 Metz (2014), 54. 
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one’s consciousness and events after one’s death. Second, there could be cases 
where large amounts of dead time do not negatively impact the narrative 
structure of a life (such as when an entire generation of humans were to go into a 
long freeze only to continue life like nothing happened afterwards).38 
Interestingly, however, Metz also remarks, just after the passage quoted 
above, that it shows that the whole-life view is “not to be taken literally.”39 In 
my view this is really all that needs to be said here. As I have tried to show 
throughout section 4, the patterns that motivate whole-lifers are often best 
thought of as sources rather than bearers of value. But even in cases where that 
reply fails to convince, it is a mistake to go to life as a whole as the bearer of 
meaning. Life as a whole contains both too much (such as times spent sleeping) 
and too little (such as events after one’s death) to be the bearer of the value that 
comes into our lives through these patterns. What these patterns show us is not 
that the meaning in life is not borne by its parts; it is that much (maybe most) of 
the meaning in the parts of a life obtains in virtue of the relational rather than the 
intrinsic properties of these parts. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
I have argued that, with regard to the bearers of meaning, Metz should 
abandon his mixed view according to which meaning is borne both by parts of 
lives and by lives as a whole. I have shown that once we bring into focus the fact 
that meaning is a value that largely depends on relational (rather than intrinsic) 
properties a pure-part life view has the resources to accommodate many of the 
intuitions that Metz uses to motivate rejecting it. The pure part-lifer can admit 
that meaning depends on certain patterns as a source while insisting that it 
nevertheless inheres in a given part. Moreover, while it may sometimes seem 
counterintuitive to locate some meaning in a particular part of a life, it is 
typically no less counterintuitive to locate this meaning in life as a whole. Thus, 
even if the pure part-life view needed to be rejected, the necessary amendment 
would not consist in the addition of a whole-life aspect. 
 
 
 
                                                     
38 Metz (2014), 54-5. 
39 Metz (2014), 52. 
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Fundamentality and Extradimensional Final Value  
David Matheson* 
 
Abstract 
I argue that life’s meaning is not only a distinct, gradational final value of individual lives, but also 
an “extradimensional” final value: the realization of meaning in life brings final value along an 
additional evaluative dimension, much as the realization of depth in solids or width in plane 
geometric figures brings magnitude along an additional spatial dimension. I go on to consider the 
extent to which Metz’s (2013) fundamentality theory respects the principle that life’s meaning is an 
extradimensional final value, and consequently suggest that the theory may stand in need of further 
refinement and supplementation. 
 
1 
 
In the introductory chapter of his Meaning in life (2013), Metz helpfully 
articulates some principles that any conception of life’s meaning should respect 
if it is to keep within the boundaries of the central concept at play in the relevant 
value-theoretic literature. One principle is that life’s meaning is a feature of 
individual lives (whether in whole or in part), not merely a feature of humanity 
in general, life as such, and so on. Another principle is that life’s meaning is a 
final value—a feature of individual lives that is desirable in its own right. This 
final value is also gradational: it can be realized to varying degrees, individual 
lives can be more or less meaningful. Yet another principle is that the final value 
is a distinct one, in the sense that it is neither identifiable with, nor reducible to a 
mere species of, any of the more familiar (e.g. moral, alethic, aesthetic, hedonic) 
forms of final value. 
I quite agree that any conception of life’s meaning should respect these 
principles. Any conception according to which meaning in life turns out to be a 
feature only of something other than individual lives, merely an instrumental 
value, an all or nothing affair, or just (a species of) moral, alethic, aesthetic, or 
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hedonic final value, would seem clearly to be working outside the boundaries of 
the relevant concept. I think, however, that there is further principle that should 
be added to the list. My ultimate purpose in what follows to consider Metz’s 
own conception—the fundamentality theory he presents in the twelfth chapter of 
his book—in the light of this further principle. In the next section I will lay out 
the nature and plausibility of the principle. I will go on in the final section to 
consider the extent to which the fundamentality theory may be said to respect it. 
 
2 
 
The further principle I have in mind is motivated by a serious consideration 
of pretheoretic metaphors for life’s meaning. It is noteworthy that among these 
metaphors, spatial ones are especially common. Thus, as Wolf (2010) writes, 
meaning in life “is commonly associated with a kind of depth. Often the need 
for meaning is connected to the sense that one’s life is empty or shallow” (pp. 
7-8). 
The central suggestion of the spatial metaphors seems to be about added 
dimensionality: meaning in life has to with final value along an additional 
evaluative dimension, just as depth in solids or width in plane geometric figures 
has to do with magnitude along an additional spatial dimension. Relative to the 
magnitudes realized by rectangles, for example, cuboids realize a magnitude 
along an additional spatial dimension—an “extradimensional” magnitude; and 
rectangles realize an extradimensional magnitude relative to the magnitude 
realized by straight lines. Similarly, we may say in the light of the spatial 
metaphors, relative to the more familiar forms of final value that lives devoid of 
meaning may realize, meaningful lives realize a final value along an additional 
evaluative dimension—an extradimensional final value. 
There are two important features of an extradimensional magnitude like 
depth or width: its realization always involves the realization to a certain degree 
of at least one other magnitude from which it is distinct, and its realization 
always yields more overall spatial magnitude than the realization to that degree 
of the other magnitude alone. Thus the realization of depth in a cuboid always 
involves the realization to a certain degree of length and width, as the realization 
of width in a rectangle always involves the realization to a certain degree of 
length; yet a cuboid with a certain length and width always has more overall 
spatial magnitude than a rectangle with the same length and width, and a 
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rectangle with a certain length always has more overall spatial magnitude than a 
straight line of the same length. 
We may appeal to analogous features to define the relevant notion of an 
extradimensional final value: 
 
Extradimensional final value: a final value whose realization (1) always 
involves the realization to a certain degree of at least one of the more 
familiar forms of final value and (2) is always more finally valuable 
overall than the realization to that degree of the more familiar form of 
final value alone.      
 
To illustrate, consider famously realized final value—final value, that is, 
whose realization is widely praised. One might suppose that it counts as an 
extradimensional final value, on the grounds that its realization always involves 
the realization to a certain degree of at least one of the more familiar forms of 
final value. But is the realization of famously realized final value more finally 
valuable overall than the realization, to the relevant degree, merely of whatever 
more familiar form of final value it involves? I think there is some room for 
reasonable doubt here. Suppose that I realize famously realized final value by 
realizing moral final value to a certain degree: I intentionally afford you the 
consideration you morally deserve, and my doing so is widely praised. Suppose 
further that you realize moral final value to the same degree without realizing 
famously realized final value: you intentionally afford someone else the 
consideration they morally deserve, but your doing so goes quite unpraised. 
Must my realization of famously realized final value be more finally valuable 
overall than your realization to the relevant degree of moral final value alone? 
Not obviously, perhaps partly because we tend to think of praise as a largely if 
not entirely instrumental value. (Praise seems desirable at least largely by virtue 
of the sort of behavior or attitudes it encourages.) So although famously realized 
final value may count as an extradimensional final value, there is some reason to 
think that it may not: although it clearly meets condition (1) above, it does not so 
clearly meet (2). 
Now consider final value whose realization brings a sense of satisfaction or 
enjoyment to the agent—satisfyingly realized final value. As with famously 
realized final value, its realization seems always to involve the realization to 
some degree of at least one of the more familiar forms of final value; but its 
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realization is not clearly always more finally valuable than the realization to a 
similar degree merely of whatever more familiar form of final value it involves. 
I am overly impressed with the importance of my own work in mathematics, 
suppose, and get a great deal of satisfaction in whatever work I complete in the 
field, however good or bad it may be; you, by contrast, are hypercritical of your 
own mathematical efforts, and never get any real satisfaction out of the 
mathematical work you do (which is typically much better than my work). 
Suppose further that we both independently discover an excellent proof of a 
modestly interesting theorem in the field. My discovery thereby realizes 
satisfyingly realized final value by realizing to a certain degree alethic final 
value. But does this bring more overall final value than your discovery, which 
merely realizes alethic final value to a similar degree? Again, there’s room for 
reasonable doubt. Despite my satisfaction at what I have done, driven by my 
inflated sense of self-importance, it is not obvious that I have realized more 
overall final value than you.1 
Perhaps a clearer example of extradimensional final value is to be found in 
the sort of final value that figures centrally in Taylor’s (1981, 1987, 1999) 
creativity conception of life’s meaning: uncommonly realized final value, i.e. 
rarely before (and in the maximal case, never before) realized final value. The 
realization of uncommonly realized final value seems also always to involve the 
realization to some degree of at least one of the more familiar forms of final 
value; I can only realize uncommonly realized final value through realizing 
moral or alethic or aesthetic or hedonic final value to some degree. And it is 
quite intuitive that the realization of uncommonly realized final value is always 
more finally valuable overall than the mere realization to the relevant degree of 
whatever more familiar form of final value it involves: there is something about 
the uncommonly realized nature of uncommonly realized final 
value—something about its rarity or uniqueness—that seems to render its 
realization always of more overall final value. Intentionally to afford a social 
group the consideration they morally deserve, in a society where the group is 
(and has long been) regularly afforded such consideration, is, I take it, to realize 
                                                     
1 As an anonymous referee points out, one might try to avoid examples like this by insisting that the 
sense of satisfaction involved in satisfyingly realized final value be appropriate, and so not driven by 
such things as an inflated sense of self-importance. But the main challenge would then be to tease out 
the relevant notion of appropriateness in a non-question-begging way, i.e. in a way that does not 
simply assume that condition (2) is met.  
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moral final value to a moderate-to-fairly-high degree (notwithstanding its 
commonly realized nature); being one of the first intentionally to afford the 
group the consideration they morally deserve, where they have heretofore 
almost never received it, is to realize uncommonly realized final value by 
realizing moral final value to a similar degree. But it is very intuitive that the 
latter realization yields more overall final value than the former. Likewise, the 
realization of uncommonly realized final value through the realization to a 
certain degree of alethic final value (e.g. by being the, or one of the first to 
discover a proof for an interesting theorem) seems clearly to carry more overall 
final value than the realization to that degree of alethic final value alone (e.g. by 
being yet another in a long list to come up with such a proof); the realization of 
uncommonly realized final value through the realization to some degree of 
aesthetic final value (e.g. by composing the first great poem of a particular type) 
seems to be of more overall final value than the realization to a similar degree of 
aesthetic final value alone (e.g. by being the most recent in a very long line of 
authors to compose a great poem of the relevant type); the realization of 
uncommonly realized final value through the realization to a certain degree of 
hedonic final value (e.g. by intentionally generating a rarely experienced 
gustatory pleasure with one’s culinary efforts) is intuitively of more overall final 
value than the realization to a similar degree of hedonic final value alone (e.g. 
by generating a commonly experienced gustatory pleasure); and so on. 
With the notion of extradimensional final value thus explicated, I can now 
succinctly state the further principle about life’s meaning that I think any 
conception of it should respect: 
 
The extradimensionality of life’s meaning (ELM): life’s meaning is not 
just a distinct, gradational final value of individual lives, but also an 
extradimensional final value. 
 
Properly understood, ELM has a good deal of intuitive plausibility and 
makes good sense of the pretheoretic metaphors that motivate it. Further, it 
allows us to accommodate—much better than we could without it—some 
frequently recurring views on life’s meaning. 
Consider, for example, the view that meaning in life has something 
importantly to do with transcendence—with “rising above” or “going beyond” 
the familiar or ordinary—in life. I suspect that this view is largely responsible 
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for the appeal of both supernaturalist and personal transcendence conceptions of 
life’s meaning. According to supernaturalist conceptions (e.g. Fackenheim 1965, 
Quinn 1999, Cottingham 2003), meaning in life requires that a life transcend its 
familiar natural setting by relating in the right sort of way to a supernatural 
realm or being. On personal transcendence conceptions (e.g. Frankl 1966, 
Nozick 1981, Gewirth 1998; cf. Nietzsche [1872] 1961, More 2010), meaning in 
life requires that the individual living the life transcend ordinary limits to her 
personhood—that she become an extraordinary, significantly less limited sort of 
person.2  
ELM allows us to accept the transcendence view without committing 
ourselves to these conceptions. Given ELM, meaning in life has something 
importantly to do with transcendence because it has something importantly to do 
with evaluative transcendence: for a life to be meaningful, on ELM, it must 
realize a final value that evaluatively goes beyond or stands above ordinary, 
more familiar final values, in the sense that its realization necessarily brings 
with it more overall final value than theirs (to the relevant degrees) alone. Yet 
this evaluative transcendence need not involve any sort of metaphysical or 
personal transcendence, as the supernaturalist and personal transcendence 
conceptions would have it. In light of ELM, we can say that these conceptions 
are right to insist on transcendence for meaning in life, but (perhaps) wrong to 
insist on the nonevaluative forms of transcendence to which they advert. 
Or consider the view that meaning in life cannot simply be a matter of 
having a very high degree of any of the more familiar forms of final value in 
life—simply a matter of doing a great amount of moral good, acquiring a large 
amount of truth or knowledge, manifesting an impressive amount of beauty, or 
getting (or giving) a great amount of pleasure, in life. This view is most salient 
in those individuals who, despite knowing full well that their lives realize 
extraordinary amounts of the more familiar forms of final value, seriously 
wonder whether their lives have any appreciable meaning at all. 3  These 
individuals do not seem guilty of any obvious, basic conceptual confusion, as if 
they were worried about whether the great deal of this or that final value they 
have realized in life makes their lives at all finally valuable. They seem rather to 
be thinking, however tacitly, that no high degree of the sort of final value they 
                                                     
2 Some personal transcendence conceptions, such as Nozick’s, seem also to be supernaturalist in 
character. 
3 Historically, Tolstoy ([1882] 1983) serves as one of the most famous examples in the literature. 
 25
have (obviously) realized in their lives can alone be sufficient for meaning in life, 
and then asking themselves whether their lives have whatever else is required. 
They may harbor some ultimately mistaken conviction about the “whatever 
else” that tempts them towards a distressingly negative answer to their question,4 
but the question itself seems quite reasonable to ask and attempt to answer. 
Without ELM (or something very much like it), I think, we lack the 
resources to explain the view that meaning in life is not simply a matter of 
having a very high degree of the more familiar forms of final value in life. The 
principle that life’s meaning is a distinct final value, for example, does not 
explain it, for having a very high degree of one or another of the more familiar 
forms of final value is itself a final value that is so distinct: it is neither identical 
with nor a mere species of any of the more familiar forms of final value. But 
with ELM, we do seem to have the resources to explain the view. If ELM is 
accepted, meaning in life cannot be regarded as simply a matter of having a very 
high degree of more familiar final value in life, because merely to realize any 
form of such value to any degree (however high) is to realize something other 
than extradimensional final value, and meaning in life is an extradimensional 
final value. On ELM, therefore, the view apparently adopted by individuals who 
seriously wonder whether their lives have any appreciable meaning at all despite 
clearly having a very high degree of moral, hedonic, etc. final value is correct, 
and the question these individuals pose to themselves is quite rational. 
Yet another frequently recurring view on life’s meaning (see, e.g., James 
[1895] 1979, Wittgenstein [1929]1965, Camus [1942] 1975, Kekes 2000, Haack 
2002, Baggini 2005, Brogaard & Smith 2005, Reginster 2006, Goetz 2014) is 
that it has something specially to do with the worthwhileness of life. This view 
need not 5  be understood as identifying, or even as asserting an analytic 
connection between, the concepts of meaning and worthwhileness in life: one 
can reasonably take meaning in life to be the prime candidate for what renders a 
life worth living (i.e. better lived than not, in an all-things-considered sense of 
‘better’), for example, without holding that ‘meaningful life’ and ‘worthwhile 
life’ are synonymous or that ‘a meaningful life is a worthwhile life’ is 
analytically true. And the view is powerfully supported by the well-known 
Schopenhauerian insight that life inevitably involves so much disvalue along the 
                                                     
4 In Tolstoy’s case, the mistaken conviction seems to be more or less what Metz aptly calls the 
“perfection thesis” (2013, pp. 138ff.). 
5 And if Metz (2012) is right, should not. 
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more familiar dimensions of final evaluation—so much moral, alethic, aesthetic, 
and hedonic evil or badness—that the realization of no amount of countervailing 
value along such dimensions could alone make it worthwhile.6 As the thought 
goes: in light of the inevitable final disvalue it includes, life could only be 
rendered worthwhile by realizing a particularly substantial sort of final value; 
and meaning in life seems particularly well suited to fit this evaluative bill. 
To think that meaning in life is so suited is to hold the view that life’s 
meaning has something specially to do with its worthwhileness. And that view is 
perfectly intelligible on ELM. Because, as ELM has it, life’s meaning is an 
extradimensional final value, it is, unlike the more familiar forms of final value, 
a uniquely plausible candidate for the sort of value whose realization can render 
a life better, all things considered, lived than not. 
 
3 
 
ELM thus has much to be said in its favor: not only does it have 
considerable intuitive appeal and account for the pretheoretic metaphors that 
motivate it, it also allows us to explain the appeal of various recurring views on 
life’s meaning. Accordingly, I think, ELM deserves to be added to the list of 
framework principles about life’s meaning. I want now to consider Metz’s 
fundamentality theory in the light of this further principle. 
Here I will be concerned only with the fundamentality theory as a 
conception of life’s meaning simpliciter—as a conception of what Metz calls 
“pro tanto meaning” (2013, pp. 39 & 220); for present purposes I will leave 
aside his richly rewarding discussions of the ways in which this theory may be 
developed into an account of both “on-balance” meaning in life (pp. 146-56 & 
235-6) and negative meaninglessness (evaluative “anti-matter”) in life (pp. 63-4 
& 234). In this basic form, the fundamentality theory takes meaning in life to be 
essentially a function of the exercise of rationality in favor of fundamental 
conditions of human existence:  
 
The fundamentality theory: An individual’s life is meaningful just to the 
                                                     
6 Sober reflection on ordinary life, Schopenhauer famously argued, should drive us to the conclusion 
that life is simply “a business that does not cover the costs” ([1844] 2011, ch. 45, p. 638; cf. [1893] 
1974, pp. 291-305). Benatar (2006, chs. 2 & 3) provides a jarring, recent expression of this 
Schopenhauerian insight. 
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extent that in her life she exercises her rationality in favor of 
fundamental conditions of human existence. 
 
Rationality (or reason) is here to be understood very broadly: it is meant to 
include “all intuitive facets of intelligence of which human beings are 
characteristically capable and animals, even higher ones such as chimpanzees, 
are not” (Metz 2013, p. 223). Thus it includes not just “certain kinds of 
cognition and intentional action” but also many things that other theorists 
“might call ‘non-rational facets of our nature’,” such as various forms of 
judgment-dependent desire, emotion, or conation (p. 223). And for an individual 
to exercise her rationality in favor of fundamental conditions of human existence 
is for her to exercise it in such a way that either promotes these conditions (i.e. 
encourages their obtaining) or protects them (i.e. discourages their no longer 
obtaining) (pp. 233-4).  
What then are the fundamental conditions of human existence that, 
according to the theory, rationality must be so exercised in favor of? They are, 
Metz says, conditions of broad human domains—human personhood, human 
sociality, and human environmental situatedness—and “largely responsible for 
many other conditions” of human existence (2013, p. 226). Thus, whereas the 
disposition rationally to care for other human beings as such, as a condition of 
both human personhood and human sociality (pp. 228-9), counts as fundamental, 
the disposition merely to share with or care for one’s own best friend 
presumably does not. Similarly, whereas the capacity of the human species to 
survive through natural selection, as a condition of human environmental 
situatedness, counts as fundamental (p. 229), my capacity to survive the 
particular strain of influenza I encountered last month does not. The 
fundamental conditions are all general conditions of broad human domains, 
causally responsible (at least in some structural sense) for a great many other 
particular conditions of human existence; the contrasting non-fundamental ones 
are particular conditions at best responsible for a few other particular conditions 
of human existence. 
I take it, moreover, that Metz intends the fundamental conditions to be 
fundamentally good ones, or at least not fundamentally bad ones. This is why a 
deep-seated penchant for selfishness, violence, or destruction would presumably 
not in his view count as a fundamental condition of human existence even if it 
turned out to be of a broad human domain and largely responsible for many 
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other conditions of human existence. It would hardly be an attractive feature of 
the fundamentality theory to allow that great meaning in life can come through 
exercising one’s rationality in favor of extreme selfishness, violence, or 
destruction.  
So understood, it is clear that the fundamentality theory well respects the 
framework principles that Metz articulates in the introductory chapter of his 
book. The exercise of rationality in favor of fundamental conditions of human 
existence is obviously a feature that individual lives can share, is of some final 
and not merely instrumental value, comes in degrees (conditions of human 
existence can be fundamental to greater or lesser degrees, one can more or less 
rationally act in favor of the fundamental conditions), and is neither identical to 
nor a mere species of any of the more familiar forms of final value.7 Hence, as 
essentially a function of the exercise of rationality in favor of fundamental 
conditions of human existence, life’s meaning is, according to the 
fundamentality theory, a distinct, gradational final value of individual lives.  
But what about ELM? Does the fundamentality theory respect it as well? On 
the theory life’s meaning does seem to satisfy the first condition for 
extradimensional final value, namely, being such that its realization always 
involves the realization to some degree of at least one of the more familiar forms 
of final value. Consider the sorts of activities that seem (following Metz’s 
suggestions) to count as paradigmatic realizers of the exercise of rationality in 
favor of fundamental conditions of human existence, and hence of meaning in 
life according to the theory: sacrificing one’s personal well being in order to 
undermine a widely oppressive social regime (cf. 2013, p. 227); doing what one 
can to contribute to an institution of wide social benefit (cf. p. 227); promoting 
healthy interpersonal (including intimate) relationships in general (cf. p. 228); 
making scientific discoveries of sweeping scientific importance (cf. p. 229); 
coming up with powerful theoretical explanations (cf. p. 229); creating great 
artworks reflective of universal themes (cf. pp. 230-1); and inventing admirable 
means of increasing human pleasure or comfort (cf. p. 223). All of these appear 
to involve the realization to some degree of one or more of the more familiar 
                                                     
7 One might think that the exercise of rationality in favor of fundamental conditions of human 
existence is merely a species of alethic (or epistemic, or intellectual) final value, but this would be a 
mistake given the broad sense of rationality here at play, which cuts across the other, more familiar 
forms of final value. Cf. Metz’s remarks on how, given this broad sense of rationality, the 
fundamentality theory is not “overly intellectual” (p. 223).  
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forms of final value. Sacrificing one’s personal well being in order to undermine 
a widely oppressive social regime, doing what one can to contribute to an 
institution of wide social benefit, and promoting healthy interpersonal 
relationships all seem to involve the realization to some degree of (at least) 
moral final value; making scientific discoveries of broad scientific importance 
and coming up with powerful theoretical explanations obviously involve the 
realization to a certain degree of alethic final value; creating great, 
universally-themed works of art involves the realization to some degree of 
aesthetic final value; inventing admirable means of increasing many others’ 
pleasure or comfort is surely to some degree of hedonic final value; and so on. 
I worry, however, that on the fundamentality theory life’s meaning does not 
satisfy the second condition for extradimensional final value. Recall that 
condition: meaning in life must be such that its realization is always more finally 
valuable overall than the mere realization, to the relevant degree, of whatever 
other more familiar form of final value it involves. Compare now a situation in 
which meaning in life is on the fundamentality theory realized through the 
realization of moral final value to some degree, with a situation in which moral 
final value is to that degree alone realized. In the first situation, suppose, I 
exercise my rationality in favor of a fundamental condition of human existence 
by realizing moral final value to a moderate degree: I sacrifice a modest amount 
of my personal well being in order partially to undermine a widely oppressive 
social regime. In the second situation you merely realize moral final value to a 
similarly moderate degree: you sacrifice a large amount of your own well being 
in order completely to correct an injustice suffered by just a single individual 
with whom you are acquainted. (The realization of moral final value in this 
second situation does not count as an exercise of rationality in favor of a 
fundamental condition of human existence because it is only in favor of a 
particular condition of a particular individual, and hence not in favor of a 
general condition that is responsible for many other conditions of human 
existence.) Here, does my realization of what the fundamentality theory 
considers as life’s meaning carry more overall final value than your realization 
to a moderate degree of moral final value alone? Is my action in the first 
situation more finally valuable overall than yours in the second situation? My 
intuition provides no clear answer here; it does not strike me as counterintuitive 
to say that your strong effort fully to correct an injustice suffered by a particular 
individual is just as finally valuable overall as my comparatively weak effort 
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partially to undermine a widely oppressive social regime. 
In a similar vein, compare a situation in which meaning in life is, on the 
fundamentality theory, realized through the realization of alethic final value to a 
certain degree, with a situation in which alethic final value is to that degree 
alone realized: I realize alethic final value to a high degree by making a 
scientific discovery of modest interest to a broad range of scientists; you realize 
alethic final value to a similarly high degree by making a scientific discovery of 
great interest to a much narrower range of scientists. (My discovery, suppose, is 
of modest interest to all sorts of physicists, chemists, biologists, and so on; yours 
is of great interest just to a small handful of high-energy particle physicists.) I 
thus realize what the fundamentality theory takes to be life’s meaning, but you 
do not: you merely realize alethic final value to the relevant degree. Does my 
discovery intuitively carry more overall final value than yours? I see no 
obviousness to the suggestion that it does; it strikes me as at least as plausible to 
suggest that your discovery is of pretty much the same overall final value as 
mine. 
I suspect that similar examples, in which the realization of what the 
fundamentality theory takes as life’s meaning is contrasted with the realization 
to the relevant degree merely of aesthetic or hedonic value, will turn out along 
similar lines: it is not obvious that the former sort of realization always yields 
significantly more overall final value than the latter. And if that is indeed the 
case, then it is unclear whether the fundamentality theory affords ELM its due 
respect. The exercise of rationality in favor of fundamental conditions of human 
existence seems clearly to meet one of the two conditions for 
extradimensionality, namely, that its realization always involves the realization 
to a certain degree of at least one of the more familiar forms of final value. But it 
does not seem clearly to satisfy the other important condition—that its 
realization is always more finally valuable overall than the mere realization, to 
the relevant degree, of whatever more familiar form of final value it involves. To 
revert to a spatial metaphor that helped motivate ELM, the worry is that the 
fundamentality theory does not obviously capture the depth of life’s meaning, 
only its width or length. 
Even so, just how well the fundamentality theory respects the other key 
framework principles about life’s meaning—much better than most conceptions 
in the literature—should not be ignored. Surely any conception that does so well 
respect the other principles is largely on the right track. The considerations I 
 31
have raised about the extent to which the fundamentality theory respects ELM 
call not, in my view, for wholesale abandonment of the theory but for its further 
refinement and supplementation. I am uncertain about the particular direction in 
which this refinement and supplementation will lead. But I am certain that, in 
whatever direction it leads, it will yield even more meaning in the life of the one 
who pursues it. 
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Meaningful and More Meaningful 
A Modest Measure  
Peter Baumann* 
 
Abstract 
We often describe lives (or parts of lives) as meaningful or as not meaningful. It is also common to 
characterize them as more or less meaningful. Some lives, we tend to think, are more meaningful 
than others. But how then can one compare lives with respect to how much meaning they contain? 
Can one? This paper argues that (i) only a notion of rough equality can be used when comparing 
different lives with respect to their meaning, and that (ii) the relation of being more meaningful is 
not transitive. It follows that all attempts to rank different lives in terms of meaning can at best lead 
to partially indeterminate and incomplete rankings. One should also give up on the idea of 
“maximizing” meaning. I will use Thaddeus Metz’s important recent book Meaning in Life. An 
Analytic Study as a foil for my discussion.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
We often describe lives (or parts of lives) as meaningful or as not 
meaningful.1 It is also common to characterize them as more or less meaningful. 
Some lives, we tend to think, are more meaningful than others. For instance, in 
his important recent book Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study Thaddeus Metz 
puts his basic claim in the following way: “A human person’s life is more 
meaningful, the more that she employs her reason and in ways that positively 
orient rationality towards fundamental conditions of human existence.”2 This 
remark implies that there are degrees of meaningfulness, as Metz confirms in 
other parts of his book.3 According to him there is intrapersonal comparability 
of meaning: “... the goods of pleasure and meaning can be ordered in the sense 
that some parts of a life are more pleasant and more meaningful than others.”4 
Metz adds a claim of intrapersonal aggregation: “… it appears that pleasure and 
                                                     
* Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Swarthmore College, 500 College Avenue, 
Swarthmore, PA 19081, USA. Email: pbauman1[a]swarthmore.edu 
1 See for overviews on the recent discussion about the meaning of life: Metz 2002, 2007 and 2008. 
2 Metz 2013, 222; see also, with more detail, 233 and 235; see also, e.g., Joske 2000, 290-294; 
Schmidtz 2001, 172; Mawson 2010; Kauppinen 2013. 
3 Metz 2013, 4, passim.  
4 Metz 2013, 63.  
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meaning are intrapersonally aggregative, i.e., are amenable to rough judgments 
of how much of these goods there are in a given life overall. … Given these 
kinds of roughly cardinal measurements of particular times in a life, one could 
conceivably add them up to inform an estimation of whether the life has enough 
pleasure in it to count as pleasant overall or period. Similar kinds of claims 
apply to meaning, even supposing … that it can include whole-life elements.” 5 
Finally, Metz goes even one step further and accepts the claim of interpersonal 
comparability: “… pleasure and meaning appear to be interpersonally 
comparative, which means that we can compare different lives with regard to 
amounts of these goods. For all I know, my life is, so far, more pleasurable than 
Emily Dickinson’s was, but less meaningful than Albert Einstein’s.” 6 Even if 
one does not interpret Metz – and there is no reason to do so – as saying that we 
can measure meaning by counting “units” of meaning and then adding up the 
units, he is still making a very strong claim here: that meanings can be compared 
across persons.7 There has been and still is a long and controversial discussion 
in economics about the possibility of interpersonal comparison of utility,8 and 
analogous claims about meaning deserve much more scrutiny than they seem to 
have deserved so far.  
How then can one compare and rank lives with respect to how much 
meaning they contain? Can one? I will argue that Metz’ strong claims about 
comparability and rankability of meaningfulness cannot be upheld. 
 
2. Incomparability or Indeterminate Rankings 
 
It is tempting to take one’s lead from value theory and the orthodox view 
that there can be exactly three comparative evaluative relations between any two 
evaluated items A and B: A being better than B or A being worse than B or A and 
B being equally good. Similarly, one could assume that there are exactly three 
ways in which any two lives (or parts of lives; from now on I will focus on 
whole lives) can compare with respect to meaning: One life could be more 
meaningful than or less meaningful than or equally meaningful as the other life. 
Different lives (or parts thereof) are comparable with respect to meaningfulness 
                                                     
5 Metz 2013, 63.  
6 Metz 2013, 63.  
7 See also Metz 2013, 39-40, 158, 236. 
8 Robbins 1938 is one of the classic contributions to this debate. 
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– where comparability is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation.9 I take it 
that Metz adheres to this orthodox view: Even though he does not seem to say so 
explicitly, there is no trace of adherence to any of the alternative views discussed 
below (which are the main options I can think of). Is this the correct way to look 
at lives, meaning and meaningful lives? 
Two ideas should be put aside from the start. First, there is no common scale 
on which different lives can be measured and compared with respect to their 
meaning. The attribution of meaning to lives is in this respect not like the 
attribution of length to material objects. In a certain sense of the word 
“incommensurable” – one in which commensurability requires a common scale 
– lives are incommensurable. However, this does not mean they are 
incomparable. To be sure, Metz sometimes talks of “scales” when he talks about 
comparisons of meaningfulness10; however, as already pointed out above, there 
is no reason to take this in the very strong sense of a ratio scale which would 
allow the counting and adding up of units (like, e.g., in the case of length 
measurements). – Second, there is only so much “precision” in comparisons 
between lives (with respect to their meanings). There is certainly some amount 
of vagueness but also a certain roughness of the degree of granularity of 
comparison. But this alone does not speak against the possibility of comparison. 
Comparison need not be ideally “precise” (more on this below).11 
So, is it true that for any two lives either one is more meaningful than the 
other or they are (roughly) equally meaningful? Consider the life of Picasso and 
the life of Euclid (or, alternatively, Einstein and Dickinson). Is one more 
meaningful than the other? It seems we are at a loss if we try to answer this 
question in the positive; the question is even somewhat suspicious and might 
involve basic misunderstandings. Should we then rather judge that Picasso’s life 
and Euclid’s life are equally meaningful (roughly)? To deal with this latter 
question, consider a third life, the life of a painter which was not quite as 
glorious and meaningful as Picasso’s but still pretty meaningful. We would say 
that in that case Picasso’s life was more meaningful than the other painter’s life. 
If Picasso’s and Euclid’s lives were equally meaningful, then it seems that we 
should also say that Euclid’s life was more meaningful than the other painter’s 
                                                     
9 Given any three relata x, y and z: x is comparable to itself; if x is comparable to y, then y is 
comparable to x; if x is comparable to y and y to z, then x is also comparable to z. 
10 See, e.g., Metz 2013, 63-64. 
11 See also Metz 2013, 63 where he talks about “rough” aggregation. I take him to mean lack of 
precision as mentioned in the text above.  
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life (if P=E & if P>O, then E>O). But this judgment seems as problematic as the 
judgment about Picasso’s and Euclid’s lives. Should we then conclude that 
Picasso’s and Euclid’s lives are incomparable with respect to meaning because 
neither is more meaningful than the other nor are they equally meaningful?12 
This suggestion can be understood in more than one way. First, as the idea 
of incomparability in the strict sense: Some lives can in principle not be 
compared with each other (with respect to meaning) because neither is one more 
meaningful than the other nor are they equally good, and there are only these 
three possibilities: quartum non datur. Incomparability in this sense amounts to 
an analogue of the failure of completeness of the better than-relation.13 
Second, there is the idea that quartum datur: that there is a fourth 
comparative relation besides more, less or equally meaningful. One could call it 
“in the same league (as far as meaning is concerned)”.14 If two lives are in the 
same league, then neither is one more meaningful than the other nor are they 
equally meaningful. They are not comparable in the sense allowed for by the 
first, orthodox, view. But according to this second, less orthodox view they still 
can be compared with each other: Being in the same league is a relation sui 
generis.  
Third, there is the idea of indeterminacy and truth-value gaps. Not only is it 
not true (as in the case of incomparability) that Picasso’s life is more meaningful 
than or less meaningful than or as meaningful as Euclid’s life but it is also not 
false that Picasso’s life is more meaningful than or less meaningful than or as 
meaningful as Euclid’s life. 15  It is simply indeterminate how some lives 
compare with respect to meaning (more on this below).  
The first idea, the idea of strict incomparability (a relation which is 
irreflexive, symmetric and not transitive), is not easy to understand: Why should 
it not be possible to compare two lives with respect to meaning, especially since 
not all lives would be incomparable? One might suspect that Picasso’s life was 
too different from Euclid’s life to be comparable. But why should the “size” of 
the difference matter? And how do we determine size of the difference anyway? 
                                                     
12 See for this type of idea as applied to the better than-relation or the relation of strict preference: Raz 
1985/86, 121; Raz 1986, 325-326, and Chang 1997. 
13 See, e.g., Luce & Raiffa 1957, 23, 25; Sen 1985, 177-181; see also von Neumann & Morgenstern 
1953, 26. 
14 See for the analogue in the case of value relations, e.g., Chang 1997, 25-27 and Chang 2002; Chang 
uses the terms “parity” and “on a par”. 
15 See Broome 1997 for the parallel case of the better than-relation. 
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There do not seem to be answers available to these questions. As long as there 
aren’t convincing answers one should remain skeptical of the idea of meaning 
incomparability (I don’t want to argue so much against this view but rather 
propose and defend an alternative view here).  
The third idea, though apparently more radical than the first one (not only is 
it not true to state certain comparative relations but it is also not false), seems to 
make more sense. There does not seem to be a good reason to think that our 
notion of meaning is so much “spelled out” that it would allow for a verdict 
about comparative meaning in every actual or even possible case. One should 
rather expect the notion of meaning to be somewhat “open” in the sense that its 
criteria of application do not determine a verdict in all possible or even actual 
cases.16 
Some examples and cases from the more recent discussion of personal 
identity, for instance, are so far-fetched that one is tempted to say that our 
ordinary notion of personhood is not “built” for these kinds of cases and does 
not allow for a verdict about personal identity through time.17 Similarly in the 
case of meaning: This notion, one could suspect, is not “built” for applications to 
cases like the Euclid-Picasso case; it would be too much to expect that the 
notion determines a verdict in such cases. For instance, one major problem is 
that one would have to weigh different criteria against each other and the notion 
of meaning might not determine how to do that.18 Indeterminacy, openness and 
vagueness seem ineliminable. However, this third view is compatible with the 
orthodox view that there are exactly three comparative relations; it is just a 
general claim about the semantics of the relevant notions, not a metaphysical 
claim about what relations there are. So, this third view is not in competition 
with the other views.  
As far as substantial ideas concerning comparative relations are concerned, 
this seems to leave us with the second idea, the idea of there being a fourth 
relation of being in the same league. Applied to the example above, we get the 
verdict that even though Picasso’s life and Euclid’s life are not equally 
meaningful and even though it is also not the case that one is more meaningful 
than the other, they are in the same league with each other. The life of “the other 
                                                     
16 See for semantic openness in general, e.g., Waismann 1945, 121-126, and, more recently, Ludlow 
2006. 
17 See, for instance, Parfit 1984, part 3. 
18 See Mawson 2010 who emphasizes this point. 
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painter” could also be in the same league with Euclid’s life – even though 
Picasso’s life and the other painter’s life are not in the same league (in the sense 
of the word as used here: being in the same league with some X rules out 
standing in one of the other comparative relations with X) but the former is more 
meaningful than the latter. The relation of being in the same league is reflexive 
(because every life is exactly as meaningful as itself), symmetric (consider 
Picasso and Euclid) and not transitive (the other painter’s life is in the same 
league with Euclid’s life and Euclid’s life is in the same league with Picasso’s 
life but Picasso’s life is not in the same league with the other painter’s life). The 
set of lives with which a given life is in the same league are “centered” in the 
following sense: Every life has its own set of lives with which it is in the same 
league, and typically some of the other lives in the set have a different such set 
of their own.  
However, there is another and even better way of describing the relation 
between Picasso’s and Euclid’s life. Instead of saying that they are in the same 
league as far as meaning is concerned one could rather say that they are equally 
meaningful. This might seem very puzzling or implausible at first, given the 
remarks above, but this impression changes quickly if one reminds oneself of 
the relativity to varying degrees of granularity (or standards of precision) which 
characterizes at least many judgments of equality.19 
Consider measurements of the length of ordinary objects. It might be true to 
say of two boards for a bookshelf that they are equally long, say, e.g., both 1 
meter long. This is, however, compatible with the one being one millimeter 
longer than the other. There is no contradiction here if (as seems plausible) the 
following is true. When we say of the two boards that they are “equally long” 
we use the term “equally long” with a certain not too fine degree of granularity 
(1 centimeter difference counts but we’re neglecting anything less than half a 
centimeter difference). If we wanted to be pedantic we could indicate the degree 
of granularity db (or the standard of precision sb) and use the term “equally 
longdb” (or “equally longsb”) instead.  
In other judgments of length different degrees and standards are in force. A 
watchmaker might truly say that one replacement piece for a watch is equally 
long as the original piece, namely .3 centimeters. This is compatible with one of 
the pieces being a tenth of a millimeter longer than the other. Again, there is no 
                                                     
19 See, for a related idea and one concerning value relations, Benbaji 2009. 
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contradiction if the watchmaker is using the term “equally long” with a 
somewhat finer but not excessively fine degree of granularity or standard of 
precision (half a millimeter does not count but one millimeter counts). Again, if 
we wanted to be pedantic we could say that the watchmaker is not using the 
above notion of being equally longdb but rather the notion of being equally 
longdw. Judgments of equality show this implicit relativity to varying degrees of 
granularity. The idea of perfect precision does not even seem to make any sense: 
The notion of being equally long, as applied to ordinary objects, loses its sense 
when we go down to the scale of nanometers; at this order of “magnitude” the 
notion of length is not defined anymore for ordinary objects. One might be 
tempted to think that the expression “equally long” thus invites a contextualist 
semantics according to which speakers in different contexts of use might mean 
different things when they use this term, depending on the relevant degree of 
granularity.20 
Something similar happens with our judgments about lives being “equally 
meaningful”. When we compare Euclid’s life with Picasso’s life and judge that 
their lives are equally meaningful we use a very rough degree of granularity. We 
think about them as extraordinarily creative people in general who have made an 
important contribution. However, when we compare Picasso’s life with the other 
painter’s life we do in addition think of them as painters, perhaps even as 
painters of the same period. Our degree of granularity is much finer here. There 
is a hidden relativity to degrees of granularity in our judgments of equality of 
meaning (of lives). Judgments of equality (of meaning), again, might invite a 
contextualist semantics according to which different pairs of lives trigger 
different degrees of granularity for judgments of equality (of meaning). This 
notion of “relative” equality is different from the orthodox notion of “strict” 
equality (see above). Both relations are reflexive and symmetric but strict 
equality is transitive while relative equality isn’t.21 
Insofar as this context-sensitivity and relativity is implicit and thus hidden, 
we can easily get puzzled or even confused when thinking about and comparing 
different lives with each other with respect to meaning, like the lives of Picasso, 
                                                     
20 See, e.g., Stojanovic 2008 for the basic semantic options; see also Benbaji 2009, 325-327; I won’t 
pursue such semantic questions here. 
21 Assume that stick I is 9.5 inches long, stick II 8.8 inches long and stick III 8 inches long. Given a 
relation of being equally longstick with a degree of granularity or precision which does not distinguish 
between differences smaller than 1 inch, we would have to say that I is equally longstick as II and II is 
equally longstick as III but that I is not equally longstick as III (but longerstick than III). 
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Euclid and the other painter. As we go from one comparison (Euclid – Picasso) 
to another (Picasso – the other painter) we change the degree of granularity and 
switch to a more fine grained notion of equality; as we go from the latter 
comparison to the third one (the other painter – Picasso) we return to a rougher 
degree of granularity and a less fine grained notion of granularity. Each such 
notion of equality is reflexive, symmetric and not transitive. However, the 
problem is that we’re using different notions of equality for different 
comparisons of meaning.  
One could argue that the case of being in the same league (see above) 
collapses into the case of equality of a given degree of granularity. If this should 
turn out not to be so and if being in the same league is not the same as being 
equal given a certain degree of granularity, then I would have problems 
understanding what could be meant by “being in the same league”. What makes 
a lot of sense, however, is the granularity-relative notion of equality.  
However, there is a price to pay: Things are in some respects more 
complicated with “relative” equality, as we could call this, than with 
“non-relative” equality. If the degree of granularity for the notion of being 
equally meaningful is rougher (or more fine-grained), then the degree of 
granularity for the notion of being more meaningful is also rougher (or more 
fine-grained). There is then not just one ranking of lives with respect to meaning 
but several which differ as to the degree of granularity. Consider a rougher 
ranking and a finer-grained ranking of lives with respect to meaning. Even if all 
the lives considered should have a definite position in the rougher ranking (e.g., 
Picasso, Euclid, the other painter and some others all equally high up while 
some others have less meaningful lives and still others perhaps even more 
meaningful lives; the position in the ranking would be determined by all the 
relations between the different lives), they might not all have a definite place in 
the more fine-grained ranking. For instance, while Picasso’s life is, according to 
our example, more meaningful than the other painter’s life it is not clear where 
Euclid’s life is located on the finer-grained ranking: above, below or at the side 
of Picasso or the other painter. Some more fine-grained rankings will thus be 
“incomplete” in the sense that for some pairs of lives it will be indeterminate 
whether the one life is more meaningful (given the relevant degree of 
granularity) than the other or equally meaningful (again, given the relevant 
degree of granularity) as the other. There can be an interval of locations on the 
finer-grained ranking but no precise location. Indeterminacy (see above) comes 
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into play here.  
One interesting implication of all this is that even though rankings of lives 
are still possible they will be limited given certain degrees of granularity (or 
standards of precision). The above remarks suggest that there are some uses of 
“more meaningful”, “less meaningful” and “equally meaningful” which do not 
allow for complete ranking of lives. This does, however, not mean that no or 
only very few comparisons of lives with respect to meaning are possible but 
only that there is a certain element of indeterminacy involved here. If one does 
not acknowledge this, one risks falling for misleading and overstretched ideas 
about comparing and ranking lives with respect to meaning. 
All this goes against Metz’ much more “orthodox” views22 according to 
which parts of lives allow for both intra- and interpersonal comparison and 
whole lives for interpersonal comparison. These kinds of comparisons are 
supposed to allow even for some kind of additive aggregation of meaning. 
Given the remarks above, this kind of “measurement” of meaningfulness just 
isn’t possible. I do not see this at all as a reason to reject Metz’ view on meaning 
as a whole; rather one would have to modify it in certain ways in order to take 
into account the element of indeterminacy and the relativity to granularity in our 
judgments about comparative meaningfulness.  
 
3. Non-Transitivity and Collapses of Rankings 
 
If several items have determinate positions on some ranking and if item A is 
higher up on the ranking then item B while item B is higher up on the ranking 
than item C, then item A has to be higher up on that ranking than item C. This is 
due to the transitivity of the relation of being higher up on some ranking. This 
much seems pretty uncontroversial. However, it is not so clear whether we 
should think that lives can be ranked in such a way that there are more 
meaningful lives higher up and less meaningful lives lower down on the ranking. 
This kind of ranking requires transitivity but the crucial question is whether the 
relation of being a more meaningful life (or a less meaningful life) is transitive.23 
Is it? It seems that Metz is committed to a positive answer; I see no hints in his 
                                                     
22 See, again, Metz 2013, 222, 233 and 235; see also 39-40, 63-64, 158, and 236. 
23 For the role of the assumption of transitivity of strict preference or of the better than-relation in 
classical decision theory see Ramsey 1990, 78, 75; von Neumann & Morgenstern 1953, 26; Savage 
1972, 18, 21. 
 42
work to doubts concerning transitivity. 
Consider three lives (more precisely: very partial sketches of three lives) and 
let us make the very plausible assumption that more than one factor contributes 
to the meaning of a life.24 For instance, as one factor to be considered here we 
can choose engagement with personal projects of value.25 As the second factor 
to be considered here we can choose the making of positive contributions to the 
lives of others.26 If one does not agree that these two factors contribute to 
meaning one can easily replace them by others – these kinds of details don’t 
matter here. Metz himself advocates a family resemblance view about the notion 
of a meaningful life and mentions three different aspects of meaning in passing: 
purposiveness, transcendence and esteem.27 
The two factors just mentioned are not completely independent from each 
other and they do often overlap; however, all that is needed here is the realistic 
assumption that one factor cannot be reduced to the other and that they can vary 
against each other. Suppose for example that a chess player has had a life rich of 
engagement with the playing of the wonderful game of chess but that he has not 
made that much of a positive contribution to the lives of others. Compare this 
first chess player’s life with the life of a second chess player who hasn’t gotten 
quite as much out of playing the game as the first chess player but has made 
more of a contribution to the lives of others because he taught little children how 
to play the game. Finally, consider the life of a third chess player who was not as 
engaged with the game as the other two but who started a very successful social 
program in troubled neighborhoods of his home town which would bring the 
game to teenagers and thus keep them off the streets and give them some 
perspective which they would otherwise have lacked. Suppose for the sake of 
the example that this is all that matters to the meaning of these lives.  
It might then well be that the first chess player’s life is more meaningful 
overall than the second chess player’s life: Even though the second had a bit 
                                                     
24 See in general Mawson 2010. 
25 See, e.g., Schlick 1979; Taylor 1981, 1987, 1999, and 2000; Nozick 1981, 610-619; Sylvan & 
Griffin 1982; Bennett 1984; Kekes 1986 and 2000; Wisdom 1987; Teichman 1993; Wolf 1997a, 1997b, 
2007 and 2010; Joske 2000; Schmidtz 2001; Thomson 2003, esp. ch.4; Cottingham 2003; Audi 2005, 
333-334; Levi 2005; Thagard 2010; Metz 2011 and 2013; Smuts 2013; Kauppinnen 2012 and 2013; 
see Wong 2008 on the value of identities; see also in general Wiggins 1987 and Hare 2000. 
26 See, e.g., Cottingham 2003; Audi 2005, 333-334; Kernohan 2006, 135; Wolf 2010; Smuts 2013; on 
whether morality and certain relations towards others are necessary or sufficient for or contributory to 
meaning see: Dahl 1987; Wolf 1997b and 2010; Thomas 2005; Landau 2011; Smuts 2013. 
27 See Metz 2013, 34-35. 
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more of a positive social impact, this is more than compensated for by the richer 
engagement with the game that the first chess player had. Similarly for the 
comparison between the overall meaning in the second chess player’s life and in 
the third chess player’s life: Even though the third player has made more of a 
positive contribution to the lives of others, the second player still got so much 
more out of the game than the third player, – so much more that overall the 
second player’s life would count as more meaningful than the third player’s life. 
But now compare the first chess player’s life with the third chess player’s life. 
The alleged transitivity of being more meaningful would ensure, given our 
assumptions, that the first chess player’s life is also more meaningful overall 
than the third chess player’s life.  
However, there is a significant problem here. It might well be that the 
difference between the contribution to the lives of others that the third player has 
made is not just bigger than the first player’s contribution; apart from that, it 
might also cross a “threshold” such that the difference of contribution between 
the first player’s life and the third player’s life weighs more than some 
“aggregative sum” of the difference of contribution between the first player’s 
life and the second player’s life and the difference of contribution between the 
second player’s life and the third player’s life. When one compares the first with 
the third player, the dimension of the contribution to the lives of others counts so 
much and weighs so heavily that it outweighs the difference between the 
respective quality of their engagement with the game. Hence, under such 
conditions we should judge that the third chess player’s life is more meaningful 
than the first chess player’s life.  
Hence, we have a lack of transitivity for the relation of being a more 
meaningful life overall. This failure of transitivity – which is not the same as 
intransitivity (if life A is more meaningful than life B and life B more 
meaningful than life C, then life A is not more meaningful (or even less 
meaningful) than life C) – can be explained in a formal way. There are two 
independent criteria or factors and at least one of them (here the contribution 
factor) is “non-linear” in the sense that there are thresholds of importance like 
the one mentioned above built into it. Structurally similar phenomena are 
well-known from the area of human preferences.28 I might prefer car B to car A 
because B has some nice extras for a bit (but not too much) more money. 
                                                     
28 See Tversky 1969; Fishburn 1991; the discussion between Hughes 1980, Lee 1984, Philips 1989 
and Rawling 1990 as well as, more recently, Temkin 2012. 
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Similarly, I might prefer car C to car B because C has some further nice extras 
for another additional (but not too substantial) amount of money. However, I 
might not prefer C to A and rather prefer A to C because now the difference in 
price has passed some threshold and outweighs the niceties of the additional 
extras.  
A similar point and argument can be made for the relation (whatever the 
degree of granularity) of being an equally meaningful life overall; I won’t go 
through the parallels here. The overall conclusion here is that both more 
meaningful and equally meaningful fail transitivity. For the sake of simplicity, I 
have focused on the first relation here. Given the complexities of life, it is very 
plausible to assume that non-transitive cycles of lives like in our example above 
are pervasive. It doesn’t happen all the time but often enough to raise serious 
questions about the possibility of ranking lives in terms of their “amount” of 
meaning. Without transitivity there is no ranking. Even though this kind of 
failure of transitivity does not entail incomparability (see above) between any 
two lives, it implies that there cannot be complete determinate rankings of lives 
with respect to their meaning (even given some fixed degree of granularity). In 
other words, even though there can be more “local” (perhaps “regional”) 
comparisons there can be no “global” rankings.  
In his book, Metz gives the following final detailed statement of his theory: 
“(FT3) A human person’s life is more meaningful, the more that she, without 
violating certain moral constraints against degrading sacrifice, employs her 
reason and in ways that either positively orient rationality towards fundamental 
conditions of human existence, or negatively orient it towards what threatens 
them, such that the worse parts of her life cause better parts towards its end by a 
process that makes for a compelling and ideally original life-story: in addition, 
the meaning in a human person’s life is reduced, the more it is negatively 
oriented towards fundamental conditions of human existence or exhibits 
narrative disvalue.”29 
Even this more detailed statement of the theory does not indicate any 
troublesome multi-dimensionality or non-linearity. There is no threat of a lack of 
transitivity and orthodox ideas of measurement and ranking seem secure in the 
case of the meanings of lives (and their parts). However, if the remarks in this 
section are correct, one would have to modify Metz’ view in the relevant ways.  
                                                     
29 Metz 2013, 235. 
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4. Conclusion: How then to Think about the Meaning of Life? 
 
There are thus two basic limitations to the possibility of ranking lives with 
respect to meaning: one from indeterminacy (section 1) and one from failure of 
transitivity (section 2). What are the implications of all this for the way we can 
or should think about the meaning of life?  
It is not ruled out in principle by anything said so far that there could still be 
one maximally meaningful life or one group of lives each of which is more 
meaningful than any life not in that group. However, one should be skeptical of 
such an idea and of the idea that this could be the case. Couldn’t there always be 
indeterminacy or a cycle of non-transitivity even among the most meaningful 
lives? It thus seems like a good idea to give up on the idea of “maximizing 
meaning”. There simply might not be such a thing as a maximum here. Metz, 
however, seems to accept the idea of a maximum, for instance when he talks 
about “the most degree of meaning”.30  
However, if the idea of maximizing meaning is as problematic as I am 
suggesting here, then we should rather take a leaf out of the book of satisficing 
views.31 What matters is whether a given life is meaningful, that is, passes the 
(vague) threshold between meaning and the lack thereof. Enough is enough, and 
also good enough. The idea of getting more and ever more out of life or the idea 
of get the most meaning into and out of it are misleading and seriously 
unrealistic. If acknowledging this makes for modesty, then we are better and best 
off with such modesty.   
Metz points out, again and again, that the notion of a meaningful life is an 
evaluative one.32 Different basic axiological views lead to different views about 
meaning then. I propose to give up on certain ideas implicit or explicit in Metz’ 
account: ideas of strict measurement, unrestricted comparability, additive 
aggregation, and global rankings. But this does not mean that one would have to 
give up on Metz’ account of meaning as a whole. On the contrary, I would 
propose to modify the view in the relevant ways in order to make it even 
stronger.  
 
                                                     
30 Metz 2013, 158. 
31 See in general: Simon 1983; Slote 1989; Schwartz 2004. 
32 Metz 2013, 6, passim. 
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Is Meaning in Life Comparable? 
From the Viewpoint of ‘The Heart of Meaning in Life’ 
Masahiro Morioka* 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to propose a new approach to the question of meaning in life by criticizing 
Thaddeus Metz’s objectivist theory in his book Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study. I propose the 
concept of “the heart of meaning in life,” which alone can answer the question, “Alas, does my life 
like this have any meaning at all?” and I demonstrate that “the heart of meaning in life” cannot be 
compared, in principle, with other people’s meaning in life. The answer to the question of “the heart 
of meaning in life” ought to have two values, yes-or-no, and there is no ambiguous gray zone 
between them. I believe that this concept constitutes the very central content of meaning in life. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In Federico Fellini’s 1954 film, La Strada, the Fool encourages Gelsomina, a 
young female member of a circus troupe who has little talent, little skill, and 
little social value.  
 
THE FOOL: You may not believe it, but everything that exists in the 
world has some purpose. Here . . . take . . . that pebble there, for instance. 
GELSOMINA: Which pebble? 
THE FOOL: Oh . . . this one, any one of them . . . Well . . . even this 
serves some purpose . . . even this little pebble. 
GELSOMINA: And what purpose does it serve? 
THE FOOL: It . . . but how do I know? If I knew, do you know who I’d 
be? 
GELSOMINA: Who? 
THE FOOL: God Almighty who knows everything. When you’re born, 
when you’ll die. Who else could know that? No . . . I don’t know what 
purpose this pebble serves, but it must serve some purpose. Because if it is 
useless, then everything is useless . . . even stars. . . . At least that’s what I 
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think. And even you . . . even you serve some purpose . . . with that 
artichoke head of yours.1 
 
In this sequence, the Fool stresses his idea that everything in the universe 
serves some purpose no matter how useless or worthless it may look, although 
no one can exactly know what purpose it may serve. It is only God that knows it. 
He says, “If it [this pebble] is useless, then everything is useless.”  
I do not believe in God, but the Fool’s words eloquently explain my personal 
sentiment on meaning in life, which is in sharp contrast with Thaddeus Metz’s 
objectivist approach in his book, Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study. In this 
paper, I criticize his objectivist approach to meaning in life and instead propose 
my own argument using the concept of “the heart of meaning in life.” 
 
2. Metz’s Interpretation of Meaning in Life and its Problems 
 
Metz classifies theories of meaning in life into two categories, namely, 
supernaturalism and naturalism. The former is the view that meaning in life 
should be interpreted in relationship to a spiritual realm, and the latter is the 
view that meaning in life can be acquired in a purely physical world.2 The latter, 
naturalism, is further divided into two categories, namely, subjectivism and 
objectivism. Subjectivism is the view that meaning in life can be acquired by 
obtaining the objects of one’s “propositional attitudes,” and objectivism is the 
view that one’s life is meaningful “in itself” at least in part regardless of one’s 
propositional attitudes.3 
Metz defends objectivism. He calls his idea “the fundamentality theory.” The 
basic idea of his fundamentality theory is described as follows. 
 
A human person’s life is more meaningful, the more that she employs her 
reason and in ways that positively orient rationality towards fundamental 
conditions of human existence.4 
 
Metz argues that fundamental conditions of human existence can be interpreted 
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in terms of the good, the true, and the beautiful. For example, Mandela and 
Mother Teresa tried hard to improve devastated people’s fundamental living 
conditions; scientific discoveries by Einstein and Darwin contributed much to 
the progress of fundamental knowledge of humans and the universe; and Picasso 
and Dostoyevsky’s works lead our eyes to the most fundamental layer of the 
world of the beautiful.5 Their lives are all meaningful because they oriented 
their rationality towards fundamental conditions of human existence on the level 
of the good, the true, and the beautiful. 
The final version of his fundamentality theory is as follows. 
 
A human person’s life is more meaningful, the more that she, without 
violating certain moral constraints against degrading sacrifice, employs 
her reason and in ways that either positively orient rationality towards 
fundamental conditions of human existence, or negatively orient it 
towards what threatens them, such as that the worse parts of her life cause 
better parts towards its end by a process that makes for a compelling and 
ideally original life-story; in addition, the meaning in a human person’s 
life is reduced, the more it is negatively oriented towards fundamental 
conditions of human existence or exhibits narrative disvalue.6 
 
This statement is composed of two parts: the part dealing with fundamental 
conditions of human existence and the part dealing with one’s life-story. Metz 
claims, with regard to the former, that the life in which one orients rationality 
towards fundamental conditions of human existence is more meaningful than the 
life in which one does not orient it towards them and, with regard to the latter, 
the life which exhibits narrative value is more meaningful than the life which 
exhibits narrative disvalue. 
Let us see an impressive example that Metz uses in his book. He stresses that 
great meaning is conferred, intuitively, on the lives of Mandela and Mother 
Teresa.  
 
In contrast, their lives would not have been notably important had they 
striven to ensure that everyone’s toenails were regularly trimmed or that 
no one suffered from bad breath, even if these conditions were universally 
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desired (or needed!). Why are the former plausible candidates for 
substantial significance, while the latter are not?7 
 
Here he concludes that the actual lives of Mandela and Mother Teresa are more 
meaningful than the hypothetical lives which are made up solely of trimming 
toenails or preventing bad breath. 
Concerning the life-story, Metz suggests that the lives in which “its bad parts 
cause its later, good parts” by virtue of “personal growth or some other pattern 
that makes for a compelling life-story that is original,” are more meaningful than 
the lives which are solely “repetitive,” “end on a low note,” or “intend to 
replicate another’s whole-life.”8 
One of the most basic presumptions of Metz’s objectivism is that we can 
compare one’s meaning in life with the other, by observing their lives from the 
outside, and can reach the conclusion that one life is more meaningful than the 
other. I have grave doubts about this way of thinking.  
Let us go back to the dialogue in the film La Strada. The central message 
there was that every life has meaning no matter what social value it may have. 
After having seen the film, many viewers would think that the life of Gelsomina, 
which was the continuance of a series of small events and ended in tragedy, was, 
indeed, full of dignity and divinity, comparable to those of sacred religious 
figures. Gelsomina did nothing to orient her rationality towards fundamental 
conditions of human existence, and the tone of her life became dimmer and 
dimmer toward the tragic end point. Hence, according to Metz’s fundamentality 
theory her life should be considered to have very little meaning compared with 
Mandela or Mother Teresa, however, many of us would probably have just the 
opposite impression. For the viewers, Gelsomina is Mandela or Mother Teresa. 
The life of a person of no importance can have equal meaning to the life of a 
distinguished person. Something strange is happening here. We might call it “the 
dialectic of meaning in life.” This, however, is no more than my personal 
impression of the central message of the film. In the following paragraphs I am 
going to translate it into more theoretical language.  
In Metz’s fundamentality theory, “meaning in life” can be interpreted as the 
significance of socially and narratively valuable life. By the words “socially 
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valuable life”9 I mean a life in which one positively orients rationality towards 
fundamental conditions of human existence. According to his final prescription, 
the more social and narrative value a person’s life has, the more her life becomes 
meaningful. 
Let us consider the life of Gelsomina. We can ask, “Is it possible that the life 
of Gelsomina has a great meaning despite the fact that her life was actually one 
without any social or narrative value?,” and answer this question positively. If 
this is correct, Metz’s interpretation of meaning in life in his final prescription 
should be considered to be wrong.  
If we look into the world of literature and religious texts we can easily find 
many stories in which the life of a person without any social or narrative value is 
depicted as having tremendous meaning at the deepest spiritual level. This 
shows that people have never limited meaning in life to a person’s social or 
narrative value, and in some cases they have found great meaning in other 
characteristics such as sincerity, faithfulness, or industriousness. I dare say that 
the life of a person can have grave and utmost meaning even if it is made up of a 
repeated routine of toenail trimming or the prevention of bad breath. 
Let us consider the lives of Mandela or Mother Teresa. Interestingly, it is 
possible to imagine a situation in which they ask themselves, “Is my life 
meaningful despite the fact that my life has been socially and narratively 
valuable to the fullest degree?,” and then they respond negatively to this 
question. For example, it is possible for them to “think” that their lives are 
completely meaningless because they had an experience of telling a lie, only 
once in their life, to their beloved friend, although their lives have been full of 
social and narrative value. This shows that meaning in life is not logically equal 
to social and narrative value (because if they are logically equal it should be that 
it is incorrect to “think” in that way). The important point is that even Mandela 
or Mother Teresa are able to doubt the meaning of their own lives, and those 
who advocate Metz’s theory of meaning in life should “correct” their doubt by 
saying, “Oh, your doubt is wrong. Your life ought to be meaningful according to 
our theory!” 
Even a person whose life fully satisfies Metz’s fundamentality theory is able 
to legitimately doubt the meaningfulness of their own life. Here lies the most 
essential characteristic of the concept of meaning in life.  
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In this section, we have demonstrated that Metz’s fundamentality theory fails 
to grasp the meaningfulness of Gelsomina’s life. In the following sections, I will 
leave Gelsomina’s case and inquiry into a much deeper dimension of meaning in 
life. 
 
3. The Heart of Meaning in Life 
 
First, I would like to explain my understanding of the concept of “meaning 
in life.” When we talk about meaning in life, we do not necessarily or solely talk 
about a person’s social and narrative value. In many cases, our question of 
meaning in life takes a form similar to the following. 
 
Alas, does my life like this have any meaning at all? 
 
I believe that what is asked or lamented in the above question constitutes the 
very central content of meaning in life. I want to call it “the heart of meaning in 
life.” This question emerges from the deep layer of my heart when I notice that 
the solid psychological ground which was supporting the affirmative basis of my 
life has suddenly collapsed or disappeared into nothing. The most important 
point here is that the words “my life” in this question point to the life of oneself, 
that is to say, the life of a person who is now writing this text, or the life of a 
person who is now reading this text. “My life” means the life of myself who is 
now writing this text, and “my life” also means the life of the reader of this text, 
that is to say, the life of “yourself,” my dear reader! You are supposed to pose 
this question, “Alas, does my life like this have any meaning at all?” This is not 
a general question which can be equally applied to anyone. This is the question 
that can only be applied to the life of myself when it is uttered by me, or to the 
life of yourself when it is uttered by you. This can be extended to the life of 
him/herself when the question is uttered by him/her. 
A question about “the heart of meaning in life” is completely different from 
a general question about the meaning in life, such as, “What is meaning in life in 
general?” A question about “the heart of meaning in life” is to be answered, in 
principle, only by the person who uttered it. There is no general answer to a 
question about “the heart of meaning in life” that is equally applied to everyone. 
Furthermore, it is very important to understand the following distinction. 
Generally speaking, we can say that a question about “the heart of meaning in 
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life” can be answered by the person who uttered it, whereas in the case of the 
reader of this text, it is only for your own actual life that you can legitimately 
talk about “the heart of meaning in life.” Only for the life one has actually lived 
and is going to live, can one talk about “the heart of meaning in life” and, in the 
case of the reader, it is for your own life that you can talk about it. Let us keep 
this in mind and delve deeper into this topic. 
Metz often says that the life of Mandela or Mother Teresa has significant 
meaning because they positively oriented their rationality toward fundamental 
conditions of human existence. We have to pay special attention here to the fact 
that Metz does not talk about “the heart of meaning in life” because Metz, 
himself, is neither Mandela nor Mother Teresa, that is to say, he is living the life 
neither of Mandela nor of Mother Teresa. Metz is talking about the meaning in 
life of persons other than himself. Metz can talk about “the heart of meaning in 
life” only when he refers to Metz’s own actual life. This is the logical conclusion 
that is derived from the concept of “the heart of meaning in life.” And we should 
note that throughout his book, Metz never talks about “the heart of meaning in 
life.” From my viewpoint, Metz fails to discuss the most important aspect of 
meaning in life in his academic discussion of this topic. His philosophical 
analysis has not yet reached the layer that I want to make most clear. 
Metz might classify my position under a certain type of subjectivism but I 
think this is wrong because subjectivists, in Metz’s sense, do not also talk about 
“the heart of meaning in life.” According to Metz, subjectivism is the view that 
meaning in life can be acquired by the acquisition of the objects of one’s 
“propositional attitudes.” It is clear that in this kind of subjectivism “we” can 
talk about “his” or “her” meaning in life by referring to their acquisition of the 
objects of their propositional attitudes. However, this is not what “the heart of 
meaning in life” really points to because “the heart of meaning in life” of his or 
her life can only be legitimately talked about by him/herself, not by us. Hence, 
my position is not even subjectivism in Metz’s sense. 
For instance, Metz describes a dominant form of subjectivism as follows. 
 
(S1)  A human person’s life is more meaningful, the more that she 
obtains the objects of her actual pro-attitudes such as desires and goals.10 
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In this sentence Metz talks about someone else’s meaning in life. This shows 
that what Metz is talking about is, by definition, never “the heart of meaning in 
life.”11 Metz discussed subjectivism throughout Chapter Nine, but my position 
in this paper is not dealt with in any pages in that chapter. 
And it is crystal clear that my position is not supernaturalism because I do 
not have any religious belief. Metz’s classification of meaning in life fails to 
catch “the heart of meaning in life” in my sense. 
Of course, it is possible for Mandela or Mother Teresa to utter, “Alas, does 
my life like this have any meaning at all?” In this case, their question is without 
doubt one about “the heart of meaning in life.” However, when we ask “Does 
the life of Mandela or Mother Teresa have any meaning at all?,” we completely 
fail to pose the question about “the heart of meaning in life” for Mandela or 
Mother Teresa.  
It is true that as a result of the accomplishments of Mandela and Mother 
Teresa many people’s fundamental living conditions were dramatically 
improved. In this sense we sometimes say their lives had great meaning and this 
makes sense in our ordinary language. But it is important to know that here “the 
heart of meaning in life” in Mandela or Mother Teresa is never being talked 
about. It is made possible only when they themselves talk about meaning in their 
own actual life. 
In the same vein, I can talk about “the heart of meaning in life” only when I 
talk about the meaning in my own actual life. However, at the same time, my 
judgment on meaning in life will be attained under the strong influence of the 
state of the human relationships that surround me. For example, whether I was 
able to make my friends and/or my family happy would play a crucial role in 
evaluating meaning in my life. Hence, whilst it is only I who can legitimately 
talk about “the heart of meaning in life” in the case of myself, it is human 
relationships and broader contexts surrounding me that strongly assist in 
determining the evaluation of meaning in my life. 
Let us turn our eyes to “my counterfactual life.” Is it possible for me to talk 
about “the heart of meaning in life” in my counterfactual life? For example, it 
makes sense to say, “if I were a billionaire, my life would be tremendously 
meaningful,” but I must say that in this case I fail to talk about “the heart of 
meaning in life.” The reason for this is as follows. 
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As was discussed earlier, “the heart of meaning in life” refers to what is 
asked or lamented in the question, “Alas, does my life like this have any 
meaning at all?” Here we have to pay special attention to the phrase “my life 
like this.” This phrase clearly means “my actual life like this,” not “my 
counterfactual life like that.” Hence, when I talk about “the heart of meaning in 
life” I must be talking about my actual life like this, not my counterfactual life 
like that. When I am talking about meaning in life in my counterfactual life in 
which I am a billionaire, I am not answering the question, “Alas, does my life 
like this have any meaning at all?” because in my actual life I am not a 
billionaire; I am no more than an upper-middle-class college teacher. It is only 
when I talk about my actual life in which I am an upper-middle-class worker 
that I can talk about “the heart of meaning in life” in the life of myself. Of 
course, it makes sense for me to say,“if I were a billionaire, my life would be 
tremendously meaningful,” but in using this sentence I can only mean something 
other than “the heart of meaning in life” that we have been discussing so far. 
Then what about meaning in my life in the past? Is it possible for me to talk 
about “the heart of meaning in life” as of my life one year ago? Before thinking 
about this question, let us examine what the phrase “my life like this” means in a 
strict sense. In this phrase, “this” means my actual life, and my actual life is the 
life I am experiencing here and now which is made possible by the accumulation 
of what I have experienced up until the present. I can talk about “the heart of 
meaning in life” solely in respect of my life of this kind. Hence, it is now clear 
that in the case of my life in the past I cannot talk about “the heart of meaning in 
life” because “my life like this” is not the phrase that denotes a certain 
time-point in life in the past. Of course, it makes sense to say, “if I were the 
person that I was one year ago, my life would be more meaningful than this,” 
but this is not the sentence which stands for “the heart of meaning in life” one 
year ago in my life. According to this line of thought, we can also conclude that 
I cannot talk about “the heart of meaning in life” for my life in the future. 
It might be helpful here to refer to Theo van Willigenburg’s concept of “an 
internalist view on the value of life.” According to van Willigenburg, the 
goodness of life is “in some sense always related to what is, or could be, 
experienced as valuable by the person who is leading that life,” and the 
important thing is “not whether others value these goods, but whether I value 
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them from my perspective.”12 At first sight, his argument looks similar to mine; 
however, he believes that the goodness of a person’s life cannot be determined 
only by that person’s self-judgment. Hence, whilst he uses the term “internalist,” 
he actually supports the idea that the value of one’s life is determined both by 
one’s own internal judgment and by the external facts and/or contexts. He 
concludes that “my internalist position rejects the experience requirement posed 
by experiential subjectivism.”13  His discussion is complicated and twisted 
because he does not clearly distinguish between the concepts of value, goodness, 
and meaning. It seems to me that although the value and goodness of one’s life 
cannot be determined only by one’s inner judgment, with regard to “the heart of 
meaning in life,” it ought to be determined in a purely internalist fashion, that is, 
only by the judgment of the person who is leading that life. 
What I am arguing is not that objective approaches are totally senseless, but 
that although objective approaches can accurately explain some ordinary usages 
of the words “meaning in life,” they can never grasp the layer of “the heart of 
meaning in life” we have discussed so far. 
Metz criticizes “first-person” approaches to meaning in life because most of 
us “are concerned about whether, say, the lives of our spouses and children are 
meaningful, and not merely because the meaning of our own life might depend 
on the meaningfulness of theirs.”14 Of course I understand what he wants to say, 
and I agree with him that in our ordinary life we usually think like that. 
Nevertheless, we have to keep in mind that the “meaningfulness” in Metz’s 
words is something completely different from “the heart of meaning in life” in 
our sense. I can never talk about the meaningfulness of my spouse’s life or my 
children’s lives at the level of “the heart of meaning in life.” 
 
4. “The Heart of Meaning in Life” Cannot Be Compared 
 
An important conclusion is to be derived from the above discussion, that is, 
it is totally impossible to compare “the heart of meaning in life” among people. 
Meaning in life is incomparable at the level of “the heart of meaning in life.” 
First, it is impossible to compare my “meaning in life” with other’s 
“meaning in life” at the level of “the heart of meaning in life.” The reason is 
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simple. It is impossible to talk about “the heart of meaning in life” in the life of 
others, and hence, it is logically impossible to compare it with mine. Metz writes 
in his book that, “For all I know, my life is, so far, more pleasurable than Emily 
Dickinson’s was, but less meaningful than Albert Einstein’s.”15 I understand that 
here he is talking about his version of the objective interpretation of meaning in 
life. If he were talking about “the heart of meaning in life” in my sense, what he 
is talking about would be total nonsense. 
Second, it is impossible to compare someone’s “meaning in life” with 
another’s “meaning in life” at the level of “the heart of meaning in life.” I cannot 
talk about“the heart of meaning in life” in the life of others, hence, it is logically 
impossible to compare them. It is logically impossible for me to compare Metz’s 
“meaning in life” with Einstein’s “meaning in life” at the level of “the heart of 
meaning in life.” It is also logically impossible for me to compare Mandela or 
Mother Teresa’s “meaning in life” with that of an ordinary, mediocre person at 
that level. 
Third, it is impossible to compare “meaning in life” in my actual life with 
“meaning in life” in my counterfactual life at the level of “the heart of meaning 
in life.” The reason for this was explained earlier. This may be one of the 
important points that distinguishes my theory from other subjectivist ones. 
The above discussion shows that “the heart of meaning in life” in my life 
cannot be compared with anything at all. This means that it is impossible to say 
that meaning in my life is greater or lesser than meaning in some other life when 
we are talking about “the heart of meaning in life.” It transcends all 
comparisons. 
This means that it is completely wrong for me to answer the question, “Alas, 
does my life like this have any meaning at all?” in a form such as “my life has a 
greater meaning than such and such” or “my life has a lesser meaning than such 
and such.” The only possible answer will be either “my life has meaning” or 
“my life does not have meaning.” The answer ought to be one of two values, a 
binary yes-or-no, black-or-white, and there is no ambiguous gray zone between 
the above two answers. This may sound counter-intuitive, but if any 
comparisons are to be prohibited at the level of “the heart of meaning in life,” 
this should be the only conclusion to this matter. It exists, or it does not exist. 
There is no third answer between them. What is questioned here is not the 
                                                     
15 Metz, p.63.  
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question of comparison or degree, but the question of existence. We are now in 
the realm of ontology. 
Of course, it sometimes happens to me that I cannot provide this kind of 
yes-or-no answer to the question of “the heart of meaning in life,” but this is not 
a big problem. What I argue here is that if I can actually answer the question, my 
answer will have to take the yes-or-no style. An interesting conclusion derived 
from this is that if I feel that my life has even just a bit meaning, then it means 
my life has complete, fullest meaning at the level of “the heart of meaning in 
life.” If I am thinking a bit like that, fullest meaning has already been endowed 
to me. It is only when I think that my life does not have any meaning at all that I 
am allowed to say that my life does not have meaning. It seems to me that there 
is an interesting asymmetry between the existence and non-existence of meaning 
in life at the level of “the heart of meaning in life.” 
You may think that I am comparing “existence of meaning” and 
“non-existence of meaning” whilst I am arguing that meaning in life cannot be 
compared, and because this is an apparent contradiction, my reasoning is totally 
wrong. I do not necessarily think so. This is closely connected with the 
discussion of anti-natalism. For example, I can say that I exist now, and this 
makes sense, but when I say this I do not necessarily compare my existence with 
my non-existence. It is very hard, or almost impossible, to imagine what it really 
means that I do not exist now. Of course I can “think” about a possible world in 
which I do not exist whilst other things do exist, however, it is impossible to 
“imagine” what that possible world looks like in a strict sense because in that 
possible world the subject, this I, who can perceive that possible world from the 
inside, does not exist at all. In order to compare two possible worlds I must be 
able to imagine what they look like; therefore, it is impossible to compare the 
world in which I exist with the possible world in which I do not exist.16 We 
have to completely distinguish imagining from thinking. 
If this reasoning is correct, then the same thing can hold true in the case of 
meaning in life. When I talk about the existence of meaning in life, I do not 
compare it with the non-existence of meaning in life. No comparison is needed 
in talking about meaning in life at the level of “the heart of meaning in life.” I 
understand that this discussion requires a more sophisticated and detailed 
analysis to be undertaken elsewhere. 
                                                     
16 This is one of the main reasons why David Benatar’s argument is considered to be wrong. See my 
forthcoming paper. 
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It seems to me that to answer “yes” to the question of “the heart of meaning 
in life” is to give affirmation to the whole process of my life up until the present. 
This suggests that “the heart of meaning in life” can be talked about for one’s 
whole life up until the present, not for one’s part life in the past.17 This should 
further lead to “birth affirmation,” saying yes to the fact that I have been born 
into this world. In contrast, to answer “no” to the question is to negate the whole 
process of my life and this will lead to “birth negation,” saying no to the fact 
that I have been born, that is to say, “better never to have been.” Here the 
philosophy of meaning in life gets connected with the philosophy of birth 
affirmation, which I have been inquiring into in recent years.18 
In the previous section I argued that the life of Gelsomina can have a great 
meaning despite the fact that her life was actually one without any social or 
narrative value, and, in some cases, the life of a person can have grave and 
utmost meaning even if it is made up of a repeated routine of toenail trimming 
or bad breath preventing. Metz criticizes this way of thinking. Remember Metz’s 
words: “[T]heir lives would not have been notably important had they striven to 
ensure that everyone’s toenails were regularly trimmed or that no one suffered 
from bad breath, even if these conditions were universally desired (or needed!).” 
Here let us think deeply about the above case from the viewpoint of “the heart of 
meaning in life.” 
First, imagine the life of mine that is made up of a repeated routine of toenail 
trimming or bad breath preventing. You may think that such a life does not have 
any meaning at all. Nevertheless, this is not my actual life. This is my 
counterfactual life. Hence, I can never make a judgment on this kind of 
counterfactual life of mine at the level of “the heart of meaning in life.”  
Second, imagine the life of a third person that is made up of a repeated 
routine of toenail trimming or bad breath preventing. As we discussed earlier, it 
is impossible to talk about other people’s meaning in life at the level of “the 
heart of meaning in life.” The situation is the same as in the first case. I have to 
say Metz’s words above appear to be totally senseless from our viewpoint. 
Third, imagine a case in which a person whose life is made up of a repeated 
routine of toenail trimming or bad breath preventing says that “my life has a 
significant meaning at the level of ‘the heart of meaning in life’.” What should 
                                                     
17 I am going to discuss this topic, by referring to Chapter Three of Metz’s book, in my forthcoming 
paper. 
18 For example, see Morioka (2011). 
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we think of this person’s words? I believe that all we have to do is to accept the 
words as they are and never say that they are right or wrong. We should refrain 
from saying that such a life has lesser meaning than Mandela or Mother Teresa, 
or that such a life does not have much meaning at all. The same thing can be 
said about a person who is no more than just alive and whose life is nothing 
more than that. 
There remains a question on which we have to make a deliberate 
consideration. That is the question of whether the life of those who deeply injure 
others should also be considered, in some cases, to have meaning at the level of 
“the heart of meaning in life.” Let us consider the life of Hitler as an extreme 
example. First, it is possible to imagine a case in which my life is just the same 
as Hitler’s, but this is the case of my counterfactual life and my actual life is 
completely different from it, hence, I cannot talk about meaning in this 
hypothetical case at the level of “the heart of meaning in life.”  
Second, then, what about my actual life? I have to say that in my actual life I 
have injured and afflicted many people, and even now I might be letting 
someone suffer from what I am doing to him/her. In such a life of mine, can I 
say that my life has meaning at the level of “the heart of meaning in life” in spite 
of the above fact? It is extremely difficult to draw a definite conclusion for this 
case, but I believe that I am able to answer yes to this question. This is made 
possible only when I sincerely review the injury and suffering I have done to 
others, and only when I think deeply about how I am going to rework my 
relationship with them, and only when I think deeply about how I am going to 
make relationships with others whom I encounter in the future. 
Third, what if someone like Hitler says that his life is full of meaning at the 
level of “the heart of meaning in life”? He would say that what he has done to 
people has significant meaning because he has successfully flourished in a way 
of life which no one other than him can ever accomplish in human history, and 
hence, even if what he has done to people has been nothing but a series of grave 
injuries and suffering, his life should be considered to have significant meaning 
at the level of “the heart of meaning in life.” Many people would feel disgusted 
and nauseated hearing his words, and, emotionally speaking, I too feel like 
giving him a slap on the cheek. However, interestingly, if he is talking about his 
own “heart of meaning in life, there are no mistakes in the use of the words 
“meaning in life” in his argument. Hence, no matter how hard it is for us to 
accept his words, all we have to do is to accept them as they are, and we have to 
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refrain from affirming or negating his argument on meaning in life. If we 
criticize him and say, “your life has no meaning at all,” these words should be 
considered totally wrong as long as they are said about “the heart of meaning in 
life.” We have to keep in mind that here lies the true uniqueness of the concept 
of “the heart of meaning in life.” 
Following that, we have to criticize him and argue that his whole life is 
ethically wrong and is never ethically justified. We have to say to him that a life 
of afflicting a great number of people should be ethically negated and should 
never again happen in this world. Although “the heart of meaning in life” and 
“goodness or evilness of life” are interconnected, the level of “meaning” and the 
level of “goodness/badness” should be clearly separated from each other in their 
ontological status. With regard to others’ lives, we cannot make a judgment on 
the former, but we can do it on the latter. 
Then, if there is a recreational drug user/addict whose life has never been 
improved, and he has never tried to improve the fundamental conditions in our 
society, but is fully satisfied with his life from the bottom of his heart, can we 
say that his life has meaning? From a common sense view, we would say that 
such a life does not have much meaning, but strictly speaking, if he himself 
believes that his life is full of meaning at the level of “the heart of meaning in 
life,” we cannot affirm or negate his words and all we have to do is just accept 
his opinion about his meaning in life as it is stated. Of course I will never 
recommend such a life to others and I will argue that one’s life free from such 
drug addiction would be by far the better life. Nevertheless, at the level of “the 
heart of meaning in life,” I dare say that we ought to refrain from judging the 
meaning in life of others from the outside and just accept their words as they are. 
Let us go back to Gelsomina’s case. We pointed out that whilst most of us 
would find meaning in Gelsomina’s life, Metz’s fundamentality theory cannot 
find so much meaning in her life because she did not try to orient her rationality 
towards fundamental conditions of human existence.  
Then, what does the theory of “the heart of meaning in life” say about 
Gelsomina’s life? The answer is already clear. At the level of “the heart of 
meaning in life,” we cannot talk about the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of 
Gelsomina’s life, nor can we compare it with that of another person’s life. What 
Gelsomina did was just to live her “miserable” life honestly and sincerely. The 
meaning of Gelsomina’s life transcends all of us at the level of its heart. 
In this paper I have demonstrated that there exists “the heart of meaning in 
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life,” a layer that cannot be compared with anything, in the layers of the question 
of meaning in life. I believe that this layer constitutes the very central content of 
meaning in life because the question of meaning in life becomes a most pure and 
painful one, not when it is posed in an objective form, but when it is posed and 
directed toward your own actual, irreplaceable life. 
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Agreement and Sympathy 
On Metz’s Meaning in Life 
Sho Yamaguchi* 
 
Abstract 
In this paper I argue that we can appreciate the real worth of Thaddeus Metz’s recent book Meaning 
in Life just by regarding it as the product of his existential struggle in our endless quest for life’s 
meaning. In other words, we could not understand in what respect Metz’s work is valuable if we 
read it from the purely analytical-theoretical perspective. My paper is, therefore, meant to challenge 
the idea of ‘analytic study on meaningfulness’. My general suggestion is that the analytic 
philosophers should go beyond their narrow theoretical concerns when they tackle the philosophical 
problem about life’s meaning, because, I argue, what fundamentally matters in our perennial 
conversation on life’s meaning is, not our universal agreement about the view on the condition for a 
life’s being meaningful, but rather our mutual encouragement in devoting our lives to various 
meaningful activities. I suggest, particularly, that Metz’s philosophical investigation is in fact 
piloted by his deep practical-existential concern to make his own life meaningful, and so we should 
not be preoccupied with his overt theoretical interests when we read the book in question. We 
should rather pay a significant amount of attention to how much the author cares about his own 
life’s meaning in dedicating himself to the philosophical study on meaningfulness, because we 
would thereby be in a position to say that the real worth of Metz’s study should consist in 
encouraging and enabling us to cherish a hope for making our own lives more meaningful by 
undertaking the philosophical search for life’s meaning. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
One of my general suggestions is that there are at least two ways to read an 
analytic philosopher’s theoretical writings about the issue of meaningfulness. 
One of them, schematically, can be dubbed ‘the way of reading from the 
detached standpoint’ and the other ‘the way of reading from a fellow’s 
standpoint’. They differ from each other in important respects, as we will see 
later. I would like to suggest, therefore, that it is a significant matter to decide in 
which way we should read Thaddeus Metz’s analytic-philosophical study, 
Meaning in Life.  
Among the goals of this paper is to develop the point of what is quite 
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roughly presented in the last paragraph. Anticipating what I’m going to argue, I 
would say here that we cannot appreciate the so-called ‘real worth’ of Metz’s 
book if we take it for a work of the purely theoretical kind and evaluate it 
according to a quasi-scientific or quasi-mathematical standard. We can really 
appreciate its worth, rather, just by regarding it as the product of his existential 
struggle in our endless quest for life’s meaning. This is what I suggest. However, 
how can I suggest that? Or, more fundamentally, what does my suggestion 
mean? I will answer these questions step by step. 
Before proceeding into the main subject, I should explain in what respect my 
suggestion is significant. At the opening stage of Meaning in Life, Metz 
manifests that the aim of his study is to find the best theory which explains 
under what condition a life would be meaningful, as we will see soon. In reading 
the book in question, therefore, we understandably tend to focus on theoretical 
points, e.g., about whether the proposed theory is adequately justified. I do not 
want to say that such theoretical issues are trifle. However, if what I am going to 
suggest is right, those points turn out to be subsidiary in the sense that there 
exists a more important matter which is essential to grasp how valuable Metz’s 
work is. One of the consequences from my suggestion is, then, that in order to 
get some crucial point of the book in question we must go beyond the purely 
theoretical concerns although these follow the natural reaction to the impartial, 
specialized style of writing Metz has adopted in his study. 
The general purpose of this paper is to develop my idea about what kind of 
concerns we should have when we tackle the philosophical problems about the 
meaning of life. I will argue that there is a certain distortion within Metz’s 
concern guiding his thinking in the book in question. I remark, however, that my 
intention is not to blame the author for lacking a right kind of interests. I will, 
rather, finally show that a hiding type of concern piloting Metz’s intellectual 
journey gives his work the essential depth without which it would be crucially 
shallow and unattractive. 
The main part of this paper is divided into three sections. In Section 2, I 
explain how I read Meaning in Life. I thereby introduce what I think to be the 
central points of the book in question to the readers of this paper. In Section 3, I 
criticize Metz’s theoretical position for suffering from a fatal fault. In Section 4, 
I nevertheless suggest that his book has a certain excellence, which I would like 
to name ‘value for the fellow-seekers of the meaning of life’. 
 
 68
 
2. Argumentation, Method, and Theory in Meaning in Life 
 
In this section, by referring to the relevant passages of Meaning in Life, I 
will introduce Metz’s theory of meaningfulness and explain how he argues for it. 
To do so, I will shed special light on the author’s method according to which he 
seeks the best theory of life’s meaning, because we would thereby be in a 
position to understand accurately in what respect his investigation is problematic, 
as we will see in Section 3.  
In what follows, I firstly outline Metz’s argumentation towards the theory 
which he thinks would best explain the condition of life’s meaning, and 
secondly explain what sort of a theory he has finally reached. I remark that my 
discourse in this section is meant to devote itself to the objective kind of 
presentation of Metz’s view in the sense that I try to concentrate just on 
describing what the author suggests and postpone the critical scrutiny about it 
till the next section. 
 
2.1 
 
The silhouette of Metz’s argumentation is simple and distinct. He divides the 
extant views about meaningfulness into three mutually excluded types, i.e., 
supernaturalism, subjectivism, and objectivism, while the latter two are subtypes 
of naturalism; he then searches for the best theory of the topics in question by 
considering the merits and demerits of each of the three rival views; and he 
finally judges a particular theory of the objectivist kind to be “the most 
defensible, given the current state of the academic literature.”1 
Before going into the details, we must look through the definitions of terms. 
In the author’s terminology, supernaturalism claims that “one’s existence is 
significant just insofar as one has a certain relation with some spiritual realm,” 
and naturalism denies it; among the naturalist theories, the subjectivist ones are 
positions “that meaningful conditions vary, depending on the subject,” while the 
objectivist ones are “that certain features of our natural lives can make them 
meaningful, but not merely by virtue of a positive attitude toward them.”2 
                                                     
1 Metz (2013), p.2. All the citations in this paper are from Thaddeus Metz, Meaning in Life, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013. I refer to it by ‘Metz 2013’. 
2 Metz (2013), pp.20-21. 
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Given these definitions, Metz suggests that naturalism is more plausible than 
supernaturalism, by arguing, e.g., that someone’s life can be meaningful without 
anything supernatural.3 In addition, he suggests that, among the naturalistic 
views, objectivism is more appealing than subjectivism, by denying that any 
subjective factor is essential for making one’s life meaningful. Less abstractly, it 
would not be the case that the subjective factor of a person’s being mentally 
attracted to the activities in her life is either sufficient or necessary for her life’s 
being meaningful. 4  Besides, he rejects several particular theories of the 
objectivist type, e.g., the ‘attractiveness’ theory and the utilitarian theory, by 
claiming that each of them has some fault which had better be corrected.5 
Finally, by arguing that his so-called “fundamentality theory,” i.e., an objectivist 
theory which supposes a person’s employing his rationality toward the positive 
enhancement and maintenance of fundamental conditions for human existence 
to be relevant to his life’s being meaningful, would accommodate all the 
desiderata for an adequate theory of meaning in life, he concludes that “the 
fundamentality theory is more justified than its closest rivals and that the theory 
warrants systematic attempts to make it less vague, more clearly defensible, and 
more wide-ranging in its application.”6 
Now, I am going to step into the more detailed points, as far as necessary for 
my consideration in the following sections. Anyone who just read the last 
paragraph, probably, should be interested in, e.g., how Metz argues that 
someone’s life can be meaningful without anything supernatural. This is one of 
the issues essentially relevant to the question of whether the author’s concluding 
suggestion is adequately justified, because, quite roughly, the structure of his 
argumentation requires that, if the precedent rejection of supernaturalism fails, 
then the justificatory procedure toward the fundamentality theory breaks off 
halfway. I remark that there are at least three crucial steps for reaching the 
book’s goal, i.e., steps of (1) rejecting supernaturalism, (2) rejecting 
subjectivism, and (3) rejecting rival theories of the objectivist type. If we are 
theoretically concerned about if Metz has justifiably supported his view, we 
should – metaphorically speaking – check whether he has succeeded in running 
up all the steps (1) to (3) or fallen down at some of them. 
                                                     
3 Metz (2013), pp.142-146. 
4 Metz (2013), pp.175, 183-184. 
5 Metz (2013), ch.10 and ch.11. 
6 Metz (2013), p.239. 
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I am going to introduce the way in which Metz rebuts subjectivism (or 
exactly some simple type of subjectivism), because to do so will enable us to 
conceive his general method, which he follows in constructing several important 
arguments in his book. I will, in the next section, critically consider how this 
method works and suggest that it doesn’t contribute to any ‘objective’ judgment 
about whether a given theory is universally acceptable. 
Metz’s method may be named by the ‘method of intuition’, because it 
appeals to something called ‘intuition’ in the analytic philosophical literature.7 
Let us see its application, to begin with. 
According to the author, as already mentioned, any subjective factor in itself 
is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for a life’s being meaningful. For 
the insufficiency, Metz argues that we would otherwise have numerous 
problematic cases. In fact, if, e.g., a person’s fulfilling her desire of a certain 
kind was sufficient for her life’s being meaningful, then the lives of persons who 
wholeheartedly desire to, and actually devote themselves to, harm others, 
maintain 3,732 hairs on her head, memorize the dictionary, try to make flowers 
sing, etc… could be meaningful. Metz says, however, that these consequences 
should be “seriously counterintuitive implications” of subjectivism.8 In other 
words, he takes it as unacceptable that one’s life could be made meaningful, e.g., 
just by fulfilling one’s desire to harm others. 
For the un-necessity of subjective factors also, by referring to something he 
calls ‘intuition’, Metz develops the following argument. 
 
Consider as well the case of a Mother Teresa who is in stereotypical 
fashion, doing all she can to alleviate serious pain and heal grave injuries 
and illness. […] Suppose that she loved neither the people she helped nor 
the activity of helping them, that she was not inspired by her work, but 
instead did it out of fear that she would face eternal damnation for not 
doing it, that for large period she wondered whether human beings were 
really worth all the trouble, etc. Even so, my intuition is that she would 
have acquired some meaning in her life simply by virtue of having 
substantially helped so many needy people.9 
 
                                                     
7 For the author’s own explanation of his method, cf. Metz (2013), p.8. 
8 Metz (2013), p.175, italics added. 
9 Metz (2013), pp.183-184, italics added. 
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This Mother Teresa, ex hypothesi, does not hold any pro-attitude toward those 
activities which occupy her lifetime to a large amount. According to Metz, 
however, his intuition tells that her life would be nevertheless meaningful just in 
virtue of those assisting labors. Ergo, he concludes, subjectivism should have a 
counter-example in respect to its claim that a pro-attitude be necessary for life’s 
meaning. 
What I think we ought to note about these arguments is, abstractly, that the 
so-called intuitions have an important kind of priority over theories or principles. 
The author himself is aware of this point. In fact, he says that 
 
[o]ften my premises include what I, with the field, call an ‘intuition’, that 
is, a judgment of a particular instance of what does or does not confer 
meaning on life, which judgment is purportedly less controversial than 
the general principle that is being evaluated in light of it.10 
 
In other words, intuitions about particular cases come first, and then we search 
for a theory or general principle that accommodates them. I remark that many 
arguments in Meaning in Life, explicitly or implicitly, follow this 
methodological order. E.g., as an argument against the supernaturalist theories, 
he develops the following discourse. 
 
Imagine that only the physical universe, at best known by the scientific 
method, exists. Now consider whether certain lives could be on balance 
meaningful, say, those repeatedly invoked here, such as Einstein, Darwin, 
Dostoyevsky, Picasso, Mandela, and Mother Teresa. Many will respond 
that they would find these lives to be meaningful in the absence of 
anything perfect or supernatural.11 
 
I suggest that the author here implicitly appeals to the thing he calls ‘intuition’. 
It’s a given premise, e.g., that the actual Mandela’s life is meaningful in virtue of 
his moral activities, independently of any external extra-conditions. Therefore – 
Metz concludes – supernaturalism, which doesn’t accommodate this premise, 
would be insufficient for an adequate theory of meaningfulness. 
 
                                                     
10 Metz (2013), p.8. 
11 Metz (2013), p.114. 
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2.2 
 
By having grasped Metz’s general method in Meaning in Life, we are now in 
position to understand the motivational profile of his inquiry in that book. As we 
have seen, Metz searches for an adequate theory of meaningfulness, which best 
covers our intuitive judgments about whether given particular lives are 
meaningful or not. If I cite his own words, Metz searches for “a general 
principle that entails, and provides a convincing explanation of, the many 
particular ways in which life can be meaningful.”12 Why, however, does he do 
so? Why does he suppose it significant to search for such a theory about 
meaningfulness? 
Though there is no direct answer to this question found in the book in 
question, there are relevant words. Noting that “[o]ne could seek to answer the 
question of what constitute meaning in life by presenting a list of specific ways 
to do so,” Metz says that 
 
[t]he philosophical mind, or at least one major sort of it, seeks more than 
a list because it seeks order, roughly explanatory unity, amongst diversity. 
It naturally asks this of a list of meaningful conditions: is there 
something that all the elements on the list have in common? An answer 
to this question is what I often call a ‘theory’ or ‘principle’ of meaning in 
life.13 
 
This means that, in order to understand the conditions of life’s meaning at the 
philosophical level, one ought not to be content with a list of miscellaneous 
cases but ought to search for a/the explanation unifying them. I suggest that we 
should agree with Metz about the point that just enumeration of specific cases 
never contributes to deepening our understanding of the matter. In short, a list 
cannot reach philosophical understanding. Therefore, we philosophers need 
something more than a list. And, according to Metz, what we need is a theory 
which unifies the particular items. 
I note that this motivational profile of Metz’s inquiry carries with it a 
presupposition orienting it toward a certain direction. In fact – as the last two 
                                                     
12 Metz (2013), p.7. 
13 Metz (2013), pp.6-7. 
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citations suggest too – his investigation starts from the factual judgment that 
there actually exist many ways in which lives can be meaningful. Concretely, 
Metz repeatedly takes several actual human lives, i.e., Mandela’s, Mother 
Teresa’s, Einstein’s, Darwin’s, Picasso’s and Dostoyevsky’s, for typical 
instances of lives with great meaning.14 In brief, according to Metz, we would 
already have a certain list enumerating particular items (while this does not 
mean that we have known exactly what is recorded in it). What Metz aims at in 
that book, thus, would be to find an inclusive principle which would 
accommodate all the (or sufficiently many) items mentioned in that list he think 
we have. 
Motivated by the wish for attaining such unifying explication, Metz 
considers which type of a theory, among those three rivals, i.e., supernaturalism, 
subjectivism, and objectivism, would inclusively explain the particular cases of 
meaningful lives. He thereby specifies several “desiderata for an attractive 
theory” of meaningfulness.15 If I cite some of them, e.g., Desideratum #1 claims 
that “an attractive theory of meaning in life ought to account for the respect in 
which supernatural conditions could add meaning, even if they are not necessary 
for it,” and #5 that that theory “ought to account for the intuition that certain 
kinds of particularly degrading behaviour undercut the meaning-conferring 
power of the good consequences that they bring about.” Metz then argues that 
the fundamentality theory, i.e., the theory which has the following statement 
(FT1) as its core idea, satisfies all the desiderata he specifies. 
 
(FT1) A human person’s life is more meaningful, the more that she 
employs her reason and in ways that positively orient rationality towards 
fundamental conditions of human existence.16 
 
Since this paper is not meant to consider whether the fundamentality theory is 
true or not (it is rather going to focus on the author’s way of consideration), we 
do not need to step into the detailed points, e.g., whether it really satisfies each 
desideratum. I just quickly explain Metz’s own understanding about how the 
theory in question works.  
Metz says, “intuitively, great meaning was conferred on Mandela’s life by 
                                                     
14 Metz (2013), pp.4-5. 
15 Metz (2013), pp.220-222. 
16 Metz (2013), p.222. 
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virtue of having sacrificed so much to overcome apartheid and on Mother 
Teresa’s life by virtue of having acted so compassionately with respect to large 
number of people in wretched conditions” and the fundamentality theory, he 
suggests, appropriately explains why it’s the case. The point is that both 
Mandela’s political activities and Mother Teresa’s medical assistances would be 
of the moral form of using one’s rationality for obtaining and maintaining the 
condition under which human beings can live as human. Metz’s idea is, in brief, 
that devoting oneself to this kind of use of rationality or akin makes one’s life 
meaningful. In addition, quite roughly, the fundamental conditions under which 
we can live as human beings, in contrast to mere animals, have an essential 
relationship not only with the moral, but also with the alethic or epistemic and 
with the esthetic. Therefore – while I omit detailed explanations – the 
fundamentality theory would nicely explain why Einstein’s, Darwin’s, Picasso’s 
and Dostoyevsky’s lives are each meaningful. 
I would like to suggest that Metz’s idea, i.e., the idea that the lives 
promoting the fundamental human condition are typically meaningful, is very 
understandable, because we sometimes think that Mandela, Mother Teresa, 
Einstein, Picasso, or other great women and men, lived more meaningful lives 
(in some sense) than ordinary persons. 17  I’d like to say that Metz’s 
fundamentality theory would adequately explain and accommodate this type of 
thought. 
 
3. Critical Scrutiny of Meaning in Life 
 
In this section, I will consider whether Metz’s work is successful at the 
theoretical level, so to speak. More concretely, I will scrutinize whether the 
author has successfully reached his theoretical goal of finding a/the adequate 
theory which would inclusively explain the particular cases of meaningful lives. 
In what follows, I firstly suggest that, if what Metz seeks is a universally 
acceptable theory of meaningfulness in the sense that it describes an 
exception-free law which holds for everyone’s life (at least in Western culture), 
then he isn’t on the right track to hit it, because, as I will argue, what I called 
‘method of intuition’ in the last section does not fit that aim at all. I secondly 
                                                     
17 I remark, at the same time, that we also sometimes think that the ordinary persons live meaningful 
lives as well as Mandela, Mother Teresa, Einstein, Picasso, or other great women and men. A related 
issue I will touch in Section 3 and 4. 
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claim that, if we take Metz’s book for a work of the purely theoretical kind, we 
will find more faults in it than merits. I would thereby suggest that, if we want to 
appreciate the ‘real worth’ of Metz’s inquiry, we ought not to regard it as a 
detached study of the theoretical type. 
 
3.1 
 
What, to begin with, does Metz mean by the term ‘theory’? As mentioned 
above, his ‘theory’ means the thing that would answer the question “Is there 
something that all the elements on the list have in common?” (where the list here 
enumerates the particular ways in which lives can be meaningful). If we rigidly 
interpret the quantifier ‘all’ in this interrogative sentence, the theory Metz 
intends to seek should be of the universal kind in the sense that it would explain 
every case of a life’s being meaningful without any exception. Or, even if we 
take the word ‘all’ for exaggerated, the theory intended there should 
accommodate at least sufficiently many cases of them. 
How, then, can we attain such a universal theory in respect to the issue of 
meaningfulness? What I am going to consider is whether Metz is on the right 
track to seek it. My answer is negative, because his way of inquiry which relies 
on something called ‘intuition’ would, I argue, not reach any universal theory. 
Let us return to Metz’s argument against subjectivism. To reject this view, he 
argues that a certain theory of the subjectivist kind would have a 
counter-intuitive implication that several types of lives, i.e., lives of persons 
devoting themselves just to harming others, maintaining 3,732 hairs on their 
head, memorizing the dictionary, trying to make flowers sing, etc… could be 
meaningful under a certain condition. I remark that, in developing this way of 
argument, Metz has committed to the intuitive judgment that such types of lives, 
e.g., lives just harming others, cannot be meaningful in virtue of any subjective 
factor. Now, I should ask how this kind of judgment could work as a warrant for 
finding a universal theory of meaningfulness. 
I would firstly say, abstractly, that anyone who relies on an intuition in her 
argumentation would finally shoot at her own foot. Less abstractly, if someone 
takes a certain kind of intuitive judgments for the foothold of his argumentation, 
then his discourse will inevitably suffer from criticisms based on other intuitive 
judgments of the same kind. How, in fact, does Metz respond to an opponent 
who says it’s intuitively true that lives of persons just harming others can be 
 76
meaningful if they feel fulfilled about that way of living? Clearly, he cannot turn 
down this opposition by saying that it be counter-intuitive, because he then 
would fall into begging the question about which judgment is intuitive. 
Generally speaking, any argument grounded on some intuitive judgments finally 
backfires in the sense that its alleged adequacy will be rejected by another 
argument of the same type. Therefore, Metz’s anti-subjectivist argument, which 
relies on several intuitive judgments in an important respect, fails to achieve its 
goal. 
My suggestion is, in short, that there is an essential tension between relying 
on intuitive judgments and seeking a universal theory. The reason why I suggest 
this is because the typical usage of the term ‘intuition’ pragmatically 
presupposes a relevant kind of diversity and conflict (in contrast to universal 
agreement or unanimity). As a matter of fact, in the context where we have no 
conflict of opinions, we need not use the words ‘intuition’, ‘intuitive’ and 
‘intuitively’ (e.g., in the context of axiomatizing elementary arithmetic, nobody 
needs to say that 1 + 1 = 2 is intuitively true, because all the participants have 
agreed about which mathematical statements are to be taken for true). Contrarily, 
it is typically in a context where a debater cannot find any firm ground to argue 
for his view that he would desperately allege that it be intuitively undeniable. 
Thus, I argue, the fact that Metz uses the word ‘counterintuitive’ in considering 
whether a given life is meaningful can be diagnosed as a symptom of his 
implicit commitment to the supposition that there exists a conflict of opinions 
about which particular lives are meaningful. Above all, Metz’s intuitive 
judgment that the lives just harming others cannot be meaningful in terms of any 
subjective factor should entail his implicit concession that someone would 
differently judge this matter.  
Now, if I am right about this point, I should say that Metz’s way of seeking a 
universal theory is significantly incoherent. Why, however, can I say so? It’s 
because it will emerge that his ‘universal theory’ is neither universal nor a theory 
in an important sense. What, then, is this sense? 
Let us return again to Metz’s intuitive judgments of meaningless lives. Metz 
suggests that, intuitively, the lives of persons devoting themselves just to 
harming others, maintaining 3,732 hairs on her head, memorizing the dictionary, 
etc… cannot be meaningful in terms of anything subjective. But, Metz has 
thereby admitted that there is someone who disagrees with him about this point, 
as explained in the last paragraph. What, then, follows? We are now in a position 
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to say that Metz’s theory, i.e., that objectivist theory which he has reached 
through his long-term consideration, would explain at most the particular cases 
of lives he (not everyone!) judges to be meaningful. Metz’s theory, shortly, only 
explains his special intuition. This, I claim, is a fatal limitation to his theoretical 
inquiry, because, if the explicanda of an investigation was restricted to a 
particular person’s intuitive judgments (and at most their derivatives), then the 
explicans would not deserve the name of ‘theory’, however inclusively it 
explicated the matter in question. In short, a ‘theory’ which only explains an 
individual’s intuition should be short of genuine theory. 
Let me summarize. I’d like to say that, so far as Metz relies on intuitive 
judgments about what types of lives are meaningful, he can never reach a 
universal theory of meaningfulness which would be ideally accepted by 
everyone. He should, therefore, have found some firm ground other than the 
thing called ‘intuition’. His method of intuition is, in short, inadequate for his 
aim. 
 
3.2 
 
Are there, then, any other grounds (i.e., other than intuition) for determining 
whether the lives of persons, e.g., just harming others can be meaningful in 
virtue of something subjective? To consider this point will enable us to 
understand what is wrong with seeking a theory in respect to the issue of 
meaningfulness, as explained in the next section. In this subsection, I will show 
that Metz’s concern guiding his thinking in the book in question is distorted in 
an important sense. I will finally suggest that, at the theoretical level, his work 
suffers from a crucial defect. 
Now, do we have any ground other than intuition for determining whether a 
given life be meaningful? We have no objective ground, I respond, in the sense 
that it would determine the matter in question independently of anyone’s concern 
(the italicized proviso is important). In fact, whether a given life is meaningful is 
a matter just so far as we are concerned about the matter.18 This means that the 
conflict between our judgments about whether a certain life is meaningful is 
hardly resolved. Let us consider the following example. Suppose that, according 
to his deep concern, some person judges the lives of those who aim at making 
                                                     
18 The pronoun ‘we’ here refers to the persons who actually or possibly care about meaningfulness. 
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their society better and devote themselves to certain public activities live to be 
more meaningful than of those who aim at fulfilling their own desire and pursue 
certain private interests. Suppose, in addition, that, according to her equally deep 
concern, another person judges quite conversely. In this case, we cannot decide 
which judgment is objectively right, because there is no firm criterion to 
determine it outside our concerns. 
To enlarge this point, recall Metz’s consideration about the reluctant Mother 
Teresa, who does not hold any pro-attitude toward her activities when she 
devotes herself to helping others. Metz says that, according to his intuition, this 
Mother Teresa “would have acquired some meaning in her life simply by virtue 
of having substantially helped so many needy people.”19 Now I’m going to 
argue that, if we take his proper concern into consideration, then we will clearly 
understand why he would say so. My suggestion will be, in short, that the 
author’s judgment about whether the reluctant Mother Teresa’s life be 
meaningful is essentially determined by his own concern. Another person who 
has a different concern could, therefore, judge in the opposite way. 
What is, then, Metz’s ultimate concern in Meaning in Life? I suggest that it 
is the concern for developing a theory according to which a person’s life would 
gain its meaning in virtue of using her rationality for obtaining and maintaining 
the condition under which human beings can live as human beings.20 This is 
why he positively judges that the reluctant Mother Teresa’s life is meaningful, 
because her medical activities really promote some of the human fundamental 
conditions. I should claim, however, that some person with a different concern, 
e.g., a social activist who has a concern for making a society where anyone can 
do what she really wants, would say that, so far as that Mother Teresa is 
reluctantly engaged in her activities, her life has not gained its real meaning. In 
this sense, I suggest, a person’s judgment about a certain life’s meaning is 
significantly relative to his particular concern. 
What has turned out through this consideration? What I think we ought to 
note is that we could reasonably wish to attain a ‘universal’ theory of 
meaningfulness which would be accepted by everyone, only if we were 
optimists about whether our concerns ultimately coincide with each other. As a 
matter of fact, however, we have a variety of concerns. Our philosophical 
                                                     
19 Metz (2013), p.184. 
20 My suggestion can be warranted by the fact that Metz has taken, so repeatedly in his book, Mandela, 
Mother Teresa, Einstein, Picasso, etc… for exemplary figures who meaningfully lived. 
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consideration on the issue of life’s meaning, therefore, ought to start by 
admitting a hardly reconcilable diversity of our judgment about meaningfulness. 
In other words, when one talks and thinks about life’s meaning, it’s reasonable 
to suppose that, in respect to the question whether a given life (e.g., the reluctant 
Mother Teresa’s life) is meaningful or not, there exist a variety of equally 
understandable answers. These answers won’t converge into the unique solution 
so far as our concerns are various. 
Another point we ought to note is that any discourse on meaningfulness is 
guided by a certain particular concern. This point would entail that Metz’s 
concern for constructing a theory in respect of the issue of meaningfulness is 
distorted in an important sense. If, in fact, someone intends to construct a theory 
which would explain the condition for a life’s being meaningful, she ought to 
prohibit her personal interest from giving any special orientation to her 
discourse. Metz’s consideration in Meaning in Life is, however, essentially 
guided by his special interest according to which he judges, e.g., Mandela’s life 
to be more meaningful than an exclusively self-interested person’s. Note that 
this interest is not universal, because someone can understandably have a 
concern for claiming that any self-interested person, or even any harmfully 
malicious person, lives a sufficiently meaningful life.21 I thus suggest that Metz, 
who aims at constructing a theory but does not hinder his particular interest from 
intervening in his argumentation, falls into the distortion of concern, as it were. 
His thinking, which depends on the special guidance of his concern, would 
never reach any universal theory of the intended kind. 
I would finally say that, at the theoretical level, we should find more faults 
in Metz’s work than merits. In the last section, I remarked that his argumentation 
had at least three crucial steps for reaching its goal, i.e., those steps of (1) 
rejecting supernaturalism, (2) rejecting subjectivism, and (3) rejecting rival 
theories of the objectivist type. As to each step, however, there exists some 
opposition to which the author cannot adequately respond. Suppose, e.g., that 
someone says to Metz, “I really understand your interest for constructing a 
theory like the fundamentality theory, because it would nicely accommodate the 
fact that we sometimes find Mandela’s life more meaningful than many ordinary 
people’s; but I equally sometimes become sure of my life having a certain 
meaning when I have an ineffable feeling of association with something 
                                                     
21 I suggest that anyone should be able to understand this concern as well as Metz’s. 
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supernatural; and I think that, without such feeling, my life would appear 
completely bland; so I’m rather interested in constructing a supernaturalist 
theory of meaningfulness which would accommodate such mystical 
experiences.” 
How does Metz respond to this opinion? What we should remark is that this 
person’s concern is understandable as well as the author’s. I do not, in fact, find 
any relevant priority of Metz’s concern over the supernaturalist one. But, this 
means that Metz’s work would theoretically fail, because its theoretical success 
essentially depends on rejecting any supernaturalist theory. I conclude that, as 
work of the purely theoretical sort, Metz’s book would not be successful at all. 
Is his work, then, without value in all respects? I negatively answer this 
question, because there is a way of reading by which we can appreciate certain 
virtues of Metz’s investigation, as we will see in the next section. I would, 
therefore, conclude this section by saying that, if we want to specify the ‘real 
worth’ of his inquiry, we should not take it for a study of the purely theoretical 
kind. For what, then, should we take it? 
 
4. The ‘Real Worth’ of Meaning in Life 
 
In the last section, I critically considered whether Metz has successfully 
reached his theoretical goal. My answer was negative, because his 
argumentation suffers from a crucial defect at the theoretical level. In this 
section, I explain in what respect I think his work is nevertheless appealing. One 
of the purposes of the following consideration is to show that we can appreciate 
the real worth of Metz’s book if, and just if, we read it as the product of his 
existential struggle in our endless quest for life’s meaning. 
In what follows, I firstly point out that Metz’s inquiry is piloted, not only by 
the theoretical concern so far considered, but also by another type of concern, 
which rather gives the essential depth to his work. And, I secondly explain how 
this non-theoretical type of concern is different from the theoretical one. I will 
finally suggest that, generally speaking, we should go beyond our narrow 
theoretical concerns when we tackle the philosophical problems about 
meaningfulness. 
 
4.1 
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I suggested, in the last section, that if we take Metz’s book for a work of the 
purely theoretical kind, we should attribute more faults to it than merits. This 
would apparently imply that his inquiry ended in failure, because his 
investigation seems to be essentially theoretical in the sense that we necessarily 
estimate it in the theoretical manner as studies in mathematics or natural 
sciences. There are, in fact, some passages in his writings which actually lead us 
to think that it’s the case22. What I am going to suggest is, however, that Metz’s 
book contains other passages which would make us to think differently. What 
are, then, those passages? And, what would they make us think? 
In the introductory part of the book in question, Metz says 
 
I confess that what has largely motivated me to devote a substantial 
portion of my research time over the past decade to issues of 
meaningfulness has been an unarticulated sense that doing so would 
itself be a meaningful enterprise […].23 
 
What we ought to remake is, I suggest, that this passage has a different tone 
which was not perceived in the analytic-philosophical part of his book so far 
considered in this paper. The point is that the author’s concern, confessed in the 
citation in question, is not the same as his theoretical concern for seeking the 
best theory about meaningfulness. In writing that passage, in fact, he cares, not 
about development of our studies on life’s meaning itself, but rather about 
whether he can engage in some meaningful enterprise in his life. He cares, in 
short, about meaning of his own life. 
What does this mean, however? It means, I suggest, that Metz’s inquiry into 
the issue of life’s meaning is piloted, not only by his theoretical concern for 
seeking the best theory of meaningfulness, but also by his so-called existential 
concern for living a meaningful life. In this respect, his book should be said to 
resemble Tolstoy’s Confession or Camus’s Myth of Sisyphus rather than studies 
in mathematics or the natural sciences. The point is that Metz, as well as Tolstoy 
and Camus, aims to save his life from the pitfall of meaninglessness by devoting 
himself to significant writings. In this sense, Meaning in Life is a trace of his 
                                                     
22 Cf. Metz (2013), pp. 8-9. Metz says there that “this book is addressed in the first instance to the 
professional scholar, and is principally devoted to organizing, clarifying, and surpassing the theories of 
life’s meaning prominent in the philosophical literature.” 
23 Metz (2013), p.1. 
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existential struggle for making his own life meaningful. 
To enlarge what I want to suggest, I will cite another passage. Metz says 
 
[…] it is not as though I have felt that knowledge of what makes a life 
meaningful is a necessary tool without which I could not acquire 
meaning in light of it. Instead, my view has been that finding full-blown 
knowledge of what makes a life meaningful would be meaningful for its 
own sake, and, furthermore, that searching for knowledge of meaning 
would be meaningful for its own sake, regardless of whether it 
successfully lands me with knowledge […].24 
 
I’d like to say that the last ‘that’-clause in this citation would give a twist to our 
way of reading the book in question, as explained in more detail in the next 
subsection. The author supposes, shortly, that searching for the knowledge about 
what confers meaning on a life is itself meaningful. By taking this supposition 
into consideration, we would naturally step back from the narrow perspective of 
just considering whether Metz has successfully reached the knowledge in 
question, and get into a broader perspective, e.g., of appreciating what his search 
itself has added to our situation around the philosophy of life’s meaning. 
 
4.2 
 
What turns out if we distinguish two types of concern, i.e., theoretical and 
existential as it were? For one thing, if Metz’s inquiry in Meaning in Life is 
guided by the concern for making his own life meaningful, we are not obliged to 
read this book in the theoretical manner as I applied in Section 3. We can rather 
estimate it by considering how his discourse developed in it would serve his 
interest about his own life. What I’m going to suggest is that, while Metz’s 
investigation suffers from crucial defects at the theoretical level as I argued in 
the last section, it has a significant virtue at the ‘existential’ level, so to speak. 
The first thing we should remark is that, if we pay attention to the fact that 
Metz cares about meaning of his own life in writing the book in question, we 
thereby get in position to say that the success of his inquiry does not require any 
discovery of some truth about the universal condition, if any, of a life’s being 
                                                     
24 Metz (2013), p.2, italics added. 
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meaningful. We can rather say that it would be a more significant matter to 
consider whether his investigation on that issue confers a meaning on his own 
life. In other words, if we keep our eyes on the fact that his aim in Meaning in 
Life is to engage in a meaningful activity in virtue of searching for the 
knowledge about meaningfulness, it turns out that what fundamentally matters is 
not whether he has reached the objective theory which would best explain all 
possible ways of meaningful life, but rather whether he has successfully engaged 
in some meaningful activity in virtue of his study. 
One of the points in this consideration is that, generally speaking, how we 
should read a book would significantly vary dependently on how we understand 
its ultimate concern. A question then arises so far as there exist some passages in 
Metz’s book which explicitly refer to his personal, existential concern about 
meaning of his own life. How should we read Metz’s book if we take this type 
of concern seriously? 
I’m going to present a schematical answer to this question, to begin with, 
and then enlarge it. 
Schematically speaking, if we exclusively focus on Metz’s theoretical 
concern for the universal theory of meaningfulness when we read his book, then 
we cannot but take him for a detached theoretician who would just try to 
describe the objective condition of life’s meaning from the purely impersonal 
viewpoint. In this case, we cannot but read his book in a quasi-scientific manner 
(and will find many defects in it as explained in the last section). If we, however, 
turn our eyes to the author’s existential concern so far considered in this section, 
we will regard him, not as a spectator, but a participant in our inescapable quest 
for life’s meaning (where, by the phrase “our inescapable quest,” I mean that 
each of us inevitably cares about her or his own life’s meaning, at least at some 
level). In this way of reading, we will view his book as a report of the 
autobiographical kind written by one of our fellows, who is worried about 
meaning of his own life as well as each of us. This way of reading would, I will 
argue, enable us to find more excellences in Metz’s work than the former, 
theoretical way does. 
To illustrate the difference between the two ways of reading, I cite an 
impressive passage from the epilogue of Meaning in Life. 
 
At a psychological level, I pretty much have to think that the search for 
life’s meaning has itself been a source of meaning in my life, and a 
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substantial one at that. However, it would be all the better for me if there 
were a philosophical justification for my judgment; indeed, one 
grounded on the very theory of meaning in life that I have argued is the 
most justified relative to existing rivals in the literature. I conclude by 
briefly pointing out how the fundamentality theory entails that the search 
for the most justified theory of meaning in life is itself a source of 
meaning.25 
 
We could, on one hand, theoretically interpret this passage as saying that 
everyone should think a search for life’s meaning to be itself a source of 
meaning and Metz’s fundamentality theory would explains this universal belief 
about meaningfulness. I would suggest, however, that this way of interpretation 
would attribute a serious fault to the author, because there might be someone 
who has a strong faith that any intellectual investigation on meaningfulness is 
irrelevant to his or her own life’s meaning. 
We can, on the other hand, read the passage above cited in an analogous way 
as we read someone’s autobiography. In other words, we can interpret it as 
reporting the author’s more or less personal fact that, for his proper life, “the 
search for life’s meaning has itself been a source of meaning.” In this way of 
interpretation, we should not necessarily find any defects in what Metz says in 
the passage cited above. We can, rather, receive it as an honest confession of his 
undeniable reality concerning meaningfulness. Note that, in this case, we have 
no reason to argue against what the last citation says, even if possibly we would 
not be persons who think the search for life’s meaning to be a source of 
meaning. 
What I should remark is that, if we understand what the last citation says in 
the second way, i.e., the autobiographical way, then we can interestingly suggest 
that Metz’s fundamentality theory is his all-things-considered response to his 
personal but firm belief that an intellectual inquiry into life’s meaning confers a 
meaning on the inquirer’s life. This suggestion is very interesting, because, by 
considering it, we can find an important kind of consistency in Metz’s inquiry. I 
would like to say that his investigation starts from the belief or faith that 
“searching for knowledge of meaning would be meaningful for its own sake” 
and then reaches a theory which would explain (or, more exactly, respond to) 
                                                     
25 Metz (2013), p.249, italics added. 
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this thought of the starting point. In this respect, Metz is consistently faithful to 
his personal ultimate position as it were. In other words, his book as a whole is 
dedicated to the explication of this ultimate view, which he can never escape 
from when he considers on life’s meaning. 
What I want to suggest in this subsection is, repeatedly, that, if we interpret 
the book in question as a report of the autobiographical kind explaining what the 
author has attained through his effort to engage himself in a meaningful 
enterprise, then we have no reason to criticize him for alleging his essentially 
personal position on meaningfulness to be the universal theory. Metz believes 
that the intellectual inquiry into life’s meaning, or more generally the intellectual 
activities in general and the enterprises for promoting the fundamental 
conditions under which we can live as human beings, would confer a meaning 
on the agent’s life. He expresses, or self-expresses, this personally firm belief 
through his writings. I feel great sympathy for such self-expression. I have no 
necessity to be antipathetic to what he says, though I disagree with him on some 
particular judgments about meaningfulness.26 
There arises a problem. Someone might oppose my suggestion in the last 
paragraph by arguing that, if the book in question was merely a personal report, 
then it would lack any philosophical value. I should say that this is a reasonable 
doubt. I agree with this opponent that any philosophical investigation must not 
be identified with something like a person’s self-portrait for private amusement 
of which value is completely estimated by his or her personal taste. For this 
reason, I ought to show that my suggestion developed in this subsection 
wouldn’t put our philosophical consideration on meaningfulness into the pitfall 
of relativism of the vicious kind. In other words, I should say something to 
warrant that my suggestion wouldn’t entail that our judgments about 
meaningfulness are completely matters of taste. What, then, can I say? 
 
4.3 
 
What I am going to say is, abstractly, that, while Metz seems to locate our 
philosophical conversation on the issue of life’s meaning in the space of 
agreement and disagreement as it were, we should rather locate it in the space of 
sympathy and antipathy. I will argue, less abstractly, for the following. If, on one 
                                                     
26 E.g., I believe that it’s important in some contexts to say that a dirty villain’s life is meaningful as 
well as those of Mandela and Mother Teresa. 
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hand, we give up the hope that we would find the universal condition for a life’s 
being meaningful, then we would seemingly submit to the vicious kind of 
relativism, under which anyone would be content to be silent about any other’s 
judgment about meaningfulness. I suggest that it is not the case. Even if there 
were no objective criteria of life’s meaning which should be universally 
accepted, our conversation on the issue in question will be never governed by 
the relativistic rule of taste. As a matter of fact – this is a quite important point – 
any decent adult will oppose those others who have an obviously malicious 
opinion about meaningfulness, even though she or he has never obtained any 
universally accepted theory of the condition for a life’s being meaningful.27 This 
means that we would not fall into the pitfall of vicious relativism even without 
any knowledge of the universal theory in question. 
In what follows, I enlarge the point roughly presented in the last paragraph. I 
will thereby explain how the way of reading which focuses on Metz’s existential 
concern would enable us to find excellences in his book. 
I’d like to ask, to begin with, how important it is for us to agree with each 
other on our judgments about whether a given life is meaningful or not. Suppose, 
e.g., that there is a countryman who has spent his whole time in farm work in his 
rural area after he graduated a local junior high school in the same area. Suppose, 
in addition, that he has a firm belief about the meaning of his life. He 
confidently says, e.g., “to cultivate this field and broaden our farmland, as my 
parents and grandparents did, it’s the meaning of my life.” It can turn out that 
this man’s ultimate conception of meaningfulness is essentially different from 
Metz’s (e.g., in the case that the man thinks, not his agricultural contribution to 
promoting the human fundamental conditions, but rather his playing a role 
destined by his position in the tradition in which he positively engages, to be the 
source of meaning). I can, however, sympathize with this man’s thought as well 
as with Metz’s. The difference between them does not, I claim, require any 
solution to remove it. I suggest, therefore, that Metz has no necessity to visit that 
countryman and to object him that the adequate conception of meaningfulness 
be rather of the kind proposed in Meaning in Life. It would be desirable for us to 
regard our space of conversation on the issue of life’s meaning as one in which 
the variety of the ultimate conceptions of meaningfulness does not seriously 
                                                     
27 E.g., there could a boy who bullies a neighbor girl with freckles by saying that any ugly freckled 
girl meaninglessly lives. I claim that this is an obviously malicious opinion about meaningfulness. Any 
adult ought to scold him. 
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matter in itself. There should be, in short, no demand for universal agreement on 
how we conceive the concept of meaningfulness. 
I should hastily add that this is not any seduction to relativism of the vicious 
type, because what I intend to suggest is not that one should be content to be 
silent about any other’s judgment about meaningfulness. In fact, I oppose to 
some views on life’s meaning when I feel a strong antipathy to them. If, e.g., 
someone says that anyone who has no ability to work lives meaninglessly, I 
would in most cases object her or him by saying that there is a source of 
meaning other than work or business. What I want to suggest is, to sum up, the 
following. The disagreement about the views on life’s meaning between Metz 
and that countryman in the last paragraph doesn’t seriously matter, but this 
doesn’t mean that any view will go without criticism. As a matter of fact, we can 
feel antipathy against someone’s opinion about life’s meaning, and such 
possibility of feeling keeps us away from the rule of vicious relativism under 
which any differences of views on meaningfulness be matters of taste. 
My suggestion is, repeatedly, that agreement or disagreement about our 
views does not in itself matter when we talk about the issue of meaningfulness. 
By suggesting this, I criticize Metz’s theoretical concern for taking an 
insignificant matter seriously. Nothing matters, I suggest, in the fact itself that 
we have a variety of the ultimate conceptions of meaningfulness which are not 
in agreement at all. 
What, then, fundamentally matters when we engage in our philosophical, 
reflective conversation on the issue of life’s meaning? My answer is that 
whether all the participants in this conversation mutually help each other in 
living in hope for a meaningful life would be at least a more significant matter 
than whether they agree with each other on the theory of meaningfulness. This 
suggestion is, as we will see just below, essentially related to the point of the 
above consideration of how we read philosophical writings on the issue of 
meaningfulness. I will close my paper with explicating this point. 
What happens, to begin with, if we read Metz’s book as a report of the 
autobiographical kind written by one of our fellows who is worried about the 
meaning of his own life as well as each of us? I’d like to answer that, since it’s 
evident to us the readers that the author sincerely tackles the problem of life’s 
meaning to develop his own understanding of meaningfulness, we will 
sympathize with him in the respect in which he seriously seeks his own words to 
express the meaning of his life. And, as a result of this sympathy, each of us will 
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feel like searching for his or her own words (not the same as Metz’s!) to 
illuminate his or her own understanding of meaningfulness. The point is that 
Metz’s sincerity and seriousness, which is clearly noticed in the passages cited 
in subsection 4.1 of this paper, inspire us as his fellow-seekers for the meaning 
of life so to speak and encourage us to engage in an intellectual, or more 
accurately philosophical-reflective, inquiry into life’s meaning. In this respect, I 
should assure, Meaning in Life succeeds in making us realize the significance of 
the ‘intellectual’ search for the meaning of life and introducing us to 
philosophical consideration on the issue of meaningfulness. Here is the 
excellence which the book in question has. 
What I think we should remark here is, abstractly, that the real worth of 
Metz’s book consists, not in establishing our agreement about the view on 
meaningfulness, but in obtaining our sympathy with his proper way of 
participating in our inescapable quest for life’s meaning. In other word, his 
intellectual inquiry into life’s meaning carries with it an excellence in the sense 
that it succeeds in encouraging us as his fellows to engage in the same type of 
inquiry in our ways in turn. I’d like to contend that such encouragement is more 
valuable in our conversation about meaningfulness than establishing some 
universal agreement of the view on the condition for a life’s being meaningful. 
Summing up, the reason why Metz’s inquiry has not ended in vain though his 
theoretical attempt suffers from a fatal defect as I argued is that we as 
fellow-seekers for the meaning of life would sympathize with his sincere effort 
to approach the life’s meaning in his way and thereby be encouraged to devote 
ourselves to some kind of philosophical consideration on the issue in question.  
What I want to stress through my whole consideration of this paper is that 
our perennial pursuit for the meaning of life would not call for the universal 
agreement about our understanding of what makes our lives meaningful. So it 
would be, I suggest, significant for us to reflect on how meaningful it is for us to 
agree with each other about our conception of meaningfulness. Certainly, we 
should be cautious about vicious relativism creeping in when we talk about 
meaningfulness, since the ‘anything-goes’ stance is obviously inappropriate in 
our thinking or caring about life’s meaning. But, the non-existence of the 
universal agreement in question does not collapse into the situation in which any 
understanding of meaningfulness would equally go. As a matter of fact, we feel 
a strong antipathy to a malicious opinion about the meaning of life. How do you 
feel when you hear someone say, “That disabled person, who cannot do anything 
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without the aid of many people, lives meaninglessly”? To oppose this, it is not 
necessary for us to have a universally agreed upon view on what confers 
meaning on a life. What is needed is just our decision to resolutely fight against 
such view. 
My concluding words are about sympathy. I suggest, more or less 
metaphorically, that we should regard the space of our conversation on life’s 
meaning as one in which the dimension of sympathy and antipathy, not of 
agreement and disagreement, plays the essential role. The reason why I suggest 
so is that I think that, while the possibility of our feeing antipathy prevents our 
talk on life’s meaning from running on the rock of relativism as already 
explained, the feeling of sympathy, as fellow-emotion so to speak, enables us to 
get along together despite of our disagreement about the ultimate conception of 
meaningfulness. The sympathetic emotion in the context of our seeking life’s 
meaning, in addition, encourages us to aid each other with living in hope for a 
meaningful life, because, e.g., we will cherish a hope for making our own lives 
more meaningful by undertaking the philosophical search for life’s meaning if, 
and just if, we see some fellow not to be in despair of meaningfulness of such 
search and to engage herself or himself in that attempt. Metz doesn’t despair of 
the significance of our philosophical investigation on the meaning of life. It is 
this fact that moved me to write this philosophical paper. 
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Abstract 
This paper is a critique of the new paradigm in analytic philosophy for investigating the meaning of 
life, focusing on Meaning in Life as the definitive example. Metz relies upon intuition, and 
reflection upon recent analytic literature, to guide him to his ‘fundamentality theory’. He calls this a 
theory of ‘the meaning of life’, saying it may be ‘the holy grail’. I argue that Metz’s project is not 
addressed to the meaning of life, but a distinct issue about social meaning; and that by neglecting 
and sidelining alternative approaches, his results are rendered provisional. I then argue that there are 
a number of equally legitimate senses of a ‘socially meaningful life’; that Metz’s exclusive and 
unjustified focus on only one radically diminishes the scope of his project; and that what remains is 
undermined by cultural specificity. Finally, I argue that the Kripkean semantics Metz adopts runs 
counter to his interests. 
 
1. Metz’s Project 
 
Thaddeus Metz is the leading figure in contemporary analytic discussions 
associated with the phrase ‘the meaning of life’. He leads a new paradigm for 
investigating an issue previously neglected within analytic philosophy, which he 
thinks offers the prospect of substantive progress being made on it for the first 
time. He says, ‘it is only in the last 50 years or so that something approaching a 
distinct field on the meaning of life has been established in Anglo-American 
philosophy, and it is only in the last 30 years that debate with real depth has 
appeared’ (Metz 2013a). In Metz’s view, there is now a rigorous literature on 
this topic, which is both well-motivated and methodologically appropriate.  
Meaning in Life provides a meticulous engagement with the literature in 
question, the insights and shortcomings of which lead Metz to his 
‘fundamentality theory’. At the end, he asks the reader, 
 
Is the fundamentality theory the holy grail of Western normative 
philosophy, the respect in which the good, the true, and the beautiful 
genuinely constitute a unity, the principle that captures all and only the 
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myriad factors that make up Meaning in Life? It would presumptuous to 
say that the search for an adequate theory of what makes a life meaningful 
is over, given how few philosophers have undertaken the enquiry in 
earnest. However, the fundamentality theory is now the one to beat. (Metz 
2013b: 249) 
 
Thus Metz encourages his readers to rise to the challenge, by trying to 
construct a counterexample to the fundamentality thesis.  
I think there are probably two reasons for this reference to the Holy Grail; I 
am less sure about the second. The first is that Metz considers it an appropriate 
title for either his theory, or a superior one destined to supersede it; and that by 
calling it this, he will encourage others to get involved. Any hyperbole would be 
justified as a counterbalance to the neglect philosophy has, until recently, shown 
this issue. The second is that Metz may have wanted to issue a rebuttal to David 
Wiggins, who warned philosophers that they ‘bewitch’ themselves if they think 
they are ‘looking for some one thing like the Garden of the Hesperides, the Holy 
Grail’ (Wiggins 1976: 377). After all, when Metz first presents his 
fundamentality theory, he writes: ‘To all those who have asked me over the past 
ten years, “So, what is the meaning of life (wise guy)?”, there you have it!’ 
(Metz 2013b: 235) 
However, this reference immediately brought to my mind Tennyson’s Idylls 
of the King, in which Sir Percivale inspires the Knights of the Round Table to 
embark on a doomed quest for the Holy Grail; one which ultimately brings 
about the demise of Camelot! Perhaps this is just because I had acquired so 
many misgivings about Metz’s project by this point, but for better or worse, my 
aim in this paper will not be to respond to the fundamentality theory within the 
framework of the new paradigm, but rather to raise questions about that 
paradigm.  
I would not like anybody to assume that I am a sceptic about the question of 
the meaning of life, however. On the contrary, I consider it just as 
philosophically important as Metz does; perhaps more so, because I think its 
implications go beyond Western normative philosophy. However what I think is 
important is the traditional question. This has been unduly neglected. But the 
neglect has been the fault of analytic philosophy; right from its inception. For 
during most of  20th century philosophy, post-Nietzschean philosophers were 
more or less obsessed with the issues this question raises; while analytic 
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philosophers were either ignoring it (the vast majority), or else denigrating it 
(e.g. Ayer 1947). Analytic philosophy’s recent resurgence of interest in 
‘meaningful lives’, strikes me as part of the same trend. For this debate conflates 
distinct issues about socially built-up meaning with the traditional question; and 
thereby perpetrates continued neglect of the latter.1 
Metz’s project is motivated by the following four claims: 
 
(1) Social meaning is the root concern expressed by the question ‘what 
is the meaning of life?’   
(2) If you want a theory of social meaning, the best place to look is 
analytic philosophy. 
(3) A priori philosophical analysis can reveal a single formula for social 
meaning. 
(4) This formula would reveal an objective truth, because social meaning 
has a natural essence (it is a physical pattern). 
 
(1), (2) and (3) are typically presupposed within the new paradigm; (4) is a 
more distinctively Metzian claim. I think that without at least the conjunction of 
(2), (3) and (4), the new paradigm is badly motivated. And without (1) – which I 
find the most implausible –its principal source of interest drops away. I will now 
examine each in turn. 
 
2. The Root Concern 
 
We routinely distinguish the meaning in a phenomenon, from the meaning of 
that phenomenon. Consider an early Western movie. If our interest is the 
meaning in the film, we might talk about what is motivating the characters, their 
personalities, trials and tribulations etc. We might say that in the film, the 
Indians are the baddies. If our interest is in the meaning of the film, however, 
then we would instead talk about its significance in a wider setting than that of 
the fictional scenario it depicts. We might say that the film reveals the negative 
stereotypes in early 20th century America towards Native Americans, and also 
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perhaps the new-found confidence of a country creating an idealised version of 
its history. This, we might say, is the meaning of the film. 
Thus meaning in concerns the contextual meaning created by a phenomenon 
(such as a film, novel, sport or musical composition), while meaning of concerns 
the meaning of the phenomenon in a wider context (a society, most typically). 
When we ask about the meaning of life, then, the form of words employed 
strongly suggests that we are not asking about the kind of meaning we build up 
within the context of social life. Rather, we are asking whether life itself has any 
meaning. Since meaning of questions require us to look outside the contextual 
meaning created by a phenomenon, this question is addressed to the possibility 
of a wider context in which life might have meaning. This wider context would 
stand to life and the meaning within it, as the wider context of society stands to a 
film and the meaning within it. The form of the question ‘what is the meaning of 
life?’ presupposes there is such a context, since it asks what meaning our lives 
are thus endowed with; endowed with by God, would be the standard 
presupposition. But as with all questions of this form, it leaves room for us to 
reject its presupposition by appropriately answering that there is no meaning of 
life. 
Given that Metz entitled his book Meaning in Life, you would expect it to 
discuss social meaning, and not the meaning of life; or perhaps argue that social 
meaning provides the meaning of life. However, Metz claims that his question 
about social meaning is what the question of the meaning of life fundamentally 
amounts to. This issue is treated quickly (Metz 2013b: 3, 23-4), but strikes me as 
crucial to motivating a book which lays claim to ‘the holy grail’; referred to as 
‘the meaning of life’ when the fundamentality theory first makes its appearance. 
Metz begins, 
 
Most people, or at least philosophers, interested in topics readily placed 
under the rubric of ‘the meaning of life’ ultimately want to know what, if 
anything, would confer meaning on their own lives and the lives of those 
people for whom they care. (ibid.: 3)  
 
The emphasis on the questioner’s own life indicates that something is about 
to go wrong. For if you ask about the meaning of life, the answer will apply to 
everybody; even if its implications for you and your loved ones are your primary 
concern. Metz goes on, 
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Of course, some, perhaps even a substantial minority, might also or 
instead be interested in considerations of whether the universe has a 
meaning or of whether the human species does. However, I do not address 
these ‘holist’ or ‘cosmic’ questions in this book. (ibid.: 3) 
 
Now something has gone wrong, because Metz clearly thinks that whether 
the human species has a meaning, has little or nothing to do with the question he 
began with. But to ask whether the human species has a meaning is to ask the 
question of the meaning of life; ‘life’ in this context means ‘human life’. If there 
is a wider context beyond life which confers a meaning on it, then that would of 
course confer meaning on our own lives and those of our loved ones. But this is 
just because the meaning of life would have implications for these lives. Our 
special concern for them may motivate us to ask the question in a particularised 
form, i.e. ‘what implications does the meaning of life have for me and my loved 
ones?’ But to answer this, you must answer the general question. Metz’s view of 
the motivation for asking has, I think, led him to misconstrue the particularised 
form of the question as conceptually isolated from the question itself. Then this 
particularised question is reinterpreted as one about social meaning, and 
subsequently identified as the question of the meaning of life. 
Consider Metz’s mention of ‘whether the universe has a meaning’. Why 
would this be brought up, when the question is about the meaning of life, not the 
universe? The reason is that the issues are closely connected. The connection is 
that if you ask about the meaning of life, this will lead you to look beyond the 
social context of life in order to place it within a wider context. The first relevant 
context you will reach is that of the physical universe. This context is relevant 
because human life is part of the universe; so if we discover why the universe 
exists, we may discover why we exist, and hence (possibly) the meaning of our 
existence. But it is not a context of meaning, akin to that of human society. So 
recognising this, it will start to look as if life does not have a meaning – unless 
we then move to an even wider context, by supposing God created the universe, 
and thereby endowed phenomena within it with meaning.  
Rather than there being three topics ‘readily placed under the rubric of “the 
meaning of life”’, then –i.e. the meanings of my life, the species, and the 
universe – it seems to me that the situation is as follows. There is one question 
of the meaning of life (i.e. the human species). A concern about the meaning of 
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my life may motivate me to ask this question. And once I do, I will immediately 
be led to inquire about the meaning of the universe. 
Metz goes on to say that the reason he does not address ‘holist’ or ‘cosmic’ 
questions, is that the literature on the ‘individualist’ question is larger. Then he 
adds: 
 
often asking ‘What is the point of it all?’ or ‘How did we get here?’ is a 
function of a deeper concern to know how, if at all, the existence of 
individual human beings can be significant. (ibid.: 3) 
 
This strikes me as a curious sense of ‘deeper’. The question of the meaning 
of life digs below social meaning to inquire whether it is grounded, and indeed 
whether it needs to be; it is a paradigmatically philosophical concern that takes 
us directly into the heart of metaphysics and epistemology. The new paradigm 
question about social meaning, however, could occur to anyone trying to figure 
out what to do with their life. Only in a tenuous sense could the essentially 
practical question of ‘how to get more meaning in my life’ be construed as 
philosophical; and most people ask this question without getting into 
philosophical analysis. 
Metz concludes his initial remarks by saying that he will always treat the 
bearer of meaning as ‘a human person’s life’; and that this includes ‘the phrase 
“the meaning of life”, which several in the literature, unlike me, use to connote 
ideas about human life as such, not a given human’s life’ (ibid.: 3). However it is 
far from clear that Metz does exclude the question of the meaning of ‘human life 
as such’ from his book, since he spends a large proportion of it discussing 
religious accounts of meaning; ‘supernaturalist’ accounts (ibid.: 23-31; 75-160). 
But any philosopher who thinks God endows our lives with meaning is talking 
about the traditional question. If the supernaturalist follows Metz in trying to 
work out which kinds of social meaning are the most positive ones – as many do 
– this is because they think God’s chosen meaning favours certain kinds of 
social meaning; they see this as an implication of their answer to the traditional 
question. Neither, I think, does Metz argue against these philosophers from an 
individualist stance. Rather, he mounts a general philosophical argument to the 
effect that supernaturalist conceptions of meaning are incoherent. If right, this 
would show that wider meaning cannot endow the human species with social 
meaning; it would have consequences for individuals, but the target of the 
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argument is general. Moreover his final chapter on nihilism seems to me 
squarely addressed to the traditional question throughout; Metz argues that 
nihilism is incoherent too.2 I find it hard to avoid the conclusion that the 
individualist question is sometimes conflated with the traditional question; 
moreover I think this kind of conflation is widespread within the new paradigm.3 
When Metz returns to the issue (ibid.: 23-4), he says that the question of the 
meaning of life ‘cannot itself be understood in theistic, or even more broadly 
supernaturalist, terms’, because that would fail to account for the fact that 
naturalists and supernaturalists debate a common subject-matter. But the reason 
naturalists and supernaturalists can debate is because they disagree about 
whether a wider context of meaning exists. Nihilists are typically naturalists, 
after all, and there is no conceptual reason why a naturalist should not hold that 
life is made meaningful by a wider context than social life.  
All in all, I do not think Metz makes a strong case for thinking Meaning in 
Life is a book about the meaning of life, or that ‘cosmic’ concerns are tangential 
to this issue; and neither do I think he succeeds in excluding these concerns. 
Now you might think I am simply arguing for my interpretation of the question 
‘what is the meaning of life?’ over Metz’s. However I think this reaction would 
only be justified if the question were an enigma in need of deciphering, about 
which various interpretations might be reasonably debated. Granted, the idea 
that it is ambiguous has popular currency – Metz quotes John Updike to this 
effect (ibid.: 17) – but I do not think this is credible.4 This is because I think it is 
one of the most ubiquitous philosophical questions in human history. As such, I 
do not think Metz can be considered to be offering a reasonable interpretation of 
that question.  
The phenomenon of religion provides the clearest manifestation of its 
cultural ubiquity. Religions typically provide their followers with a belief about 
the meaning of life, by holding that life exists within a wider context of meaning 
determined by deities. Literature provides another reminder. Thus the earliest 
                                                     
2 Metz thinks supernaturalism is incoherent because we know there is social meaning but do not know 
there is wider meaning (ibid.: 158). But any sensible supernaturalist will say only that they believe in a 
wider meaning that grounds their judgements about social meaning; though it might instead undermine 
these judgements, and there might not be any wider meaning. Metz thinks nihilism is incoherent 
because it both rejects wider meaning and uses it to judge that life is meaningless (ibid.: 242-4). But 
the nihilist does not reject the concept of wider meaning; they think reality does not satisfy it. I 
elaborate on these responses in Tartaglia 2016: chapter 2. 
3 For a wider analysis of this situation, see Tartaglia 2016: introduction (appendix). 
4 The reasons I think this idea has acquired currency are set out in Tartaglia 2016: introduction. 
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substantially extant work of human literature, the Epic of Gilgamesh, is 
essentially the story of one man’s quest for the meaning of life; it began a 
literary preoccupation which has continued unabated through Dante and 
Shakespeare to David Foster Wallace. The best-known discussion of this 
question in modern times comes from Tolstoy (1880). Tolstoy begins from the 
premise that his life has accrued exceptional levels of social meaning; but 
despite his prodigious achievements, Tolstoy starts to wonder if life has a 
meaning. Tolstoy clearly distinguishes social meaning from the traditional 
question, so given how widely reprinted his reflections are in philosophical 
anthologies, it is surprising that philosophers in the new paradigm do not. 
Popular culture is another place philosophers can look if puzzled by the 
words ‘what is the meaning of life?’ – where they will find that it has been 
regularly poked fun at. If the question were about social meaning, it would be 
hard to see the joke. But with the traditional question the jokes fall readily into 
place. Douglas Adams’ famous punchline that the meaning of life is 42, for 
instance, follows the standard humourist’s strategy of disappointing 
expectations; we were waiting to hear the reason why we exist, but are 
disappointed by an answer we cannot understand.5  
The best place for philosophers to look, however, is philosophy. In Plato, the 
transcendent forms provide the wider context; and the philosopher-kings guide 
our lives by reflecting on them. The metaphysical systems that followed, right 
through to Kant and Hegel, are designed to meet the same concern, typically by 
providing an understanding of the world with God at its centre.6 When doubt 
about whether there is a meaning of life set in during the 19th century, the issue 
remained just as central, culminating in Nietzsche’s warnings about the threat of 
nihilism. And this set the scene for the 20th century; in which analytic 
philosophy shelved it, while continental philosophy tried to get to grips with life 
without meaning. This thumbnail sketch of the history of philosophy is surely 
enough to remind us that the meaning of life has been one of its abiding 
concerns; you do not need the words ‘meaning of life’ to recognise this. But I do 
not think the same could be said about the new paradigm question about social 
meaning, especially if we follow Metz in distinguishing it from the question of 
what constitutes a morally good life (ibid.: 5-6). 
                                                     
5 For a philosopher who takes Adams’ joke very seriously, see Waghorn 2014. 
6 For discussion of the transition which took place in 19th century philosophy which I think ultimately 
led to the side-lining of the traditional question in analytic philosophy, see Beiser 2014, esp. 211ff.  
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It seems to me that anything deserving to be called the Holy Grail in this 
area would be a positive answer to the traditional question. Nevertheless, Metz’s 
interest in a formula for social meaning does – after a fashion – fall under the 
rubric of ‘the meaning of life’, because many people think the meaning of life is 
something like love, happiness, knowledge, art, etc.; a quick internet search 
reveals hundreds of such answers. However the clear oversight in the case of 
this kind of answer is that if there is a meaning of life (or if there is not one), 
then this might undermine the value we place in love, happiness, etc.  
For all that has been said so far, the project of trying to find a formula for 
social meaning might be legitimate and feasible. On the face of it, it seems an 
interesting issue. However philosophers in the new paradigm should clearly 
demarcate their project from the question of the meaning of life. For not doing 
so might be misconstrued as misleading advertising – an attempt to attract 
interest in their project by associating it with such an evocative question. And 
they certainly should not dismiss the traditional question, or claim they are in 
fact addressing it. 
 
3. Analytic Philosophy Dominates the Field 
 
To the best of my knowledge, the most systematic attempt to develop an 
acceptable theory of meaning in life has been undertaken by 
contemporary Anglo-American analytic philosophers. (ibid.: 9) 
 
Given that Metz is only interested in social meaning, is he right? The 
emphasis on ‘theory’ reveals a strategy for making this plausible; he says that 
philosophers from other traditions take ‘more particularist, phenomenological, 
or hermeneutic approaches’ (ibid: 9). I am not sure how a ‘particularist’ 
approach differs from Metz’s ‘individualist’ one. But leaving that aside, the 
suggestion seems to be that you cannot have a phenomenological or hermeneutic 
theory; or at least a sufficiently systematic one.   
However the question of the meaning of life – and meaning in life – is most 
closely associated with major philosophers from the continental tradition, such 
as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre and Camus. The restriction to social meaning 
does not help make the statement plausible, because this was their principal 
concern; they did not think there was a meaning of life, and hence sought to 
investigate how people can build up positive social meaning in a world without 
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God. That is what the 20th century discourse of ‘authenticity’ concerned. And 
neither does the insistence on theory help, because all these philosophers 
developed theories; massive and incredibly complex ones in the cases of Sartre 
and Heidegger – both phenomenological, and in Heidegger’s case, hermeneutic 
too.  
Nietzsche had a theory of nihilism which motivated his account of social 
meaning. Nihilism, as he saw it, resulted from essentially religious values which 
project meaning into another, fictional world, such that when people retain these 
values after ceasing to believe in the other world, they find themselves 
condemning the real one. And although Nietzsche did not complete the 
revaluation of values he thought the onset of nihilism called for, he said enough 
for commentators to develop rich Nietzschean theories of social meaning (e.g. 
Reginster 2006). Camus later gave Nietzsche’s nihilism a more positive spin, 
with his concept of the ‘absurd man’ living in defiance of life’s lack of meaning; 
and living all the better for it (Camus 1942: 98). 
Heidegger was a more systematic philosopher than Nietzsche and Camus, of 
course; about as systematic as they get at certain points of his career. Heidegger 
argues that our sporadic withdrawal from everyday dealings with objects and 
other people, is at the root of Cartesian ontology and epistemology; and the 
traditional problems attendant upon it. His critique of the prioritising and 
grounding of this ‘present-at-hand’ attitude, is part of a strategy to draw 
philosophy’s attention to the social meaning of human life. Thus he argues that 
‘the less we just stare at the [Thing], and the more we seize hold of it and use it, 
the more primordial does our relationship to it become’; and that this 
relationship is one of ‘circumspection’, according to which things are seen 
within the context of our projects (Heidegger 1927: 98). This analysis is 
designed to remind us of the nature of our absorption in projects, and reveal that 
people typically fail to determine this, instead letting it be determined by 
anonymous public opinion. Heidegger’s aim is to persuade us to wrest control of 
our lives by choosing and possessing our projects. He means to show us how to 
live authentically, by choosing in light of ‘heritage’; since man’s deepest values 
are to be found within what Gadamer called ‘the historical reality of his being’ 
(ibid.: 435; Gadamer 1960: 277). 
Heidegger is not mentioned in Meaning in Life. Nietzsche, Sartre and 
Camus are not discussed, but are occasionally mentioned as representatives of 
certain positions. Thus Nietzsche is mentioned as an objectivist about social 
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meaning; but I do not think this is a tenable interpretation.7 And Camus is 
mentioned as someone who combined supernaturalism with nihilism; I agree 
with this, but it occurs at the beginning of a discussion squarely addressed to the 
traditional question (Metz op. cit.: 242). Sartre is the continental philosopher 
who comes up most; as an example of a subjectivist about social meaning. 
However the summary which is provided of Sartre’s argument from 
Existentialism is a Humanism (ibid.: 99) strikes me as embodying a serious 
misunderstanding; and I think this raises big questions about this interpretation 
generally.8  
In short, there is no serious engagement with continental philosophy in 
Meaning in Life. But that is fair enough, because Metz did not promise any. 
However, he justifies this omission by sidelining the continental literature, in 
exactly the same way that he sidelines the traditional question. In both cases, the 
impression I took – and which I think any impartial reader would take – is that 
both the continental literature and traditional question are somewhat tangential, 
and can be safely ignored by those who are really serious about the ‘meaning of 
life’.  
In order to focus my misgivings about this message, let me turn to the 
analytic literature in question. It was not clear to me that all the literature Metz 
discusses concerns his issue (sometimes the authors are talking about a ‘good 
and worthwhile life’ or the ‘value of a life’ (ibid.: 150, 187)). But most of it does, 
and Metz has investigated it thoroughly.9 So what does it amount to? 
Thomas Nagel (1971; 1986) and Robert Nozick (1981; 1989) produced the 
best-known analytic discussions of the meaning of life, and Metz discusses them 
both. However, both are interested in the meaning of life, and I think only 
Nozick can be legitimately counted within Metz’s literature, since he answered 
his inquiry with an account of social meaning; and thus moved into the territory 
                                                     
7 Some have detected commitment to a form of objectivism within Nietzsche’s perspectivism (e.g. 
Schacht 1983: 8-10, 104). However, even on this kind of interpretation, Nietzsche’s view that ‘all 
evaluation is made from a definite perspective: that of the preservation of the individual, a community, 
a race, a state, a church, a faith, a culture’ (Nietzsche 1883-8: 149), could not be squared with 
objectivism as Metz understands it (physicalist moral realism). 
8 The summary is ‘since there is no God, since only God could ground objective values, and since 
there are values, all values are subjective’. In the last paragraph of the essay, Sartre says of his 
existentialism that, ‘even if God existed that would make no difference from its point of view’ (Sartre 
1946: 369). The humanism Sartre was defending largely consisted in the claim that authenticity is 
objectively valuable; see, e.g., Webber 2009: chapter 10. 
9 That said, highly pertinent books by Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Kelly (2011) and Paul Thagard (2010) 
are omitted; the latter poses a very direct challenge to the methodology of the new paradigm.  
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of the new paradigm.10 Philosophers who approach the problem from a religious 
perspective (e.g. Cottingham 2003) also typically have things to say about social 
meaning within this context. In addition, the literature can lay claim to 
well-known articles by Richard Taylor (1970), Paul Edwards (1967), and John 
Kekes (1986), which all moved towards the new paradigm by trying to show 
that the traditional question can be put aside, so long as we are subjectively 
engaged by social meaning. And there is also Wiggins’ article; although the 
overall message of this piece seems to be a warning about the new paradigm that 
was to come (Wiggins 1976: 378). 
The new paradigm first emerges in recognisable form in the late 1990s, with 
the work of Susan Wolf. Metz has adopted Wolf’s approach exactly, namely that 
of stating paradigm-cases of meaningful lives (e.g. Mandela, Picasso, Einstein) 
and then applying intuition to various test-scenarios in an attempt to isolate the 
meaningful factors. These intuitions can be highly specific; Wolf does not think 
that aerobics adds meaning to life, for instance (Wolf 1997: 233). The other 
major influence on Metz, which appeared around the same time, is Alan 
Gewirth’s Self-Fulfillment (1998), which provides the basis of his 
fundamentality theory. However Metz distances himself from Gewirth on the 
basis of two intuitions. Firstly, that contra Gewirth, ‘basic natural sciences’ are 
not significantly more meaningful than biological and social ones (Metz agrees 
they are more meaningful). And secondly, that universal activities could be as 
trivial as cutting toenails (Metz op. cit.: 217-8).  
Since then, a number of articles have been written in the Wolf / Metz vein, 
and Meaning in Life usefully brings them together within a systematic 
framework. However, in terms of sheer quantity, which is a factor Metz often 
mentions, I do not think this literature bears much comparison with the 
continental one; just going on the four figures I mentioned, and the vast 
secondary literature on them, I think the continental literature would win hands 
down. But if quality is the issue, then whether philosophers interested in social 
meaning should exclusively focus on the analytic literature depends on the 
credibility of the new paradigm approach, which is an issue I turn to in the next 
section. However, it also depends on the credibility of continental approaches; 
and this is not addressed in Meaning in Life.  
 Metz mentions that there is also relevant literature in empirical psychology 
                                                     
10 I argue in Tartaglia 2016: introduction (appendix) that Nozick’s argument for making this transition 
involves a logical error. 
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(ibid.: 9). There is a well-established scientific research programme stemming 
from the work of Viktor Frankl (1946). Given this, it seems to me that 
philosophers do not need to speculate about what people mean by a socially 
meaningful life. Moreover, psychology, quite unlike the new paradigm, takes 
cultural specificity into account; it is alive to the possibility that people in Japan 
and the USA, for instance, might have different things in mind by a ‘meaningful 
life’ (Steger et. al. 2008; see also Mason 2013). So, if your interest is in the 
actual concept, its importance to people, and in helping those who feel their 
lives are meaningless – which does seem to be the primary concern of many 
philosophers (Kekes 1986, 2000; Levy 2005, Heyd and Miller 2010, Oakley 
2010, Brogaard and Smith 2005) – then this area of psychology should not be 
neglected. Even if you think philosophical analysis can penetrate ordinary usage 
to discover a single formula for a socially meaningful life, it still seems clear 
that such analyses should begin from real data; especially when it exists.  
Let me be clear about what I have and have not been arguing. I have not 
been arguing that the traditional question is the only legitimate concern for 
philosophers. And neither have I been arguing that the continental approach to 
social meaning is better. Rather, my opposition has been to side-lining the 
traditional issue and continental literature, by suggesting that social meaning is 
the real, central issue about the meaning of life, and that the recent analytic 
literature provides the best, most serious attempt to address it. Philosophers are 
of course free to disregard the traditional issue in favour of social meaning, but 
they need to be clear that this is what they are doing, and should do so 
consistently. However, I do not think they are free to disregard the continental 
literature and then make great claims for their results, for this literature might 
undermine what they are saying, or at least contain neglected, supplementary 
insights. That was the mistake Casaubon made in Eliot’s Middlemarch; he 
claimed to have the ultimate answer (‘The Key to All Mythologies’), but it 
turned out that he had not engaged with vast swathes of pertinent literature – 
because he could not read German. 
Of course, it is good for philosophers to try out new approaches, and there is 
already plenty of excellent analytic work on continental philosophers. However, 
the new paradigm proceeds as if it were the only approach analytic philosophers 
need concern themselves with. What I am suggesting, then, is that philosophers 
who are really serious about social meaning should also investigate the 
continental literature, empirical psychology, and the contributions of analytic 
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philosophers before the Wolf / Metz agenda became entrenched. If they find that 
the new paradigm usurps all else, then so be it – but this would need to be 
justified. Without such a justification, its results will be provisional, to the effect 
that if we take this approach and ignore others, then we will alight upon this 
result. It might still be interesting, but it should not be held up as the Holy Grail. 
 
4. A Single Formula 
 
On the face of it, the concept of a socially meaningful life looks highly 
culturally specific. It is not the kind of thing you would expect a Greek warrior, 
medieval hermit, and contemporary hedge fund manager to agree about. It also 
looks situationally specific, in that our inclinations to describe a life as socially 
meaningful might be different at the funeral of a loved one, than in a history 
lesson about an influential despot. At a funeral, it would be offensive to point 
out that just like the deceased, Hitler had a very meaningful life; but in a history 
lesson, it would be silly to deny that he did. This strongly suggests that this 
attribution has different senses. On the face of it, then, the prospects for finding 
a single formula for socially ‘meaningful’ seem about as good as for socially 
‘cool’.  
Here are four things you might mean by a socially meaningful life:  
 
(1) The social meaning of life is determined by social impact. As Metz 
says, ‘meaningful’ and ‘significant’ are synonyms (op. cit.: 21).  
(2) The social meaning of life is determined by good social impact.  
(3) The social meaning of life is determined by what we value. So the 
telly-addict whose life has negligible impact, still has a meaningful 
life because of their love of TV. 
(4) The social meaning of life is determined by what we do. So the 
telly-addict has the meaning of their life determined by TV even if 
they hate it.  
 
We use the notion of a ‘meaningful life’ in all of these ways. At a funeral, 
(2) and (3) would be apposite; in a historical or sociological discussion, (1) and 
(4) would be more likely to come up. Now Metz and others in the new paradigm 
think that only (2) is worthy of consideration; they think it best captures what we 
mean by a ‘meaningful life’. It is this notion which fuels all the intuitions which 
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lead Metz to his fundamentality formula. However, this produces a clash with 
the other side of Metz’s methodology, namely accommodating the analytic 
literature. For many philosophers evidently have (3) in mind. (1) and (4) have 
been neglected, and the reason for this, I suspect, is that philosophers have 
wanted to discuss the notion of a socially meaningful life within the realms of 
value-theory, which only (2) and (3) allow for. But this is not a good reason, 
given their aim of analysing what we mean by a meaningful life simpliciter. 
The clear conflict between basic judgements of meaningfulness between 
these senses, it seems to me, conclusively demonstrates the untenability of the 
new paradigm project. For if you have (1), (3) or (4) in mind, then Hitler had a 
meaningful life (Kekes 2000: 30; Frankfurt 2002: 246-8); while if you have (2) 
in mind, then Hitler had a meaningless life (Kauppinen 2012: 361; Metz op. cit.: 
5) – or in Metz’s view, a less-than-meaningless life (ibid.: 234). If philosophers 
cannot agree on whether Hitler had a meaningful life, however, then I see no 
prospect of a nuanced debate in which careful analysis leads us to a single 
formula. I am happy to rest my entire case on the Hitler question, in fact. If new 
paradigm philosophers cannot provide a principled, non-question-begging 
reason why we should consider Hitler’s life meaningless, then I think their 
research programme falls at the first hurdle. And I do not think they will be able 
to, because these are all perfectly legitimate notions of a ‘meaningful life’. I 
imagine that all around the world at the moment, senses (1) to (4) are being 
employed, and I see no prospect of arguing that any of these uses are confused.11  
The new paradigm could retreat to the ambition of analysing one particular 
sense of a ‘meaningful life’. But given that the question of the meaning of life 
has already been excluded, this would raise doubts about the motivation for such 
a project. Moreover, given that of all the senses, (2) looks the most culturally 
specific, since different activities are valued within different societies – and the 
evidence from empirical psychology backs this up – it seems that (2) is the least 
likely to yield to the methods of the new paradigm. 
Let us turn to Metz’s justification for focusing exclusively on (2). He says 
he will ‘ascertain whether there is something common to, and unique to, the 
conceptions of life’s meaning to be found in at least the Anglo-American 
philosophical literature’ (ibid.: 18). That does not strike me as methodologically 
                                                     
11 Wolf’s combined subjective and objective criterion for social meaning is an attempt to unify senses 
(2) and (3). However, I have argued in Tartaglia 2016: introduction (appendix) that the result is 
incoherent. 
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sound, because the literature in question might have neglected some perfectly 
valid (non-contradictory, widespread) conceptions of life’s meaning. Moreover it 
is an approach that cannot succeed even on its own terms, because some in that 
literature have focused on (3) rather than (2) (hence the disagreement about 
Hitler).  
In any case, Metz finds three promising themes: purposiveness, 
transcendence, and esteem. He then proceeds to argue that they are each 
individually unsatisfactory. However it seems to me that Metz makes his case by 
relying on intuitions based on sense (2), and hence begging the interesting 
question. Thus he argues that not just any purpose will make life meaningful, 
because not all are ‘prima facie candidates for conferring meaning’ (ibid.: 25). 
But that just means they are not all are good in the sense Metz thinks (2) 
requires. Transcendence will not do either, because it ‘wrongly entails’ that 
naturalist accounts are ‘not theories of meaning at all’ (ibid.: 29). But 
philosophers invoke transcendence to address the traditional question, as we 
have seen; and if there were a meaning of life, it might provide its own account 
of meaning in sense (2). The esteem criterion is trickier for Metz to extricate 
himself from, since it is at home in sense (2). But he makes the attempt by 
appealing to the intuition that living in a natural ecosystem might make your life 
more meaningful, without being something you can take pride in (ibid.: 34). As 
far as I can see, this simply shows that Metz’s idea of ‘good’ does not 
necessarily require personal achievement. 
Metz concludes that one single property will not do the trick. But by tying 
his three themes in with sense (2) – which in the case of transcendence, requires 
him to completely reconstrue it as ‘transcending one’s animal nature’ (ibid.: 35) 
– he is able to see overlap between them. He then presses on with his project of 
looking for a single formula for social meaning (ibid.: 35-6). But I think Metz 
has failed to see that purposiveness has just as much application to sense (3), 
that transcendence concerns a different issue, and that his passing denial that 
sense (1) can be conceptually ruled out (ibid.: 26) undermines his project; for if 
sense (1) cannot be ruled out – remember that on sense (1), Hitler had a 
paradigmatically meaningful life – then the fundamentality formula cannot be 
the correct analysis of the concept of a socially meaningful life. Metz thinks he 
can accommodate the sense that social impact makes lives meaningful, by 
restricting this to good social impact; but without an argument for why we 
should do this, he cannot claim to be analysing the concept of a socially 
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meaningful life simpliciter. At best he could be right about sense (2); but the 
natural worries I have been raising about cultural specificity put this into serious 
doubt. 
  
5. Physical Patterns 
 
Metz thinks that his intuitions about how meaningful people’s lives are 
detect physical patterns in the world. If this were right, it might put to rest my 
worries about cultural specificity, and hence show that the new paradigm project 
of finding a single analysis for social meaning in sense (2) is still viable.  
His reasoning begins from an acceptance of Kripke’s account of a posteriori 
necessary identities for natural kind terms, according to which the term ‘water’ 
has its reference causally fixed upon a natural essence, thus allowing us to 
empirically discover the necessary truth ‘water = H2O’. Metz thinks this account 
can be extended to cover claims about meaningfulness. He realises that the kind 
of claims he wants to defend are normative, and hence, on the face of it, 
radically unlike natural kind terms. But he nevertheless thinks that claims such 
as ‘you ought to do X’ denote physical patterns in the world, such that it could 
be an objective fact that if you do X, your life will ceteris paribus become more 
meaningful (ibid.: 92-3). Metz thinks these patterns could in principle be 
measured with precision and recorded by a meaningfulness calculus, akin to 
Bentham’s hedonistic calculus; he supposes that ‘the desirable is 
well-represented with a positive number, and the undesirable with a negative 
one’ (ibid.: 234).12  
This is an original and substantive position, but unfortunately Metz offers 
very little in way of justification for it. He is encouraged by the fact that some 
philosophers have applied a Kripkean account to moral realism, but notes that 
nobody has extended this to normative claims before (ibid.: 92). However, he 
does not say why he thinks that such an extension is possible; he simply says 
there is ‘nothing stopping’ it. As such, I have no justification to critically engage 
with, and so shall just say why I think a moral realist would be ill-advised to 
extend their account in this way. 
Any physical pattern for social meaning must have been created through our 
behavioural interactions. Metz accepts this, saying ‘a world without human 
                                                     
12 Nozick once toyed with this idea in passing (Nozick 1974: 50) but did not pursue it. 
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beings would be devoid of value, or at least would have much less than it does 
now’ (ibid.: 172). This immediately creates two major problems for his proposal, 
as I see it. The first concerns his methodology. For if the project is to detect the 
physical patterns people have created – and people did not create water, after all 
– then we need to know as much as possible about the linguistic and other 
behaviour that has created them. An empirical study of what people in different 
contemporary cultures say when they use ‘a meaningful life’ as a term of 
approbation would be a good start; but Metz, in line with the standard practice 
within the new paradigm, does not take empirical psychology into account.13 
However if the study was to be really serious, I think you would also have to 
look into the history. With all that data at hand, you might conceivably be in a 
position to draw conclusions about a physical essence. But Metz simply uses his 
intuitions; together with those of some recent analytic philosophers, who 
sometimes radically disagree with him.  
The second problem is that if our behavioural interactions create physical 
patterns which dictate what we ought to do to make our lives meaningful, then 
these patterns might conflict. Perhaps Samurai culture created a pattern 
revolving around honour, according to which your life is made more meaningful 
if you show dishonourable enemies no mercy. Metz could not rule out the 
possibility of such cases, given that it is physically possible for humans to 
behave in this manner, and thus create the patterns in question. But then, which 
norms govern us? Metz cannot say that Samurai norms only governed their 
culture, because that would be to abandon his quest for a universal formula. He 
cannot say such norms are impossible, if norms are just physical patterns. And 
he cannot say that such norms are simply not actual, because that would require 
him to abandon his methodology and engage with historical and otherwise 
empirical evidence. 
Metz’s physical norms commit him to either moral scepticism or relativism, 
both of which are anathema to his philosophical outlook. For if our behaviour 
creates the patterns constitutive of a socially meaningful life, then if we change 
behaviour, there will be new patterns. So if people stop valuing the positive 
orientation of rationality towards the fundamental conditions of human existence, 
the fundamentality formula will no longer apply. If the physical patterns of the 
old and new norms both govern human behaviour ahistorically, they will conflict. 
                                                     
13 The sole exception to this rule I have come across is Kauppinen 2013. 
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We would have to say that according to the old pattern, we ought to X, and 
according to the new pattern, we ought to not-X; so the physical world would 
not tell us whether we ought to X. But if we instead say that the physical 
patterns govern only the cultures that produced them, then we are relativists; in 
which case we must give up on the Holy Grail, and start paying attention to the 
specifics of different cultures. 
These are the daunting problems that would face a Kripkean account of 
normative claims about social meaning. But I think any such account is a 
non-starter in any case, because in the case of social meaning, there is nothing 
asocial for our concepts to latch onto. When concepts are built around natural 
phenomena such as our perceptual capacities, or biological pain and our natural 
aversion to it, then an appeal to natural essence may have some plausibility. But 
norms about positive social meaning have nothing of the kind; and so given that 
social practices vary widely and continually change, I think we can assume there 
is no unified natural pattern. A minimal evidential starting point for 
hypothesising such patterns, it seems to me, would be a strong case for believing 
that there is a substantive, pancultural, conceptual unity supervening on the 
physical world. Given that Metz actively disavows the latter (ibid.: 36), then, it 
seems to me that not only does he lack reason for believing in unified physical 
patterns; he endorses a good reason for thinking there are not any.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The new paradigm makes me instinctively uneasy. This is because it ranks 
people’s lives; ordinary people find their lives condemned as relatively 
meaningless by formulas like Metz’s – while philosophy always seems to turn 
out to be a particularly meaningful pursuit. I suspect that any armchair attempt 
by philosophers to analyse social meaning in sense (2) is likely to have this 
outcome, because their intuitions will be guided by the kind of lives they admire. 
However although a comparative tendency is built into (2), I see absolutely no 
reason to think the judgements it produces should be capable of being analysed 
with precision, any more than judgements based on (1) should be. Perhaps some 
have the vague intuition that Gandhi had a more meaningful life than Mother 
Teresa in sense (2), and that Hitler had a more meaningful life than Gandhi in 
sense (1) – but it seems eminently sensible to leave the matter at that. Then these 
senses would remain as refreshingly anodyne as (3), in which we might say that 
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a man’s hobby gave his life meaning, or (4), in which we might say that the 
meaning of a medieval peasant’s life was determined by his farming activities. 
But so much for my instinctive unease; for I think I have done more than enough 
to raise serious doubts about the foundations of this project, which need to be 
addressed before anybody starts thinking about devising an imaginative 
counterexample to the fundamentality formula. Until that happens, philosophers 
interested in either the meaning of life or social meaning should remain in 
Camelot. 
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Abstract 
Thaddeus Metz in Meaning in Life centers his research within western philosophical thought. I will 
engage early Buddhism to see whether its thinking about meaning is compatible with Metz’s 
fundamentality theory of what makes life meaningful. My thesis is: Early Buddhist thinking 
generally supports a fundamentality reading of meaning but in the ethical state of nibbāna (nirvana) 
the Arahant (enlightened one) is in a state that has access to the pure potentiality for meaning. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Thaddeus Metz in Meaning in Life explains that his “…fundamentality 
theory is an improvement over extant rivals; I do not mean to suggest that it is 
the last word on what matters.”1 This concession is appropriate considering that 
Metz centers his critique of meaning theory within research done primarily in 
English speaking journals and classic European sources.2 This, of course, leaves 
room for consideration of those philosophical treatises and journals in other 
languages and places. If fundamentality theory is “the one to beat” as Metz 
claims, then we must begin to frame the theory against other philosophies that 
were not part of his analysis.3 I will not attempt to subject the tenets of 
fundamentality theory to all other philosophical writing on the subject of 
meaning in life. Rather I will narrowly consider fundamentality theory in 
relationship to the early Buddhist theory of knowledge, principally from the Pali 
Canon. My thesis is:  
 
Early Buddhist thinking generally supports a fundamentality reading of 
meaning but in the ethical state of nibbāna (nirvana) the Arahant 
(enlightened one) is in a state that has access to the pure potentiality for 
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meaning.4  
 
English sometimes is not helpful because its speakers want to ascribe an 
exact meaning to a word or phrase. The phrase ‘access to’, defined as ‘being 
available to’ is not completely accurate. What I mean is that the pure potentiality 
for meaning is always already there in the early Buddhist ethical state of 
nibbāna. But as we will discover, the Arahant is no longer concerned with 
meaning in life. The pure potentiality for meaning is always already there in 
nibbāna and for want of a different phrase, the Arahant ‘taps into’ this 
potentiality without accumulating or depleting meaning in any way. The 
challenge of this idea of meaning is that it has no real western counterpart or 
concept.  
Nibbāna is achieved by a person who follows a path of ethical practices, 
contemplation and insight. To enter nibbāna is to extinguish the flame of 
desires: desire to possess, and to cling to being and further becoming. It is the 
elimination of ignorance and the endless change that is the becoming and it is a 
transition into an ethical state of otherwise than being. This state of otherwise 
than being produces meaning by releasing the impermanence of existence and 
the ignorance of meaningful meaning. Nibbāna is the peace of rest from the 
exigencies of becoming.  
Said the Buddha: 
 
Monks, when I fully comprehended, as it really is, the satisfaction in the 
world as such, the misery in the world as such, the escape therefrom as 
such,—then did I discern the meaning of being enlightened in the 
world…Then did knowledge and insight arise in me, thus: Sure is my 
heart’s release. This is my last birth. Now is there no more becoming 
again.5 
 
In nibbāna, the Arahant is in a state of ‘otherwise than being’, which is a 
state where being and becoming are no longer an issue for the Arahant. In the 
state of ‘being and becoming’, all living things experience dukkha (loosely, 
                                                     
4 I will use Pali words e.g. nibbāna for the Sanskrit nirvana, because from Pali the texts of the Pali 
Canon were first translated into English. 
5 The F.W. Woodward Translation of the 2006 Pali Text Society The Book of Gradual Sayings, Book 1 
Chapter XI. Enlightenment (§§ 101-110) §2. 
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suffering) which is a state where meaning in life is possible but the pure 
potentiality of meaning is not available to the unenlightened. It is important to 
consider meaning in context of nibbāna because it puts a new dimension on 
meaning that Metz does not address in his (FT3) explanation of fundamentality 
theory repeated here: 
 
A human person’s life is more meaningful, the more that she, without 
violating certain moral constraints against degrading sacrifices, employs 
her reason and in ways that either positively orient rationality towards 
fundamental conditions of human existence, or negatively orient it 
towards what threatens them, such that the worse parts of her life cause 
better parts towards its end by a process that makes for a compelling and 
ideally original life-story; in addition, the meaning in a human person’s 
life is reduced, the more it is negatively oriented towards fundamental 
conditions of human existence or exhibits narrative disvalue.6 
 
Metz suggests that this statement represents a pursuit beyond personal 
happiness towards that which is worthy to pursue and that which transcends our 
animal nature into an ethical condition that produces “conditions worthy of great 
pride or admiration.”7 One reason why Metz believes that fundamentality 
theory is an improvement over other theories is that it includes an active 
cognitive engagement, a honing of one’s skills towards the ethical.8 It is not 
simply doing the ethical thing but reorienting thinking towards the ethical. The 
ethical state of nibbāna is also an active cognitive engagement oriented towards 
the fundamental conditions of human existence. However it is a state where 
dukkha, and its clinging and craving and attachment has been overcome. While 
others may have admired the Buddha, he himself would have explained that 
meaning for him was without the attachment of pride. Instead meaning comes 
from the defeat of ignorance, attachment, and lack.    
Meaning in nibbāna is revealed to the person who follows the eightfold path 
and becomes enlightened. Therefore having more meaning in life is no longer an 
issue for the Arahant. Access to the ‘pure potentiality’ of meaning in the ethical 
state of nibbāna means that there is no need and no longer any desire to produce 
                                                     
6 Metz, (2013), p. 235. 
7 Metz, (2013), p. 235. 
8 Metz, (2013), p. 236. 
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more meaning because meaning is always already part of the ethical state of 
nibbāna. In the ethical state of nibbāna, the Arahant does not stop living. In 
nibbāna the Arahant’s otherwise than being is always already oriented towards 
the core of Metz’s ethical alignment in (FT3), “…employs her reason and in 
ways that either positively orient rationality towards fundamental conditions of 
human existence, or negatively orient it towards what threatens them…”.  
Therefore, early Buddhism’s idea of nibbāna is not concerned with meaning 
in life, but is concerned with acting ethically towards all creatures (including the 
Arahant), and not just humans, because in early Buddhism all life is sacred. The 
Arahant does not desire to possess or accumulate meaning because such desire 
of possession or clinging and craving are the cause of dukkha and the Arahant 
has defeated dukkha. However, meaning that is derived from ethical action in all 
endeavors is central to the otherwise than being in the ethical state of nibbāna. 
Following the eightfold path can lead to nibbāna. But it is a steep slope and 
many will not achieve nibbāna in this or perhaps many more lifetimes. Is life 
without nibbāna meaningless? No, those who have not been enlightened can live 
an ethical meaningful existence, but they will not be in a state where the pure 
potentiality for meaning is available to them. Meaning is attained by those who 
follow an ethical path, but as long as they desire or covet meaning and become 
attached to it they will be reborn because they have not yet defeated dukkha.9 
The eightfold path is not unlike Metz’s orientation of being towards the ethical 
act, the ethical response. The ‘right ways’ of the process orient the aspirant 
towards: right view, right speech, right doing, right aspiration, right livelihood, 
right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration.10  
By limiting my discussion to early Buddhism and not including other 
Asian-originated belief systems I am subjecting myself to the same critique of 
universality that Metz has expected to receive, but since Asian thought was left  
untouched by Metz, perhaps an  overview of the early Buddhist canon would 
be beneficial in understanding how one non-western philosophy (within the 
scope of early Buddhism) defines meaning and whether this meaning can be 
subsumed under the banner of fundamentality theory. First, what can we say 
about meaning in early Buddhism? 
 
                                                     
9 This is why Stephen Collins recommends the term ‘aspire to’ enlightenment. Collins, (2010), p. 56. 
10 The T. W. Rhys Davids Translation of The Dialogs of the Buddha Volume II, Chapter 14, The 
Mahapdana Sutta, The Sublime Story II, 21 [35]. 
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2. Considering the Idea of Meaning in Early Buddhism 
 
Early Buddhism has no exact phrase for ‘meaning in life’. The process 
called the eightfold path first espoused by the Buddha leads towards the 
elimination of dukkha, which has been translated into many different English 
words. 
Dukkha has no easily explained meaning in English. As T. W. Rhys Davids 
explains, English likes to narrowly define words; Pali centers dukkha in a much 
broader spectrum of this aspect of the condition human. Dukkha has been 
explained as suffering, ill, unsatisfactoriness, and lack. But no one of these is a 
good fit because dukkha involves not only the physical but the mental.11 
Dukkha, Michael C. Brannigan says, is “dislocation” that includes both physical 
pain and mental anguish.12 Rhys Davids and others translate dukkha into 
English as ‘ill’ for the texts written for the Pali Text Society at the turn of the 
twentieth century. Padmasiri de Silva adds, “disharmony, anxiety and 
unsatisfactoriness” but he cautioned that dukkha is not angst.13 Sue Hamilton 
explains that, “…it is important for a proper understanding of dukkha means to 
realise that is being used to make a truth statement and not a value judgment…In 
particular it is not stating that human experience is unpleasant.”14 Therefore if 
dukkha is a truth statement assigning the western concept of ‘evil’ to it would 
not be appropriate. Dukkha simply is. 
However, central to dukkha is the unsatisfactoriness of the clinging, craving 
and striving for more becoming and more being. The methodology of the 
eightfold path in early Buddhism is to help the aspirant to find the way to 
nibbāna, or the release of the āsavas, the passions (the cankers) and the desires 
to cling to and possess things, others, self, and being. The aspirant is on a path to 
defeat dukkha which means leaving behind attachments even to desire nibbāna. 
The aim of the eightfold path is to defeat dukkha, not to attain (possess) nibbāna. 
Nibbāna comes to those who reach nibbāna, but if it is coveted by the aspirant 
this leads only to more dukkha. And living the right ways according to the 
eightfold path is the route towards nibbāna. But what is this state called 
nibbāna? Steven Collins explains through the Buddha from the early Pali text, 
                                                     
11 Rhys Davids, (1921-1925), p. 363, dukkha. (– NOTE: this is the page and the word reference in the 
dictionary). 
12 Brannigan, (2010), p. 52. 
13 de Silva, (1976), p. 20. 
14 Hamilton, (2000), p.13. 
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Majjhima Nikāya, “…the enlightened person is deep, immeasurable, 
unfathomable like the great ocean.”15 Collins also states that “…nirvana is a 
genuine Existent, not a conceptual one.”16 While the Buddha cannot articulate 
for the unenlightened what it is like in the state of nibbāna there is a profound 
sense that it is the end of striving for unsatisfactory things. That it is so full of 
meaning it could never be explained but that this is a fullness of immeasurable 
depth and breadth. None of this meaning is possessed it is simply available for 
the understanding. Collins describes the wisdom of nibbāna not as something 
that is momentary, “Rather, it is supposed to be a continuous form of awareness 
present throughout any and every activity, achieved by and embodied in the 
practice of mindfulness.”17 
Metz’s desiderata of beauty for fundamentality theory appeals to deep 
themes of human experience.18 For nibbāna beauty is not the aesthetic driven 
by the passions and emotions but the removal of ignorance for the understanding 
of the world without the experience of dukkha. Nibbāna is the primordial theme 
of themes under which beauty, ethics, understanding, and logic can be 
subsumed. 
Early Buddhism has no omnipotent or omniscient God as is expressed by 
most Western Abrahamic religions. Nor does early Buddhism believe in the 
separate soul or separate self. T. W. Rhys Davids explains the origin of anattā 
(without soul) in context of Indian thinking and in contrast with the west:  
 
And the original anattā, teaching is only a denying of what a man might 
wrongly hold to be the self—surely a very different thing from denying 
his reality. Seeking the master among the staff, as I have said elsewhere, 
you may say to each servant: ‘You are not he!’ without meaning: ‘You 
have no master.’ I would add here, that it is good to see the translator [F. L. 
Woodward] rendering the Sankhyan citation na me attâ (pp. 171, 178) by 
Not for me (or, to me) is this the self.’ Here is the true Indian way. ‘This is 
not my soul’ is to talk British.19  
 
                                                     
15 Collins, (1996), p. 163. 
16 Collins, (1996), p. 164. 
17 Collins, (2010), p. 42. 
18 Metz, (2013), pp. 230-231. 
19 The F. L. Woodward translated, The Book of Gradual Sayings, Volume II, The Book of the Fours, 
Introduction by T. W. Rhys Davids, p. viii. 
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While retaining the ontological, ‘human person’s life’, Metz allows for the 
beginnings of an otherwise than being by orienting human rationality towards 
the human condition. But is this enough for the Buddha?  
Likely not, as G. P. Malalasekera explains: 
 
The passionate sense of egoism is regarded as the root of the world’s 
unhappiness. For one thing, it makes the individual blind to the reality of 
other persons. When the notion of self disappears, the notion of ‘mine’ 
also disappears and one becomes free from the idea of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ 
(ahaíkára-mamaòkára), and there follows a gentler, profounder sympathy 
with all sentient existence.20 
 
I suggest that the Buddha disambiguated meaning from self, ego and I, and 
situated the pure potentiality for meaning within the ethical state of otherwise 
than being. The becoming of life is located in impermanence, the impermanence 
of being and the craving for being. Becoming in the sense of wanting to be 
reborn into another being is the cause of dukkha, the clinging, grasping, craving 
ultimately for more life. The circle of becoming is the circle of dukkha, which 
many call suffering, but it is also the condition of ignorance, the ignorance of the 
pure potentiality for meaning. Meaning in the sense of otherwise than being is 
the cessation of the cycles of becoming because ignorance and craving have 
been vanquished. This meaning in the state of otherwise than being is a pure 
meaning in a state of freedom from wants, cares, and existence in dukkha. It is a 
becoming from rather than a becoming into for it is a freeing from the fetters of 
taņhā, lust for life. 21  Meaning without ego is the otherwise than 
being—nibbāna. The Arahant does not judge meaning, for nibbāna is the 
control of the delusion of the ego which judges by desiring one thing over 
another. 
Any meaning in life for Buddhism is not derived from supernaturalist 
theories. Nibbāna, I will agree with T. W. Rhys Davids, is not a transcendental 
state, but rather an ethical state.22 Nibbāna is a state of otherwise than being. 
                                                     
20 Malalasekera, (1996), p. 11 
21 T. W. Rhys Davids supplies two meanings to taņhā, first, “tormented by hunger or thirst”, and 
second, “is a state of mind that leads to rebirth”. Combining the two it is a thirst or a lust for 
continuing existence—rebirth and to live again. Rhys Davids, (1921-1925), p. 330, taņhā. 
22 “Nibbāna is purely and solely an ethical state, to be reached in this birth by ethical practices, 
contemplation and insight. It is therefore not transcendental. Rhys Davids, (1921-1925), p. 405, 
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Nibbāna is not heaven in the traditional Western sense, but an ethical state and it 
is achieved while the Arahant (enlightened one) lives. Nibbāna, it is true, leads 
one to the end of rebirth but not to death in the traditional sense. 
Before one achieves nibbāna, becoming is impermanent and nibbāna 
reveals the true nature of deathlessness (amata) that is nibbāna. Certainly the 
truth of dukkha is not just that life can be painful…life can be joyous…but that 
life is impermanent and full of change, including the cycle of rebirth (saṁsāra) 
that is the goal of the eightfold path to stop. Dukkha isn’t evil, or even suffering 
in much of its manifestation…dukkha just is. However, for the Buddha and his 
followers dukkha was something that needed to be overcome. 
Metz’s fundamentality theory pushes back the animalistic ego and asserts 
meaning’s achievement within an ethical framework positively oriented towards 
the fundamentals of human existence. Metz is denying neither the self nor 
satisfaction in the conduct of a life oriented towards positive meaning. But what 
he has done is to have the ego, the self, and the soul (in context of his first 
desiderata that there could be, “…relevance of supernatural conditions for 
meaning in life”) first logically consider the consequences of action and act 
positively towards the fundamental conditions of human existence and even 
strive to turn around those who would act negatively towards these same 
conditions.23 If there is no word for meaning in life in early Buddhism how can 
we derive from early Buddhist theories of knowledge what meaning might 
mean? The process of rebirth or saṃsāra is because there is dukkha, ultimately 
the clinging and craving to being itself. But being, becoming and rebirth are 
what Buddhism ultimately wants to cure. I will explain.  
 
3. What Might Meaning Mean in Early Buddhism? 
 
The Buddha would not deny that the householder (a non-monk) derives 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Nibbāna.” However, Maurice Walshe disputed this understanding of nibbāna, “In fact it is precisely 
the one and only transcendental element in Buddhism, for which very reason no attempt is made to 
define it in terms of a personal god, a higher self, or the like. It is ineffable. It can, however, be 
realised, and its realisation is the aim of the Buddhist practice. (The Maurice Walshe 1997 translation 
of The Long Discourses of the Buddha, Dīgha Nikāya for Wisdom Publication, p. 29, Introduction.) 
Transcendental without a God is one possible interpretation, but since nibbāna does not require 
anything but earthly practices, I will maintain that for purposes of this exploration of meaning that 
nibbāna is principally an ethical state and it is not tied to supernaturalism or requires any 
transcendence. 
23 Metz, (2013), p. 232. 
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some satisfaction from being a householder and is perhaps oblivious that his 
clinging and craving to things in the world, others, and ultimately to himself 
causes dukkha. The ordinary person experiences happiness, the passions, and 
sorrow. The condition of life where dukkha is a fact of existence can be looked 
at pessimistically under the general subject of suffering, but it can also be looked 
at optimistically that life, even with its dukkha, provides the opportunity or a 
means to enlightenment.  
The pure potentiality for meaning in early Buddhist thinking I will suggest 
can be accessed only in the state of nibbāna or otherwise than being. In this 
ethical state that which is necessary to throw off the shackles of dukkha has been 
derived during the process of following the eightfold path. Existence in an 
ethical state of nibbāna means that the Arahant is cognizant of the methods 
necessary to maintain this ethical state even when tempters like the deva (a 
Buddhist ‘god’) Mara try to dissuade the enlightened one from continuing on the 
process that is the eightfold path. It is only in nibbāna, however, that the Arahant 
becomes aware of and can access the pure potentiality for meaning.  
While the householder and others in early Buddhism may conduct 
themselves ethically, they still have not overcome dukkha. They certainly derive 
meaning from this ethical life and may even through their ethical ways assure 
themselves a higher rebirth in the cycle of saṃsāra, but they have not yet 
conquered dukkha. This is actual meaning which follows, accumulates, or is 
counterbalanced against unethical acts from rebirth to rebirth. Frank Hoffman 
explains the anātman (no self) in context of living and rebirth as, “continuity 
without identity of self-same substance.” 24 It is only after dukkha has been 
conquered can the enlightened one begin to understand the full meaning of 
ethical existence and that existence is called nibbāna. It is only in this ethical 
state of otherwise than being that the full meaning of meaning can be accessed. 
This does not mean that the Arahant exists in a state of pure meaning, only that 
the Arahant is in an ethical state where meaning is without the restraint and 
unsatisfactoriness of dukkha, which means that the Arahant is in an ethical state 
where the causes of suffering (dukkha) have been eliminated (for the Arahant) 
and where an ethical existence in the purest possible sense is in an otherwise 
state, a state of otherwise than being. And meaning in Nibbāna is no longer 
meaning in life for the Arahant because being and becoming are no longer an 
                                                     
24 Hoffman, (1987), p. 53. 
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issue. This is meaning in a state of otherwise than being. And, as said before, I 
maintain nibbāna is not best understood as a transcendental or a supernatural 
state but an ethical state. Arahants like the Buddha may live for years after 
becoming enlightened so we cannot say that the Buddha or other Arahants exist 
on another plane, only in an ethical state of otherwise than being.  
Admittedly the ethical state of nibbāna, the otherwise than being, is a 
challenge for those steeped in Western philosophy.25 There is nothing quite like 
it in traditional Western thinking because most enlightened states such as living 
sainthood and other aspects of the purely ethical life have overtones of 
supernaturalism that early Buddhism does not espouse. Collins paraphrases 
Wittgenstein’s last proposition in his Tractatus in relationship to nibbāna, “What 
you can’t say about nirvana you can’t say, and you can’t picture it by means of 
imagery either.” He follows with, “Inexpressible, timeless nirvana is a moment 
in the Buddhist textualization of time, the explicit or implicit closer marker in its 
discourse of felicity. It is the motionless and ungraspable horizon, the 
limit-condition that makes of the Pali imaginaire a coherent whole.” 26 What the 
outsider (unenlightened) cannot know about nibbāna is greater than what the 
outsider can know.  
Metz’s fundamentality theory (FT3) strives, like the acolyte on the early 
Buddhist eightfold path, towards a life of meaning by being negatively oriented 
towards that which is not desirable in the fundamental conditions of human 
existence (dukkha) and being positively oriented towards the fundamental 
conditions of human existence. In Buddhism the culmination of this 
reorientation is nibbāna. The eightfold path requires a person to be mindful, 
wise, and act ethically. Fundamentality theory emphasizes cognitive 
reorientation (mindfulness), logical decision making (wisdom), and positive 
orientation to the fundamentals of human existence (ethical thoughts; ethical 
acts). In this both theories appear to agree.  
The process of the eightfold path eschews and sheds practices that produce 
dukkha, substituting them with different practices, behaviors, and thinking that 
are towards the ethical state in nibbāna where being and becoming are no longer 
                                                     
25 Of course, Emmanuel Levinas uses the term “otherwise than being” in context of his ethics of 
responsibility to the other. However, no state change like nibbāna is contemplated by Levinas, even 
though his idea of putting the metaphysical before the ontological could make one think he is going in 
that direction. 
26 Collins, (2010), p. 185. Wittgenstein’s last proposition is, “Whereof one cannot speak, therefore one 
must be silent.” Wittgenstein, (1922), Proposition 7. 
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an issue for the Arahant because dukkha has been defeated and the cycle of 
saṃsāra or rebirth has been severed.  
Meaning, in the form of acting ethically while following the eightfold path 
towards enlightenment, produces meaning along the way. The householder, as 
has been explained, also achieves meaning in life by living ethically. Even if the 
individual dies before becoming enlightened, living ethically is quite often 
rewarded by rebirth into a higher state. In other words, meaning is carried 
forward in the cycle of saṃsāra. At the same time ethical lapses are black marks 
or (‘anti-matter’27 as Metz calls it) which are part of the balance that is carried 
forward into the rebirth cycle. In one lifetime ethical living may propel the 
person to a higher form of rebirth, but ethical lapses may push the person to a 
lesser form of existence in the next cycle of rebirth.  
But since there is no separate self and no soul, what carries forward from 
rebirth to rebirth? This is Hoffman’s continuity without identity of self-same 
substance. And we know from the earliest chroniclers of the Buddha that he 
could remember his past lives in sufficient enough detail to derive meaning from 
these lives in relationship to his own enlightenment.  
There is never a part-whole distinction for meaning in early Buddhist 
thinking. If meaning were derived only by being in the state of nibbāna, then 
only in nibbāna could there be any meaning. In the west we might say, then, that 
only the saint could have achieved meaning in life because he/she lived a life 
devoted to the path towards sainthood. The Buddha sees meaning in a 
householder’s life as well as the Arahant in nibbāna.  
He says: 
 
O priests, if anyone says that a man must reap according to his deeds, in 
that case there is no religious life, nor is there any opportunity afforded for 
the entire extinction of misery. But if anyone says that the reward a man 
reaps accords with his deeds, in that case there is a religious life, and 
opportunity is afforded for the entire extinction of misery.28 
 
Certainly there is a Buddhist hell for those whose practices are anti-ethical 
in the extreme. However, this is not a permanent state either, for there is always 
possibility for achieving enlightenment in some future life, though it may take 
                                                     
27 Metz, (2013), p. 64. 
28 Ross, (1952), p. 106. 
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much longer and many more cycles of rebirth as a result. Meaning is not lost in 
saṃsāra; it is accumulated but can also be counterbalanced by actions that Metz 
calls ‘anti-matter’ and for which the Buddha might have called conditions which 
maintain or produce dukkha. Dukkha is a fact and itself is not anti-matter, but 
actions that Metz calls anti-matter can continue the condition called dukkha.   
The householder was not scorned, but celebrated by the Buddha. There is 
every much the need for householders as there are monks in society. However, 
this does not mean that the householder will escape dukkha. This means that the 
householder can obtain meaning in life by living an ethical life, but will not 
achieve the ethical state of nibbāna without engaging the rigors of the eightfold 
path and conquering dukkha.  
By way of summarizing the discussion so far, I want reiterate that early 
Buddhism does not embrace supernaturalism as the foundation for meaning in 
life. The Buddha thought that all life, human or otherwise was sacred and that 
meaning in life can be obtained through ethical practices. This meaning 
cumulates but can be offset by non-ethical practices (anti-matter) anytime during 
the cycle of rebirth, saṃsāra. However, and this is something that is not 
explored in Metz’s fundamentality theory, there is an ethical state called nibbāna 
that can be achieved (no one is precluded) by anyone and where the pure 
potentiality for meaning is available. But while the Arahant who achieves 
nibbāna is still living, being and becoming is no longer an issue. Therefore the 
ethical state of nibbāna is in a state of otherwise than being. This state of 
otherwise than being is not outside of existence (the extra-physical), because the 
Arahant still lives in this world, but this is a person who has shorn the shackles 
of the need for being and becoming and has ended for himself/herself the 
unsatisfactory desire for rebirth.  
Finally, what are the dimensions of nibbāna? Floyd Ross explains that the 
ethical and psychological comprise one dimension and the metaphysical the 
second. He said: 
Liberation from resentment, coveting, lusting constitutes the ethical factor in 
Nirvana. Expressed psychologically, it involves relinquishing all sense of the ‘I’. 
The metaphysical dimension refers to the cessation of Becoming and of 
ignorance. This cessation of Becoming is the supreme goal sought; the 
extinction of craving is merely a steppingstone to this.29 
                                                     
29 Ross, (1952), p. 116. I concur with Ross but with the rejection of the term goal which is an 
attachment term. Becoming simply ceases to be upon enlightenment. One cannot desire this or one 
 124
 
4. Meaning in Nibbāna 
 
Nibbāna is not a state where one has accumulated so much meaning; one 
enters it not as someone who has for years paid down a debt to finally achieve 
full ownership. Enlightenment, while it comes from the process of living the 
eightfold path, is not something that is the same for everyone. Nibbāna is not 
achieved after filling the bucket full of meaning. For some, enlightenment may 
come quickly; for others, it may take many more cycles of saṃsāra. While 
meaning accumulates in the state of being and becoming, in the state of 
otherwise than being it does not because the ethical state of nibbāna is the state 
where the pure potentiality for meaning is always already available to Arahant. 
However, this does not mean that the Arahant will ever actualize the full 
potentiality of meaning.  
In early Buddhism there is no shortage of ‘good’ meaning for anyone who 
lives ethically and performs ethical deeds. However, until dukkha can be 
defeated by following the eightfold path and achieving nibbāna, even the ethical 
person will probably be reborn. Good meaning and Metz’s anti-matter accrued 
during life is accumulated and balanced, sending the reborn into a higher or 
lower rebirth. The person who follows the eightfold path and achieves the 
ethical state called nibbāna has not accumulated more good meaning than 
anyone else, because the amount of good meaning one has accumulated is not 
tied to achieving enlightenment. One can throw off the shackles of dukkha even 
if the accumulation of anti-matter from this life and previous rebirths is higher 
than the total of good meaning. However, once in the ethical state of nibbāna, 
rather than accumulate more meaning, the Arahant is in a state where the pure 
potentiality for meaning can be ‘tapped into’. Nor is this a state where the 
Arahant would want to or need to accumulate meaning because attachment to, 
cumulating or possessing meaning, like the possession of being and becoming 
would only serve to produce dukkha…and the Arahant has been successful in 
defeating dukkha. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
will continue in the cycle of saṁsāra. 
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5. The Dilemma of Parinibbāna 
 
The living Arahant, as the Buddha describes, is like the charcoal log that 
could burn again as “having fuel remaining.” “While the Arahant is still alive, 
he/she still experiences the process of the five aggregates, but they do not burn 
with the fires of passion, aversion, or delusion. When the Arahant passes away, 
there is no longer any experience of aggregates here or anywhere else.”30 Few 
Arahants die at the moment of their enlightenment, and the Buddha was not in 
favor of suicide upon the achievement of enlightenment.  
However, there is a state to which the Arahant passes, and that is the state of 
Parinibbāna. The Arahant is already in an ethical state, a state of otherwise than 
being where being and becoming are no longer an issue. The cycle of rebirth has 
been severed, so the Arahant will not be reborn. However, there is no separate 
soul in Buddhism, which means no soul, metaphysical or otherwise, can be 
passed into the state called Parinibbāna. In life there is no ‘I’ but we are the 
process called the five aggregates (the khandhas) they include material form 
rūpa, feeling (vedanā), perception (saññá), dispositions or coefficients of 
consciousness (sankhārā), and cognition or consciousness (viññāṇa). The five 
aggregates never coalesce into a whole because they form the process that is our 
becoming. The Arahant severs being, becoming, and rebirth when entering 
nibbāna. What happens to the Arahant after there is no more rebirth (amata or 
deathlessness)? The Buddha would not speculate as to what happens to the 
Arahant after the final passing. Why? There are no processes of the khandhas 
after the Arahant passes away which means no one can report what the state of 
Parinibbāna is like. The Buddha refused to speculate about what he could not 
know or understand from experience or through empirical evidence. Can we 
ascribe a meaning to the meaning for the otherwise than being, nibbāna and 
Parinibbāna? Even the Buddha backed away from this idea.  
T.W. Rhys Davids explains: 
 
Unspeakable, of that for which in the Buddha’s own saying there is no 
word, which cannot be grasped in terms of reasoning and cool logic, the 
Nameless, Undefinable (cp. the simile of extinction of the flame which 
may be said to pass from a visible state into a state which cannot be 
                                                     
30 Note 1, §44, p.29, from the Thanissaro Bhikkhu translation of the Itivuttaka in the chapter, The 
Group of Twos. 
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defined. Thus the Saint (Arahant) passes into that same state, for which 
there is ‘no measure’ (i.e. no dimension)).31  
 
 Is Parinibbāna heaven? Not in the sense of mainstream Abrahamic 
religions. Heaven with these mainstream Western religions is associated with the 
omniscient and omnipotent God. For early Buddhism, the karmic forces of the 
universe are always already present, so the question early Buddhism asks is 
whether these self-same forces would also be present in Parinibbāna but in an 
ethical state that is the continuation of nibbāna after the Arahant’s final rebirth 
into deathlessness (amata). In the end, the Buddha did not explain this mystery. 
 
6. What Challenges Does Early Buddhism Offer Fundamentality Theory? 
 
We can seek to undermine the early Buddhist ideas of rebirth, enlightenment, 
and the state of otherwise than being after the last rebirth of the Arahant called 
Parinibbāna as not being helpful towards a theory of meaning in life, or we can 
reconsider fundamentality theory in light of early Buddhist thinking. 
I believe that Metz’s fundamentality theory as expressed in (FT3) generally 
applies to early Buddhist thinking. However, because the ethical state of 
nibbāna is something that can be achieved by the living and in this state one has 
access to the pure potentiality of meaning, the definition (FT3) may be 
inadequate to describe what meaning means to the Arahant. As I have explained 
before, nibbāna is not a state of pure meaning but it is the ethical state where the 
Arahant can avail himself/herself of the pure potentiality for meaning. Those not 
in this ethical state can strive for more and more meaning but cannot avail 
themselves of the pure potentiality for meaning without becoming enlightened. I 
submit along with Metz, there is no question that the ethical person in early 
Buddhist thinking who is not an Arahant will obtain meaning in life as 
expressed by (FT3). And in early Buddhist thinking this meaning will not be lost 
when an unenlightened person dies. The continuity without identity of self-same 
substance aspect of the early Buddhist theory of knowledge explains that this is 
possible.  
But we have no real equivalent in Western thinking of an ethical state quite 
like nibbāna. Certainly there are saints and persons like Mother Theresa who 
                                                     
31 Rhys Davids, (1921-1925), p. 405, Nibbāna. 
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lived their lives in ethical ways beyond what most would aspire to or even 
consider possible or desirable. The difference between the Buddhist Arahant and 
the Christian saint, for example, is that early Buddhism does not ascribe to a 
purpose theory in which an omniscient and omnipotent God creates all of, or in 
part, an objective moral system. Nor in early Buddhism does anyone have a soul 
that can enter such a place as heaven or hell. In nibbāna the Arahant has shed 
the āsavas, the cankers, and when the Arahant enters Parinibbāna the five 
aggregates (khandhas) no longer function. However the Buddha did not believe 
that there was nothingness in Parinibbāna. While the Buddha could not explain 
what of the Arahant went into Parinibbāna, Hoffman’s ‘continuity without 
identity of self-same substance’ conveys the general idea.    
Early Buddhism affirms that anyone can harness the karmic forces of the 
universe by following the eightfold path towards nibbāna. In early Buddhist 
thinking, one does not have to have an omniscient or omnipotent God to effect 
the karmic forces. These forces simply are. Belief in a God is not necessary for 
nibbāna to be achieved. This is not all that different from the arguments Metz 
has made with his first desideratum, “An attractive theory of meaning in life 
ought to account for the respect in which supernatural conditions could add 
meaning, even if they are not necessary for it.”32 While mysterious, Nibbāna is 
not a supernatural condition; it is an ethical state, a state that any living person 
can aspire to.33  
Early Buddhist karma (kamma in Pali but I will use ‘karma’ going forward) 
says that acts produce consequences for the living and for the living’s prospects 
for rebirth: karma is moral causation and the result is called vipāka. Thus we 
might surmise that there is both good karmic act and bad karmic act.  
Within Metz’s definition of meaning, if I prize it, a bad act could be 
meaningful. Metz explains that in part meaning is “…something that is worthy 
for its own sake, something that provides a person with at least some (pro tanto) 
basic reason to prize it.”34 But this is only part of the equation because Metz 
further requires that meaning in life have an ethical component. With this I 
                                                     
32 Metz, (2013), p. 220. 
33 The Mahayana branch of Buddhism says that any sentient being can aspire to whether bug, slug, or 
human. This idea called ‘Buddha nature’ is beyond the scope of this paper because the idea was 
conceived long after the chronicles of early Buddhism in the Theravada tradition were written. 
However, if all sentient beings can become enlightened can they also obtain meaning in life like 
humans? This question requires additional consideration and likely would be a good subject for a 
subsequent discussion and paper. 
34 Metz, (2013), p. 4, emphasis in original. 
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believe the Buddha would agree. The pure potentiality for meaning becomes 
apparent to the Arahant only after years (and perhaps countless rebirths) of acts 
and thoughts that are inherently good—ethical. The act or thought that is bad 
carries with it bad karma (similar to Metz’s anti-matter) which quite often 
perpetuates dukkha and leads one down the path towards rebirth. The Buddha 
did not believe that letting others suffer would make them stronger. Rather he 
used his pedagogical powers to help monks and others overcome the hurdles 
they faced along the eightfold path. But he would not always be there which is 
why his eightfold path was carefully explained and taught. 
In a traditional story the murdering robber Angulimala confronts the Buddha 
alone on the road. Angulimala asks the Buddha questions and the Buddha 
explains to him how the robber’s bad deeds today will haunt him through many 
more rebirths.35 Angulimala right then and there asks to follow the Buddha and 
the Buddha welcomes him.   
Karma is action; however it is we who judge the value of meaning produced 
by any action whether its consequence is good or bad. For example, does the 
action produce dukkha? Can we always know? Karma gives no easy answers to 
its understanding because the consequences of two nearly identical acts by two 
different persons may be different.36 The fatty meal eaten by a glutton who does 
not take care of himself may have far greater consequences than the same meal 
eaten by one who lives a more wholesome life. Then again the consequence may 
be insignificant in this lifetime but be significant in a future rebirth. A lot 
depends upon three factors: “…merit acquired in the past…life in appropriate 
surroundings…proper resolve or application.”37 Karma in and of itself is not 
meaning, but it is “one of the contributing factors in the human personality.”38 It 
is the Arahant who discovers the pure potentiality for meaning because he/she 
has defeated ignorance (avijja) and dukkha. The pure potentiality for meaning 
lies in the understanding which is nibbāna. This may have taken the Arahant 
many rebirths, so we must remember that “I” may be understood as “continuity 
without identity of self-same substance.” 
 
 
                                                     
35 D. J. I. Kalupahana, (1982), p. 182. 
36 D. J. Kalupahana, (1976), p. 45. 
37 D. J. Kalupahana, (1976), p. 50. 
38 D. J. Kalupahana, (1976), p. 51. 
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7. Is There a Buddhist Fundamentality Theory? 
 
It would not be appropriate to suggest that there is another fundamentality 
theory we might call Buddhist fundamentality theory. There are so many 
branches of Buddhism that no one theory of meaning could encompass all. What 
I am suggesting that if there is an ethical state called nibbāna that can be aspired 
to by anyone, and in that ethical state the pure potentiality for meaning is 
available to the Arahant, then there is more to meaning in early Buddhism than 
what has been expressed in Metz’s (FT3). Nor am I saying that (FT3) could not 
accommodate the pure potentiality for meaning in nibbāna, but because Metz’s 
orientation to meaning theory is strictly through the English language and 
classic European thinking, where Eastern ideas such as nibbāna are not 
considered in his fundamentality theory.  
Early Buddhism is more than just a religion. The Buddha formulated the 
eightfold path from his own experience towards achieving enlightenment. He 
saw that nibbāna was possible through the process called the eightfold path 
(right view, right purpose, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, 
right mindfulness and right concentration) and that within that process there are 
three aspects of the otherwise than being that are essential to achieve ethical 
state: mindfulness, wisdom, and ethical action. Nibbāna is not an ethical state 
where the Arahant becomes separate from humanity. The island the Buddha 
speaks (as written by early chroniclers because the Buddha wrote nothing down) 
about in the Dhammapada is an island against the temptations of the āsavas, and 
the deva Māra who try to sway the Arahant away from the eightfold path and 
nibbāna. Said the Buddha, “By rousing himself, by earnestness, by restraint and 
control, the wise man may make for himself an island which no flood can 
overwhelm.”39 The Buddha was not saying become a hermit or recluse, but 
construct impenetrable barriers against the temptations and flaming passions. 
The Arahant practices mindfulness and meditation, reasons and acts in an ethical 
manner, and puts knowledge before faith. The Buddha put knowledge before 
faith (saddhā) because faith can sometimes be blind to knowledge. Knowledge 
is asserted by the experience of it by the individual who experiences the 
knowledge. If one does not experience and yet believes, one is acting in faith. 
Faith without knowledge and verification leads to the taking for granted of ideas 
                                                     
39 The 2000 F. Max Muller translation of the Wisdom of the Buddha, the Dhammapada, Dover 
Publications, Mineola, N.Y., Chapter II On Earnestness, Location 91, Kindle Edition.  
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that could be falsehoods.  
 
8. The Dimension of Meaning in Early Buddhism 
 
For the most part I find little to quibble with in Metz’s nine desiderata for 
his fundamentality theory in relationship to early Buddhist thinking.40 However 
desiderata number four, ‘good consequences’ deserves some additional attention 
in context of early Buddhist thinking.  
Damien Keown explains that Buddhism is not utilitarian because it “does 
not define the right separate from the good,” and “for Buddhism acts have bad 
consequences because they are bad acts, they are not bad acts because they have 
bad consequences as a utilitarian would maintain.”41 What precedes the act, the 
motive, determines whether it is a rightful act. Therefore intentionally stomping 
a bug would not be a rightful act, but the accidental stepping on a bug while 
otherwise in the performance of rightful acts could be a rightful act. There are, 
however, branches of modern Buddhism where any denial of any living other’s 
becoming is avoided in the extreme. Therefore early Buddhism would probably 
replace the word ‘consequences’ with ‘acts’ in the fundamentality discussion. 
My objection with ‘good consequences’ in connection with early Buddhist 
thinking is with the term only. Metz is vociferous like the Buddha that it is the 
thinking, the logic of the agent in part that produces meaning. Metz says:  
 
Meaning depends, in part, on whether the agent: promotes well-being in 
others in morally permissible ways, promotes well-being in others in ways 
that robustly involve her agency and effort; reflects excellence in relation 
to herself, and is subjectively attracted to what she is doing.42  
 
What is at the core of the similarities between Metz’s fundamentality theory 
of meaning in life and early Buddhism’s ideas is that in early Buddhism there is 
meaning in life for all who are not enlightened and this cumulates or is devalued 
by living the lives of being and becoming during the cycle of rebirth or saṃsāra. 
It is not until one becomes enlightened that one discovers that the pure potential 
                                                     
40 Metz, (2013), pp. 220-222. Desiderata include: 1) spiritual realm, 2) subjective conditions, 3) 
negative conditions, 4) good consequences, 5) moral constraints, 6) agent-relativity, 7) internal and 
external, 8) deliberation and decision, and 9) object of rationality. 
41 Keown, (1992, 2001), pp. 177-178. 
42 Metz, (2013), p. 198. 
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for meaning is available in the otherwise than being in the ethical state called 
nibbāna. But the difference between Metz’s fundamentality theory and early 
Buddhist thinking is that in this ethical state of otherwise than being, ‘meaning 
in life’ is no longer an issue, and its measurement, and accumulation, is no 
longer an issue for the Arahant because the accumulation of anything, including 
meaning, is a cause of dukkha. Dukkha has been defeated by the Arahant. The 
Arahant would not desire or seek to ascertain whether one person has more 
meaning than another in the state of being and becoming or in the state of 
otherwise than being. The accumulation of meaning is simply not an issue for 
the enlightened one.  
The Buddha was an Arahant, and there presumably have been many others 
who have achieved nibbāna. The Buddha, by all accounts, was an extraordinary 
person whose legacy and teachings have outlived his final rebirth. But is the 
Buddha’s meaning greater than most others? I maintain that this is not the case. 
The Buddha was a great teacher who strode an ethical path after enlightenment 
and encouraged many others to follow his footsteps into enlightenment. Even as 
he began to see and feel his own death coming, he resisted the idea of appointing 
an ontological successor. Instead he passed (presumably) into Parinibbāna and 
deathlessness without asking others to assess or measure his own meaning. One 
Arahant has no more meaning than another. What is possible is that the Arahant 
who lives longer as an Arahant could help to produce more meaning for others 
along the way. However there is no formula for this because there are some 
Arahants like the Buddha who will be better teachers than others.  
There is no more meaning to be accumulated for an enlightened one. All 
enlightened are always already in a state where the pure potentiality for meaning 
is available for the understanding and use by the Arahant in the process of 
continuing along the eightfold path, employing Metz’s “…reason and in ways 
that either positively orient rationality towards fundamental conditions of human 
existence, or negatively orient it towards what threatens them…”  
Certainly, like the Buddha, any Arahant may live a long life of ethical 
service to the world, live long in mindful meditation, and amass great 
knowledge and wisdom about the karmic forces. This, fundamentality theory 
would measure as meaning in life. However, what is fundamentally different in 
early Buddhist thinking is that the Arahant is in a state of otherwise than being 
where such measuring of ‘meaning in life’ is no longer an issue and in fact has 
been defeated because such accumulation even of the good, true and beautiful, is 
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a cause of dukkha. As a result Arahant (A)’s otherwise than being in nibbāna is 
no more meaningful than Arahant (B)’s. We can speak of this or that person and 
his or her deeds before becoming and debate who had produced the greater 
number of good deeds before becoming an Arahant. But the Arahant is no 
longer concerned with his or her own meaning derived from the ethical state of 
nibbāna, only in acting in ways that produce meaning for others.  
I do not see early Buddhist thinking about meaning imperiling 
fundamentality theory. Those who continue to exist in the cycle of saṃsāra will 
continue to do so because they desire being and becoming, and the accumulation 
of even meaning, all of which cause dukkha. What I suggest is that meaning 
itself, when considered through the lens of early Buddhism, has an additional 
dimension that is not concerned with measurement. That the pure potentiality for 
meaning that the Arahant can access in the otherwise than being of nibbāna is 
just that, pure and without measure. With early Buddhist thinking I maintain that 
this meaning in the ethical state of deathlessness is something that all can obtain 
by following the eightfold path and eschewing that which produces dukkha. 
Meaning without ego means that meaning without dukkha is possible and that is 
the most wondrous idea of meaning of all.  
However, I conclude with Metz that meaning in early Buddhism is not the 
last word on meaning or meaning theory because early Buddhism adds only one 
of possibly many more dimensions to the complicated conversation that is 
meaning. 
 
 
References 
 
*Note: Please see footnotes for references to the early Buddhist texts. 
Brannigan, M. C. (2010). Striking a Balance. Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books. 
Collins, S. (1996). Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Collins, S. (2010). Nirvana: Concepts, Imagery, Narrative. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
de Silva, P. (1976). Tangles and Webs (2 ed.). W.A.D. Ramanayake Mawatha 
Colombo: Lake House Investments LTD. 
Hamilton, S. (2000). Early Buddhism: A New Approach: The I of the Beholder 
(Vol. 16). New York: Routledge. 
 133
Hoffman, F. J. (1987). Rationality & Mind in Early Buddhism. Delhi, India: 
Motilal Banasaridass. 
Kalupahana, D. J. (1976). Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis. 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
Kalupahana, D. J. I. (1982). The Way of Siddhartha. Boulder, CO.: Shambhala. 
Keown, D. (1992, 2001). The Nature of Buddhist Ethics. New York: Palgrave. 
Malalasekera, G. P. (1996). The Truth of Anattá. Encyclopaedia of Buddhism Vol. 
I (Fascicle 4) (Vol. 94). Kandy, Sri Lanka: The Wheel. 
Metz, T. (2013). Meaning in Life. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Rhys Davids, T. W. S. (1921-1925). Pali-English Dictionary. Sri Lanka: Pali 
Text Society. 
Ross, F. H. (1952). The Meaning of Life in Hinduism and Buddhism. London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (C. K. Ogden, Trans.). 
London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, and Co. Ltd. 
 
 134
Journal of Philosophy of Life Vol.5, No.3 (October 2015):134-149 
Death and the Meaning of Life 
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Abstract 
In Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study, Thaddeus Metz advocates a kind of naturalistic objective 
theory of meaning in life, through a rejection of supernaturalism. In this paper, I examine Metz’s 
argument on supernaturalism, in particular, soul-centered theory and immortality. I will argue that 
his objection to supernaturalism is inadequate because he does not treat properly a familiar idea 
about the relationship between death and meaning, namely, the idea that a person’s death itself 
makes her life meaningless. Metz interprets immortality as a condition for obtaining meaning, but in 
view of the idea that I present, immortality means the negation of the death of a person whose life 
already has meaning. As I see it, this idea about death and meaning is also one of the motivations to 
accept a soul-centered theory and therefore key to a fuller rejection of supernaturalism. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study, Thaddeus Metz advocates a kind of 
naturalistic objective theory of meaning in life on the basis of a comprehensive 
survey of existing literature about this topic in analytic philosophy. In this paper, 
I focus on his argument in Part II of his book on supernaturalism, in particular, 
the argument in Chapter 7 on soul-centered theory and immortality. I will argue 
that Metz does not treat properly a familiar idea about the relationship between 
death and meaning, namely, the idea that a person’s death itself makes her life 
meaningless. Metz interprets immortality as a condition for obtaining meaning, 
but in view of the idea that I present, immortality means the negation of the 
death of a person whose life already has meaning. As I see it, this idea about 
death and meaning is also one of the motivations to accept a soul-centered 
theory and therefore key to a fuller rejection of supernaturalism. Besides this, 
my argument involves some general metaphysical remarks about life’s meaning. 
The argument goes as follows. In Section 2, I summarize the metaphysical 
devices concerning the relationship between meaning and person, rather than 
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life. By using these devices, in Section 3 and 4, I examine Metz’s argument on 
soul-centered theory and immortality. Although Metz interprets immortality as a 
condition for meaningfulness, I argue that immortality can be taken as the 
negation of the death of a person whose life already has meaning. In Section 5, I 
conclude by adding a few suggestions about the alleged importance of “traces” 
of life, which Metz takes up peripherally. 
 
2. A Metaphysics of Meaningfulness 
 
I introduce here a somewhat formal and metaphysical way of talking about 
meaningfulness in order to make clear my main argument in the sections below. 
One of the aims of the question of meaning in life can be stated generally as 
follows: to specify the properties that make a person’s life meaningful when she 
has them, whether they are intrinsic or relational, physical or non-physical, 
natural or supernatural. Examples of such properties may include being such 
that her family members live long and happily, finding a cure for a certain 
intractable disease, making a contribution to the liberation of non-human 
animals, and so on. According to Metz’s own “fundamentality theory,” the 
(general) property that makes a person’s life meaningful would be (sufficiently) 
“employ[ing] her reason and in ways that positively orient rationality towards 
fundamental conditions of human existence.” 1  By contrast, according to 
subjectivism, which Metz rejects, the (general) property might be “obtain[ing] 
the objects of her (or her group’s) propositional attitudes” in terms of 
meaningfulness (p. 220). 
It is important to emphasize that the subject of these properties is person, 
not life. Of course, it is trivially true that the property of “meaningfulness” is a 
property of life, as Metz maintains that life is the bearer of meaningfulness (3.2 
and 1.2). Indeed, we use phrases like “a meaningful life,” “her life has meaning,” 
“her life is meaningful,” and so on. However, I focus on the properties of the 
person, which make her life meaningful, because my interest in this paper is in 
the relationship between death and meaning.2 What dies is the person, not the 
                                                     
1 This is from (FT1), which he formulates as the most basic statement of his view (Metz 2013, p. 222). 
Hereafter, where reference to Metz’s book is made, I only mention the page or section number. 
2 This is also a reason why I clarify the metaphysics of meaningfulness in detail in this section. As 
Metz focuses on the notion of life, not person, it is important for the sake of clear argument to 
distinguish between the devices that Metz uses and those that I use. Additionally, in this paper, I argue 
only about a person’s life, for the sake of simplicity. It seems that there is no good reason to exclude 
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life (instead, the life ends, in that it has a terminal point). 
We can call the kind of property at issue a “meaning-making property” in an 
analogy with welfare: on the simple form of hedonism, for example, 
pleasantness is a good-making property (painfulness is a bad-making property). 
A person’s having good-making properties makes her well off or promotes her 
welfare.3 
There are two important additional elements concerning how a person has 
meaning-making properties: time and degree. First, let us see about time. Metz 
distinguishes two senses of “life.” One is “whole-life” and the other is 
“part-life” (pp. 38–9). He argues that both of them can be the bearer of meaning 
(3.3–3.5). My focus is on the relationship between the time when a person has a 
certain meaning-making property and the time when her life is meaningful by 
virtue of her having that property. As I see it, there are various relationships 
between these times. For example, a person may have, at a certain time, the 
property of achieving her great goal for which she sacrificed her life, but the 
obtaining of it appears to make not only her part-life of that time meaningful. It 
seems natural to think that it makes her whole-life meaningful. Perhaps getting 
some meaning-making property at a certain time makes the period of her life 
after the time of getting it, or a certain period before the time of getting it, 
meaningful retroactively. While the clarification of the general condition of the 
relationships at issue is worth undertaking, here I treat them on a case-by-case 
basis and do not pursue the clarification further. 
Second, meaning may come in degrees. Metz maintains that a life can be 
both pro tanto (that is, to some extent) meaningful, or, on balance, meaningful 
(pp. 39–40). This distinction appears to make sense in terms of both part-life and 
whole-life. It seems plausible to think that we can do both pro tanto meaningful 
things and pro tanto meaningless things at the same certain time or period (for 
example, a Sunday) and that we can evaluate whether these parts of life are, on 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the possibility that (at least some intelligent) non-human animals have meaningful lives. 
3 There is at least one interesting difference. The bearer of both welfare and good-making properties is 
basically thought to be the person, but there is another category of the “intrinsic value for a person” 
whose bearer is standardly thought to be states of affairs. A person’s welfare is determined by the 
intrinsic value for her of each state of affairs, that she has certain good-making properties. Besides, 
each whole- and part-life can be thought of as a complex composition of states of affairs. Then, using 
the notion of a state of affairs would enable a unified treatment of both a whole- and part-life. See, for 
example, Bradley (2009), esp. pp. 4–8. The same might be said about meaningfulness, but Metz seems 
not to be concerned in his book about what life itself is, whether it is whole or part. 
 137
balance, meaningful.4 I will focus only on a meaning-making property that 
makes life, on balance, meaningful and hereafter represent it as “P,” because 
this P is relevant to my interest in this paper about meaninglessness, which in 
turn is important to the issue of death. If P is an on-balance meaning-making 
property, the lack of any P represents, on balance, the meaninglessness of one’s 
life. On the other hand, if P is pro tanto, the lack of any P can mean a pro tanto 
meaningless but still pro tanto meaningful life. The former but not latter kind of 
meaninglessness seems the object of our concern when we wonder whether our 
lives are meaningless or not.  
Now, let us turn to how a life does lack meaning, that is, how a life is 
meaningless. This topic relates to Metz’s arguments about “anti-matter,” which 
is a negative factor of meaning (pp. 63–4). Without this negative factor, we can 
simply think in this way: When S lacks any P, S’s life is (on balance) 
meaningless. However, in the context of showing similarity (and dissimilarity) 
between pleasure and meaning (Chapter 4), Metz claims that meaning is not 
monopolar but bipolar, that is, meaning has both positive and negative scales. 
Our language seems to suggest that, as he admits (p. 64), meaning has only a 
monopolar dimension. However, Metz argues that while “blowing up the Sphinx 
for fun” appears to be much worse in terms of meaning than “oversleeping,” 
both would be represented with the same zero level of meaningfulness if 
meaning had only a positive dimension. If he is right, blowing up the Sphinx for 
fun is an example of, so to say, anti-meaning-making properties (hereafter “PA”).  
I am not convinced that life can have negative meaning. First, intuition on 
Metz’s example may differ. Some might intuit that actions like blowing up the 
Sphinx for fun are just a waste of time and just have no value (cf. Kauppinen 
2015, p. 604). At least, our evaluations will depend on the further detailed 
description. Besides, there seem to be some clear differences between “blowing 
up the Sphinx for fun” and “oversleeping,” other than meaning. The former is an 
action that destroys a thing with salient external values (e.g., aesthetic and 
historical values) and such an action is perhaps even morally wrong. Although 
most of us think that such actions have an important difference in value, it does 
not seem clear that the difference, which our intuition tells us about the situation, 
is about meaningfulness. Second, actions (or more generally, events) can make 
worse one’s life without a negative scale. All these actions need is to be making 
                                                     
4 I suspect that Metz thinks that the notion of “on balance” meaningfulness applies only to whole-life. 
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a difference comparatively. It seems plausible to take into account a 
counterfactual element when we evaluate actions: a comparative evaluation 
between the value of the actual situation where one does an action and the 
counterfactual situation where the action and the consequences of it do not hold. 
Mere oversleeping seems not to make so much of a difference, but blowing up 
the Sphinx seems to make a great difference, because, for example, a person 
who can do such an aggressive thing could have done much more meaningful 
actions otherwise.5 Such a person wastes her time and ability by doing the thing 
with no meaning. 
I have a doubt about the concept of anti-matter, but the remark I have just 
stated is not sufficient to counter it. Therefore, I will examine not only the 
monopolar view but also the bipolar view. Under the monopolar view, person 
S’s life is meaningless when S does not have any P. Under the bipolar view, 
which admits anti-matter, S’s life is meaningless when S has some PA (I 
presuppose that some cases of having a certain PA are represented with the zero 
level of meaning). I also assume that PA is an on-balance anti-meaning-making 
property, just the same as P. In the next section, by using these metaphysical 
devices, I will start to examine Metz’s argument against the supernaturalism of 
meaning in life. 
 
3. Metz on Soul and Immortality 
 
In Chapter 7 of his book (especially, 7.3 and 7.4), Metz examines 
soul-centered theory, “the view that a significant existence is nothing but being 
constituted by a soul that lives forever in a certain way, where a soul is an 
indestructible, spiritual substance” (p. 123). The point of the criticism I will 
propose against Metz’s argument can be stated in several different ways. First, 
the idea of immortality should not necessarily be taken to be a supernatural one. 
I do not mean, however, a physical (or at least non-supernatural) eternal life like 
that of a vampire. Nor do I mean a modal status, such as being unable to die (cf. 
pp. 123–4).6 I will argue that there is another simple idea: immortality means 
                                                     
5 I do not mean here that we should admit the notion of “external meaning” as a distinct category, 
according to which a mere fact of an event’s being counterfactually better in respect of meaning makes 
the event meaningful. See Smuts (2013), pp. 553–6 as a criticism of this notion. 
6 I also do not mean the view, which Metz mentions negatively, that the reason why we crave our own 
immortality or long-term consequences is explained by our capacity to conceive of ever better states 
and our tendency to wish to achieve these (pp. 247–8). 
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the negation of death, especially in the context of what I want to call Tolstoian 
nihilism, the view that a person’s death itself makes her life meaningless. To put 
my point another way, according to Metz, soul-centered theorists think that 
immortality is important because an eternal soul has unusual great value. I point 
out, however, that there is at least one understanding of immortality in which the 
amount of value is not important: immortality can mean simply retaining the 
existence of things with their usual earthly value. 
The idea that immortality means the negation of death seems not 
controversial in itself. Metz may of course realize this, and he may just be 
limiting his argument to the relationship between the supernatural soul and 
meaning. However, I argue that once we see the concept of immortality as the 
negation of death, the point of the standard rationales for soul-centered theory 
can be fully understood. Finally, I attempt to agree with Metz that 
supernaturalism is wrong, but I think that a close examination of the idea that I 
focus on is key for a fuller rejection of supernaturalism. 
I will now begin to examine Metz’s argument against soul-centered theory. 
According to Metz, there are three traditional rationales for soul-centered theory. 
(a) Realizing justice (7.4.1): “[L]ife would be meaningless if the injustices of 
this world were not rectified in another world” (p. 124). Or, as Kant claims, a 
person’s moral perfection with happiness requires her own immortality (p. 126). 
(b) Making a permanent difference (7.4.2): “[L]ife would be meaningless if 
nothing were worth pursuing and that nothing would be worth pursuing if it 
would not have an ‘ultimate consequence,’” and “one could apparently make a 
permanent difference only if one’s life did not end with the death of one’s body” 
(p. 128). (c) Transcending limits (7.4.3): “[T]he meaning of something in 
general appears to be a matter of asking about its relationship with other things 
[…]. A life is meaningful, then, insofar as it relates to something beyond it in the 
right way” (p. 130). In addition, immortality would be an instance of 
transcending one’s own temporal limit (p. 131). 
Metz argues that although all rationales might require an afterlife, each of 
them does not require an eternal life. As I see it, his basic argument can be 
understood by using the concept of meaning-making property P: in order for 
person S to get some P at a certain time t, it is necessary to exist at t but not 
necessary to persist after t. Therefore, it is not necessary for S to persist eternally. 
Metz’s explanation about each rationale and argument against it can be 
understood as follows: (a) P for realizing justice includes being compensated for 
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the losses in one’s lifetime, being punished for wrongness and vice, being 
rewarded for rightness and virtue, or being morally perfect. Incidentally, all 
these Ps appear to make one’s whole-life meaningful (it is possible that the same 
thing can be said about Ps for other rationales, which we will see below). Metz 
maintains that we can get these properties in finite time, even if we eventually 
come to an end (pp. 124–7). In particular, a limited (afterlife) time is sufficient to 
get the reward of a limited living time. Or, with regard to moral perfection, “We 
seem able to conceive of a morally ideal agent who eventually dies” (p. 126, 
emphasis mine). This remark means that S’s persistence after getting P is not 
required to get P.7 (b) According to Metz, as I understand him, P for making a 
permanent difference can be thought of as making a permanent difference on 
infinite things other than S (p. 129). Once S has gotten this P, S’s own 
persistence is not needed. Therefore, S can get some P without S’s own eternal 
life. (c) P for transcending limits is understood as crossing S’s boundary, or 
being connected with an external value. According to Metz, certain valuable 
things that can be realized in S’s lifetime, such as loving others or creating a 
work of art, seem sufficient to transcend limits. Thus, transcendence of S’s own 
temporal limits is not needed (pp. 130–1). 
Metz’s argument seems simple and convincing. There appears to be no good 
reason to think that we humans cannot get those Ps mentioned above in our 
limited time. In order to get Ps, we do not need persistence after getting them, or, 
needless to say, eternity. Therefore, these three rationales would fail to support 
soul-centered theory (at least in its standard forms).  
Here, it is worthwhile to give an overview of Metz’s argument in Part II of 
his book on the supernaturalism of meaning in life. Metz’s strategy against 
supernaturalism is to show that any promising argument for supernaturalism is 
based on the perfection thesis, “the claim that meaning in one’s life requires 
engaging with a maximally conceivable value” (p. 138, emphasis original), and 
then to reject this thesis. In more detail, in Chapter 7 of his book (7.1–7.2), he 
maintains that the most defensible God-centered view is the idea that “the more 
we respect, love, and commune with a (non-purposive) being with the 
qualitative properties,” by which he means atemporality, immutability, simplicity, 
and infinitude, “and the more it does so with us, the more meaningful our lives” 
(p. 122, see also p. 110). He claims that a perfect being with the properties has a 
                                                     
7 He also rejects the idea that the only way to separate from one’s physical self is to become an 
indestructible soul (pp. 125–6). 
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“maximally conceivable value.” This concept of value is also key for his 
argument against soul-centered theory. First, after criticizing the three existing 
rationales for soul-centered theory (as we have seen), Metz shows that once 
these rationales are reconstructed so that they support soul-centered theory, these 
arguments would claim that an immortal soul is required for engaging with a 
“maximally conceivable value” (7.3–7.6). Metz argues finally that that value is 
not necessary for meaningfulness, and he rejects the perfection thesis and 
supernaturalist theories in general (Chapter 8). I avoid examining Metz’s 
argument against supernaturalism further, but it has been confirmed that Metz’s 
basic line of thought involves the intimate connection between immortality and 
a kind of superlative value. 
 
4. Death and Meaninglessness 
 
I agree with Metz that none of the three rationales work well for 
soul-centered theory, but I think there is an appealing idea in their original form 
that Metz overlooks.8 In particular, the idea can be drawn from a passage in 
Tolstoy. 
 
Sooner or later there would come diseases and death (they had come 
already) to my dear ones and to me, and there would be nothing left but 
stench and worms. All my affairs, no matter what they might be, would 
sooner or later be forgotten, and I myself should not exist. So why should 
I worry about all these things?9 
 
Metz objects to this remark that “death intuitively cannot undercut the worth 
of performing certain constructive actions. […For example,] helping others can 
be worth doing, even though the helping agent will die and the helping action 
                                                     
8 I have already put forward the core idea of this section in Yoshizawa (2011, in Japanese). I focused 
there mainly on Metz (2003), in which he argues about the “Immortality Requirement” for 
meaningfulness. In the present paper, I make clearer and develop this idea and argue for it in a rather 
broader scope, in particular to cover the topics about external valuable things and the arguments that 
are developed further in Metz (2013). 
9 Tolstoy (1905), p. 9. I do not attempt to say that Tolstoy indeed realized the idea I point out. Tolstoy 
may really be, as Metz interprets him (p. 242), a supernaturalist in terms of meaningfulness. However, 
if my argument in this paper is right, it is possible that Tolstoy himself eventually goes the wrong way 
about grasping his initial idea concerning death and meaning. 
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will have no infinite ramifications” (p. 128).10 Metz continues, “Tolstoy would 
have a stronger response to […the criticism] if he could explain why it at first 
seems as though it is worthwhile for a mortal to help other mortals and why this 
judgment is false, upon further reflection” (p. 128). He then suggests that 
“Probably the strongest explanation is that while such activities seem to merit 
performance from an everyday perspective, from a broader perspective nothing 
is worth doing unless it will have an ultimate consequence” (p. 128, emphasis 
mine).11 The point is that Metz here thinks that Tolstoy’s remark can be 
understood as being based on the idea of “ultimate consequence.” Metz then 
continues to argue (rightly) that even if an “ultimate consequence” is necessary 
for meaning, an eternal soul is not necessary for it (as seen in the last section). 
Now, I will show that there is a seemingly plausible explanation that does not 
appeal to the idea of “ultimate consequence.” 
This seemingly plausible explanation is based on the idea that a person’s 
death itself makes her life meaningless.12 To put it more precisely, the idea is 
that even if a person’s life is meaningful, this vanishes with her death (and this 
appears to mean meaninglessness). By contrast, Metz’s interpretation of 
Tolstoy’s remark is this: a person’s life is meaningless if she dies (that is, she is 
finite) because death is an obstacle for realizing or connecting with superlative 
infinite value, which is required for meaning. I will continue to amplify this 
idea. 
Two kinds of death are at issue in Tolstoy’s passage above (and in Metz’s 
criticism of it). One is the death of the subject S of meaningfulness (“me”), and 
the other is the death of the valuable beings that are external to S (“my dear 
ones”), which can be called the “consequences” of S’s life. 
First, in order to explain the relationship between S’s death and the 
meaningfulness of S’s life, we should look at the general condition between S 
and the meaning-making property P, which I introduced in Section 2, in more 
detail. Here, I focus on the kind of P such that when a person has P at a certain 
time t, her whole-life is meaningful, because Tolstoy’s concern seems to be 
                                                     
10 Metz refers here to Antony Flew’s remark (Flew 1966, p. 105). 
11 Metz refers here, for example, to Oswald Hanfling’s remark (Hanfling 1987, pp. 22–4). See also 
note 17 below about the relationship between the idea of “ultimate consequence” and “broader 
perspective,” which Metz suggests here. 
12 I write “seemingly” because I think, ultimately, that the idea that a person’s death itself makes her 
life meaningless, on which this explanation is based, is dubious, as we will see later, but even a 
dubious idea can motivate one to claim a certain view (just as a conclusion can be inferred validly 
even from false presumptions). 
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about whether his whole-life is meaningless and also, as we saw in the last 
section, the properties at issue with respect to soul-centered theory appears to be 
this kind of P. (I make brief remarks about another type of P later.) There is a 
form in which S’s whole-life is meaningful by obtaining some P at a certain time 
t: 
 
(1) S has some P. 
 
However, there are two forms in which person S’s life is not meaningful by 
virtue of lacking P at t: 
 
(2) S does not have any P. 
(3) S does not have any P, because there is no such person. 
 
Form (2) means that S’s life is meaningless, while (3) means that S is absent, 
more precisely, that S has no property at all at t because S does not exist at that 
time. Both of these could be expressed as the “lack” of meaning, in a sense. 
Taking the anti-meaning-making property PA into consideration, the 
corresponding forms would be as follows: 
 
(1’) S has some P (and does not have any PA). 
(2’) S has some PA. 
(3’) S has neither any P nor any PA, because there is no such person. 
 
The difference between (2’) and (3’) is clearer with respect to PA: (3’) means 
that S does not even have any PA, while (2’) means that S has some PA. 
Both (1) and (1’) are normal forms of life’s being meaningful and are 
equivalent to the negation of (2) and (2’), respectively. Moreover, S’s 
immortality means the negation of (3) and (3’), not the negation of (2) and (2’), 
respectively. What should be stressed here is something we can guess from 
Tolstoy’s passage, namely, that Tolstoy’s family (“my dear ones”) are some of 
the important beings that contribute to his life’s meaning. It is natural to interpret 
the meaningfulness of Tolstoy’s life as being a connection to an earthly and 
(relatively) usual value in this context, rather than as being a connection to a 
kind of superlative value. To put it more plainly, while Metz interprets 
immortality as an instrument or a condition of meaningfulness, I think of 
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immortality not as a condition of meaningfulness, but as the negation of a “lack” 
or “loss” of meaningfulness by death. 
A similar line can be used for the deaths of external valuable beings like 
“the dear ones” (hereafter “D”): 
 
(1’’) D has some value V. 
(2’’) D does not have any V. 
(3’’) D does not have any V, because D does not exist. 
 
The immortality of D is the denial of (3’’). The cases where the valuable 
external things are not persons but, for example, great artworks or great pieces 
of literature, may be treated in a similar way (while their annihilations are not 
said to be “deaths”). 
Now, the questions of “why it at first seems as though it is worthwhile for a 
mortal to help other mortals” and “why this judgment is false, upon further 
reflection” (p. 128), which are the two parts of the Metz’s objection against 
Tolstoy, would seem to be explained without appealing to the idea of “ultimate 
consequence.” The answer to the first question, which Metz would also agree 
with, is this: because human lives have value in themselves and to help such 
mortals is meaningful in itself. The answer to the second question, which Metz 
overlooks, is this: because these valuable beings D vanished by their deaths, 
then the relation with D does not hold (because one of the relata does not exist); 
in turn, the relational property P, being connected properly with D, is no longer 
instantiated, and eventually the very subject S of P vanished by virtue of S’s 
own death. Besides, in Tolstoy’s passage, an attitudinal element of the others 
(“sooner or later be forgotten”) is also at issue and can be explained along a 
similar line. What is feared about being forgotten here? Does this fear come 
from the idea that staying remembered has (or is an instrument of) superlative 
value or the idea that the longer it stays remembered the larger amount of value 
it brings? Perhaps not. What is feared about being forgotten seems to be an 
already valuable thing. This observation appears to accord with the fact that 
Tolstoy’s life seems meaningful when he writes this passage. As I see it, it is 
plausible to think that he undergoes a thought process as follows: He finds that 
all valuable things for him will be “lost” because they will die or disappear. And 
because of this fact, he feels sorrow and loses his zest for life. Then, he claims 
that his life is meaningless. In a process like this, one would crave (wrongly, as I 
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see it) immortality in order to realize a meaningful life.13 
The idea that a person’s death makes her life meaningless can be called 
“naturalistic nihilism,” which I think is involved in Tolstoy’s remark, while Metz 
sees Tolstoy’s view as a “supernaturalistic nihilism.”14 I think that this idea 
about death and meaning is key to fully understanding the rationales of 
soul-centered theory and therefore key to rejecting them. 
 
5. Existence and the Meaning of Life  
 
A Tolstoian kind of concern about meaning can be related to the well-known 
idea of the importance of “leav[ing] longstanding ‘traces’ behind upon our 
death” (p. 247),15 and it is not necessarily connected to supernatural eternity, as 
Metz rightly argues, albeit peripherally (13.4). I conclude this paper by making a 
few remarks about “traces,” which are thought to be typical things with external 
(perhaps objective) value. 
One might think from my argument that I maintain that, to seek a long-term 
continuity of the traces or the subject of meaningfulness misses the point with 
regard to meaning in life. However, it is certainly an oversimplification to say 
that existence itself is the matter of meaning in life and that continuity is then 
irrelevant to the question of meaning. Indeed, there are cases in which continuity 
is important. We should perhaps hurry and not procrastinate in finding truly 
valuable things and engage with them, simply because we mortals do not have 
much time. Besides, some events that occur after one’s own death or the survival 
of the others (or humankind as such) can be important as external things (if not 
necessary) for our personal meaningfulness or other personal values. 16 
Nonetheless, I want to emphasize that there is at least one other matter. Our 
concern about existence and meaning may arise even in a person who is free 
from the above possible obstacles about continuity to realize a meaningful life. 
                                                     
13 It seems easy to see that a similar line can be used in order to explain why we want to transcend our 
temporal limit. Besides, one aspect of “realizing justice” might be understood in essentially the same 
way. If death itself is the tragedy of life, only immortality itself is thought to be immune from it (and 
not compensation for it). 
14 Metz writes that soul-centered theory is compatible with nihilism (p. 124). That is, assuming 
soul-centered theory, if there is no soul, then nihilism is true. If my argument in this paper is right, 
however, the story seems the other way round: Naturalistic nihilism comes first, and the craving 
(wrongly, as I see it) for supernatural valuable things follows. 
15 Metz ascribes this expression of “traces” to Robert Nozick (1981, esp. p. 582).  
16 For example, recall Samuel Scheffler’s unorthodox notion of “the collective afterlife,” which is 
contrasted with “the personal afterlife” (Scheffler 2013, esp. pp. 15–6, 64). 
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The concern is over the disappearance of our lives in the end, whether they are 
meaningful or not.17 
However, I do not attempt to claim here that the idea that a person’s death 
itself makes her life meaningless is true. I do not think that death really makes 
life meaningless, because it is dubious that (3) (and (3’)) implies 
meaninglessness. It is different from (2) (and (2’)), which surely do imply 
meaninglessness. On the one hand, when (2) is realized, S’s meaningful state 
come to an end and S is in a meaningless state; on the other hand, when (3) is 
realized, S is in neither a meaningful state nor a meaningless state.18  
Furthermore, especially in cases where the P at issue is the kind of property 
such that the time of obtaining P corresponds to the time of life’s having 
meaning, even though we may refer to (3) (and (3’)) as “meaninglessness,” this 
may not matter with respect to meaning. After one’s death, what matters appears 
to be whether the life was meaningful, not whether it is meaningful, as Metz 
argues about whether or not “Hitler’s life was meaningful” (pp. 5, 26, emphasis 
mine), “Gauguin’s life was meaningful” (p. 191, emphasis mine), and 
“Mandela’s life was meaningful” (p. 228, emphasis mine).19 In addition, a 
person may be able to have some P after her death (for example, being admired 
on the occasion of the eventual completion of the Sagrada Familia); if so, her 
life would become meaningful posthumously (cf. p. 70). 
My point is, however, that even if the idea that a person’s death itself makes 
                                                     
17 This sort of concern is often related to the idea of meaninglessness from the point of view of the 
universe (13.3). But the nothingness of death can be captured by a much more narrow perspective. So 
I think that the scale or the depth of objectivity is irrelevant, or at least there is another point. The point 
is existence (of valuable being) itself. 
18 In some cases, S’s death could make her life meaningless. With respect to the kind of P that makes 
S’s whole-life meaningful, there are two ways in which S’s life is meaningless: one is that S never gets 
P and the other is that she loses P that she had once possessed. It is possible to say, in a sense, that S’s 
death could make her life meaningless in the former way, when S’s life ends before S gets P (in other 
words, during S’s lifetime, (2) is true at all times). However, that there could be some such cases does 
not mean that death generally makes all people’s lives meaningless. What I want to elicit as Tolstoian 
nihilism is the general claim that S “loses” P by her death in the latter way, that is, the claim that (3) 
means S’s lack of P (while I finally claim that (3) does not mean meaninglessness). It is worth 
emphasizing here that this clarification of the point of Tolstoian nihilism is based on the distinction 
between (2) and (3) and, in turn, on the materials of the metaphysics of person and its properties, not 
life and its properties, which I introduced in Section 2. 
19 One might think that it is better to express Tolstoian nihilism as the idea that the life was 
meaningful until (or more properly, only before) it ended. An anonymous reviewer makes this line of 
suggestion. I think that, however, by making the idea a little clearer, it turns out to be either not 
different from mine, or else problematic. If the idea is that the life was meaningful until it ended and it 
is meaningless after death, the point is nothing but what I want to bring up. If the idea is that the life’s 
past meaningfulness makes the life “meaningless” on her death, the idea seems not to make sense. 
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her life meaningless is dubious, it is deep and familiar. A parallel idea is one of 
the main topics in the arguments about the evil of death. A branch of 
Epicureanism maintains that death is neither bad nor good for the one who dies, 
because after S’s death, S no longer exists, and relations between events and S, 
such as “is bad (good) for” or even “was bad (good) for,” do not hold.20 
Furthermore, sometimes the nothingness of death itself is said to be fearful. 
According to Aristotle, “[D]eath is the most terrible of all things; for it is the end, 
and nothing is thought to be any longer either good or bad for the dead” 
(Nicomachean Ethics III, 1115a, emphasis mine). On the other hand, sometimes 
the nothingness of death (Frances Kamm calls it “the Extinction Factor” of 
death) is even said to be bad.21 So, we should take the idea seriously. (A line of 
argument against it would be based on the distinction between (2) and (3), as 
previously noted.) 
I attempt to agree with Metz that naturalistic objectivism is on the right track 
as a theory of meaningfulness (and indeed it is now the most common sort of 
view), but I am not satisfied with his treatment of the relationship between 
(non)existence and meaning. As I stated above, our concern about existence and 
meaning is deep. On the other hand, I suspect that we know well what is 
valuable in our own life (while we sometimes lose sight of them in a lot of 
unimportant things). So, I am optimistic, in a sense, that the answers to the 
question of meaning will be revealed to be not so demanding, once we have got 
rid of the “metaphysical” concern about existence and meaning. When we 
                                                     
20 See, as criticism of this view, Bradley (2009), pp. 81–3. This view is often thought to be based on 
the metaphysical framework of presentism, according to which only present things exist and those that 
have ceased to exist (relative to time) literally do not exist at all. Peter Singer replies to the Tolstoian 
concern about meaninglessness (and morality) as follows, appealing to the metaphysical framework of 
four-dimensionalism (more precisely, eternalism): “If we regard time as a fourth dimension, then we 
can think of the universe, throughout all the times at which it contains sentient life, as a 
four-dimensional entity. We can then make that four-dimensional world a better place by causing there 
to be less pointless suffering in one particular place, at one particular time, than there would otherwise 
have been” (Singer 1997, p. 274). Singer’s aim here can be understood as showing that our 
“consequences” do not cease to exist in a sense even when they disappear (relative to time). The point 
is that being placed somewhere in four-dimensional space-time does not mean eternity or the 
transcendence of temporality. In other words, the point is not eternity but existence itself. I think that 
Singer’s remark certainly captures the point of one of the concerns about meaning, which is essentially 
related to the concept of existence and time. 
21 Kamm (1998), pp. 43–4. According to Kamm, the badness consists in “the factor of the possibility 
being all over of more of a life in the direction in which time moves” (Kamm 1998, p. 43). Theo Van 
Willigenburg writes, “This threat of complete extinction arouses terror in us and is a major motive for 
belief in an after-life” (Van Willigenburg 2001, p. 34). He clearly distinguishes this “badness” from the 
evil of death as the “deprivation” of possible goods (cf. Bradley 2009). 
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understand (rightly) that the meaning of our life and external values are not 
threatened even if they do not continue over a very long period of time, we need 
not be disturbed about our everyday, “tiny” meaning. I think that dissolving such 
a concern is one of the most important tasks of philosophers (in particular 
anti-nihilists such as Metz (and me)) with respect to the question of meaning in 
life.22 
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Abstract 
In his Meaning in Life, Thaddeus Metz puts a certain argument – the ‘incoherence objection’ – to a 
number of different uses. The incoherence objection states that attempts to establish knowledge of 
the truth of certain conditionals will, in conjunction with some uncontroversial knowledge claims, 
commit us to decidedly controversial ones. Given that we do not wish to be so committed, it follows 
that we cannot claim to know the truth of those conditionals. This article seeks to examine some of 
the underlying epistemological assumptions of such an argument, raising potential problems to work 
on and locating areas where the argument might be refined or clarified. Although the considerations 
raised are for the most part general, specific issues concerning epistemic transmission principles are 
canvassed as regards the argument’s application to a particular view of life’s meaning associated 
with John Cottingham. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Thaddeus Metz’ Meaning in Life is a rich discussion of meaningfulness, 
impressively covering a large amount of ground without sacrificing depth in its 
treatment of the questions. It will doubtless provide material for philosophers 
working in this area to think through for many years to come. It is testament to 
the thought-provoking nature of the book that my own discussion focuses on just 
a few pages, but at some length; there was a great deal to say even about this 
short section. I still do not think I have exhausted it, but I hope that the issues I 
raise in this article will profitably open up further avenues to a consideration of 
the theoretical context of some of Metz’ views – particularly the epistemological 
context. 
 
2. The Incoherence Objection and Cottingham’s Response 
 
I would like to discuss an argument that Metz puts to a number of different 
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uses, but first appears as an objection to John Cottingham’s claim that a theistic 
worldview best grounds the type of universal, objective, necessary and 
normative morality that is required for meaningfulness in life. Metz’ claim is 
that this position leads to a logical incoherence in Cottingham’s views, and in 
the views of most of the rest of those who would embrace Cottingham’s claim. 
To explain this he outlines the following principle (A): If I know that X obtains, 
and I know that ‘If X, then Y’ is true, then I know that Y obtains.1 Applying this 
principle, Metz holds that Cottingham’s claim to know that (1) ‘Wrongness 
exists’, to know that (2) ‘If wrongness exists, then God exists’, but not to know 
that (3) ‘God exists’ is an incoherent one. If Cottingham (or anyone else) wants 
to persist in claiming to know the truth of the claim that ‘A theistic worldview 
grounds ethics’ he must either claim to know that God exists, or deny knowing 
that wrongness exists. Metz adduces textual evidence from Cottingham’s 
writings to indicate that Cottingham is unwilling to embrace the latter two 
claims, but is anxious to indicate his argument’s wider reach: if one thinks one 
knows that wrongness is real, but can doubt that God exists, one cannot claim to 
know that wrongness logically depends on God. This is quite an important 
argument for Metz, as elsewhere he uses versions of it to criticise 
supernaturalism about meaning (p.145), non-naturalism about meaning (p.158), 
and consequentialism about meaning (p.194). Given this, and the fact that the 
argument seems to be one that has a very general application outside of Metz’ 
work and would lead to a number of quite startling conclusions, I will spend 
some time discussing it. I will consider the version raised against Cottingham 
here, but I think that most of the questions I raise about it will apply mutatis 
mutandis to the versions Metz presents elsewhere (though not all – the 
discussion of transmissivity with which I conclude is specific to the version 
raised against Cottingham). 
Metz considers a counterexample from Cottingham, who claims that he can 
maintain that apples are constituted by quarks, yet be much more confident of 
the evidence that apples exist than of the evidence that quarks do. Metz still 
finds this incoherent, on the basis that if one has enough evidence to know that 
apples exist, and to know that if apples exist, then quarks exist, one cannot 
consistently claim one does not have enough evidence to know that quarks exist. 
He diagnoses Cottingham’s error in the latter’s use of the word ‘confidence’, 
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insofar as this allows evidence to be inconclusive, as opposed to knowledge, 
which requires that evidence be conclusive. The idea is that one might 
consistently claim the conditional ‘If wrongness exists, God exists’ is true whilst 
being very confident in the truth of the antecedent, and less confident in the truth 
of the consequent. But Metz’ principle (A) refers to knowledge, not confidence, 
and one cannot consistently make the mutatis mutandis claim. 
Those versed in epistemology will observe that (A) is in some ways very 
similar to, yet is also importantly different from, a simple epistemic closure 
principle. Such a principle states that all members of a given epistemic set (say, 
‘x’s warranted beliefs’) bear a given relation (say, entailment) only to other 
members of that set – the set is ‘closed’ under that relation. Examination of 
certain facets of closure principles can help in our assessment of Metz’ argument. 
First we must observe that, as it stands, (A) needs some tweaking, for it is quite 
possible that I fail to follow through all the consequences of my knowledge, 
through laziness, or stupidity, or being distracted or somesuch. This can easily 
be resolved by adding that I competently deduce the fact of Y’s obtaining from 
X’s obtaining and from the fact that if X is true then Y is true. However, I take 
the thrust of Metz’ argument to be that the evidence for wrongness and for 
Cottingham’s conditional transmits warrant, and hence (I am assuming here) 
justification, to the proposition that God exists. So we have here not just an 
epistemic closure principle, but, more strongly, an epistemic transmission 
principle. So we need to add to (A) not only that I make the relevant deduction, 
but that I know that Y obtains in virtue of knowing that X obtains and the truth 
of the conditional. Note that it is the addition of this ‘in virtue of’ that 
distinguishes a transmission principle from a closure principle; whilst a closure 
principle merely tells us that if X obtains (and the conditional is true) Y obtains, 
a transmission principle will tell us why Y obtains – namely, in virtue of X’s 
obtaining (and the conditional being true). Call (A) with these tweaks ‘(A*)’ 
(further tweaks are possible, and probably necessary, but are not salient for 
present purposes). Now, I think that Metz is right in holding that there appears to 
be no obvious transmission failure2 if we apply (A*) to the apples and quarks 
case, so denying that (A*) applies is not a way out, unless one can point to a 
difference between the apple case and the God case which means that the latter 
exemplifies transmission failure and the former does not. In fact, I think that 
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there is such a difference, and that the God case, unlike the apple case, does 
involve transmission failure, but that this fact may not be as helpful to 
Cottingham as it first appears. Given this, I will postpone discussion of 
transmission failure until the end of this article. 
One may have other concerns about the incoherence objection. Metz appears 
to overlook that Cottingham has said (in the same paragraph in which he makes 
the apples/quarks analogy) that he does not wish to think of his arguments for a 
theistic ground of ethics as ‘conclusive’,3 and so presumably, contra Metz 
(p.88), he does not think he knows the conditional, he merely takes a weaker 
attitude toward it, like holding it to be true, or having a certain degree of 
justified belief in it (this is suggested by Cottingham’s claim that he ‘maintains’ 
the conditional, rather than ‘knows’ it). This would prevent the application of 
Metz’ principle, the price paid being that Cottingham must accept that his 
arguments for a supernaturalist theory of life’s meaning do not conclusively 
refute alternate views. I imagine, given the tenor of Cottingham’s work, that this 
will not be a great worry for him (his apples/quarks example may indicate that, 
by analogy, he takes his arguments for the conditional to be abductive-style 
reasoning, whereby theism is the best out of its competitors at explaining ethics, 
but cannot be said to be the only option), or anyone who is not convinced that 
many, if any, philosophical arguments are conclusive, although it may worry 
other upholders of theistic grounds for ethics more. 
 
3. Fallibilism 
 
Another perspective to take on Metz’ argument would be to examine the 
distinction Metz draws between being confident in a proposition’s truth and 
knowing it to be true. Insofar as Metz claims that knowledge requires conclusive 
evidence, he seems to be embracing an infallibilist epistemology.4 On the other 
hand, it is plausible, given Cottingham’s claims about gradations of confidence 
in evidence, to take the latter to be espousing a fallibilist (and internalist, 
although I am not sure anything turns on this) epistemology. Infallibilism in 
epistemology roughly claims that, in order to be said to know a given 
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4 Although Metz does sometimes use the phrase ‘conclusive reason(s)’ in an epistemic context, I do 
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of justification (see later in this section) and of closure both do not sit well with such a view. 
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proposition to be true, one’s justification for it must be so good that one cannot 
rationally doubt that proposition. Fallibilism claims the opposite – one can be 
said to know a true proposition for which one’s justification is nevertheless not 
conclusive. Looked at from the point of view of a fallibilist internalist 
epistemology, however, multi-premise closure principles (let alone transmission 
principles) of justification, and thus knowledge, famously give rise to problems, 
insofar as they seem to lead to lottery paradoxes and the paradox of the preface.5 
The appearance of these paradoxes is often taken to suggest that such principles 
fail in this context. The claim is that when knowledge is fallible, if we conjoin 
enough claims for which we take ourselves to have sufficient justification to 
count as knowing, we might nevertheless not take ourselves to have sufficient 
justification for their conjunction to know that conjunction (and likewise for a 
proposition entailed by this conjunction, which is important for our current 
discussion) – this is due to the small amount of epistemic risk pertaining to each 
claim accumulating for the conjunction of them. 6  (A*) is one of these 
aforementioned suspect multi-premise principles, although it is, of course, not a 
very extensive multi-premise transmission principle.7 But to make anything out 
of this latter point would require some principled way of explaining how many 
premises a transmission principle may legitimately have. Moreover, in the 
context of arguing that single-premise closure (and by extension single-premise 
transmission) is just as problematic as multi-premise closure, Maria 
Lassonen-Arnio has claimed that the competent deduction required in a principle 
like (A*) will not require infallibility and so will itself add some epistemic risk 
(which she calls ‘deductive risk’).8 Not only will this lead to the possibility of 
multi-premise transmission principle paradoxes affecting single premise 
transmission principles, as Lassonen-Arnio thinks, but it will increase the risk 
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principles, conclude that no ticket will win. But this contradicts our knowledge that one ticket will win, 
hence the paradox. Incidentally, note that I say ‘of justification, and thus knowledge’ in this sentence 
as I agree with Luper (2012) that attempts to break the link between justification and knowledge in 
this context are ad hoc. Of course, Metz may disagree. 
6 On this, see Collins (2015), section 1. c. 
7 Nevertheless, it is a multi-premise principle. On this, see Sharon and Spectre (2013), p.2734, 
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accumulated under seemingly low-risk, few-premised multi-premised 
transmission principles like (A*). Finally, we would also have to ask where the 
justification threshold for knowledge was; if the answer to this is vague, it may 
make it harder to use our intuitions about what we think we know to 
demonstrate a logical incoherence in Cottingham’s position. 
Transcending these messy details, the moral is that on fallibilism (taking into 
account the connection between probability and knowledge), highly likely 
premises, sufficient in likelihood for knowledge, can entail a conclusion that is 
not sufficient in likelihood for knowledge due to the accumulation of epistemic 
risk, so even if Cottingham were to claim he did know the conditional, yet not 
that God existed, his position would not display a logical incoherence, as Metz 
claims.9 (So, even were I to be mistaken about Metz’ infallibilism and he in fact 
accepts a fallibilist epistemology, this will not allow him to convict Cottingham 
of such an incoherence.) Now, depending on the level of epistemic risk one 
assigns to the premises, Metz’ argument may well locate greater or lesser tension 
in such a position – where the less the tension the more implausibly great the 
level of epistemic risk one is taken to tolerate for the premises. Certain 
comments from Metz suggest that he may be amenable to constructing a weaker 
argument along these lines: he sometimes talks of the strength of the evidence 
for a God-based ethic needing to be only comparable, rather than equal, to that 
of God’s existence.10 And he posits that, for theists who maintain that they do 
know God’s existence, he might grant this but reformulate his objection to 
invoke ‘a large discrepancy in the degree of justification for believing in God 
relative to that for believing in meaning [or wrongness]’.11 Whilst we should 
agree that a weaker argument along these lines avoids the problem of epistemic 
risk, moving from a claim of incoherence to a claim of tension does lessen the 
dialectical force of the objection. So many of the words used in constructing the 
objection and assessing its force will be vague (‘risk’, ‘comparable’, 
‘justification’) that, coupled with the considerations about transmission in 
section 5, a weaker objection may be hard to press (though obviously this will 
vary from individual to individual). 
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10 Metz (2013), p.88. 
11 Metz (2013), p.146, footnote 3. I am not sure that objection can be reformulated in this context, as 
given that, for Metz, knowledge must be based on conclusive evidence, and evidence is either 
conclusive or it is not (being conclusive is not a property that comes in degrees), there can be no 
discrepancy in the degree of the justifying evidence. One cannot be more than certain. 
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Now, of course, there have been various ways mooted in the literature to 
maintain both fallibilism and multi-premise closure principles, so the foregoing 
does not show that Cottingham or others can just ignore (A*). However, all of 
these methods have to do something with both the epistemic paradoxes and the 
plausible intuition that, on fallibilism, epistemic risk increases as we add fallibly 
known premises (an intuition that Metz seems to share, insofar as he concedes 
that if we focus on ‘confidence’ rather than ‘knowledge’ his argument fails), and 
unless what they do with these manages to reconcile fallibilism and 
multi-premise closure principles and preserve Metz’ argument, that argument 
cannot be said to have isolated a logical incoherence in Cottingham’s view. It is, 
it would seem, encumbent on Metz to produce an epistemological theory which 
can accomplish all this in order to press his argument. 
Maybe Metz can just reject Cottingham’s fallibilism. Aside from putting a 
(substantial) theoretical price tag on his argument, such an embrace of 
infallibilism may have other unattractive consequences. Metz seems to think that 
his own naturalistic grounding of morality is immune to a tu quoque objection of 
logical incoherence, since ‘[v]irtually no one disputes that there is a material 
world’.12 I take him here to mean that his position satisfies (A*), as he knows 
that morality exists, he knows that morality is a function of natural properties, 
and so he knows what this entails: that there are natural properties. But does 
Metz know all these things on infallibilism? He claims that knowledge requires 
having ‘conclusive evidence’, but it is hard to see how he acquires such 
evidence for the material world’s existence just from the sociological fact that 
virtually no one disputes this claim. In order to claim that he has conclusive 
evidence for this claim, Metz would have to conclusively refute idealism, 
solipsism and scepticism about the external world (Metz own principle (A*) is, 
of course, handy in formulating this point). It is just the sort of difficulties that 
one has in doing this that have provided part of the motivation for fallibilist 
construals of knowledge. Metz also denies that we have inconclusive evidence 
that wrongness exists. In doing so he appeals to Cottingham’s claim that, say, 
cruelty is not just wrong if wrongness exists, but is in fact wrong, on the basis 
that wrong actions such as cruelty are wrong in all possible worlds. Metz seems 
to take this to amount to an explicit denial that there is merely inconclusive 
evidence that wrongness exists.13 But I am not sure that I see how this follows 
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(or that Cottingham meant his claim to establish this). Someone who doubts that 
wrongness exists in this world (that is to say, they doubt that cruelty is really 
objectively wrong, and instead explain our moral intuitions via some kind of 
error theory, for example) need not find their doubts assuaged by being told that, 
if wrongness exists in this world, it exists in all other worlds. They might even 
find their doubts increased, as the latter claim is much stronger! Even if true, 
Metz’ statement that most debate in moral philosophy is not about whether 
wrongness exists, but about its nature and epistemology once again seems to tell 
us less about wrongness and more about what moral philosophers are interested 
in; certainly, by itself it does not provide the conclusive evidence that an 
infallibilist would take to be required for knowledge. Finally, both the claim that 
wrongness exists and the claim that the material world exists seem to have much 
more evidential support to me than Metz’ claim that naturalism can ground 
morality (even if we suppose the evidence for the latter to be pretty good). 
Given this, Metz’ own position does not satisfy principle (A*) (as he seems to 
suggest it does) because, according to epistemological standards whereby one 
must have conclusive evidence, he does not know either his two premises or his 
conclusion. 
 
4. A Successful Tu Quoque Argument? 
 
This shows that Metz’ own way to avoid a tu quoque argument is 
unsuccessful. Metz would avoid the logical incoherence claim, not because his 
conclusion is known, as are both of his premises, but because his conclusion is 
not known, as are both of his premises. According to such epistemological 
standards, Cottingham’s position will avoid the logical incoherence claim for the 
same reasons. This would leave Metz and Cottingham’s positions in the same 
boat, as regards the incoherence objection – but Metz’ argument against 
Cottingham just was the incoherence objection. Problems do not end there, 
however. Cottingham might attempt to mount a successful tu quoque attack on 
Metz’ naturalistic grounding of morality using fallibilist epistemological 
standards. At first, the prospects for this look bleak, as on fallibilism it appears 
as though Metz does know that natural properties exist, which is presumably the 
counterpart to the claim that Cottingham does not think he knows, namely that 
God exists. But suppose we restructure some of Metz’ claims. We (fallibly) 
know that wrongness exists. We also know the following entailment: if 
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wrongness exists, then a naturalistic theory of grounding wrongness is correct.14 
So, to avoid violating (A*) (and bracketing my earlier remarks about the 
accumulation of epistemic risk over premises), we must know that a naturalistic 
theory of grounding wrongness is correct. Now, Metz only says that ‘nature 
could plausibly ground such an [objective] ethic’,15 which suggests to me that, 
even on falliblism, he may not believe that he knows this conclusion (I myself 
find a number of propositions plausible, but I would want to stop short of saying 
that I (even fallibly) knew them to be true). And more generally, I do not think 
that many of us would want to say that we know that a naturalistic theory of 
grounding wrongness is correct, still less the rather complex Cornell 
meta-ethical realism that Metz thinks is the right one. Or, to speak in terms of 
comparability, I do not think my justification for believing Cornell meta-ethical 
realism to be correct is comparable to my justification for believing that 
torturing an innocent child for fun is wrong (even given Metz’ arguments for the 
former). If this is so, then we display the same sort of incoherence as Metz 
claims Cottingham does. Of course it is open to Metz to claim that he never said 
he knew the entailment ‘If wrongness exists, then a naturalistic theory of 
grounding wrongness is true’. This is essentially Cottingham’s move, and so it 
will lead to dialectical parity.16 
It seems to me that the reason why we have to restructure Metz’ claims to 
produce the tu quoque argument lies in the difference between divine command 
ethics and naturalistic ethics. In the case of the former, if we, with Metz, leave 
Euthyphro problems aside, the difficulty is always liable to be the ontological 
claim (that God exists), rather than the grounding claim (that God grounds 
objective ethics). In the case of the latter, matters are reversed; the hard doctrine 
is not the ontological one (that natural properties exist), but the grounding claim 
(that natural properties can ground rightness and wrongness). When Metz 
outlines the position that he alleges Cottingham is incoherent in accepting he 
suppresses the less controversial grounding claim: ‘Wrongness exists. If 
wrongness exists, then [theistic grounding is true, which entails that] God exists. 
                                                     
14 I take Metz’ arguments (in particular, the incoherence objection) against both supernaturalist and 
non-naturalist attempts to ground wrongness to be attempts to establish this conditional, along with 
any arguments/presumptions in favour of naturalism as a metaphysical thesis. 
15 Metz (2013), p.97. 
16 Nevertheless, this would be a rather odd move for Metz to make, as it would seem to imply that the 
incoherence objection, by which he hopes to rule out alternatives to naturalistic grounding, is 
inconclusive. 
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Therefore God exists.’ When I outline the position that I allege Metz is 
incoherent in accepting I suppress the less controversial ontological claim (given 
here in square brackets): ‘Wrongness exists. If wrongness exists, then 
naturalistic grounding is true [which entails that natural properties exist]. 
Therefore naturalistic grounding is true.’ Moreover, it is notable that both 
Cottingham and Metz offer arguments to support their respective grounding 
claims, and neither offer arguments to support their ontological claims (although 
elsewhere in his work Cottingham argues that God’s existence is at least 
consistent with our total evidence, contra some of Metz’ expressed reasons for 
doubting God17), which does put Cottingham in a dialectically weaker position: 
Metz is bolstering his vulnerable flank with arguments, whereas Cottingham is 
merely further bolstering his well-defended flank (although in doing so he is 
aiming arguments against Metz’ grounding claim). 
 
5. Psychological Doubt vs. Rational Doubt 
 
Another possibility might be for Metz to say that he has given arguments for 
his conditional and for the existence of wrongness, and the evidential force of 
these arguments transmit, in accordance with (A*), to his conclusion; it is 
irrational not to say that one knows it given this. As I said above, it seems that 
Metz would not want to say this, but he could change his mind – as could 
Cottingham (alternatively they could both change their minds and say that the 
application of (A*) would just provide us with reason to doubt that wrongness 
exists). Were the latter to regiment his claims so as to conform them to (A*), he 
would present something very much like a moral argument for the existence of 
God of the type used, for example, by William Lane Craig (although Craig 
typically says that his premises are just more worthy of belief than their denial, 
and so transmit the commensurate level of evidence).18 In a footnote, Metz 
considers the suggestion of Roger Crisp that this possibility can be applied to 
Cottingham, but I do not follow his response: he seems to indicate that this 
                                                     
17 Metz (2013), p.243. 
18 Craig outlines his moral argument for God in his (2008), pp.172-183. It is interesting to note that, if 
we were to take this regimentation of claims in response to Metz’ use of the incoherence argument 
against supernaturalism about meaning, we could say that Metz has devised a new argument for the 
existence of God from meaningfulness! It is also necessary to carefully assess other reasons for and 
against believing in the existence of God; Metz perfectly understandably does not want to spend time 
doing this, but a proper discussion (rather than an appeal to what many philosophers think – Metz 
(2013), p. 146) cannot be postponed indefinitely. 
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possibility cannot be used by Cottingham as most of us are unsure of the claim 
that if wrongness exists, then God exists. Further, continues Metz, Cottingham’s 
work gains importance insofar as it defends that claim so powerfully. But surely 
whether we are unsure of the conditional claim is not a problem for Cottingham, 
as, on Metz’ interpretation, the former does take himself to know this? Moreover, 
as Metz observes, Cottingham has given us arguments to establish that we know 
this conditional, and so it may be unjustified to be unsure of the claim, 
depending on how successful those arguments are. Metz’ main objection against 
Cottingham’s conditional is his incoherence objection, which the possibility we 
are currently considering is a response against; it thus would beg the question to 
assert that this response fails because of the incoherence objection alone. 
One way of mitigating some of the counterintuitive nature of these sorts of 
‘newly discovered knowledge’ responses is to note the difference that the tweaks 
that alter Metz’ principle (A) to principle (A*) make; specifically, the difference 
made by altering the principle from a closure principle to a transmission 
principle (perhaps Metz will disagree with this alteration to a stronger principle, 
but I cannot see on what grounds he would). This makes a difference when we 
consider the difference between psychological doubt and rational doubt; 
supposing Kripkean semantics to be true (as Metz does19), it may be possible for 
me to psychologically doubt that water is H2O, but it is not possible for me to 
rationally doubt it (the reason for this might be explained by, for example, using 
David Chalmers’ distinction between prima facie and ideally conceiving that 
water is not H2O; we can do the former, but not the latter20). If we baldly ask 
someone whether they know all of the three claims Metz attributes to 
Cottingham, in accordance with closure (Metz’ own un-tweaked principle (A)), 
but omitting any mention of evidence transmission, they might find it easier to 
psychologically doubt the claim Metz singles out for doubt than if we made 
evidence transmission salient (in accordance with the tweaked principle (A*)), 
even though they cannot rationally doubt the conclusion in either case (assuming 
we set aside accumulation of epistemic risk). Further support for this may come 
from considering that Metz’ argument is one based on logical incoherence, and 
logical modelling of our epistemic practices frequently has to deal with the 
problem of (lack of) logical omniscience; epistemic agents typically do not 
follow through the logical consequences of all their beliefs or knowledge (as 
                                                     
19 Metz (2013), p.91. 
20 On Chalmers’ distinction, see his (2002), pp.147-149. 
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was indicated by the first tweak I had to make to (A)), and so certain 
conclusions may come as a surprise to them, and as initially counterintuitive. 
However, in being taken through their reasoning and showing how the evidence 
transmits, it may be that the epistemic agent will realise that they cannot 
rationally doubt the surprising conclusion, and, seeing how it follows from other 
propositions they have good reason to believe or to think they know, their initial 
sense of dubiousness about that conclusion will dissipate. Hence, I am 
suspicious of how much weight we can place on subjects’ initial impressions of 
what they think they know out of a set of propositions we express baldly, tied 
together by a very simple epistemic closure principle: such a scenario leaves a 
lot of room for impressions tinted with a merely psychological doubt that may 
only be dissipated by allowing the epistemic agent to ruminate and ‘live with’ 
his or her new-found recognition of the connections between propositions (I 
think Cottingham might agree with this sort of point). 
One way of marking this distinction between psychological and rational 
doubt would be to tie it to the familiar epistemological distinction between our 
doxastic warrant and our propositional warrant. This latter distinction is useful 
as it is a common observation that what we are justified in believing and what 
we take ourselves to be justified in believing are two different things. I have 
propositional warrant for p iff, given the evidence I possess, believing p is 
rational. I have doxastic warrant for p iff, on the actual evidence I take to myself 
to have for p, believing p is rational. With this distinction in place we can posit 
the possibility that someone who thinks they know that wrongness exists and 
that if wrongness exists then God exists, but does not think they know that God 
exists can coherently hold all of this if we are talking about knowledge insofar 
as it is doxastically warranted, but not insofar as it is propositionally warranted. 
Neither (A) nor (A*) are applicable to knowledge insofar as it is based on 
doxastic warrant. Of course, once we make that individual aware that their 
propositional warrant, which should conform to (A*), does not conform to it, 
they will want to make it so conform. But there is no set way as to how they go 
about doing that, at least, not without bringing in further substantive 
considerations that will affect that propositional warrant. 
We might add that incoherence objections based on transmission principles 
like Metz’ are dialectically quite strange. If one just states that, if one knows the 
premises of an argument but not the conclusion, then there must be something 
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wrong with one of the premises, this seems to license dogmatism.21 We must 
ask why one doubts the conclusion. If one cannot give a reason, then one’s doubt 
in it is likely to be merely psychological. If one can give a reason (and Metz 
believes that he himself can), then one must transmit one’s doubt to one of the 
premises, and furthermore, give reasons for one’s doubt in that premise. 
Otherwise one would be doubting that premise, rather than another premise, or 
the premises of the reasons one has given for doubting the conclusion, 
irrationally, and this is just as bad as doubting the conclusion irrationally. Now, 
if one has reasons for one’s doubt in the premise, one should give them, but 
Metz does not do this. His argument is the incoherence objection, but if, as the 
foregoing suggests, the incoherence objection will only have force if one has 
some substantive reasons against one of the premises anyway, the former 
objection drops out as irrelevant. 
 
6. Transmission Failure 
 
Earlier, I promised to return to the issue of transmission failure, and how it 
might affect the incoherence objection. The literature on transmission principles 
is steadily growing, and, within the confines of this article, I can only sketch 
some of the ideas and how they might relate to Metz’ argument. In doing so my 
plan is to follow some of the discussion in Martin Davies’ ‘Two Purposes of 
Arguing and Two Epistemic Projects’, which has the benefit of being both fairly 
self-contained and wide-ranging. We can begin by using Davies’ distinction 
between the two epistemic projects mentioned in the title of his article to situate 
Metz’ argument. Metz’ account of what we take our epistemic attitudes to his 
three propositions to be seems closer to what Davies calls the epistemic project 
of ‘deciding what to believe’ than the epistemic project of ‘settling the question’. 
That is to say, when we examine these propositions we are trying to tease out of 
the consequences of some of our beliefs, specifically here our belief that we 
know (1) and (2) and that we do not know (3). Metz’ claim, remember, is that if 
we think we know (1) and (2), we must also say we know (3) in virtue of (1) and 
(2) transmitting their warrant to (3). However, this will only be true if the 
argument that has (1) and (2) as premises and (3) as a conclusion (henceforth: 
‘Argument (1)-(3)’) does not exhibit transmission failure. Whether it does or not 
                                                     
21 Cf. Harman (1977), p.148, for the similar Kripke-Harman paradox of dogmatism. 
 163
will depend on how we understand transmission failure. Take Davies’ first 
criterion for transmission failure based on Copi: 
 
(C1) The warrant, W, to believe premise P1 of a valid argument with 
conclusion Q, is not transmitted from premise to conclusion if W depends 
on an antecedent warrant to believe Q. 
 
Strictly speaking, I do not think Argument (1)-(3) does suffer from 
transmission failure according to this criterion. Whichever premise we take as 
P1, I fail to see that the warrant for (1) ‘Wrongness exists’ or (2) ‘If wrongness 
exists, then God exists’ requires an antecedent warrant to believe (3) ‘God 
exists’, at least in any obvious way. 
That said, Davies offers a second criterion for transmission failure based on 
Copi which I think does apply to Argument (1)-(3), viz: 
 
(C2) The warrant, W, to believe premise, P1 of a valid argument with 
conclusion Q, is not transmitted from premise to conclusion if W depends 
on an antecedent warrant to believe B, and there is a direct argument from 
B plus acceptance of P2 to Q.22 
 
First, why does Davies propose this criterion when he already has (C1)? 
Well, one factor that makes an argument less-than-well-suited (although not 
wholly unsuited) to the project of deciding what to believe is if it exhibits 
‘epistemic indirectness’, that is, if it takes a gratuitous detour to its conclusion – 
it is needlessly indirect. Such an argument involves departing from the ‘norm of 
conforming the structure of one’s network of beliefs to the structure of the 
abstract space of warrants’.23 
Assuming we adopt (C2), Argument (1)-(3) fulfils the criterion in the 
following way. Take the premise (2) ‘If wrongness exists, God exists’. I submit 
that the warrant brought forward for this premise is such that it depends on an 
antecedent warrant to believe a certain proposition, and there is a direct 
argument from that proposition to ‘God exists’. So what is the warrant that is 
advanced for (2)? Metz provides a handy capsule summary of Cottingham’s 
                                                     
22 Note that I have generalised Davies’ formulations of (C1), (C2) and (J) to cover two-premised 
arguments, as the argument under discussion, Argument (1)-(3), is of this type. 
23 Davies (2009), p.373. 
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warrant for believing premise (2) in section 5.4 of Meaning in Life: the moral 
norms that allow for attributions of wrongness or rightness must be universal in 
scope, objective, necessary and normative, but only God has the required 
attributes to ground moral norms with these characteristics. I will not examine 
how certain attributes of God serve to ground certain of these characteristics of 
moral norms, with the exception of the one relevant to showing how Argument 
(1)-(3) exhibits transmission failure. Metz claims that, if God exists necessarily 
and could not change His mind, then any commands He gives that ground moral 
norms would be necessary, and so those norms would also be necessary. Such a 
claim is meant to provide warrant for (2). However, this warrant depends on an 
antecedent warrant to believe the proposition ‘It is possible that it is necessarily 
the case that God exists’. Since there is a direct argument from ‘It is possible 
that it is necessarily the case that God exists’ to (3) ‘God exists’, the conclusion 
of Argument (1)-(3), that argument meets the criterion for transmission failure 
according to (C2). 
Let us look at these last two claims in more detail. Why does the warrant 
adduced to believe (2) require antecedent warrant to believe ‘It is possible that it 
is necessarily the case that God exists’? Well, if it is not possible that it 
necessarily be the case that God should exist, then it is not possible that God 
should, by means of the attributes He possesses, ground the necessity of moral 
norms. God, not being even possibly necessary, will not exist in some worlds, 
whereas moral norms, being putatively necessary, exist in all of them. A result of 
this is that God cannot be said to be an adequate ground of necessary moral 
norms (after all, Metz followed Cottingham in appealing to God’s necessary 
existence as the attribute required to effect His capacity to ground them). If this 
is so, then we have no warrant to believe (2) ‘If wrongness exists, then God 
exists’. Now, as for the second claim, acceptance of the proposition ‘A necessary 
being possibly exists’ amounts to conceding the controversial premise of the 
modal ontological argument proposed by philosophers such as Plantinga,24 the 
conclusion of which is ‘God exists’, that is, (3). Assuming the majority view that 
the modal system of S5 captures the logic of our claims about metaphysical 
possibility and necessity, the following argument is valid: (O1) It is possible that 
it is necessarily the case that God exists, (O2) (Therefore) God exists.25 (O2) is 
the same as (3). So there is a direct argument from ‘It is possible that it is 
                                                     
24 Cf. Plantinga (1974), Chapter X. 
25 Cf. Oppy (1995), p.70. 
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necessarily the case that God exists’, which is (necessarily part of) the warrant 
for (2), to (3), namely the conclusion of Argument (1)-(3). Hence Argument 
(1)-(3) conforms to (C2), and so fails to transmit warrant. 
Before moving on to consider the implications of this, I also note that, for 
similar reasons, Argument (1)-(3) meets a different criterion for transmission 
failure that Davies bases on Jackson’s work, rather than Copi’s, viz: 
  
(J) The warrant, W, to believe premise P1 of a valid argument with 
conclusion Q, is not transmitted from premise to conclusion if doubt about 
Q plus acceptance of P2 would directly rationally require acceptance of a 
defeating hypothesis for W. 
 
Davies seeks to show that any argument meeting (C2) will meet (J). It will 
be enough to note that where W = ‘It is possible that it is necessarily the case 
that God exists’ (plus any other ancillary propositions that need to be added to 
this to constitute warrant for (2)), P1 = (2), P2 = (1) and Q = (3), doubt about (3) 
will indeed directly rationally require acceptance of a defeating hypothesis for 
‘It is possible that it is necessarily the case that God exists’. Why so? Well, if it 
is the case that God, if He exists, necessarily exists, then doubts about God’s 
existence, that is, doubts about (3), will be doubts about it being necessarily the 
case that God exists. But if it must necessarily be the case that God exists if He 
exists at all (which must after all be true if God is to ground necessary moral 
norms), then a doubt about whether it be the case that God exists will be a doubt 
about whether it is possible that it necessarily be the case that God exists – in S5, 
if a necessary being does not exist in a given world, it will not exist in any 
possible world, and so will not possibly exist. Thus doubt about (3) leads to 
acceptance of a defeating hypothesis for ‘It is possible that it is necessarily the 
case that God exists’, namely, ‘It is not possible that it is necessarily the case 
that God exists’, and hence Argument (1)-(3) fits (J). 
Davies also notes that, just as any argument that meets (C1) or (C2) will also 
meet (J), so any argument that meets (J) will meet (C1) or (C2)26 provided that 
we also accept a certain thesis, (AW): If warrant to doubt a proposition B 
(warrant to believe not-B) would defeat the prima facie warrant to believe P 
provided by a putative warranting factor, F, then F can constitute a warrant to 
                                                     
26 Davies (2009), p.374. 
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believe P only given an antecedent warrant to believe B. As we have seen 
Argument (1)-(3) meets (J), and so if we accept (AW), it will also meet (C1), 
contrary my initial impression. 
There is a great deal more that can be said here, such as discussion of the 
credibility of (AW), comparison of Davies’ accounts of transmission failure with 
others on the market, such as Crispin Wright’s or Moretti and Piazza’s, or 
examination of which kind of warrant is transmitted. But as I said earlier it will 
not be possible for me to outline or treat all of the aspects of the debate over 
transmission of epistemic warrant and how they relate to Metz’ incoherence 
objection. My discussion here can only really be a first pass, which others may 
decide to take up or refine for themselves. Given this caveat, I will now go on to 
sketch what moral I think we can draw from the fact that Argument (1)-(3) is an 
example of transmission failure. 
At first blush, it seems as though this fact will not help Cottingham (or 
anyone who takes the same view as him) very much. After all, if the warrant for 
‘If wrongness exists, then God exists’, which Cottingham thinks he knows, 
entails ‘God exists’, then he also must know that God exists, and so there is 
indeed an incoherence in Cottingham’s view, as Metz suggests (unless we take 
the points about epistemic risk above).27 Argument (1)-(3) is an example of 
transmission failure because warrant is transmitted to its conclusion in a 
needlessly indirect way, rather than because no warrant is transmitted to it at all. 
But observing the non-transmissivity of Argument (1)-(3) allows the possibility 
of a different type of tu quoque objection to be issued against Metz: that he 
himself exemplifies a certain kind of logical incoherence. For Metz, like 
Cottingham, believes wrongness to exist, and to exist by necessity, and he takes 
Cottingham to be claiming that the existence of wrongness entails the existence 
of God, which would mean that God would exist by necessity also. So the 
concept of God that Metz ascribes to Cottingham is that of a metaphysically 
necessary being (rather than, say, a Swinburnian metaphysically contingent 
God).28 However, Metz only seems to doubt the existence of this God, not to 
                                                     
27 Note that it will not help for Cottingham to say he merely believes, rather than knows, the 
proposition ‘If wrongness exists, then God exists’, as all that is needed to run the ontological argument 
is the coherence of the concept of God as a necessary being. That this is Cottingham’s concept follows 
from the necessity of moral truths and the view that God grounds those truths, both of which it seems 
Cottingham holds. Maybe he can rebut this charge by denying that wrongness is necessarily grounded 
in God, or necessarily grounded in anything – rather it is just most plausibly grounded in God. 
28 See, e.g., Metz (2013), p.94. 
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find the concept of such a God incoherent (if he thought the latter was the case, 
there would be no need to use his argument based on the (A*) principle).29 As 
we have seen, to find the concept of a necessary being coherent is to grant the 
contested premise of Plantinga’s modal version of the ontological argument, by 
which it would follow that Metz is committed to claiming knowledge of God’s 
existence, contra his expressed doubts. Hence it may be possible to charge Metz 
with incoherence insofar as he allows the possibility of God as a necessary being, 
yet doubts that God exists in actuality. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
None of the issues I raise in this article strike me as dispositive of Metz’ 
incoherence objection. Rather they appear to me to need a number of iterations, 
developing, countering and re-framing, before their actual impact can be 
adequately assessed. Nevertheless my hope is that this treatment provides at 
least a starting point for the process of such an assessment.30 
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Meaning in Consequences 
Mark Wells* 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims to respond on behalf of consequentialist theories of meaning in life to criticisms 
raised by Thaddeus Metz and, in doing so, demonstrates how the debate over theories of meaning in 
life might make progress. By using conceptual resources developed for consequentialist theories of 
morality, I argue that Metz’s general arguments against consequentialist theories of meaning in life 
fail. That is, some consequentialist theories can accommodate Metz’s criticisms. However, using 
conceptual resources developed in debate concerning consequentialist theories of practical reason, I 
then demonstrate how we might progress in the debate between consequentialist and 
nonconsequentialist theories, and in theorizing on meaning in life more generally. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In his comprehensive and impressive Meaning in Life, Thaddeus Metz 
argues that we should reject any theory of meaning in life with a 
consequentialist structure.1 In this paper, I argue that Metz’s arguments fail to 
establish his conclusion by drawing upon resources developed for 
consequentialist theories of morality. 2  While I am not sure whether some 
consequentialist theory of meaning in life is correct, or even the best available 
theory, I think such theories have more going for them than Metz’s discussion 
suggests. 
Even more important than the defense of consequentialist theories, however, 
is the broader lesson to be learned from this defense. As this paper demonstrates, 
the discussion on meaning in life has much to gain by drawing on the conceptual 
resources available in other domains of normative inquiry. By taking advantage 
of these resources, we will be able to make real progress in our theorizing on 
                                                     
* Visiting Assistant Professor, The College of Wooster, Scovel Hall, 944 College Mall, Wooster, OH 
44691, USA. Email: mpwells[a]gmail.com 
** I thank Scott Simmons and Dallas Amico for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
1 Metz (2014), pp. 197-8. 
2 There are limits to the fruitfulness of any distinction between types of consequentialisms. As 
Campbell Brown aptly notes, “‘consequentialism’ is a term of art used by philosophers to mean 
different things on different occasions, none of which is most obviously deserving of the name” (2009), 
p. 751. 
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meaning in life. 
The paper will proceed as follows. In Section 2, I explain Metz’s 
terminology. Then, in Section 3, I reconstruct Metz’s arguments and demonstrate 
how someone who defends a consequentialist theory of meaning in life might 
respond. Finally, in Section 4, I explain how the failure of Metz’s objections 
illustrates the larger point concerning progress in both the debate over 
consequentialist theories and the wider literature on meaning in life. 
 
2. Preliminaries 
 
On Metz’s analysis, to talk of ‘life’s meaning’ is to talk about some 
combination of the purposiveness, self-transcendence, and admirability of that 
life (and, perhaps, some further property a life might have as well).3 Metz cites 
the lives of Nelson Mandela, Mother Teresa, Albert Einstein, Charles Darwin, 
Pablo Picasso, and Fyodor Dostoyevsky as exemplars of lives with meaning (i.e. 
meaningful lives) in the sense he is after.4 
Thus, a theory of meaning in life is an attempt to explain what feature these 
lives have in common such that they are meaningful. A theory is 
‘consequentialist’ when it posits that the unifying element of meaningful lives is 
that it produces good consequences. More particularly, per Metz, it is the view 
that “the more final goodness one produces, and the more badness one reduces, 
wherever and however one can in the long-term, the more meaningful one’s 
life”.5 
At this point, I wish to stop and flag a concern. In his characterization of 
consequentialist theories, Metz builds in a number of assumptions that 
proponents of consequentialism need not accept and do not when it comes to 
moral consequentialism. These include the assumptions that neither the 
distribution of goods nor the means to them are themselves relevant to the final 
net goodness of the consequences.6 However, as Metz will later capitalize on 
these assumptions in his objections, and much of my defense will involve 
                                                     
3 Metz (2014), pp. 34-5. 
4 Metz (2014), p. 2. Some of these lives are controversially meaningful. For our purposes, however, 
we can set aside whether these lives are actually meaningful. We can instead say that these lives as 
popularly conceived would be meaningful. 
5 Metz (2014), p. 184. 
6 Metz also assumes that relationship between consequences and meaning are aggregative such that 
any increase in meaning requires an increase in net final goodness and vice versa. Though this 
assumption is not so controversial, it is worth noting that some consequentialist might deny it. 
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denying them, it is important that we recognize them as we proceed. 
Metz, or someone sympathetic, might stipulate that consequentialist theories 
of meaning in life are committed to these assumptions. Any theory which does 
not share them is simply not the sort of theory to which the label 
‘consequentialist’ applies. This reply obscures the substantive issue at stake. The 
question is whether, and to what extent, the goodness of consequences explains 
why some lives are meaningful. Stipulating the use of the term ‘consequentialist’ 
in this manner still leaves open the possibility that consequences are all there is 
to meaning in life. 
 
3. Three Arguments against Consequentialist Theories of Meaning in Life 
 
Metz argues primarily against a utilitarian theory of meaning in life on 
which final goodness and badness are solely a function of what is good or bad 
for people. In this paper, I am not interested in defending any particular 
consequentialist theory of meaning in life such as those advanced by Peter 
Singer or Irving Singer.7 I set aside any particular arguments against them (and 
grant their conclusions) except where relevant to Metz’s broader objections to 
consequentialist theories. Rather, I am more interested in Metz’s general 
rejection of a theory “because of its consequentialist structure”.8 
 
3.1: Meaning in Means 
 
In his own words, Metz’s first criticism of consequentialist theories is that 
“bringing about final value with any (permissible) mechanism whatsoever does 
not exhaust the respect in which realizing it can confer meaning on life”.9 The 
reasoning is as follows:  
 
1. The means by which goods are produced cannot increase net final 
goodness. 
2. The means by which goods are produced can increase net final 
meaningfulness. 
3. So, there is more to meaningfulness than net final goodness (i.e. 
                                                     
7 See Singer (1995) and Singer (1996). 
8 Metz (2014), p. 12. 
9 Metz (2014), p. 198. 
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consequentialism). 
 
Metz’s characterization of consequentialist theories implies the first premise. 
Metz justifies the second premise by appealing to two thought experiments. The 
first, originally created by Robert Nozick, calls us to imagine a machine which 
can bring about any result with the push of a button. The second calls us to 
compare two individuals, one who donates inherited wealth to charity to benefit 
some impoverished community, and the other who works to benefit that 
community. In both experiments, Metz judges that, “ceteris paribus, promoting 
goodness for its own sake in a robust, active, or intense way would confer more 
meaning”.10 That is, using the machine or one’s inherited wealth for some 
meaningful end – such as the benefit of an impoverished community – would be 
less meaningful than the alternative where achieves that end via robust, active, 
or intense work. 
For the sake of argument, I accept Metz’s judgement about both cases and 
that they establish his premise.11 The central problem remains that Metz fails to 
motivate his characterization of what it means for a theory to be consequentialist. 
As such, a consequentialist might simply deny the first premise by allowing that 
robust, active, or intense means contribute to the final goodness of the 
consequence they produce. It is better – they might say – when someone works 
hard. Even if we wish to resist saying that hard work itself is a good, we might 
still say that the good results of hard work are made even better by that work 
then they would have otherwise been. To see how this might work, consider G. E. 
Moore’s principle that “The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the 
same as the sum of the values of its parts”.12 In this way, hard work might 
enhance the value of an ‘organic whole’ (to use Moore’s language) without 
being valuable itself.13 
 
3.2: Meaning in Distribution 
 
Metz’s second objection to consequentialist theories of meaning in life is 
that “the instruction to promote as much objective value wherever one can is too 
                                                     
10 Metz (2014), p. 198. 
11 Ben Bramble argues that these cases contain confounding details which undermine them as 
counter-examples to consequentialist theories of meaning. See Bramble (2015), pp. 5-7. 
12 Moore (2015), §18. 
13 Moore (2015), §20. 
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crude” and “there would often be most reason of meaning to realize it in 
oneself”.14 The reasoning here is: 
 
1. The distribution of goods produced cannot increase net final goodness 
produced. 
2. The distribution of goods produced can increase net final 
meaningfulness. 
3. So, there is more to meaningfulness than net final goodness. 
 
As before, the first premise follows from Metz’s characterization of 
consequentialist theories. To support the second premise, Metz offers a thought 
experiment concerning a wife and her husband. In it, the two (quite 
impressively) calculate that more total goods will be “produced in the long run if 
the wife stayed home and supported the husband in his professional career, more 
than if he instead took care of the household or if they both worked and shared 
the domestic labor”.15 However, Metz finds the consequentialist implication that 
the wife would thereby lead a more meaningful life in her domestic role 
counterintuitive. It matters for the meaningfulness of a life whether the goods 
produced are in that life or in some other person’s life. 
In this case, I share Metz’s intuition but doubt that our shared judgment 
supports the second premise. The case contains details that, I suspect, confound 
my judgment and, perhaps, others’ judgments as well. The detail that most 
concerns me is the gender and relationship of the individuals in the case. As the 
case is constructed, optimal behavior comports to traditional patriarchal norms 
about the role of women in marriage. On these norms, wives are expected to 
make personal sacrifices to support their husbands. As a critic of such traditional 
patriarchal norms – a position I suspect I share with many other academics – I 
cannot be sure my judgment about the meaningfulness of the wife’s life is not 
being influenced by the appearance of these norms. When I modify the case to 
be about two teammates rather than a wife and her husband, I am less willing to 
say that teammate who sacrifices for the other thereby lives less meaningfully. 
This difference in judgment between the two cases indicates that in the married 
couple case, my judgment is tracking something irrelevant to the second premise. 
To be clear, I am not accusing Metz of subscribing to these patriarchal norms. 
                                                     
14 Metz (2014), p. 195. 
15 Ibid. 
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Nor am I suggesting that his thought experiment supports such norms. I am 
merely suggesting that there is reason to doubt our intuitions support the second 
premise, especially the intuitions of those who strongly oppose traditional 
patriarchal norms. 
Nevertheless, the truth of the second premise would not diminish the deeper 
problem. As with Metz’s previous objection, it is again open to a 
consequentialist to deny the first premise. A consequentialist can allow that the 
net final goodness of a consequence depends in part on how the distribution of 
goods ends up. Examples from the literature include Larry Temkin, who holds 
that an equal distribution is better, Derek Parfit, who maintains the good of a 
distribution which prioritizes the least well-off, and Shelly Kagan and Fred 
Feldman, who have each claimed (in their own way) goods are better distributed 
according to desert.16 
 
3.3: Meaning in Attraction 
 
Metz’s third objection is that “bringing about what is non-instrumentally 
desirable is not the only way to relate to it so as to accrue meaning in life”.17 
The problem for the consequentialist is that “although subjective attraction is not 
necessary for a condition to be pro tanto meaningful, it would increase its 
meaning”.18 Metz reasons: 
 
1. Someone’s attitude towards their life cannot increase that life’s net 
final goodness. 
2. Someone’s attitude towards their life can increase that life’s net final 
meaningfulness. 
3. So, there is more to meaningfulness than net final goodness. 
 
The first premise follows from Metz’s understanding of what 
consequentialism is such that “According to the standard form of 
consequentialism, exhibiting a propositional attitude […] can have only 
instrumental value”.19 He supports the second premise with another series of 
                                                     
16 See Temkin (1993), Parfit (1997), Feldman (2004), and Kagan (2012). 
17 Metz (2014), p. 198. 
18 Metz (2014), p. 196. 
19 Ibid. 
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thought experiments. We can imagine “a Mother Teresa who helps others 
enormously but is alienated from her work”.20 Metz thinks that, in such a case, 
Mother Teresa’s life would be more meaningful were she not so alienated. Since, 
as I take it, her alienation is a function of her propositional attitudes towards her 
work, the second premise follows. 
Metz considers a consequentialist objection to the second premise. A 
consequentialist might assert that Mother Teresa’s life would be better for her 
absent alienation and life going better for someone does not necessarily make 
their life more meaningful. Thus, we can explain why Mother Teresa’s life 
would be preferable absent alienation without thinking it would be more 
meaningful and, thereby, committing ourselves to the second premise. Metz 
denies that her life going better completely explains what’s preferable about 
Mother Teresa’s life absent alienation. As he puts it “It is not a matter of welfare 
to exhibit attitudes such as identifying closely with a project, or concentrating 
intently on it, or setting an end and realizing it. And even if it were, I submit that 
these subjective conditions have an additional, non-welfarist property that is the 
factor conferring meaning on the agent’s life”.21 For the sake of argument, I 
once more accept Metz’s judgment about this case and his response to this 
objection. 
But again, the consequentialist can deny the first premise. The world is an 
even better place when people appreciate the work they do to improve it. There 
are a number of plausible explanations for why this might be so. For example, 
failure to appreciate the worth of one’s actions might consist in a form of 
ignorance. If it is better that we have true beliefs about the world then it would 
be better to appreciate the worth of our actions.22 Alternatively (or additionally), 
failure to appreciate the worth of one’s actions might consist in a failure to 
pursue things for the right reasons. If it is better that we do so, then appreciating 
the worth of our actions is again better. 
 
4. Progress 
 
Metz’s objections to consequentialist theories of meaning in life 
systematically underestimate the flexibility of the consequentialist approach. 
                                                     
20 Ibid. 
21 Metz (2014), p. 197. 
22 See Lynch (2004) for the view that it is better we have true beliefs. 
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Consequentialist theories are compatible with a wide range of results about 
cases. Aaron Smuts provides an illustrative example. On his good cause account, 
“One’s life is meaningful to the extent that it promotes the good”.23 What 
promotes the good? Smuts mentions an open-ended list of, “various kinds of 
goods that matter, such as achievement, moral worth, perfectionist value, and 
aesthetic value”.24 Such a list provides Smuts the resources to respond to 
counter-example by insisting that there is some “value to be found”.25 
Though Smuts does not discuss the extent of this flexibility, this feature of 
consequentialism has been the subject of some discussion among those 
interested in consequentialist moral theories.26 For example, consider what has 
been sometimes called ‘consequentializing.’ As Douglas Portmore explains “we 
consequentialize a nonconsequentialist theory by constructing a substantive 
version of consequentialism that yields, in every possible world, the same set of 
deontic verdicts that [the nonconsequentialist theory] yields”.27 With regard to 
morality, this can be accomplished as follows: “Take the very feature that the 
nonconsequentialist says determined which act should be performed […] and 
claim that this feature determines which outcome the agent should prefer”.28 
While the method needs to be expanded to capture other moral concepts like 
permissibility, agent-relative restrictions (e.g. rights), supererogation, and moral 
dilemmas, Portmore, at least, is confident that “for any remotely plausible 
nonconsequentialist theory, we can construct a version of consequentialism that 
is deontically equivalent to it”.29 
Such a method works just as well for consequentialist theories of meaning in 
life. A consequentialist can take the feature the nonconsequentialist says 
determines the meaningfulness of a life and claim that this feature determines 
which outcomes we should admire, regard as purposive, or self-transcendent. In 
fact, the method is much more straightforward for these theories as there are no 
equivalents to moral permissibility, dilemma, and supererogation within the 
evaluation of meaning in life. 
The underappreciated upshot of this method is that the general debates 
                                                     
23 Smuts (2013), p. 1. 
24 Smuts (2013), p. 14. 
25 Smuts (2013), p. 17. 
26 See Vallentyne (1988), Oddie and Milne (1991), Dreier (1993), Louise (2004), Portmore (2009), 
Smith (2009), Brown (2011), and Hurley (2013). 
27 Portmore (2009), p. 330. 
28 Portmore (2009), p. 329. 
29 Portmore (2009), p. 336. 
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between consequentialist and nonconsequentialist theories of meaning in life can 
only make minimal progress with the use of thought experiments to produce 
counter-examples. While particular consequentialist theories remain susceptible 
to such counter-examples, there will always be some consequentialist theory that 
avoids the counter-example and thereby remains extensionally adequate.30 
How, then, are we to progress the debate between consequentialist and 
nonconsequentialist theories of meaning in life? We will need to develop criteria 
for what a good explanation of meaning in life will look like, apart from 
extensional adequacy. I recommend we look to normative theory for assistance. 
Consider Elizabeth Anderson’s reply to commentary from Nicholas 
Sturgeon where similar issues are raised regarding consequentialism about 
reasons for action (which Anderson calls ‘C’).31 Anderson writes: 
 
My objection to C is not that it gives us the wrong ends. Sturgeon is right 
to suppose that with enough ingenuity in defining the structure of valuable 
states of affairs and in postulating causal connections, C can end up 
recommending almost any aim and thereby mimic the causal 
consequences of any other theory. My objection to C is rather that it fails 
to articulate an adequate rationale for the ends it recommends. It turns into 
a brute evaluative fact what begs for an explanation.32 
 
Here we see Anderson criticizing a consequentialist theory of reasons for 
action (i.e. theory of practical reason) on the grounds that it fails to explain why 
the moral ends are as they are. This is because a consequentialist understanding 
of which ends are valuable subordinates the value of people to the value of states 
of affairs (or possible worlds). Why? It is simply a brute fact that some states of 
affairs are more valuable than others. Anderson favors an alternative view on 
which everything derives its value from the value of people. Specifically, 
something is valuable just in case people can, on intersubjective reflection, have 
the evaluative attitudes they do towards the things they value for the reasons 
they value those things.33 
                                                     
30 Brown argues, convincingly to my mind, that this is not true for moral theories on one plausible and 
common understanding of ‘consequentialism.’ See Brown (2009). 
31 Paul Hurley connects this debate with the debate over consequentialist theories of morality. See 
Hurley (2013). 
32 Anderson (1996), pp. 541-42. 
33 Anderson (1996), p. 540. 
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate Anderson’s complaint and 
whether her alternative ultimately succeeds. Rather, I use her discussion to 
demonstrate how we might criticize consequentialist theories of meaning in life 
(and to indicate how they might respond in turn) such that progress can be made. 
Her remarks suggest a criterion of adequacy for any theory of practical reason: 
an adequate theory will be able to explain why something is more valuable than 
another without brute appeal. We might adopt a similar criterion of adequacy for 
theories of meaning in life and see whether consequentialist and 
nonconsequentialist theories fare. Alternatively, we might judge that there is 
something about meaning that differentiates it from practical reason in general 
such that different explanatory burdens obtain for their respective theories. 
To develop this latter point, a theorist about meaning in life might take 
themselves to only be discussing a certain class of practical reasons – reasons of 
meaning in life – and this class is, at least partially, distinct from other classes of 
practical reason (e.g. moral reasons, prudential reasons, etc.). These classes have 
different features (e.g. moral reasons relate to deontic requirements like 
rightness and wrongness) such that explaining why certain reasons belong to the 
class they do will require different criteria. Either way, our discussion of 
meaning in life will be all the richer for considering these issues. 
All of this is to demonstrate what I take to be the ultimate lesson of this 
paper. We should seek to understand the structural similarities between our idea 
of meaning in life and other normative concepts, like morality. Insofar as they 
are similar, we should draw upon the conceptual resources to be found in the 
wide literature on those subjects to inform our discussion of meaning in life. 
This paper itself exemplifies the fruitfulness of this method. 
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Defending the Purpose Theory of Meaning in Life  
Jason Poettcker* 
 
Abstract 
In Meaning in Life (2013, Oxford University Press), Thaddeus Metz presents a robust and 
innovative naturalistic account of what makes an individual’s life objectively meaningful. Metz 
discusses six existing arguments for purpose theory of meaning in life and offers objections to each 
of these arguments. Purpose theory is “the view that one’s life is meaningful just insofar as one 
fulfills a purpose that God has assigned to one” (Metz, 2013a, p. 80). Metz also proposes a novel 
argument to undermine purpose theory by showing that it is inconsistent with the best argument for 
a God-centered theory of meaning. He argues that an infinite, immutable, simple, atemporal being 
could not be purposive or active. I aim to defend purpose theory against Metz’s arguments and 
objections by arguing that Metz’s novel argument against purpose theory fails. I argue that God 
need not have all these properties and that having these properties does not entail that God cannot 
be purposive or active. I also provide a new argument for purpose theory that addresses the concerns 
and inconsistencies that Metz finds with current versions of purpose theory. I conclude that purpose 
theory is not undermined. 
 
1. Setting the stage 
 
‘Why is life made only for an end?  
Why do I do all this waiting then?  
Why this frightened part of me that’s fated to pretend?  
Why is life made only for an end? 
 
Why in the night sky are the lights on? 
Why is the earth moving round the sun? 
Floating in the vacuum with no purpose, not a one 
Why in the night sky are the lights on?’ 
 
“Blue Spotted Tail” (2011) Robin Peckinhold of the Fleet Foxes 
 
Perhaps due to the enormous influence of Nietzsche (1886), Schopenhauer 
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(1900), Heidegger (1927), Camus (1942), Sartre (1946), and Russell (1903, 
1957) and the rejection of the existence of a supernatural or divine creator, the 
question of life’s meaning was either avoided or considered to have no positive 
answer by many analytic philosophers during the twentieth century.1 Recently, 
interest in the question has re-emerged among contemporary philosophers such 
as John Cottingham (2003, 2005, 2008),2 W.L. Craig (1994),3 and Joshua 
Seachris (2010, 2013),4 who each defend various supernaturalist views of 
meaning in life. They argue that the existence of God (or God and immortality) 
is necessary for a person’s life to be objectively meaningful. In response to these 
supernaturalist views, philosophers such as Erik Wielenberg (2005), Susan Wolf 
(2010), and Thaddeus Metz (2013a) argue that a person’s life can be meaningful 
insofar as one pursues subjective or objective goods found in the physical world. 
They take an “optimistic naturalist view”; namely, that even if there are no 
supernatural entities and human life as a whole has no objective meaning 
because it is the product of the blind forces of nature, individual lives can still be 
objectively meaningful.5 Thus, God is not necessary for meaning in life. Metz 
has recently emerged as a front-runner in this debate with a book-length 
argument for a naturalist theory of meaning in life. In Meaning in Life (2013), 
Metz presents a robust and innovative naturalistic account of what makes an 
individual’s life objectively meaningful. First he surveys all of the naturalist and 
                                                     
1 Susan Wolf (2010b) explains that the question “What is the meaning of life?” has been avoided 
because it has already been answered and the answer is depressing, or it is considered to necessarily 
depend on the existence of God and is thus “not in the purview of secular philosophers” (Cited in in 
Seachris (2013a: 305). Joshua Seachris also notes that analytic philosophers have been mostly silent 
about the question either because they doubted it had an answer or they were suspicious that the 
question was “incoherent and meaningless” (2013a) p. 2.  
2 John Cottingham argues that God is necessary for meaning in life because he is the only basis for 
objective morality. He writes: “The religious perspective – or at least a certain kind of religious 
perspective (more of this later) – offer the possibility of meaningfulness by providing a powerful 
normative framework or focus for the life of virtue. … To act in light of such an attitude is to act in the 
faith that our struggles mean something beyond the local expression of a contingently evolving genetic 
lottery; that despite the cruelty and misery in the world, the struggle for goodness will always enjoy a 
certain kind of buoyancy” (2003), pp. 72-71.  
3 Craig (1994) writes: “Without God, there can be no objective meaning in life. …For the universe 
does not really acquire meaning just because I happen to give it one.” (Cited in Seachris (2013a, 
p.164). 
4 Joshua Seachris argues that the meaning of life is a “narrative that which provides the deepest 
existentially relevant explanatory narrative framework through which to answer this existentially 
relevant cluster of questions. This narrative framework is what ultimately tracks what is being 
requested in asking, “What is the meaning of life?” … If the theistic God does not exist, then my 
intuitions are with them, and life is not a dramatic narrative,” [thus life would not be objectively 
meaningful] (2010), p. 110, p. 299.  
5 Seachris, (2013a), p. 10. 
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and supernaturalist theories and finds them wanting. Then he presents his own 
novel “fundamentality theory” which, he argues, “accounts for the 
meaningfulness of the good, true and beautiful, and avoids the objections to 
other theories while incorporating their kernels of truth.”6 Metz’s summarizes 
his theory as follows: “A human person’s life is more meaningful, the more that 
she employs her reason and in ways that positively orient rationality toward 
fundamental conditions of human existence.”7 In other words, one can increase 
the meaningfulness of one’s life by rationally choosing to pursue goals that 
positively affect human individuals, groups, and their environment. These goals 
include “moral achievement, intellectual reflection, and aesthetic creation.”8 I 
am responding to his novel arguments against one supernaturalist theory of 
meaning called purpose theory. 
 
2. Metz’s new argument against purpose theory  
 
Metz defines purpose theory as “the view that one’s life is meaningful just 
insofar as one fulfills a purpose that God has assigned to one”9 A purpose 
theorist holds that God must both exist and provide us with a purpose that we 
must fulfill in order for there to be objective meaning in life. This is one kind of 
supernaturalist theory of meaning of life. Metz presents a new argument against 
purpose theory which aims to show that the most compelling motivation for 
God-centered theories is in tension with purpose theory. First, he builds his case 
for why we should think that his formulation of God-centered theory is the best 
standard for appraising purpose theory. Then he argues that God having the 
properties simplicity, immutability, atemporality, and infinitude constitutes the 
best reason for thinking that God alone could make our lives meaningful. Finally, 
he argues that if God has these properties it would be impossible for him to 
provide us with a purpose. I will explain Metz’s new argument and then argue 
that his novel argument is not successful in defeating purpose theory. I will also 
provide a new argument for purpose theory that addresses the concerns and 
inconsistencies that Metz finds with current versions of purpose theory.  
Metz first explains that his argument against purpose theory rests on 
                                                     
6 Metz, (2013a), p.13. 
7 Ibid., p. 409. 
8 Ibid., p. 19. 
9 Ibid., p. 80. 
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accepting that the God-centered theory he presents is the most promising. If one 
is not convinced that this theory is the most promising, the rest of the argument 
loses its force. He explains that God-centered theory “maintains not just that the 
better one’s relationship with God, the more meaningful one’s life, but also that 
the existence of God is necessary for one’s life to be at all meaningful (or at 
least meaningful on balance).”10 Metz gives three main reasons for thinking that 
God-centered theory (as he construes it) is the right standard for judging purpose 
theory. First, the most historically prominent views of meaning in life in the 
Western religious traditions are “clear instances of God-centered theory.”11 
Second, the God-centered view coheres with religious theories of value and 
goodness. Meaning is closely connected with the notion of value and most 
religious thinkers agree that God is necessary for objective morality, human 
excellence, and wellbeing. Thus, a religious theory of meaning should also hold 
that God is necessary for a meaningful life.12 Third, in order to make a real 
distinction between naturalist and supernaturalist theories of meaning, one must 
argue that God’s existence and a certain relationship with him is necessary for 
meaning rather than merely sufficient. A naturalist might agree that if God 
existed he would add the meaning of our lives, but she would deny that God is 
necessary for a life to be meaningful (p. 108). So for reasons of “tradition, 
coherence, and relevance” we should think that his version of God-centered 
theory is the correct standard for assessing purpose theory; a specific instance of 
God-centered theories.  
I will state Metz’s argument and explain how he supports each premise. 
Metz’s argument, stated formally:  
 
(1) The best argument for a God-centered theory includes the claim that 
God has certain properties such as simplicity, immutability, atemporality, 
infinitude/unlimitedness.  
(2) These properties (simplicity, immutability, atemporality, infinitude) are 
incompatible with a purposive God.  
So, (3) Purpose theory probably cannot be the correct version of 
God-centered theory.  
 
                                                     
10 Ibid., p. 107. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., p. 108. 
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2a. Metz’s support for premise (1) 
 
First, as motivation for premise (1) he argues that the six common arguments 
for purpose theory already in the literature fail because “nature, independently 
of God, could perform the function of which God alone has been thought 
capable.”13 The six arguments for purpose theory (very roughly sketched) claim 
that fulfilling God’s purposes is necessary and sufficient for meaning in life for 
the following reasons. First, only God can provide a reward for right choices in 
the afterlife. Second, only God could prevent our lives from being accidental. 
Third, only God could create an objective ethic, which constitutes his purpose. 
Fourth, only God could make our lives part of a grand scheme that encompasses 
the universe. Fifth, only God’s eternal love can ground a meaningful life. Sixth, 
only an infinite God can stop an infinite regress of finite meaningful 
conditions.14 In response to each of these arguments, Metz argues that nature 
could provide rewards, prevent contingency, provide objective moral standards, 
allow us to be part a grand plan, make loving relationships possible, and give us 
intrinsic meaning.15 So Metz has boxed the purpose theorist into a corner with 
only two ways out, reject purpose theory or accept his version of God-centered 
theory. Herein lies the motivation and force of premise (1); if nature can do all 
of these things, we must come up with a better reason to accept that God is 
necessary for meaning in life and this means looking for “something utterly 
supernatural, viz., something that nature simply could not (or cannot even be 
conceived to) exhibit.” 16  So, what are these unique properties that Metz 
proposes? 
Metz notes that a theist may want propose that God being all-good, 
all-powerful, or all-knowing would be sufficient for meaning in life. He thinks 
these properties are not sufficient because we find them to a lesser degree in the 
natural world. For God to be both necessary and sufficient for meaning his 
essence must be completely unique from anything in nature and have “the kind 
of final value towards which it would be worthwhile contouring one’s life.”17 
So, he draws from the perfect being theology of Katherin Rogers (2000) to argue 
that the qualitative properties that meet these conditions are atemporality, 
                                                     
13 Ibid., p. 110. 
14 Ibid., p. 109. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., p. 110. 
17 Ibid. 
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immutability, simplicity, and infinitude/unlimitedness.18 He argues that these 
properties are distinct from nature, and that they could be thought to display 
final and superlative value.  
First, to show how these properties are distinct from nature, he argues that 
human beings, angels and the natural world clearly could not display these 
properties because they are spatiotemporal, changeable, decomposable, and 
limited.19 If God displayed simplicity, which is a “condition of being unable 
even to be conceived as being composed of separate parts”, he would also be 
atemporal and immutable because, “a being without parts obviously cannot 
change, while a being in time implies that it has extension, viz., stretches over 
moments, and hence has parts.”20 So, simplicity is a good candidate for being 
distinct and it implies two other unique qualitative properties, atemporality and 
immutability. He does not explain how simplicity might also imply 
unlimitedness, but I will assume that he thinks God’s unlimitedness somehow 
displays his distinctness from nature.   
Next, he shows how the four properties display important sorts of final value. 
God’s simplicity would display final value when combined with the independent 
good of personhood. All four properties exhibit the values of unity and 
independence. First, independence is displayed by a perfectly simple being who 
does not depend on any parts for its existence and is thus completely 
self-sufficient (it does not need anything other than itself).21 A being free from 
the limits of space and time would not be subject to death or decay, nor would it 
be subject to a perspective restricted by space and time. An immutable being 
would also be completely self-determining and thus free from other influences 
except itself.22 An infinite being is “unlimited and all encompassing” and thus, 
                                                     
18 Ibid. 
19 It is strange for Metz to include angels in this list as they are often supposed to be pure spirit and 
thus non-spatiotemporal and not made of parts.  
20 The doctrine of divine simplicity has nothing to do with conceivability. Rather it is just the claim 
that God has no parts or distinct attributes. Ibid., p. 111 
21 Metz, (2013a), p.111. Metz seems to be arguing that the doctrine of divine aseity is derived from 
God being free from dependence on parts (simplicity). But Katherine Rogers argues that it is the other 
way around. She writes: “For the medievals the doctrine of divine simplicity followed inevitably from 
the aseity of God and the incorruptibility of God. God exists a se, absolutely independently of all that 
is not Himself. In fact, whatever is not God is created by Him. It is certainly correct to characterize 
Him as wise, powerful, good, etc., but if wisdom, power, goodness and the rest are necessary to God’s 
nature, but not identical to it, then God depends for his existence on other things. But that is 
impossible. Therefore God does not possess these qualities. He simply is omniscience etc. For God 
essence and existence are the same” (1996) p. 167). 
22 Ibid. 
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“free of any restrictions” (Metz borrows this notion from Nozick).23 A being 
with these four properties perfectly displays the value of independence.  
Second, a being with these properties would also display the final value of 
unity. A simple being is completely unified “in that it cannot even be conceived 
to dissolve.24” In reference to the other properties he writes, “A being beyond 
space and time would lack extension or the “feebleness of division (Plotinus).”25 
An immutable being cannot help but remain what it is. Lastly, “an unlimited 
being would be utterly whole.”26 Metz points out that other theists such as 
Plotinus, Anselm, and Aquinas have argued that the values of unity and 
independence are constituted by the qualitative properties.27 Metz is implicitly 
arguing that these values are what allow God to “confer significance on our 
existence when we orient ourselves towards it [his value].”28 This provides us 
with the best reason for accepting a God-centered theory, given that the other six 
common arguments fail to show that God is necessary for meaning. The next 
step Metz takes is to show how these properties conflict with purpose theory in 
order to convince us of premise (2).   
 
2b. Metz’s support for premise (2)  
 
Recall that premise (2) is “the claim that God’s having such qualitative 
properties is incompatible with the central tenets of purpose theory.”29 The first 
concern is that a being who does not exist in time and cannot change would not 
be able to adopt a plan for the following reasons. Adopting an end requires 
deliberation; deliberations are temporal events involving alteration. Even 
adopting an end without prior deliberation takes time and forms something new 
in God.30 Further, the act of God creating the world according to a plan also 
requires temporal succession.31 In other words, creation is an activity that 
implies there was a moment in time T1 when there is nothing and a later moment 
in time T2 when something that previously did not exist, now exists. Thus, 
                                                     
23 Ibid., p. 112. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., footnote 9, p. 111 
28 Ibid., p. 112. 
29 Ibid., p. 112. 
30 Ibid., p. 113. 
31 Ibid. 
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creation requires time and change or alteration from non-being to being. Also, if 
purpose theorists think that God responds to our free decision of whether to 
fulfill his purpose or not, this response must occur in time. All of these activities 
are events, and events require change and take place in time, thus God could not 
be atemporal and capable of forming, adopting, acting, or responding to a 
purpose.32 Metz concludes that an atemporal being could not form intentions or 
engage in any activities at all (if we assume that all activities require time). Thus, 
an atemporal God could not be purposive. 
Next, he explains the problem of a simple being having more than one 
purpose. He argues that we must assume that God would have a different 
purpose for humans and for animals in order to avoid the “counterintuitive 
implication that animal lives can be as meaningful as human lives.”33 Even if 
God had one grand purpose that allowed human and animal purposes to be a part 
of the grand purpose, this would still conflict with simplicity because the plan 
would have parts. Although Metz does not spell this out here, he seems to be 
assuming that if God’s plan has parts, then God would also have to be composed 
of parts. In the same way, if God engaged in more than one activity then he 
would not be simple. Even if one tried to argue that God’s creation was a single 
grand act, Metz argues, “it is difficult to see how a single grand act ground 
purpose theory’s conception of what God does.”34 It is unclear exactly why 
Metz thinks it is difficult to see this. It could be because he thinks that purpose 
theory requires God to form more than one intention or it could be that a single 
act does not seem adequate to provide a specific purpose for human beings.  
Finally, drawing from Robert Nozick, Metz argues that the property of 
infinitude implies being unlimited. A being that has a purpose would be limited 
in virtue of being defined by that purpose and not another purpose. To 
reformulate this problem, a being that is defined by anything or any way of 
being, (having a purpose) would be limited by that way of being. He seems to be 
arguing that an unlimited being would have to encompass every way of being, or 
have all possible purposes at once. This shows us that if God is unlimited then, 
as Nozick argues, “no human terms can truly apply to it (God)” because to 
describe God in one way would imply that he was limited by that property.35 If 
                                                     
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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this is true then an unlimited purposive agent is self-contradictory. Metz 
concludes that a God who is simple, atemporal, immutable, and infinite could 
not be purposive, and thus could not assign us a purpose that gave us meaning in 
life and… “Shazaam!” the central tenet of purpose theory is defeated.  
 
3. Objections to premise (1) 
 
In response to Metz’s argument against purpose theory I will begin with 
premise (1). He proposes that simplicity is only valuable when “conjoined with 
the independent good of personhood.”36 Later in his explanation of premise (2), 
he sums up the unique features of God as “simple or infinite personhood.”37 
First of all, one could argue that the properties would have no value at all if it 
were not for the personhood of God. Metz admits that one could imagine a 
perfectly simple impersonal sub-atomic particle (Higgs Boson?) but we would 
not want to say that a particle has sufficient value to provide meaning in life just 
because it is simple. I point this out because I see two main problems with 
introducing personhood as the independent good that makes the other properties 
valuable.  
First, it is unclear whether personhood should be understood as just an 
independent good or as a property that displays a good. If personhood were a 
property then it would not really be unique to God since human persons share 
the property of personhood and Metz would not employ a property found in the 
natural world for his argument.38 Second, if it is only an independent good that 
gives the others their value, then it is unclear why God would need the other 
properties to prove his final value. Metz argues that we need the other qualities 
combined with personhood in order for God to be completely unique from 
nature. This is a strange move that presents a problem for the whole argument. If 
we know anything about personhood, it is probably from our own experience as 
persons. Typically we understand persons as rational agents capable of: 
determining their own ends, of exercising rights, awareness, intentional action 
and thinking (acting for a purpose or goal, thinking about something rather than 
mere sensation). We also assume that persons are beings distinct from 
impersonal entities or things and forces such as animals, rocks, trees, and gravity. 
                                                     
36 Ibid., p. 111. 
37 Ibid., p. 112. 
38 Ibid., p. 110. 
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Theologians such as Wolfhart Pannenberg and philosophers such as Immanuel 
Kant, William Hasker, William Lane Craig, and Christine M. Korsgaard all 
regard persons as capable of at least some kind of activity.39 Kant bases human 
value on personality which he defines as “freedom and independence from the 
mechanism of the whole of nature.”40 Kant goes on to argue that human and 
divine personality have this same kind of freedom.41 For Kant, personality is 
fundamentally the capacity for free action and thought. Korsgaard agrees with 
Kant that what defines a person is their capacity for acting morally and 
rationally.42 If one accepts this conception of personhood, then by definition, a 
God who is personal would be capable of activity and change, thus undermining 
Metz’s argument for premise (2): Forming purposes take time and require the 
capacity to change both of which an atemporal and immutable God could not do. 
Presumably, Metz would not include this notion of personhood in his argument 
because it would undermine his argument, so we must assume that he is 
supposing some notion of personhood that does not imply the capacity for action, 
change or having purposes. Thus, for his argument for premise (1) to be 
non-contradictory, Metz needs to provide a plausible account of personhood that 
does not include being capable of action or change.  
Further, Metz is too quick to assume that omniscience, omni-benevolence, 
                                                     
39 There is also a large body of literature on human personhood and divine personhood that I will not 
address here. For clear and insightful work on human personhood see Christine Korsgaard’s piece on 
the origin of our legal concept of persons, “Personhood, Animals, and the Law”, (2013). She writes, 
“In ethics, a person is an object of respect, to be valued for her own sake, and never to be used as a 
mere means to an end, while a thing has only a derivative value, and may be used as a means to some 
person’s ends.” (p. 25).  
For work on Divine Personhood see Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Systematic Theology, 3 vols., trans. 
Geoffrey W. Bromiley (1991–98). He argues that personhood is defined by activity.  
Theodore James Whapham writes about Pannenberg’s view, “Thus, at the very center of Pannenberg’s 
definition of divine personhood is the notion that the persons are distinct centers of activity. In this 
way they can be identified with the modern notion of subjects. This idea of three distinct centers of 
divine activity flows naturally from the idea that the Trinitarian persons receive their divinity from one 
another.” (2010: 376).   
Also see William Hasker’s recent work Metaphysics and the Tri-personal God (2013). He explains 
the complex and long debate in theology and philosophy about the Trinity and divine personhood. He 
defends the view that “each of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is a person, a “distinct center of knowledge, 
will, love, and action.”” (abstract for Chapter 24). 
See also Craig’s paper “Divine Timelessness and Personhood.” (1998) pp. 109-124.  
40 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:87, p. 74. 
41 Kant writes “We rightly attribute this condition even to the divine will with respect to the rational 
beings in the world as its creatures, inasmuch as it rests on their personality, by which alone they are 
ends in themselves.” (1997), 5:87, p. 74. 
42 “To hold some one responsible is to regard her as a person-that is to say, as a free and equal person 
capable of acting both rationally and morally” Christine M. Korsgaard, (1992), p. 306. 
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and omnipotence could not be properties that make God qualitatively different 
and more valuable than nature, just because we find them to a lesser degree in 
the natural world (p. 110). Most theists argue that God has goodness, knowledge 
and power essentially, so nature would need to have these qualities essentially, 
not accidentally. But of course nature is not essentially good, powerful or 
knowing, neither does anything in nature have these properties essentially. If 
nature is not necessarily or essentially good, powerful, and knowing, then one 
could imagine a purely physical world that did not have these qualities. Even if 
we could find instances of goodness, knowledge and power in nature, this would 
not mean that nature is sufficient for meaning if meaning in life requires having 
these qualities essentially. So, possessing omnipotence, omnibenevolence, and 
omnipotence essentially could be properties that are necessary for ground 
meaning in life. 
 
4. My objections to premise (2) 
 
4a. Atemporality vs. purpose 
 
In response to Metz’s argument, the purpose theorist could accept that Metz 
has indeed pointed how God’s being an immutable, atemporal, simple, and 
infinite would make God completely distinct from nature and have final value, 
but try to undermine premise (2) by arguing that these properties do not conflict 
with a purposive God. I will offer some good reasons to think that the properties 
Metz considers do not conflict with the notion of a purposive God. First, in 
response to Metz’s first argument about the conflict between atemporality and 
purposiveness, one could argue that God could have a plan that exists eternally 
within his mind and thus God never adopts a plan because he always has it, thus 
avoiding the claim that God’s deliberation involves change. There is also a large 
body of literature on God’s relation to time that Metz utterly fails to engage. In 
this literature, there are numerous accounts of how an atemporal God could 
relate to a temporal world. So for Metz’s objection to succeed, he would need to 
show that these explanations are implausible, which he does not do. Further, 
Metz’s view of God as atemporal not only bars God from forming intentions, but 
also implies that God could not create the world or engage in any activity at 
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all.43 Thus, his view of God contradicts most, if not all, theistic notions of God’s 
atemporality. There are many theists who think that God is atemporal and still 
think that God can create. One could turn to Augustine for a suggestion about 
how an atemporal God could create. He writes in his Confessions, an answer to 
those who ask, 
  
How did it occur to God to create something, when he had never created 
something before? …Grant them, O Lord, to think well what they say and 
to recognize that ‘never’ has no meaning when there is no time. …Let 
them see, then that there cannot possibly be time without creation. …Let 
them understand that before all time began you are the eternal Creator of 
all time, and that no time and no created thing is co-eternal with you44  
 
If God created time then it would not make sense to say that God’s decision 
to create took time. Metz assumes that time would have to exist before God 
created and that creation implies temporality, but these assumptions are not 
adequately supported. One could also turn to Aquinas who argues that God 
created time along with the heavens and the earth.45 Anselm (who also views 
God as atemporal) presents a view of God’s creation as God expressing his 
eternal thought.46 For a modern formulation of how it is possible for an 
atemporal God to create we can look to Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (1992, 
1985)47 and Brian Leftow (1991).48 Stump and Kretzmann argue that God is 
one timeless act identical to his will, which has multiple effects.49 In order for 
Metz to provide adequate support for this apparent inconsistency between God 
being atemporal and purposive he would need to engage with this literature and 
give good arguments for why they fail to show that God can be atemporal and 
                                                     
43 Metz writes “How could a person who is beyond time, create a spatio-temporal world, when doing 
so, would appear to require time?” (2013a), p. 115.  
44 St. Augustine, (1961), Book XI Chapter 30, p. 279.   
45 Aquinas writes in The Summa Theologica, “Things are said to be created in the beginning of time, 
not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but because together with time the heavens 
and earth were created” (1948) Q. 46 Article 3. p. 258. 
46 Anselm writes in Monologium “Hence, although it is clear that the beings that were created were 
nothing before their creation, …yet they were not nothing so far as the creator’s thought is concerned, 
through which, and according to which, they were created” (1962), Chapter IX.  
47 Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, "Eternity, Awareness, and Action," (1992), pp. 477-8.  
48 Brian Leftow, "Eternity and Simultaneity," (1991), pp. 148-79. 
49 See note 56 for more details of their argument. Also see Barry Miller’s (1996) account of divine 
causation for a better explanation of how a simple God can create.   
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purposive. To be fair, Metz does acknowledge that these responses are out there, 
but he does not engage with them.50  
  
4b. Are atemporality and immutability necessary?  
 
A purpose theorist could also accept that God is simple and infinite while 
denying that God is essentially atemporal and immutable. Metz has not done 
enough work to show that theists must believe that God is atemporal or 
immutable. In his argument he assumes that time exists absolutely before God 
creates the world. William Lane Craig argues that if God is the creator of the 
temporal world then he is temporal.51 The upshot of his argument is that before 
God created the world He was timeless and then “undergoes an extrinsic change 
at the moment of creation which draws Him into time in virtue of His real 
relation to the world.”52 Taking this view would allow one to reject Metz’s 
argument that “since the universe is spatio-temporal, God must be an atemporal 
being to have been its creator.”53 Craig’s view allows for God to undergo 
extrinsic change from atemporality to temporality while avoiding intrinsic or 
essential change in his nature. Nicholas Wolterstorff also proposes a view of 
God as everlasting rather than atemporal which allows God to create and act in 
time.54 Metz at least needs engage with arguments like this to show that God 
must be and remain atemporal to create a spatio-temporal world. Metz might 
respond by arguing that if God were atemporal and ‘subsequently’ became 
temporal then he could not be immutable. In response, one would either need to 
accept that God is not immutable or give some explanation (as Craig does 
above) about how it is possible for God to undergo extrinsic change without 
undergoing intrinsic change.  
                                                     
50 Metz, (2013a), p. 115. 
51 Craig writes, “The argument can be summarized as follows: 
22. God is creatively active in the temporal world. 
23. If God is creatively active in the temporal world, God is really related to the temporal world. 
24. If God is really related to the temporal world, God is temporal. 
25. Therefore, God is temporal. 
This argument, if successful, does not prove that God is essentially temporal, but that if He is a Creator 
of a temporal world—as He in fact is—, then He is temporal.” (2009), p. 160. 
52 Craig, (2009), pp. 145-66. 
53 Metz, (2013a), p. 115. 
54 “It is not because he is outside of time – eternal, immutable, impassive – that we are to worship and 
obey God. It is because of what he can and does bring about within time that we mortals are to render 
him praise and obedience” Wolterstorff, “God Everlasting” (1975), p. 98. 
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4c. Simplicity vs. purpose 
 
In response to the Metz’s charge that purpose theory is not cohesive with 
simplicity, consider an analogy. Just as an architect designing a school could 
have the single purpose of increasing learning while assigning people various 
roles in contributing to that purpose, so God could have one purpose of 
glorifying himself and give animals and humans distinct ways of accomplishing 
that purpose. Metz objects to this answer because even if “human and animal 
purposes were components of a single plan for the universe, the fact of their 
being components would seem to imply a lack of simplicity. The same goes for 
different acts mentioned above.”55 At issue here is whether God would have to 
be composed of parts in order to perform more than one act, or provide a 
multifaceted plan. Metz thinks that a being with a single plan that has 
components could not be simple.  
I respond to this worry by comparing Gods purpose or actions with single 
human acts that have many effects. A single spoken phrase, handshake, or 
signing of one’s signature in the right context can have multiple effects, such as 
the starting of a war, the beginning of a long period of peace, the formation of a 
lifelong friendship.56 Metz does not do enough to show that theists must accept 
that simplicity implies that God’s plan could not have parts, or that God could 
not perform more than one act. Metz does admit that the purpose theorist could 
appeal to Aquinas by arguing that, “willing and knowing are not really distinct 
in God, and that having a purpose is part of the concept of willing.”57  
Instead of engaging with these long-standing debates, Metz responds to 
Jacob Affolter’s argument that God could assign various specific purposes 
without having multiple purposes in himself.58 I think Metz needs to engage 
                                                     
55 Metz, (2013a), p. 113. 
56 Stump and Kretzmann have a similar analogy in their paper “Absolute Simplicity” (1985) they 
write, “Everyone recognizes analogous characterizations of ordinary human actions: the man who flips 
the switch on the wall may be correctly described as doing just one thing or he may, equally correctly, 
be said to do many things in doing that one thing (turning on the light, waking the dog, frightening the 
prowler, etc.) – a case of one action with many correct descriptions or many consequences of one 
action in the strict sense and many actions in a broader sense.” they go on to argue that, “there is no 
special difficulty in understanding goodness to be manifested differently to different persons on 
different occasions […] in ways that must be counted among the extrinsic accidental properties of the 
goodness manifested” p. 356. 
57 Metz, (2013a), p. 115. 
58 Ibid., p. 117. 
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directly with the literature on divine simplicity in order to sufficiently motivate 
the claim that God’s simplicity prevents him from being purposive.59 Metz 
might accept that there are good answers to his objections, but he would still 
argue that it is difficult to see how a single act could ground purpose theory’s 
conception of what God does.”60 So the problem might still be that purpose 
theory requires that God perform more than a single act in order to have a 
purpose, create the world, reveal his purpose to human beings and then respond 
to our attempts to fulfill that purpose. But, this would only be a problem if God’s 
single act could not have multiple, complex, and powerful effects that could 
ground meaning in life. A minor engagement with Kretzmann and Stump gives 
us a potentially viable option for how God’s single act of will could be his 
willing “both goodness and the manifestation of goodness” manifested in 
different ways by him creating the world, revealing his purpose to human beings, 
and responding to our attempts to fulfill that purpose.61 Surely an all-powerful 
God manifesting his goodness in different ways would be sufficient to ground 
purpose theory. Thus, the claim that simplicity precludes the possibility of a plan 
or action having components or multiple effects is not sufficiently motivated. 
One could also simply reject simplicity as a property that God must have and 
thus avoid any apparent inconsistency between simplicity and purposiveness.  
 
4d. Infinitude vs. purpose 
 
Third, in response to the notion that infinitude implies being unlimited 
which conflicts with the notion of having one purpose, we need to clarify Metz’s 
notion of being unlimited. Metz seems to imply that a being that is defined by 
anything or any way of being, (having one purpose) would be limited by that 
way of being. So he seems to be saying that an unlimited being would have to 
encompass every way of being, or have all possible purposes at once. If Metz 
thinks that God should have unlimited purposes, this implies that at least some 
of his purposes would conflict. However, (as other theologians have argued) 
God’s omnipotence does not imply that God could do what is logically 
impossible.62  
                                                     
59 Metz mentions Katherin Rogers (1996), Kretzmann and Stump (1985), and Lodzinski (1998) as 
further reading on how to develop this line of thought.   
60 Metz, (2013a), p. 113. 
61 Kretzmann and Stump, (1985) p. 356.  
62 Metz, (2000), cited in Seachris, (2013a), p. 208. 
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If God had conflicting purposes he would be internally inconsistent and 
contradictory, so a God having all possible purposes is inconceivable. God’s 
unlimitedness need not imply that he has all possible purposes; rather, it could 
imply that he is not subject to external constraints or limits. In other words, God 
is only bound by the properties of his own nature. Let us assume for the sake of 
the argument that this means the following: God cannot do evil because he is 
essentially good. God cannot make a rock bigger than he can lift because that 
would entail that his creative ability could conflict with his physical strength. 
God cannot make a round square or make 2+2=5 (pacé Descartes) because the 
laws of math, geometry, and logic are an expression of his nature, so it makes no 
sense to ask if he can contradict his own perfect nature. God is perfectly 
internally consistent with his own nature so we cannot pit his capacities or 
expressions of his character against each other.  
Nozick argues that if God is unlimited, then “no human terms can truly 
apply to it (God)” because to describe God in one way would imply that he was 
limited by that property.63 Nozick might be right in saying that human terms do 
not fully capture or define God’s essence, but most theists would agree with him 
on this. John Scotus Eriugena argues that God reveals himself in such a way that 
we can talk about God by affirming certain names but remembering that God 
transcends the meaning of those words without saying that human terms can 
fully capture the essence of God.64 Just as we can know something about the 
pattern of some particular numbers in an infinite set without fully grasping 
infinity, we could also know enough about God to distinguish between God and 
not God. Metz gives no argument for his conclusion that a purposive infinite 
God is not “theoretically comprehensible.”65 He has also not done enough to 
show that God being infinite means that he is unlimited in Nozick’s sense of the 
word and he does not give enough clarification on what it would even mean for 
God to not “be one way”. I argue that Nozick’s notion of unlimitedness is 
                                                     
63 Metz, (2013a), p. 113. 
64 Katherine Rogers explains Eriugena’s way of talking about God. “When we try to think about God, 
Eriugena holds, we are pushing the limits of human capacities. We cannot possibly wrap our minds 
around God just as He is. The closest we can come to understanding God is to affirm all those names 
which Scripture applies to Him, never forgetting that, because He is unity, God transcends any 
meaning we give these terms. Thus God is Good and Not Good, Wise and Not-Wise, Being and (yes!) 
Not-Being. And it is up to the human knower to keep both sides of the equation in mind at once. We 
do this by, in a way, transcending both via afirmativa and via negativa and opting the via superlativa, 
God is Super-Good, Super-Wise, etc. This is a sort of synthesis, says Eriugena, because although the 
terms are positive grammatically, they are negative in meaning” (1996), p. 169. 
65 Metz, (2013a), p. 113.   
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theoretically incomprehensible and thus could never be properly applied to God.  
Further, Metz seems to be implying that no human terms can apply to God, 
and yet he is describing God as having these four properties. If no human terms 
can apply to God because he is unlimited, then Metz’s explanation of the most 
promising God-centered view is self-contradictory since, one of the properties 
he includes makes it impossible to use the other properties to describe God. If 
this is true, then Metz has built a straw man (that he calls the most promising 
God-centered theory), and then attacked it by showing that it is incoherent, even 
though he explicitly states that his “position does not threaten God-centered 
theory as such.”66 Thus, his version of the most promising God-centered theory 
might not be the most promising God-centered theory after all. In fact it might 
be a really bad God-centered theory because it leads to internal incoherence and 
contradiction and it conflicts with most theists who believe that an atemporal or 
temporal God created the world.  
 
5. A new argument for purpose theory 
 
What else does this craving, and this helplessness proclaim but 
that there was once in man a true happiness, of which all that now 
remains is the empty print and trace? This he tries in vain to fill 
with everything around him, seeking in things that are not there 
the help he cannot find in those that are, though none can help, 
since this infinite abyss can be filled only with an infinite and 
immutable object; in other words by God himself.  
Penseés, #148, Blaise Pascal 
 
Metz asks if there are any other properties that God might have that would 
be necessary to ground meaning in life. To begin to develop a new argument for 
purpose theory, consider the view that objective meaning in life requires 
fulfilling a purpose given to us by God and the overarching purpose God gives 
us is to live in personal loving relationship with him. Further, suppose that a 
necessary element of meaning in life were relating in love to an essentially 
personal being. If this were the case, then God would have to be essentially 
multi-personal in order to already possess the quality of loving relational activity 
                                                     
66 Metz, (2013a), p. 114. 
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and be able to invite others into that activity.67 Lets call this PT4: a person’s life 
is objectively meaningful if and only if:  
 
(i) One is intentionally created by an essentially and necessarily 
multi-personal, purposive, relational, omnibenevolent, omniscient, and 
omnipotent God.  
(ii) God provides one with a good, significant, and rational purpose that 
provides lasting psychological/existential satisfaction: living in a loving 
relationship with God. 
(iii) One fulfills that purpose by means of a free choice 
 
Thus, God must exist, be essentially multipersonal and give one a purpose of 
living in loving relationship with him in order for one to have objective meaning 
in life, contra Metz’s claim that God is not necessary for objective meaning in 
life and that even if God exists he could not give us a purpose. I argue, that one 
must fulfill this purpose freely because a good God values the free will of 
persons so much that he will not coerce anyone to live in relationship with him. 
One possible worry about this argument is that if meaning were about being 
in relationship with someone else, there could be an infinite regress of relations 
because one could always ask: what makes the being one is related to 
meaningful? Only a being that is intrinsically meaningful could stop this regress. 
Thus, I argue that only a multi-personal God/supernatural being that exists 
necessarily and essentially in perfect relation with the persons within him/herself 
could ground this kind of meaning. It is important to note that a monistic or 
unitarian God could not relate with itself in any meaningful way and thus could 
not stop the regress. Borrowing from Augustine’s view of the Trinity, I propose 
that if God exists, he is essentially or necessarily personal, relational, and 
purposive because the three persons of the trinity perfectly relate with each other 
in free, purposive, loving, activity.68 On this view God need not be a temporal, 
immutable, or perfectly simple in every respect. God’s good, loving, all knowing 
character is immutable, while each person in the Godhead need not be 
immutable in that they are constantly active toward the other persons and 
                                                     
67 Part of my motivation for responding to this argument was stimulated by Tim Mawson’s 
suggestion: “Further work on how certain properties uniquely had by God would ground 
meaningfulness would be helpful”. Mawson (2013), p. 1142.  
68 See St. Augustine, (1958), Book XI, Chap 24, p. 233. 
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towards creation. God is still one God, qua God, and thus simple but God exists 
as three persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) within the Godhead and in this 
respect is not simple. Further, God does not need to create creatures in order to 
be purposive or relational with other persons because the each person of the 
trinity already has the eternal purpose of living in relationship and glorifying the 
other two persons through free loving activity within the Godhead. So God is 
relationally self-sufficient (a se) and thus creates out of an overflow and not a 
lack. When God created human beings as ontologically distinct from himself, he 
created them for his ultimate purpose of glorifying himself, and further, he 
designed human beings in such a way that their greatest joy, highest good, and 
most meaningful activity is to glorify God through freely chosen acts of love, 
first towards God and then other human beings, thereby giving human beings a 
purpose that they can freely choose to fulfill.69  
This account blocks Metz’s novel argument against purpose theory in three 
ways. First, if one accepts that meaning in life is relational, nature could not 
ground meaning in life because it is not essentially personal, relational, or 
purposive. Second, the qualities of a multi-personal God do not conflict with 
purposiveness, so a multi-personal God could provide a purpose and create 
beings for a non-arbitrary reason. And third, only a multi-personal God could 
ground meaning as purpose in life because only a multi-personal God could be 
essentially purposive and relational. A supernatural being that was not 
multi-personal would lack relationship and would lack an intentional object for 
purposive activity before it created and thus could not ground meaning as 
purpose.  
One might accuse me of proposing this account of purpose theory ad hoc. 
Metz might say, “Ok you have created an elaborate conception of God that 
                                                     
69 This argument is not really brand new, it is adapted from Tim Keller who quotes C.S. Lewis, in his 
book King’s Cross: The Story of the World in the Life of Jesus (2011). Keller writes “Each person of 
the Trinity glorifies the other. In the words of my favorite author, C.S. Lewis, “In Christianity God is 
not a static thing … but a dynamic, pulsating activity, a life, almost a kind of drama. Almost if you will 
not think me irreverent, a kind of dance.” Theologian Cornelius Plantinga develops this further, noting 
that the Bible says the Father, the Son, and the Spirit glorify one another: “The persons within God 
exalt each other, commune with each other, and defer to one another. …Each divine person harbors the 
others at the center of his being. In constant movement of overture and acceptance, each person 
envelops and encircles the others. …God’s interior life [therefore] overflows with regard for others.” 
(p. 6). ““What does it all matter?” Lewis writes. “It matters more than anything else in the world. The 
whole dance, or drama, or pattern of this three-Personal life is to be played out in each one of us 
…[Joy, power,peace, eternal life] are a great fountain of energy and beauty spurting up at the very 
center of reality” (p. 8). Keller quotes Lewis from Mere Christianity (1977), p.151, and Plantinga from 
Engaging God’s World: A Christian Vision of Faith, Learning and Living (2002), pp. 20-23.  
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meets my demands by adding a bunch of qualities to God, but do any theists 
actually endorse this view?” To which I would respond, yes, many Christian 
theists throughout the ages have accepted a Trinitarian conception of God. One 
only needs to read William Hasker’s new book Metaphysics and the 
Tri-Personal God (2013) to see the history of Trinitarian theology beginning in 
the fourth century with Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine, to Karl Barth, Karl 
Rahner, Jürgen Moltmann, John Zizioulas, Bryan Leftow, Peter van Inwagen, 
Jeffrey Brower, Michael Rea, William Lane Craig, Richard Swinburne, Keith 
Yandell and William Hasker. These thinkers along with St. Anselm, St. Thomas 
Aquinas, Jean Calvin, Jonathan Edwards, Charles Wesley and countless other 
theologians and philosophers are committed to Trinitarian doctrine and most 
deem it as a central and vital tenet of orthodox Christianity. Metz still might 
argue that I am appealing to authority. I grant that this is an appeal to the 
historical doctrines of Christianity. However, we are trying to figure out the 
strongest version of God-centered theories and not necessarily to give an 
argument to prove they are true. Metz also appeals to the historical doctrines to 
develop his version of God-centered theory.70 Still, there is evidence in the 
Christian Bible that points to God being tri-personal, including the accounts in 
Matthew, Mark, and Luke where Jesus is baptized and the Spirit of God 
descends on him like a dove and the Father speaks from Heaven.71 Further, 
there are a-priori and a-posteriori arguments for the doctrine of the trinity that 
Richard Swinburne has developed. The a-priori argument is roughly, “from the 
need for any divine being to have another divine being to love sufficiently to 
provide for him a third divine being whom to love and by whom to be loved.” 72 
In other words, perfect unselfish love requires at least three persons. His 
a-posteriori argument is:  
 
Most people who have believed the doctrine of the Trinity have believed it 
on the basis of the teaching of Jesus as interpreted by the church. The only 
reason for believing this teaching would be if Jesus led the kind of life 
which a priori we would expect an incarnate God to live in order to 
identify with our suffering, make atonement for our sins, and to reveal 
                                                     
70 “First, the most influential statements on the meaning of life in the Western religious tradition are 
clear instances of God-centered theory”. Metz, (2013a), p. 107. 
71 Matthew 3:16-17, Mark 1:11, Luke 3:22 (ESV).  
72 Swinburne, Richard (2013) pp. 13-27. 
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truth to us; culminated by a miracle which God alone could do and which 
would also authenticate the teaching. Given good a posteriori evidence for 
the existence of God, there is enough historical evidence to make it 
probable that Jesus did live that sort of life, and so to believe the doctrine 
of the Trinity (2013: 13). 
 
In order to refute this version of purpose theory Metz would need to engage 
with arguments like these to show that God could not be a trinity. On the 
Trinitarian view God’s primary activity amongst the three persons is relating in 
love, thus it seems that the highest purpose he could give his creation is to 
lovingly relate with him. I have provided at least a few historical and 
philosophical reasons to believe that if God exists he is tri-personal and 
therefore there is good reason to think that God could and would provide us with 
a purpose of living in loving relationship with him.  
Finally, I argue that God is necessary for objective meaning in life because, 
contra Metz, nature cannot provide us with a purpose, nor can it lovingly relate 
with us, which I have posited is a necessary element of objective meaning in life. 
Metz could still argue that living in a loving relationship with God is not 
necessary for objective meaning in life. My brief reply is to say that loving 
relationships seem essential to what Metz calls “the fundamental conditions of 
human existence” which include the good, the true and the beautiful.73 In 
agreement with Metz I think that we must orient our rationality towards these 
fundamental conditions. I diverge from Metz where he argues that these 
fundamental conditions do not require the existence of and a relationship with 
God. I argue that it is only God that gives the other fundamental objects that we 
pursue their final value. The good, true, and beautiful do not have the kind of 
final value that Metz argues they do, if they are grounded in nature. Value 
requires a value giver and nature cannot give objective value. Humans are the 
only beings in nature that we know of that can give things subjective value by 
valuing things and pursuing them as having value, but humans cannot maintain 
or sustain the objective value of anything because they are contingent, finite, 
mutable beings. For example, if all the humans on earth suddenly died, and then 
aliens came to earth and discovered banks full of cash, the cash would have no 
value to the aliens because they would not recognize it as valuable.  
                                                     
73 Metz, (2013a), p. 222.  
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I have not come across another convincing naturalist theory of value that 
provides a sufficient ground for objective value that is not subject to the same 
problems of mutability, subjectivity, and contingency. Thus, I argue that God is 
the only being that can give things objective value. God is eternal, and his 
character is immutable so his values do not change, and he has inherent value 
within himself because each person of the trinity eternally values the other as 
they relate to each other in love. This means that God is essentially valuable, 
purposive, and relational and thus is the only sufficient source of meaning in life. 
Thus, if God did not exist, and did not give one a purpose, anything else that one 
directed one’s life toward would not be have final or objective value and thus 
one’s life would be meaningless. This of course, is a brief response in need of 
development but, I hope it stimulates discussion on this incredibly important 
topic. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
I conclude that Metz’s master argument against purpose theory fails in two 
main ways. First, he fails to show that God must be immutable, infinite, simple, 
and atemporal in order to be necessary and sufficient for grounding meaning in 
life. The reasons he does give have been shown to be faulty or not sufficiently 
supported. Second, even if one accepts that God must have the qualitative 
properties above, I have shown that there are plausible ways that the purpose 
theorist can respond to avoid the conclusion that a God with those properties 
could not be purposive.  
Metz presents his readers with a false dilemma. In effect, Metz claims that 
either one must accept that nature is sufficient for meaning or accept that the 
most promising account of God-centered theory is that God must be a temporal, 
immutable, simple, and infinite. If one accepts that nature is sufficient, he thinks, 
one must admit that God is not necessary and abandon the God-centered view. If, 
on the other hand, one accepts the most promising account of God-centered 
theory, Metz’ thinks that one should abandon purpose theory.  
I have argued that accepting his God-centered view does not imply that God 
could not be purposive. I have also argued that we do not need to accept that 
God having the qualities of a temporality, immutability, simplicity, and 
infinitude is the best God-centered view of meaning. Finally, I have proposed a 
new argument for purpose theory that addresses Metz’s arguments and blocks 
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two main objections one could make against it. PT4 includes the claim that God 
being necessarily multi-personal, purposive, and relational is the best reason to 
think that God is necessary and sufficient for meaning in life. I have given a few 
reasons to accept purpose theory as the correct theory of meaning in life. I 
conclude that purpose theory is neither incoherent nor inconsistent with 
God-centered views and thus has not been defeated by Metz’s objections. I also 
conclude that God must both exist and one must freely fulfill the purpose of 
living in relationship with God in order to obtain objective meaning in life.  
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[Essay] 
Review of Thaddeus Metz’s Meaning in Life 
Minao Kukita* 
 
Abstract 
In this review, we examine Thaddeus Metz’s theory of meaning in life proposed in Meaning in Life. 
After providing an overview of the book, we critically assess how successful his theory is. In 
specific, we argue that the key concept of fundamentality does not work as well as Metz claims it. 
Either the concept is not free from arbitrariness or ambiguity, or Metz is wrong in claiming that 
fundamentality is essential for a work of art to confer meaning to the artist’s life. Finally, we raise 
some questions about basic intuitions and assumptions in Metz’s theory. 
 
In this book, based on thorough research and analysis of a large amount of 
literature written mostly by Anglo-American analytic philosophers on meaning 
in life, Metz attempts to construct a theory of life’s meaning that can account for 
many different opinions and theories expressed by influential writers in recent 
decades. While doing this, first, Metz studies existing influential theories and 
classifies them into several categories. Furthermore, he carefully and critically 
examines each theory and reveals the key intuitions that operate behind people’s 
judgements about whether a person’s life is meaningful or how meaningful it is. 
Most of all, this book provides an excellent survey; it is an informative guideline 
for anyone who wishes to contribute to the field of meaning in life. 
After surveying existing theories, Metz further proposes his own principles 
to distinguish what Anglo-American analytic philosophers have considered to be 
meaningful lives and what they have not. Accordingly, the argument here 
primarily depends on what philosophers in this community have thought and 
said and the ‘intuitions’ lying behind them. The significance of Metz’s theory 
depends on how well it deals with such intuitions. Most of what is proposed here 
may seem implausible to those who do not share judgements regarding the 
meaningfulness of individual lives and who do not share intuitions concerning 
life’s meaning. Indeed, I will propose some questions concerning basic intuitions 
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and assumptions made by Metz later in this review. Thus, despite a title that 
attracts the attention of a wide range of readers, the theory proposed in the book 
is only intended for a very limited group of readers. Nevertheless, it will be 
instructive and interesting for any philosophers outside the analytic tradition and 
Anglo-American culture to learn what Anglo-American analytic philosophers 
have thought and said on the subject and in what manner they have done so. 
The main question Metz struggles to answer in the book is as follows: ‘What 
features of one’s life make it (more/less) meaningful?’ In Chapter 2, he clarifies 
this question by explicating the concept of ‘meaning in life’. He considers the 
question regarding what constitutes ‘meaning in life’ as a cluster of the 
following three questions that overlap or share a ‘family resemblance’: 
 
 What purpose is most worth pursuing? 
 How should one transcend one’s animal nature? 
 What is a life worthy of pride and admiration? 
 
Metz argues that each one of these by itself fails to capture the concept of 
life’s meaning; however, together they do capture it. Based on this concept, 
Metz assesses existing theories of what makes life meaningful (Chapters 5–11) 
and then, constructs his own theory (Chapter 12). 
In Chapter 3, Metz argues that both the part-life and whole-life perspectives 
are relevant for life’s meaning and that meaning can be dealt with in ‘pro tanto’ 
terms—‘How much meaning does this life have?’—and in ‘on balance’ 
terms—‘Everything considered, is this life meaningful?’ In Chapter 4, it is 
argued that meaning in life is a final good that differs from pleasure as such. As 
a pleasant life can be identified with a happy life, happiness and meaning are 
shown to be two different fundamental values. 
Chapters 5–11 examine existing mainstream theories that Metz classifies 
into the following three categories: supernaturalism, subjectivism and 
objectivism. Metz regards each as insufficient; however, he thinks that the 
intuitions underlying them ought to be saved (as data to be explained). Further, 
he begins Chapter 12 by laying down nine desiderata, derived from an 
examination of existing theories that any satisfactory theory of meaning in life 
should explain. 
Then, Metz proposes his own principles for these desiderata. The principle 
from the pro tanto perspective for part-life meaning is as follows: 
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A human person’s life is more meaningful, the more that she, without 
violating certain moral constraints against degrading sacrifice, employs 
her reason and in ways that either positively orient rationality toward 
fundamental conditions of human existence, or negatively orient it 
towards what threatens them; in addition, the meaning in a human 
person’s life is reduced, the more it is negatively oriented towards 
fundamental conditions of human existence. (p. 233.) 
 
Furthermore, Metz proposes the principle from the pro tanto perspective for 
whole-life meaning and argues that these principles satisfy all the desiderata 
mentioned above and that typical meaning conferrers such as moral achievement, 
discovery of truth and creation of beautiful works indeed add to meaning 
according to these principles. In addition, Metz formulates how the total amount 
of meaning in life is calculated based on the above principle and, using that 
formula, proposes the principle that determines the meaningfulness of one’s life 
on balance. 
Metz calls ‘fundamentality theory’ the theory constituted by these principles. 
While he admits that the theory is not complete and that there are cases it is 
unable to deal with well, he concludes that it is the best among mainstream 
theories proposed so far. 
The advantage he attributes to his theory is its explanatory power: it can 
account for the apparent kernels of truth in many of the major theories proposed 
so far and the intuitions underlying them. Metz tries to achieve this goal by 
abstracting common features shared with many theories and by complementing 
conditions for intuitions that are not included in the abstraction. This is why 
Metz’s theory is abstract, complicated and long. 
If a theory has epistemic merits by including different existing theories, it is 
because it deals with more phenomena with fewer principles. If a new theory is 
constituted by principles already realised, that is, if it merely packs old theories 
into one package, it is not so great an innovation. References to reason, moral 
constraints or life story and the distinction between the part-life and the 
whole-life perspectives seem not to be so great an advantage of Metz’s theory. 
This is because Metz only puts together elements of existing theories into one 
long statement, though I appreciate his efforts in reading a great deal of 
literature on the subject and extracting important features. In contrast, according 
 211
to Metz, no one has incorporated the ‘Negative Condition’ (namely, that some 
conditions can reduce meaning in life) into their theory. Therefore, this is an 
original contribution. However, the fact that no one has ever tried to do so may 
indicate the possibility that it is Metz alone who has this intuition and that other 
philosophers in the field may regard this desideratum as irrelevant, rather than as 
a datum to be explained. 
What seems to be the greatest merit of Metz’s theory is his general 
characterisation of meaning-conferring objects as ‘fundamental conditions of 
human existence’. According to Metz, this generalisation enables us to explain 
how moral achievement, discovery of important truths and creation of beautiful 
works of art—typical exemplars of what makes a life meaningful—confer 
meaning on one’s life and to distinguish meaningfulness from mere pleasure or 
happiness as such. However, this generalisation seems to me to be too general 
and abstract. The fundamental conditions of human existence are defined as 
those conditions that are largely responsible for many other human conditions. 
Metz claims that this concept is relatively free from ambiguity; however, I am 
still unsure what this concept means. For example, in explaining how his 
principles work in the case of the creation of works of art, Metz says that for an 
artwork to be great, i.e. to confer substantial meaning on the artist’s life, it 
should deal with what is not only universal but also fundamental and that 
morality, death, war, love and family are fundamental while excreting and dust 
are not, though they are universal. This distinction seems to me not only quite 
arbitrary, but also simply wrong. For example, the most famous and popular 
work of haiku (a form of traditional Japanese poetry consisting of seventeen 
syllables) is simply about the sound of a frog jumping into a pond (‘An old pond, 
the sound of a frog jumping into it’). The author, Basho Matsuo, also wrote a 
piece of haiku about the urine of a horse (‘Fleas, lice, a horse urinating near my 
pillow’). According to Metz, these haiku are not about fundamental conditions 
of human existence, and therefore, do not pass as great art. If Metz is not 
insolent enough to dismiss these examples as not being instances of great art, he 
will have to admit either: (1) that these haiku are about certain fundamental 
conditions of human existence, or (2) that great art is not necessarily about 
certain fundamental conditions of human existence. If he chooses (1) he will 
also have to admit that fundamentality is more arbitrary and ambiguous than he 
thought. However, taking path (2) will reveal a serious defect in his theory 
because it implies that the theory cannot account for the intuition that creating a 
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beautiful work of art makes one’s life more meaningful. 
One possible response to this objection is to recall what Metz says about 
non-representational artworks (minimalist paintings or music, for example). He 
suggests the possibility that such artworks are about themselves qua artworks, 
about some abstract patterns, or in fact about fundamental and pressing aspects 
of human existence such as death and fate (p. 231). An obvious difficulty here is 
that the above-mentioned haiku are apparently representational and about 
nothing other than an old pond, a frog, flea, lice and a horse urinating. To 
interpret them, contrary to appearances, as not representational or not about 
these things needs special justification. I am afraid that there are many other 
artworks that are apparently about unimportant things but that are nonetheless 
viewed as great art. Each of these cases will call for a separate justification if 
you wish to interpret them as not representational or not about things they 
appear to be about. This will somehow reduce the explanatory power of 
fundamentality theory as a general theory. 
The abovementioned constitutes an overview of Metz’s book. Reading this 
book, I found myself with radically different basic intuitions and assumptions, 
such that I disagree with Metz almost everywhere throughout the book. I will 
spend a few words describing these disagreements. The following remarks are 
by a reader for whom the author did not intend the book. Thus, if you follow the 
Anglo-American analytic tradition and find no difficulty in the basic intuitions 
and assumptions on which it is constructed, you may skip the following and 
finish reading this review. However, if you are interested in what people from 
another culture think about meaning in life, please go on to read the rest. 
The most fundamental difference between Metz and myself does not 
comprise individual judgements about whether a given person’s life is 
meaningful or not, but in the assumption that you can divide people’s lives into a 
meaningful group and a meaningless group by some objective measure (though 
Metz usually seems more interested in specific aspects of a life, namely, pro 
tanto meaning). I will protest against anyone other than myself evaluating my 
life as meaningful or not meaningful by any measure. I want no one to judge my 
life to be meaningless. Nor would I judge any other person’s life to be 
meaningless, or arrange other people’s lives in order of how meaningful they are. 
Since I cannot share the assumption that one can compare meaningfulness 
across people’s lives by some objective measure, I cannot appreciate what Metz 
attempts to achieve in his book. 
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Metz might object to my argument by claiming that it is not a matter of 
liking or disliking, or of being right or wrong. It is a matter of fact whether 
someone’s life is meaningful or not, or whether someone’s life is more 
meaningful than another’s, because meaning in life is, according to Metz, a real 
object that is independent of our perception of it. A meaningful life is a category 
comparable to that of water defined to be the chemical compound H2O. No 
matter how strongly I protest to the judgement that I am living a meaningless 
life, it is an unshakable fact. The naturalist realism of Metz, however, has no 
ground. At least, he has not yet shown us anything resembling evidence that 
supports it. It is dubious that the concepts he appeals to in building his criteria 
for meaningfulness, e.g. intelligence, reason, morality and so on, are natural 
kinds in the same sense that water is defined as H2O. Moreover, in clarifying the 
concept of life’s meaning, he appeals to ‘family resemblance’, an instrument that 
is useless for rigorous classification, though convenient in that it can be used in 
an ad hoc and arbitrary way. To claim naturalist realism about meaning in life 
based on such an unstable foundation seems too hasty and dogmatic. 
Metz’s naturalist realism may be due to analytic philosophers’ common 
aspiration to engage in philosophy in a scientific fashion. From the beginning, 
analytic philosophers have thought much of rigour and clarity in order for 
philosophy to qualify as part of science. Thus, some early analytic philosophers 
intentionally tried to distance themselves from metaphysical, value-relating or 
religious issues that seemed difficult to handle with scientific rigour and clarity 
(whether they in fact succeeded or not is another question). Over the century, 
analytic philosophers have established methods and styles for rigorous 
argumentation and have come to increasingly think highly of outcomes of 
natural science. Naturalism now seems to have become their default method; 
unless done in a naturalist fashion, it is not worth doing. With this default 
naturalist attitude, analytic philosophers have somehow returned to the subjects 
and questions their ancestors tried to avoid; however, this time armed with 
rigorous methods and styles their great ancestors have invented. Hence, there 
have emerged the fields of analytic metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, theology and, 
finally, existentialism. 
However, there is a problem here. Methods and styles for argumentation 
alone do not make a doctrine scientific. Any scientific research must be supplied 
with observable, objective and reproducible data. However, we have no such 
data about, for example, necessity, morality, beauty, deity, meaning in life and so 
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on, except for people’s expressed opinions about them. So, in dealing with these 
matters, analytic philosophers have heavily depended on their intuitions in the 
place of the more solid evidence used in natural science. However, if the data are 
not subject to scientific tests, the theory should not be called scientific. 
Clear arguments by analytic philosophers are valuable in that they reveal 
what intuitions underlie our discourse about these matters, which assumptions 
are shared and which are not, exactly where our conflicts come from and so on. 
Knowing them will help us to better understand, evaluate and appreciate what 
other people think and say and establish a common ground. Specifically in this 
sense, Metz’s work is valuable for those interested in the subject of meaning in 
life. However, we cannot ultimately justify our intuitions about these matters, 
nor can we ultimately falsify others’, at least until advances in science bring new 
evidence that will explain the matter. A problem I found in Metz’s exposition is 
that he marginalises the intuitions of those who disagree with him or his analytic 
friends with little justification when there is no evidence supporting the order of 
superiority among contradicting intuitions. If he is to really be a 
naturalist—though I do not think an analytic philosopher should always be 
one—he should examine his intuitions using scientific means (statistic or 
neurological) instead of merely favouring his analytic circle. 
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Abstract 
Thaddeus Metz’s Meaning in Life (2013) offers considerable insights into previous philosophical 
theories and psychological research. It inspired aspects of this study, which presents a psychological 
model for the meaning of life that is grounded in a investigation of philosophical theory and 
psychological research. In this paper, I introduce three models: Model I (Framework), Model II 
(Elements), and Model III (Composition). Model I was a theoretical framework model based on 
philosophical, anthropological, and psychological theories. Model II was constructed using 
categorized data on the meaning of life drawn from various previous studies. Model III was 
constructed by integrating Models I and II. These models proposed four fundamental principles 
underlying meaning of life concepts: personal, relational, social/universal, and religious/spiritual. 
These principles formed a “nested” structure that unfolded from personal to relational to 
social/universal to religious/spiritual. Finally, I address differences between Metz’s theory and my 
model and suggest another approach to the meaning of life. 
 
1. Psychological approach to the meaning of life 
 
As Metz notes, many modern theorists take the view from naturalism, 
whereas some philosophers still adopt the view from supernaturalism when 
tackling the meaning of life (Cottingham, 2003; Craig, 2000; Davis, 1987). 
Similarly, psychological research shows that people often associate meaning in 
their lives through a belief in the religious or spiritual realm (Debats, 1999; 
Ebersole & DePaola, 1987; Reker, 1996; Schnell & Becker, 2006). Religion and 
spirituality may serve a crucial function in restoring both the what and the why 
of our global sense-making assumptions, especially when unexpected traumatic 
events (e.g., sudden loss of a loved one, natural disasters) happen (Proulx, 
Markman, & Lindberg, 2013). Psychologists argue that supernaturalism affects 
behavior and attitudes irrespective of whether it is true or philosophically 
coherent. Therefore, it is an important issue in the psychology of meaning from 
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the implicit theories approach. Implicit theories are laymen’s beliefs regarding 
psychological constructs such as personality, intelligence, love, and meaningful 
life (Wong, 1998). They are numerous in the literature. They identify structures 
underlying conceptions of meaning by asking people to describe what is 
meaningful in their lives (e.g., Ebersole & DePaola, 1987; O’Connor & 
Chamberlain, 1996; Schnell & Becker, 2006). From this point of view, I 
established psychological models that adopt implicit theories.  
 
2. Psychological model about the meaning of life 
 
There are two methods for academically examining the meaning of “the 
meaning of life”: review philosophical theories, as attempted by Metz and/or 
review psychological research. I pursue both methods in a model that mediates 
theory and research. Predominantly, I construct three models: Model I 
(Framework), Model II (Elements), and Model III (Composition).1  
Model I (theoretical framework) is based on philosophical, anthropological, 
and psychological theories. Many philosophers and psychologists discern two or 
three fundamental meanings of life (Tables 1 and 2). Their categorizations 
generally distinguish concrete, terrestrial, subjective, and natural meanings from 
abstract, global, objective, and supernatural meanings as categorized by Metz. 
Some theorists distinguish “created or invented” meaning from “discovered or 
found” meaning (e.g., Baird, 1985; Frankl, 1963; Singer, 1992). Others 
distinguish objective from subjective meaning (e.g., Klemke, 2000; Smith, 2000; 
Markus, 2003; Metz, 2002). Metz also differentiates “part-life” from 
“whole-life” in thinking about the meaningful life. According to Metz, part-life 
means that only segments of a life in themselves are what can be meaningful, 
and whole-life means that only the narrative relationships among the parts of life 
are what can be meaningful (Metz, 2013a, pp.9-10). 
These categorizations are parallel and categorical relations, but they include 
the relations indicated in Figure 1, which differentiates the meaning of life from 
meaning in life.2  
 
 
                                                     
1 Yamada (2002) developed this method of constructing models to integrate abstract configurations and concrete 
arrangements of qualitative data.  
2 Metz (2001, 2013) also distinguishes meaning in life from meaning of life and focuses on the former. 
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Table 1 
Conceptions about the Meaning of Life in Philosophy 
Conceptions Author 
metaphysical / religious, secular / humanistic, pessimistic / 
nihilistic 
Sanders & Cheney (1980)
ultimate, terrestrial Edwards (1981) 
discovered, created Singer (1992) 
intrinsic, extrinsic Wiggins (1988) 
pre-meaning, super-meaning, trans-meaning Yamada (1999) 
physical, moral, esthetic, religious Hick (2000) 
intrinsic, derivative Joske (2000) 
objective, subjective Klemke (2000a); Smith 
(2000); Markus (2003) 
individual, cosmic Quinn (2000a) 
axiological, teleological, complete Quinn (2000b) 
from within, from without Taylor (2000); Aoki (2004)
meaning of life, meaning of a life Adams (2002) 
supernaturalism, naturalism Metz (2001,2002,2007) 
coherence, purpose, value Markus (2003) 
purpose, value, intelligibility / coherence Thomson (2003) 
answerable, ineffable Cooper (2005) 
subjective, intersubjective Levy (2005) 
teleology, hermeneutics, empiricism Murayama (2005) 
meaning of human life as such, meaning of an individual’s 
life 
Metz (2007) 
whole life, part life Metz (2013a) 
 
 
Table 2 
Conceptions about the Meaning of Life in Psychology 
Conceptions Author 
cosmic, worldly/personal Frankl (1963) 
ultimate, terrestrial Yalom (1980) 
discover, create Baird (1985); Kenyon (2000) 
purpose, efficacy and control, value and justification, self-worth Baumeister (1991) 
objective, relative, subjective, appellative Längle (1992) 
meaning of life, meaning in life Ebersole & DeVore (1995) 
ultimate, provisional Farran & Kuhn (1998) 
self-glorification, self-transcendence Hermans (1998) 
importance, value-congruency, self-identity, absorption, enjoyment Little (1998) 
relational, personal Wong (1998a) 
ultimate, specific Wong (1998b) 
interpretive, directional Dittmann-Kohli & Westerhof 
(2000) 
implicit/definitional, existential meaning, meaningfulness Bar-Tur, Savaya, & Prager (2001)
situational, global Folkman & Moskowitz (2000); 
Park (2005) 
events, experience, existence Bering (2003) 
work/achievement, intimacy, relationships, spirituality, 
self-transcendence/generativity 
Emmons (2003) 
purpose, value, foundation Kameda (2003) 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Conceptions Author 
belonging, doing, understanding self and world King (2004) 
semi-religious, religious, humanistic Laverty, Pringle-Nelson, Kelly, 
Miket, & Jenzen (2005) 
ultimate, personal, provisional Auhagen & Holub (2006) 
phenomenological dimension, behavioral dimension, ontological 
dimension 
Leontiev (2007b) 
high-order, low-order Orbach (2007) 
determinate, indeterminate Peterson (2007) 
 
 
Table 3
Categorization of Meaning (Model II) 
Principle Value 
orientation 
Elements of meaning Description 
Personal Subjective 
well-being 
Health Maintaining physical or mental health. 
Appearance Smarten one’s appearance 
Obtaining Obtaining materialistic/monetary things 
Hedonism Obtaining hedonistic pleasure 
Happiness Feeling of pleasure and contentment 
Experiences Experiencing various things 
Aesthetic Giving oneself beautiful esthetic things 
Self acceptance Accepting one’s limits and feeling 
fulfillment 
Life itself Belief that life itself has meaning 
Self- 
actualization 
Goal attainment Making an effort to attain one's goal 
Responsibility having a responsibility and autonomy 
Growth Developing one’s competency and skills 
Actualizing potential Identifying one’s potential and trying to 
actualize it 
Creativity Creating something 
Lifework Engaging occupation, job 
Understanding Having a wider sense of judgment and 
understanding many things 
Relational Interpersonal 
relationships 
Family Maintaining good relationship with family 
Approval/Respect Being recognized from others and respected
Friendship Keeping good relations with a close friend 
Romantic relationship Having the intimacy in romantic 
relationships 
Service Helping other people who are socially 
troubled 
Social/ 
Universal 
Collective/ 
Universal 
values 
Morality Considering justice and morality to be 
important 
Truth Seeking after the truth 
Contribution to society Having the social/political belief 
Flame keeping Following a tradition of the culture and 
maintaining a valuable thing 
Relationship with nature Recognizing that mankind is a part of the 
nature and feeling connected to it 
Evolution/Generativity Passing on one’s genes and contributing the 
human existence and evolution 
Religious/ 
Spiritual 
Self- 
transcendence 
Religious belief Finding faith in God and connecting to God
Spirituality Keeping the connection with spiritual and 
higher being 
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Figure 1 Theoretical Model of Meaning of Life 
 
 
This distinction is common among professional philosophers as Metz notes: 
 
The former [meaning in life] concerns a desirable, higher property that a 
person’s life can exhibit to a certain degree, whereas the latter [meaning of 
life] is a feature of the human species as such or of the universe in toto, 
e.g., a source of these wholes (having sprung from God) or a pattern they 
could exhibit (developing toward a telos) (Metz, 2013b, p.406). 
 
Psychologists also suggested similar distinction: 
 
 “Meaning in life” must be differentiated from “meaning of life.” The 
latter refers to the metaphysical question of why the human race in 
general exists. Meaning in life is concerned with the most central, 
personal, individual values of people. The majority of empirical 
investigations of meaning in life, or a more commonly used phrase, 
“purpose in life”, have explored the relationship of other variables to 
differing degrees of intensity or depth of meaning in life (Ebersole & 
DeVore, 1995, p.41). 
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With reference to Metz (2013a), meaning in life includes subjectivism, and 
meaning of life includes subjectivism, objectivism, and supernaturalism. 
Meaning in life is subsumed under meaning of life in the model. 
The model is best represented as concentric circles of meaning. If life is 
meaningful because a deity or soul instills it with purpose or reason, daily life 
may be meaningful and fulfilling. Having a global purpose (e.g., to do good or 
to achieve cultural immortality) might make every personal activity 
meaningful.3 
Furthermore, in light of other literature, I propose the related concepts of 
pre-meaning, supra-meaning, trans-meaning, and no-meaning. Victor Frankl 
explained that supra-meaning is also called ultimate meaning, as follows:  
 
[S]upra-meaning is no longer a matter of thinking but rather a matter of 
believing. We do not catch hold of it on intellectual grounds but on 
existential grounds, out of our whole being, i.e., through faith (Frankl, 
1988, p.145).  
 
Japanese philosopher Kunio Yamada (1998) defined pre-meaning and 
trans-meaning. The former is a way of living in which people do not quest after 
life’s meaning or worth because they are callow or unconscious. The latter is 
“the way of living where he or she transcends the dual view of meaning or no 
meaning, and does not quest for ‘why’ question” (Yamada, 1998, p.305).4 Thus 
pre-meaning is the fusion or undifferentiated states, whereas trans-meaning 
transcend both pre-meaning, meaning and no meaning. Therefore, I mapped 
supra-meaning at the perimeter of the exterior circle, pre-meaning into the center 
of circle as inherent meaning, and trans-meaning into the outside the meaning of 
life (and no-meaning) circle. 
No-meaning is the experience of emptiness or meaninglessness. It might 
arise from encountering instances of meaninglessness in life or generalized 
global meaninglessness of life, which is similar to the meaning circle. Therefore, 
I mapped no-meaning as a shadow under the meaning of the life circle. 
Model II was constructed from data in previous psychological studies (Table 
3). Earlier studies isolated different sources of meaning, but they also identified 
common sources such as relationships, growth, pleasure, service, and religious 
                                                     
3 The same might be said about many forms of absolutism, including totalitarianism and religious cults. 
4 Yamada (1998) quotes Meister Eckhart, Hasidism, and Zen Buddhism as exemplars of trans-meaning. 
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belief. Model II proposes four principles underlying meaning of life concepts: 
personal, relational, social/universal, and religious/spiritual.  
Model III integrates Models I and II. Four principles from Model II form a 
“nested” structure that unfolds from the personal to the relational to the 
social/universal to the religious/spiritual (Figure 2). The circle that 
circumscribes meaning in life includes personal and relational meaning, and the 
circle that circumscribes meaning of life envelops all principles.  
 
 
 
Figure 2 Psychological Model of the Meaning of Life 
 
 
3. Model as a psychological version of Metz’s theory 
 
My model has many resemblances to Metz’s theory. Both differentiate 
specific from global meaning and natural from supernatural meaning.5,6 Both 
suggest that life has natural meaning without need for a god or soul. Both offer 
fundamental frameworks for the meaning of life. 
However, Metz and I differ in substantial ways. I regard every view of life 
                                                     
5 I divided questions about the meaning of life into these two dimensions when interviewing research subjects 
(Urata, 2013). 
6 In my definition, supernaturalism and objectivism may be meaning of life and subjectivism meaning in life. 
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as psychologically real and true for people who seek meaning in/of life and 
disregard their philosophical rigor. Unlike analytic philosophers, I do not judge 
the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of one’s life by a final value. I try to 
understand each person’s interpersonal view of life, to see relationships between 
the meaning of life and other psychological conditions and to find support for 
people who lose their life’s meaning. 
Metz and I also differ in our stances regarding transcendental perspectives 
of meaning (i.e., supra-meaning and trans-meaning). Transcendental 
perspectives may be naive and might or might not be germane to any meaning of 
life, but they are motivationally significant in the quest for meaning. It is 
interesting that since ancient times, similar views concerning trans-meaning 
emerge in Eastern and Western cultures and are treated as the omega of human 
existence (e.g., perennial philosophy). 
Our third difference is in the distinction between theory and model. Metz 
developed his theory by presenting desiderata step-by-step. And they were 
presented as sentences. However, my visual model mediates data from 
psychological research and frameworks of philosophical theory. A visual model 
depicts discrete phenomena comprehensively and captures patterns in personal 
systems of meaning. Recently I apply this model to analyze meaning of life 
narratives and developed a method to assess the breath, depth, and coherence of 
meaning (Urata, 2013).  
The final difference is in how we examine meaning in life and meaning of 
life. Metz sees these two as different categories. I accept those categorizations, 
but my model suggests additional perspectives and more inclusive relationships. 
Psychological research suggests that low-level narratives of meaning relate 
solely to private meaning in life such as pleasure and comfort, whereas, 
high-level narratives span the range from private meaning in life to global 
meanings of life (O’Connor & Chamberlain, 1996). I also found that eminent 
narratives regarding the meaning of life are elaborately connected to both 
meaning in life and meaning of life (Urata, 2013). Thus, it might be better to 
regard the meaning in life as included in the meaning of life. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Theorists who consider the meaningful life cannot avoid Metz’s work, 
although other viewpoints (e.g., non-categorical perspectives) deserve 
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consideration. Laymen seldom have clear answers regarding life’s ultimate 
meaning, and they can be ambivalent about the meaning of life and the meaning 
in life (and meaninglessness). An individual could seek multiple levels of 
meaning and connect them explicitly or implicitly within internal systems of 
meaning. 
Furthermore, as Metz notes, nihilists sometimes presuppose supernaturalism 
and sometimes undergo conversions to meaningfulness (e.g., Tolstoy) or 
trans-meaning (e.g., Zen Buddhism). Scholars must acknowledge laymen’s 
mixed or ambivalent views about the meaning of life and suspend judgment 
about their truth. The model comprising the concentric circles aids 
understanding of implicit systems of meaning.  
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Assessing Lives, Giving Supernaturalism Its Due, and 
Capturing Naturalism 
Reply to 13 Critics of Meaning in Life  
Thaddeus Metz* 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is astonishing to encounter in this special issue of the Journal of 
Philosophy of Life more than 225 pages of critical discussion of my book 
Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study (a précis of which can be found elsewhere in 
this volume). To make my reply to this great amount of penetrating thought 
manageable, and to make it readable, I have elected to focus on three 
overarching themes that capture a large majority of the analysis.  
One recurrent issue is how to assess a life, or how to understand meaning as 
a value-theoretic category. In Meaning in Life I do so by: evaluating the lives of 
individuals, not of the human race as a whole; contending that a life has two 
dimensions by which to exhibit meaning, in terms of its parts and in terms of it 
as a whole; comparing lives from outside their first-personal standpoints and 
ranking them with judgments such as that one life has more meaning in it than 
another; and seeking out at least some universal claims about meaning, ones that 
apply to all human persons and not merely those in a particular country or 
society. In this volume, Peter Baumann, Masahiro Morioka, James Tartaglia, 
Hasko von Kriegstein and Sho Yamaguchi have particularly been the ones to 
question these facets of my approach to assessing the meaning in people’s lives, 
which concern mainly part one of the book. 
A second salient theme in this issue has to do with the status of 
supernaturalism, the general view that God or a soul, as normally construed in 
the monotheist tradition, is necessary for meaning in life. With regard to 
supernaturalism, in the book I argue that: an immortality requirement is 
implausible, i.e., a life that will end is compatible with there being meaning in it; 
the most influential instance of supernaturalism, purpose theory, is questionable 
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because it is incompatible with the best motivation for holding any 
supernaturalism; and most supernaturalists hold incoherent beliefs at an implicit 
level. Here, Jason Poettcker, Nicholas Waghorn and Fumitake Yoshizawa take 
issue with my defences of these positions, which appear in part two of Meaning 
in Life. 
The third topic that stands out in the contributions concerns which physical 
features of a life confer meaning on it, supposing a naturalist approach is 
broadly correct. In my work, I contend that they: are essentially constituted by 
the deliberate exercise of intelligence; are deontological in the sense of not 
being solely a function of long-term desirable consequences that a life produces; 
and include positive engagement with the fundamental features of human 
existence, at least when the meaning is great. Christopher Ketcham, Minao 
Kukita, David Matheson, Mark Wells and Yu Urata have provided prima facie 
reason to doubt these facets of my favoured understanding of the nature of 
meaning in life, advanced in part three of my book. 
In the following I naturally see what there is to be said in defence of my 
views as initially expressed in Meaning in Life. However, I hope the reader finds 
that I do not do so in a defensive way. I have appreciated the opportunity to 
reconsider so many core claims of the book, and I am pleased to admit where I 
need to reflect still more on them and where I need to change them.  
If one of the key claims of the book still seems true, namely, that searching 
for what makes a life meaningful is itself a source of meaning, then it is apt for 
me to express gratitude to the contributors to, and the editor of, this volume for 
having conferred some meaning on my life. They have continued–indeed, 
broadened–the search with me. 
 
2. Assessing Lives 
 
In this section I address what one might call “pre-theoretic” or 
“methodological” issues. Here, critics raise queries not about what, if anything, 
can make anyone’s life more meaningful (which sections 3 and 4 address), but 
instead about whether that sort of question is even appropriate to seek to answer, 
at least in the way that I do in the book. In 2.1 below, I reply to the objection that 
enquiry into meaning is properly understood as being about the life of the 
species, not the lives of individuals. In 2.2, I respond to the claim that the 
meaning in a life inheres merely in its parts, not also the life as a whole. In 2.3, I 
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deal with arguments that meaning is not (very) comparable, as opposed to 
admits of comparison between periods of a life and even between lives. In 2.4, I 
rebut criticisms that my methods are incompatible with striving for a principle 
that might obtain warrant for having a universal scope.  
 
2.1. Which Life Matters Most?  
 
The title of my book, Meaning in Life, was meant to signify that I was not 
addressing what some others have in mind with talk of the meaning “of” life. I 
have been strictly interested in what, if anything, would confer meaning on the 
life of a given person, what would put more meaning into her life, not what 
might confer meaning on human life as such. However, James Tartaglia argues 
in his contribution that the latter issue is where the action is and what 
philosophers should be addressing.  
His article is a robust challenge to the analytic approach taken towards life’s 
meaning not only by myself, but also by a majority of those currently writing in 
English on the topic. His implicit view is that I should not have published 
Meaning in Life, for a wide array of reasons, including that it does not address a 
truly philosophical topic and threatens to direct the field away from one that is. 
Why does Tartaglia maintain that seeking to answer the question of what (in 
the physical world) makes a given person’s life meaningful, which he calls 
“social meaning”, is not really philosophical? He writes that my posing the  
 
question about social meaning, however, could occur to anyone trying to 
figure out what to do with their life. Only in a tenuous sense could the 
essentially practical question of “how to get more meaning in my life” be 
construed as philosophical; and most people ask this question without 
getting into philosophical analysis (2015: 95). 
 
I see three distinct suggestions here. One is that anyone trying to ascertain what 
to do with her life might readily pose the question of what would make her life 
meaningful. It is very hard for me to see why that should mean that the question 
is not philosophical. After all, the question of what counts as happiness or as 
moral wrongness or as justified belief “could occur to anyone trying to figure 
out what to do” with her life; does Tartaglia believe these also fail to count as 
philosophical questions?  
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A second suggestion is that most people address the question of what makes 
their lives meaningful “without getting into philosophical analysis”. I am not 
sure that this empirical claim is true. But if it is true, then, again, the same is true 
of happiness, wrongness and justification; after all, few people are acquainted 
with philosophical methods, ideas and texts. The fact that most might opt for 
answers from religious sources or self-help books does not mean philosophy is 
not relevant. 
Tartaglia’s third, and most powerful, suggestion is that asking what would 
confer meaning on a particular life is “essentially practical”, whereas 
philosophical questions are not. For a third time, I make a “partners in guilt” 
argument in reply. Questions such as whether one should believe anything on 
faith (as opposed to live by evidentialism), whether one can have good reason to 
perform immoral actions, and how to act so as to avoid injustice are essentially 
practical, but would be deemed philosophical by most self-described 
“philosophers”.  
Indeed, note that Tartaglia’s own article is largely making a practical point, 
but I presume that he considers it to be a work of philosophy nonetheless. He 
maintains that my approach “should not be held up as the Holy Grail” (2015: 
103) and that “philosophers interested in either the meaning of life or social 
meaning should remain in Camelot”, i.e., should not go seeking for what might 
unify the good, the true and the beautiful as variable sources of meaning in 
people’s lives (2015: 109). If Tartaglia deems his article to be philosophical 
despite drawing conclusions about what philosophers should do with their time 
(viz., don’t publish books like Metz’s), then, by analogy, it seems apt to deem 
my book to be philosophical even though it draws conclusions about what 
people should do with their lives. 
Finally, although asking about whether and how a particular life might be 
meaningful is more practical than asking whether and how the life of the species 
might be meaningful, I deny that it is thoroughly practical. In fact, in the book I 
contended in several places that it is not (e.g., 2013: 68-69, 141-142, 147-150, 
241). My position in Meaning in Life was that talk of meaning in people’s lives 
is by definition about a final value, where people’s choices might not be able to 
bring it about, either because, à la the nihilist, the world is structured so that 
meaning is available to no one, or because, my favoured view, sometimes people 
lack the requisite mental, social or material resources to realize it. “Although it 
is correct that meaning comes in degrees, that it varies within a life and also 
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between lives, and that we have pro tanto reason to seek more of it rather than 
less, these claims are consistent with the view that meaning is at bottom 
evaluative rather than normative…. (M)eaning is basically a good rather than a 
should” (Metz 2013: 142). 
In sum, the question I pose about meaning in a life is not essentially practical, 
in the sense of exhaustively being about which choices people should make, and, 
even if it were, that would be insufficient to disqualify it as a philosophical topic 
(on pain of at least disqualifying Tartaglia’s own article as well). Consider, now, 
Tartaglia’s bold claim more directly:  
 
(T)o ask whether the human species has a meaning is to ask the question 
of the meaning of life…. Rather than there being three topics “readily 
placed under the rubric of ‘the meaning of life’”, then – i.e. the meanings 
of my life, the species, and the universe – it seems to me that the situation 
is as follows. There is one question of the meaning of life (i.e. the human 
species) (2015: 94). 
 
This point is trivially true if one distinguishes between questions about the 
meaning “of” life from those about meaning “in” life; Tartaglia’s point is rather 
that only the former is a genuine philosophical question.  
However, Tartaglia’s own diagnosis of the field provides strong reason to 
doubt his narrow construal of meaning-talk. He points out that philosophers such 
as Nietzsche and Sartre “did not think there was a meaning of life, and hence 
sought to investigate how people can build up positive social meaning in a world 
without God. That is what the 20th century discourse of ‘authenticity’ 
concerned” (2015: 98-99; see also 97). I agree. This point is evidence in favour 
of my view that there are at least two distinct philosophical questions one can 
sensibly pose about life’s meaning, whether the human species has a meaning 
and how a given individual might be able to exhibit meaning in her life (even if 
the species as a whole lacks meaning).  
Most post-war philosophers working in the Anglo-American tradition have 
followed Nietzsche’s and Sartre’s lead in letting go of the search for a meaning 
“of” human life as such and instead considering what meaning might be 
available “in” particular lives and, more often than not, from within a purely 
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physical world. 1  That is, a majority have been what I call “naturalists”, 
maintaining that meaning is to be found in a purely physical world, with much 
of the debate being about whether meaning in life is subjective or objective and 
which particular version of these broad views is most defensible.   
There are occasions in his article when Tartaglia does not maintain that there 
is no distinct philosophical issue of meaning in life, and instead is inclined to 
grant that there is one or that a case could be made for one (2015: 98, 102). Here, 
Tartaglia maintains that one cannot philosophize well about meaning in life 
without first exploring the meaning of life, and hence without engaging in the 
rich Continental literature devoted to the latter (2015: 94, 96, 98-99; cf. Urata 
2015: 222). I believe that is true in one sense, but false in another.  
To make my point, I need to draw some distinctions. First, consider a 
distinction about the object of analysis, i.e., whether one is interested in the 
meaningfulness of (a) the human species as a whole or (b) particular human 
persons. Second, consider a distinction regarding the source of meaning for the 
relevant object, that is, whether one is interested in meaning insofar as it is 
conferred by (c) something beyond the human, physical realm or (d) something 
within it.  
Now, when Tartaglia speaks of meaning “of” life he is combining (a) and (c), 
and strictly contrasting it with the combination of (b) and (d), which concerns 
“social meaning” in his terms. His construal of the debate glosses the possibility 
of an orthogonal combination bewteen the two distinctions, viz., between (b) 
and (c), and it is precisely such a combination that is at the core of not only my 
project in Meaning in Life, but also much recent English-speaking philosophical 
literature on life’s meaning. 
My enquiry was never meant to be restricted to (b) and (d). I intended to 
restrict myself solely to (b), and not to address (a), but to be open to the idea that 
the source of meaning in (b) could come from either (c) or (d) or both. In other 
words, I, with a large majority of other analytic philosophers, have been 
interested in knowing what might make the lives of particular individuals more 
or less meaningful, and I have been interested in whether the meaning might 
come from something supernatural or natural or both.   
So, I believe Tartaglia is right that in order to answer the question of whether 
a particular life is meaningful, one must ask about (c), e.g., whether God is 
                                                     
1 Notice that the psychological literature in the post-war era, which Tartaglia chides me for neglecting, 
has also overwhelmingly focused on “meaning in life”, on which see Ebersole and DeVore (1995: 41).  
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necessary for any of our lives to have meaning in them. That is why I spend the 
entire second part of the book enquiring into the merits and demerits of 
supernaturalism. The reader will note that I conclude that God’s existence could 
enhance meaning in our lives insofar as we, say, love Him, but that we could 
exhibit meaning in them even if He did not exist (Metz 2013: 158-160).  
But that does not mean that the combination of (a) and (c) must be 
considered in order to address (b). In fact, this combination appears logically 
irrelevant to being able to answer any question about (b). Questions about (b) 
are, as I articulate at the start of the book (Metz 2013: 4-6; see also 62-63), about 
whether an individual’s life has more meaning in it at a given period than at 
another and about whether it has more meaning in it on balance than another’s 
life. It is essentially about meaning insofar as it can vary over the course of a life 
and between lives. But posing a question about (a), whether human life as a 
whole is meaningful, is essentially to ask about an invariant sort of meaning, 
where if one person’s life is meaningful to a certain degree, then, necessarily, so 
is another’s by virtue of membership in the human species (cf. Tartaglia 2015: 
93).  
Hence, I do not think that I am the one guilty of “conflation” (Tartaglia 
2015: 92, 96), for instance when I consider whether God is necessary for any 
one of our lives to be meaningful and, if so, how to relate to Him so as to secure 
more meaning rather than less. It is perfectly coherent to ask whether, for 
instance, our lives are meaningful merely to the varying degree that we as 
individuals succeed in fulfilling His purpose or in getting to Heaven where we 
meet Him. And it is false to contend that “any philosopher who thinks God 
endows our lives with meaning is talking about the traditional question” of 
whether the human species has meaning (Tartaglia 2015: 95). Leo Tolstoy wants 
to know how he can get to Heaven (1884: 18); Robert Nozick wants to know 
how he can connect in the right way to an unlimited, all-encompassing God 
(1981: 606-608); John Cottingham wants to know whether he will partake of the 
good, the true and the beautiful as constituted by God’s mind (2003, 2005); and 
then monotheistic people by and large want to know how they (as distinct from 
the species as a whole) can obey God commandments (cf. Metz 2013: 77).  
There are many other criticisms of my book amongst the buckshot of 
Tartaglia’s article, and I lack the space to address them all, having taken up what 
I consider the most important ones. I close by addressing a final concern, that 
my book suggests that “both the continental literature and traditional question 
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are somewhat tangential, and can be safely ignored by those who are really 
serious about the ‘meaning of life’” (2015: 100; see also 102).2  
In reply, for one, as I have worked to clarify in this section, I believe that 
there are simply two different sorts of enquiry with regard to life’s meaning, that 
about human life as such and that about particular human lives. I elected to 
focus on the latter in Meaning in Life, and did not mean to disparage the former.  
For another, there is of course relevant and worthwhile material in the 
Continental tradition and in other ones, too, including the African, the Confucian 
and the Buddhist. I tried in the book to explain that I was focusing on 
Anglo-American literature because I needed to “obtain focus and to make my 
task manageable” (2013: 9) as well as because that literature “is large enough to 
work through and evaluate on its own” (2013: 9). It is unfortunate that these 
remarks did not register. Meaning in Life stands at 130,000 words; I found more 
than enough in a certain body of scholarship, which tends to share certain 
presuppositions, to keep me busy. Meanwhile, several others had already 
addressed Continental thinkers on the topic of life’s meaning in book-length 
discussions (e.g., Singer 1996; Belliotti 2001; and especially Young 2003).  
I naturally acknowledge that a more comprehensive analysis, one more 
likely to ground any strong claim to universal validity, would take up 
cross-cultural engagements, ones that I have begun in earnest in other works 
since the publication of Meaning in Life (e.g., Metz 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2015a, 
2015b). Indeed, much of the point of my helping to produce the present special 
issue of the Journal of Philosophy of Life was precisely to encourage dialogue 
between Anglo-American perspectives and others, particularly from East Asia. 
 
2.2. Where Is the Meaning in a Life?  
 
To speak of a “life’s” being meaningful is vague. What is a life, and which 
aspects of a life can have meaning or lack it? In the third chapter of Meaning in 
Life I address one facet of these queries, concerning whether it is the parts of a 
life, or life as a whole, or both that can be meaningful. My answer is the latter, 
“impure” or “mixed” view, according to which there are two independent 
dimensions by which to appraise a life, roughly, in terms of particular 
                                                     
2 In 2.4 below, I address one more of Tartaglia’s many objections, regarding whether a view of 
linguistic reference that I advance undercuts the chance of making a universally valid claims about the 
nature of meaning.  
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spatio-temporal slices, whether they be actions, projects or even more attitudinal 
ways of approaching the world, on the one hand, and how the slices are 
patterned over the life as a whole, on the other.  
Hasko von Kriegstein contends that my arguments for a mixed view are too 
quick, and that a pure part-life view is still to be taken seriously. He temptingly 
suggests that since my discussion of the whole-life dimension is by my own 
lights sketchy in Meaning in Life, the overall contribution made there could be 
seen as more complete, were I simply to drop adherence to such a dimension.  
Furthermore, a chunk of von Kriegstein’s strategy is to appeal to some of my 
own claims against me; I acknowledge in the book that there are often relational 
dimensions to what makes something meaningful (2013: 34-35, 66-68, 210, 218, 
221), and von Kriegstein ingeniously contends that upon careful consideration 
of them, one need not appeal to the largest relational context, viz., between all 
the parts within a whole-life, in order to account for the intuitive presence of 
meaning in the cases I discuss. “(I)f a part of my life can be (and typically is) 
meaningful in virtue of its relational properties, what reason is there to reject a 
pure part-life view of the bearers of meaning? After all, we could simply say that 
the bearers of meaning are always parts of a life but that these parts are 
sometimes meaningful in virtue of their relations to other parts” (von Kriegstein 
2015: 7); there is no need to posit the whole itself as something that can be 
meaningful. 
This move is powerful, and is indeed one that I neglected in the book. Upon 
reflection, I am inclined to think that von Kriegstein’s strategy is successful, or 
at least promising, for many cases, for instance that of posthumous meaning 
(von Kriegstein 2015: 14). However, to keep things succinct and to push the 
debate forward, I focus on cases in which it does not look so promising, and 
where it instead appears that a whole-life dimension, or something 
approximating it, most easily entails that, and best explains why, there is 
meaning intuitively present. 
Consider first the issue of repetition in a life. Part of what accounts for the 
lack of meaning in the case of Sisyphus, as well as in lives spent in prison or on 
an assembly line, is the lack of variety. As von Kriegstein notes, it is not merely 
the likely boredom that I contend accounts for the lack of meaning; it is also the 
fact of sameness in the content of the activities undertaken over time. In reply, 
von Kriegstein is inclined to bite the bullet. “Would we really want to say of a 
doctor who spends her entire life curing malaria without ever getting bored or 
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blasé about it that her life would have been more meaningful if instead she had 
invested some of her time in other meaningful activities (such as appreciating 
exquisite art or, even, curing yellow fever)?” (von Kriegstein 2015: 10-11). 
I myself am inclined towards a different view about the case of curing 
yellow fever. In addition, a doctor who learns from the process of treating 
malaria and finds, say, cheaper ways to do so would, it seems to me, have more 
meaning than one who stuck with same treatment time after time. 
However, there is a deep point to be made on von Kriegstein’s behalf with 
the case of appreciating art. In the book I suggested that a life with variety has 
some (pro tanto) more meaning in it than one with repetition. But appreciating 
art and discovering a new treatment for malaria would be comparably effective 
ways for von Kriegstein’s malaria doctor to avoid repetition and introduce 
variety into her life. Indeed, the former might have more in its favour on this 
score. And so what von Kriegstein has probably shown is that it is not variety as 
such that is a plausible candidate for enhancing meaning. At this stage it appears 
to be development or advancement (or perhaps creativity, as per Richard Taylor 
1987) that is key; and these bode well for the view that a whole-life can bear 
meaning. 
One sort of development or advancement is redemption, which Charles 
Taylor, for one, appeals to as evidence in favour of a whole-life dimension to 
meaning. He remarks, “We want our lives to have meaning, or weight, or 
substance, or to grow towards some fullness.... But this means our whole lives. 
If necessary, we want the future to ‘redeem’ the past, to make it part of a life 
story which has sense or purpose, to take it up in a meaningful unity” (1989: 
50).  
Against this, von Kriegstein points out that redemption can occur within a 
less-than-whole stretch of a life, or perhaps even in two parts of a life (as distinct 
from any stretch), and need not be a function of the whole. In Meaning in Life I 
considered the case of a young woman who had engaged in prostitution to feed a 
drug addiction but who eventually became a counsellor to help others avoid such 
a lifestyle. In contrast to the case of variety above, von Kriegstein grants there is 
meaning to be accounted for here, but makes two objections to the idea that it is 
a whole-life that does the work. 
First, and most boldly, von Kriegstein contends that it is plausible to think 
that “the additional meaning in cases like this inheres in both the redeemed and 
redeeming parts rather than in the pattern itself” (2015: 13). His thought is that it 
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is the period of being an addicted prostitute that becomes less meaningless when 
it causes (or otherwise figures into the production of) something good, and that 
it is the period of being a counsellor that is arguably more meaningful if it was 
caused by something bad. Such a view contrasts with a whole-life view 
according to which it is the pattern, the relationship between the periods, that is 
meaningful. 
It can be a difficult matter to choose between these two descriptions of what 
bears meaning. Is something, say, an action meaningful in virtue of its relational 
properties such as its effects, on the one hand? Or is a relation meaningful in 
virtue of its relata such as an action and its effects, on the other? von Kriegstein 
is maintaining that the former would invariably suffice, or at least does so in the 
redemption case. 
I agree that one sensibly could evaluate the periods of life as separate bearers 
of meaning. It is not unreasonable to focus on the period of being an addicted 
prostitute and then to judge it to be somewhat less meaningless in virtue of its 
relational properties, specifically, the good ones they brought about in the future. 
The issue is whether such an approach exhausts the sort of judgment that we are 
inclined to make and without apparent mistake.  
When I put myself in the shoes of the counsellor and look back on my life, I 
do not merely think of the two periods of my life and then add them together, 
which is all that I should do if von Kriegstein’s approach were sound. I do not 
first think of the period of being an addicted prostitute, noting that it caused me 
to become a counsellor, and then think of the period of being a counsellor, 
noting that it was caused by having been an addicted prostitute, and finally 
aggregate the two periods for an overall assessment of meaning.  
I could do that, but it is not all that I am inclined to do. In the first instance, 
in fact, I instead attend to the pattern, the story. Looking back, I ascribe a certain 
value to the narrative properties of having undergone something undesirable but 
then having struggled to make something desirable come of it. Of course, I 
might be “in the grip of a theory”, making my judgment idiosyncratic; the more 
that fellow readers are inclined to judge similarly, though, the more evidence 
that such judgment is part and parcel of philosophical reflection on meaning in 
life.  
At this point von Kriegstein’s second objection arises, which is to grant that 
there is meaning in the pattern here, but to deny that the pattern must extend 
over the entire life. “The fact that we are able to talk about the meaning of these 
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two parts and the pattern connecting them, without knowing anything else about 
our protagonist’s life, seems a fair indication that it is not her whole life that 
bears the meaning in question but simply these two episodes” (von Kriegstein 
2015: 13).  
His point about this particular redemption case is fair. And I do not 
necessarily want to press talk of a “whole-life” too literally (cf. Metz 2013: 52). 
The key point I wanted to make in the book was to deny that slivers of 
space-time are the sole bearers of meaning. I had in mind utilitarians, for 
instance, who would maintain that the meaningfulness of a life is simply a 
function of the degree to which one’s actions have fulfilled people’s preferences. 
I agree that pulling a child out of the way from on-coming traffic can confer 
meaning on one’s life, regardless of whatever else happens in one’s life. What I 
deny is that evaluating meaning in life is merely a matter of totting up the desire 
satisfaction produced by all one’s actions seriatim. So long as large stretches of 
a life are agreed to be able to bear some meaning, the most crucial claim from 
the book would stand.  
However, there is more to be said that still leads me to think that a life as a 
whole can be a relevant, and perhaps even an important, bearer of meaning. For 
one, if one grants that some relationships between parts of a life can bear 
meaning, then “the camel’s nose is inside the tent”, by which I mean that there is 
little reason to deny that the relationships between parts over the entire life could 
also do so. I presume part of what makes an (auto)biography first-rate is the fact 
that it views all later stages of a life as a function of childhood (think “Rosebud” 
from Citizen Kane), or shows how all major stages have progressed from each 
other (analogous to the way spirit develops in Hegel’s system). If a story about 
someone’s life can be valuable in virtue of a whole-life perspective, presumably 
the whole-life that the story is about could be, too.  
For another, since having composed Meaning in Life I have begun thinking 
more systematically about the distinction that some have drawn between 
“ultimate” and other, more “partial” or “incomplete” kinds of meaning (Nozick 
1981: 599; Cooper 2003: 126-142; Bennett-Hunter 2014; Waghorn 2014). I did 
not give the distinction any weight in the book, but have been considering 
whether that was to neglect something important for thought about meaning in 
life (Metz 2016a, unpublished). One key idea is that for any meaningful facet of 
a life, it would be more meaningful if (several argue that it would be meaningful 
at all only if) it were related to something else in one’s life that is meaningful, 
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and that the latter meaningful condition would in turn be more meaningful if 
related to something else meaningful, and so on until one has a view of how all 
the meaningful conditions of one’s entire life could be interconnected. A good 
candidate for an ultimate kind of meaning in a life would be for it to include a 
chain of meaningful conditions throughout it as a whole. Or, returning to 
Charles Taylor’s comments, an ultimate kind of meaning would plausibly be 
constituted by a constant development towards self-realization or by one’s life 
forming a comprehensive unity.  
Supposing I am in a position to look back on my life when on my deathbed, 
I hope I will be able to detect some kind of big picture. I would like to see a 
forest and not merely trees, not even just ones apprehended to be in causal or 
spatial relationships with one another. Am I alone in having such a wish?  
 
2.3. Can One Compare Meaning between Lives? 
 
In my work, I routinely compare the degrees of meaning intuitively to be 
found in two different courses of action, e.g., becoming a worker in a caring 
profession seems to promise much more meaning than electing to count blades 
of grass. I also compare the amount of meaning to be found in earlier and later 
periods of a life, e.g., my middle aged life as a thinker, teacher, lover and father 
is much more meaningful than it was when I was a depressed teenager 
dependent on drugs and doing what he could to skip school. Still more, I 
compare the extent to which entire lives have been meaningful, deeming 
Einstein’s life to have been more meaningful than mine.  
Such judgments are a function of two key elements. For one, I often take an 
external perspective on the (part of the) life, which means that, when judging, I 
am neither the one living it at the time, nor working within the viewpoint of the 
one whose life it is. For another, I rank (aspects of) lives, and do so not merely 
ordinally, such that I make some roughly quantified appraisals about how much 
meaning there is in them. 
Masahiro Morioka and Minao Kukita reject any kind of external evaluation, 
while Peter Baumann accepts it but denies that it admits of much systematicity 
when it comes to assessing degrees of meaning between lives. In the following, I 
defend an external standpoint as a relevant approach to assessing lives, and then 
say more than I did in Meaning in Life about the respects in which one can judge 
the extent to which lives have meaning in them. 
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Morioka carefully and thoroughly articulates an approach to evaluating 
meaning in life that differs dramatically from the one I and the overwhelming 
majority of Anglo-American philosophers employ. In the first instance, his 
approach is strictly internal or first-personal, a matter of asking the individual 
whether she deems her life to be meaningful. In addition, it is what one might 
label “presentist”, for it asks a person to judge whether her life is meaningful as 
it is, and not whether it was meaningful, could be or will be. Still more, 
Morioka’s method is binary, rather than gradient; that is, one is to pose the 
question of whether one’s actual life is meaningful, not how much meaning is in 
it. Morioka calls the combination of an internal, presentist and binary judgment 
of meaning in one’s life “the heart of meaning in life”, which, as he points out, 
“transcends all comparisons” (2015: 60).  
I am inclined to think that this standpoint could well be of some use when 
thinking about meaning. I find it strongly analogous to asking whether one has a 
headache. Asking whether one has a headache is of course perfectly appropriate, 
and would provide a certain understanding of what kind of state one is in and 
what one should do in light of it. Similarly, it is sensible to pose the question of 
whether one’s actual life is meaningful, and the answer one gives could be 
revealing and action-guiding.  
However, I seriously doubt the much stronger claims that Morioka 
sometimes makes for the relevance of “the heart of meaning in life”. He 
maintains that “the heart of meaning in life” is the key vantage point by which to 
evaluate meaning.   
 
Alas, does my life like this have any meaning at all? I believe that what is 
asked or lamented in the above question constitutes the very central 
content of meaning in life…. And we should note that throughout his book, 
Metz never talks about “the heart of meaning in life.” From my viewpoint, 
Metz fails to discuss the most important aspect of meaning in life in his 
academic discussion of this topic (Morioka 2015: 55, 56). 
 
Although Morioka acknowledges that it can be coherent to adopt an external or 
non-presentist or gradient approach to issues of life’s meaning (2015: 57, 59), 
and although he does not quite say that only “the heart of meaning in life” is 
valid (but see 2015: 59), his claim is that the latter is to be much preferred to the 
former.  
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Similarly, Kukita writes, “I want no one to judge my life to be meaningless. 
Nor would I judge any other person’s life to be meaningless, or arrange other 
people’s lives in order of how meaningful they are…. I cannot share the 
assumption that one can compare meaningfulness across people’s lives” (2015: 
212). 
I have not encountered a strictly noncomparative approach to life’s meaning 
before, so that Morioka’s and Kukita’s claim that it is key is original for all I 
know, relative to an English-speaking audience. In the following, I focus mainly 
on Morioka’s discussion, as his text suggests an argument for this strong claim.  
At one point Morioka contends that posing the question of whether one’s 
actual life is meaningful “emerges from the deep layer of my heart when I notice 
that the solid psychological ground which was supporting the affirmative basis 
of my life has suddenly collapsed or disappeared into nothing” (2015: 55). I take 
his implicit reasoning to be that the importance of a philosophical perspective, at 
least when it comes to meaning in life, is a function of its emotional source. If I 
am led to question whether my life is meaningful because I am experiencing 
concern, fear, dread, angst or the like with regard to it, then that question is (so 
the argument goes) more weighty than other questions that spring from weaker 
emotions or from no emotion at all but from mere intellectual curiosity. One 
might put it this way: meaning in life should be approached in terms of what it 
would mean to the enquirer.3 
Of course, one might reasonably doubt that the importance of a 
philosophical approach is strictly a function of its emotional source and the 
intensity thereof. Being a pluralist about philosophical methods, I am open to the 
idea that one reasonable way to choose amongst them is in terms of whether 
they satisfy certain emotional needs. But I am also open to the idea that 
additional reasonable ways to choose philosophical methods are based on what 
would be useful for the purposes of, say, obtaining important knowledge for its 
own sake, guiding public policy or relating to others in beneficent ways. 
Morioka must say more to convince someone who does not already share his 
view that the only or most reasonable way to choose a philosophical approach is 
on the basis of the enquirer’s emotional perspective.  
Suppose, now, for the sake of argument, that the importance of a 
philosophical approach were solely a function of the degree to which it speaks to 
                                                     
3 Compare this approach with that advocated by Yamaguchi elsewhere in this volume (2015: 66-89) 
and discussed in 2.4 below. 
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the intense emotional life of the enquirer. Interestingly, it would not follow that 
the “the heart of meaning in life” is invariably the most vital method for thinking 
about life’s meaning. That is because one’s strongest emotions might be about 
not one’s own life, but rather that of someone else.  
Consider someone who is more concerned that his children live meaningful 
lives than that he does. Think about a father who asks, “Alas, do the lives of my 
children as they are have any meaning at all?”. This question could well 
“emerge from the deep layer of his heart when he notices that the solid ground 
which was supporting the affirmative basis of their lives has suddenly collapsed 
or disappeared into nothing”. If so, then an external approach to meaning in life 
would be called for, and not the purely internalist “heart of meaning in life”, by 
the logic of what appears to be Morioka’s reasoning in defence of the latter. 
Similar remarks apply to non-presentist and gradient methods; these, too, 
could be what would most satisfy a given enquirer’s deepest emotional concerns. 
Consider: “Alas, will the lives of my children have any meaning at all?”, or 
“Alas, will the lives of my children have any substantial meaning?”. These 
questions could also spring from the deepest layer of a father’s heart.  
It is true that these questions are not the same as what Morioka calls “the 
heart of meaning in life”, but the present issue is why we should focus on the 
latter and not also the former to a comparable degree. The only argument 
Morioka seems to have provided for deeming “the heart of meaning in life” to 
be central is about its emotional source, but I have argued that people with 
strong other-regarding sentiments might not be led to “the heart of meaning in 
life”. 
Finally, notice that, despite their official views that comparing meaning 
between lives cannot be done, both Morioka and Kukita seem to invite such 
comparisons at certain points in their articles. Morioka says, “The life of a 
person of no importance can have equal meaning to the life of a distinguished 
person” (2015: 53), which implies a comparison between them. And Kukita 
maintains that certain works of art are great, not that all works of art are great 
(2015: 211-212), which suggests the view that a life that has created great art is 
to some degree more important for having done so than a life that has not, all 
things being equal.  
It would normally be offensive to tell someone that her life is not as 
meaningful as someone else’s, and perhaps this is influencing Morioka and 
Kukita to reject this kind of appraisal altogether (see Kukita’s mention of 
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insolence at 2015: 211). However, the fact that a judgment would be offensive to 
convey does not mean that the judgment would be false. After all, just because it 
would be offensive to tell someone that he is ugly does not mean that he is not. 
Our moral reticence to communicate certain judgments to others is one thing, 
and their truth or falsity is another.  
Unlike Morioka and Kukita, Peter Baumann readily accepts that thought 
about life’s meaning sensibly employs an external, non-presentist and gradient 
approach. His enquiry instead concerns how much precision (and organization) 
can be expected from such an approach. He reads Meaning in Life as suggesting 
that substantial precision (and organization) is available, and he provides serious 
reason to doubt that. Baumann is correct that reflection on interpersonal 
comparisons of meaning simply has not been undertaken in the field, and his 
article is a first, important step.  
Baumann often works with the example of three lives, that of Euclid, 
Picasso and a second-rate painter, and I shall do the same. How precisely can we 
assess the degree of meaning in such lives? According to Baumann, not in any 
absolute way. What is typically available to us are comparative judgments that 
are true relative to certain variable purposes or standards.  
 
When we compare Euclid’s life with Picasso’s life and judge that their 
lives are equally meaningful we use a very rough degree of granularity. 
We think about them as extraordinarily creative people in general who 
have made an important contribution. However, when we compare 
Picasso’s life with the other painter’s life we do in addition think of them 
as painters, perhaps even as painters of the same period. Our degree of 
granularity is much finer here (Baumann 2015: 39).  
 
An important implication of this view is that there is an indeterminacy with 
regard to the question of how much meaning there is in one life compared to 
another, even working with just two lives (and so setting aside issues of 
transitivity). For Baumann, one cannot answer that in the abstract, and must first 
specify the context, where contexts can vary considerably.  
 
There is then not just one ranking of lives with respect to meaning but 
several which differ as to the degree of granularity. Consider a rougher 
ranking and a finer-grained ranking of lives with respect to meaning. Even 
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if all the lives considered should have a definite position in the rougher 
ranking (e.g., Picasso, Euclid, the other painter and some others all 
equally high up….), they might not all have a definite place in the more 
fine-grained ranking. For instance, while Picasso’s life is, according to our 
example, more meaningful than the other painter’s life it is not clear 
where Euclid’s life is located (Baumann 2015: 40). 
 
I think that Baumann is correct that one way that we can and routinely do 
compare lives is relative to certain interests or contexts. One could use a 
“microscope” and focus on the meaningfulness of two people’s paintings, on the 
one hand, or use a “naked eye” to assess creativity more broadly. The question is 
whether this is all that is available to us, and in the following I aim to provide 
some reason to think not.  
If there is going to be some more absolute approach to comparing lives, it 
will likely be a function of the best theory available about what constitutes 
meaning in life. To see this point, first consider some analogies. If one wants to 
know whether one rock has more gold in it than another, answering that from 
some kind of human perspective as such should invoke the chemical analysis of 
gold as Au with atomic number 79. The more of that chemical, the more gold 
that is present, at least for any (near) absolute perspective available to human 
beings. 
Similarly, if one wants to know whether one person was more morally 
wicked than another and to what degree, it would make sense to appeal to the 
most defensible philosophical account of what it means to live immorally. 
Presumably such a theory would entail (amongst other things) a ranking of 
wrong acts,4 so that, e.g., killing one's spouse for the insurance money is worse 
than breaking a promise to meet a student in order to play pinball.  
Not only would the theory entail that some acts are more wrong than others, 
but it would also indicate the rough extent to which one act is more wrong than 
another. For instance, the degree to which killing for money (A) is worse than 
breaking a promise for amusement (B) is greater than the degree to which 
breaking a promise for amusement (B) is worse than forgetting to pay for one's 
share of office coffee (C). The space between A and B on the imagined scale is 
larger than the space between B and C.  
                                                     
4 The next remarks about degrees of wrongness are cribbed from Metz (2002a: 282). 
 246
Although one is hard pressed to say exactly how much space there is 
between these acts (and there might well in principle not be any precise answer 
to that question), wrongness plausibly has degrees of at least the two sorts just 
noted. And, so, assessing the extent to which two people have been morally 
wicked in their lives would involve appealing to such rough cardinal judgments 
of wrongful behaviour. 
Now, what goes for the disvalue of wrongness plausibly goes for the value 
of meaningfulness. If there were a plausible theory of what constitutes meaning 
in life, akin to theories of what constitutes gold and immorality, then it could be 
used to ground comparisons of meaning between lives that are independent of 
more particular purposes and idiosyncratic standards. And I of course think there 
is such a theory, namely, the fundamentality theory that I advance in Meaning in 
Life (Metz 2013: 219-239, 249). 
The fundamentality theory is not simple, and there is probably no fact of the 
matter about how exactly to weigh its various elements against each other. Even 
so, if the theory were true, or at least most justified, it would seem able to 
ground context-independent interpersonal comparisons of meaning in life. In 
principle, when comparing the meaning in people’s lives, the fundamentality 
theory would direct one to attend to factors that include the following: how 
many facets of their intelligence that they exercised; how much they did so; how 
sophisticated the exercise of their intelligence was; how dedicated or effortful 
they were; how much their intelligence was positively oriented towards a 
fundamental dimension of human life; how broad the fundamental properties 
were (viz., those basic to an individual or to a society or to the species); and how 
useful their actions ended up being for these properties; and how much they 
exhibited narrative values such as improvement, redemption and originality.  
Appealing to such elements, one readily detects large gaps between periods 
of a given life (recall the example of my teenage versus middle aged selves), and 
also potentially between different lives altogether. Returning to Euclid, Picasso 
and the second-rate painter, it would not obviously be nonsensical or impossible 
to judge which of the first two had a more meaningful life and by how much. To 
see whether a precise answer were available would require a thorough survey of 
all the different elements inherent to the fundamentality theory and their careful 
application to all the different facets of both lives. That would not be an easy 
task, but seems to be largely doable in principle.  
Of course, it could turn out that the lack of precision about how to balance 
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various facets of the fundamentality theory means that it would fail to render a 
precise answer about whose life was more meaningful and to what degree (as 
well as fail to ground transitivity when it comes to ordering more than two lives). 
However, it could still ground the conclusion that Euclid and Picasso were “in 
the same ballpark” so far as amount of meaning goes (cf. Baumann 2015: 36-38), 
or, to use a metaphor I have used elsewhere about degrees of moral status, were 
“in the same orbit”, compared to the second-rate painter who is in a different one 
(Metz 2012: 394-395, 397).5  
 
2.4. Are Any Universal Claims about Life’s Meaning Justified?   
 
Recall that by a “theory” of meaning in life I mean a basic principle intended 
to capture what all meaningful conditions of any given human person’s life have 
in common as distinct from the meaningless ones. Such a principle aims to 
capture the nature of meaning analogous to the way that H20 captures the 
essence of water. One reason to doubt that any such theory is available is that 
meaning is incomparable, as per the previous sub-section. Another reason for 
doubt is that, even if the meaning in some people’s lives can be compared, there 
is little reason to think that one can be justified in making claims about meaning 
across all people. In their contributions, Sho Yamaguchi and Tartaglia provide 
reason to think that certain aspects of my methodology undercut my ability to 
make any justified claims about meaning that apply to everyone, even supposing 
substantial interpersonal comparison were feasible. 
Yamaguchi doubts that I am justified in making any claims about meaning 
with a universal scope because I usually seek to do so by appealing to intuition 
(as does Kukita 2015: 213-214). In Meaning in Life, I use the term “intuition” to 
signify a judgment of the degree of meaning in a particular case that is less 
controversial than the more general principles the judgment is being used to 
evaluate. The claims that caring for others who are medically vulnerable and 
making a scientific discovery confer meaning on a life, whereas chewing gum 
and torturing people for the fun of it fail to do so, are examples of intuitions that 
I used to evaluate principles, e.g., ones that meaning is merely a function of 
                                                     
5 And note that deeming lives to be in the same ballpark with respect to degree of meaning might be 
enough to continue to think in terms of maximally meaningful lives (albeit not a single maximally 
meaningful life), a concept that is essential to my account of how to judge whether anyone’s life is 
meaningful on balance (Metz 2013: 154-158). 
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satisfying one’s strongest desires or consists solely of developing rational 
natures. Insofar as the principles accord with the intuitions, that is some 
evidence in the former’s favour, and insofar as they fail to do so, that is some 
evidence against them. Or so I maintain in the book.    
However, Yamaguchi maintains that these evidential claims are true only for 
those who also share my intuitions, which is not everyone. According to him, for 
any intuition I posit, there will be someone who could have the opposite 
intuition, meaning that any principle I seek to defend with my intuition will not 
be justified for such an interlocutor, pulling the rug out from any pretensions I 
have for the principle’s universal validity. As he puts it, “Generally speaking, 
any argument grounded on some intuitive judgments finally backfires in the 
sense that its alleged adequacy will be rejected by another argument of the same 
type” (2015: 76; cf. Tartaglia 2015: 103).  
After mounting this argument in a thoughtful and rigorous manner, he 
maintains that all is not lost for Meaning in Life, since its “real worth” 
(Yamaguchi 2015: 66, 67, 75, 80, 88) lies in its existential, and not theoretical, 
dimensions. In particular, Yamaguchi suggests that my “intellectual inquiry into 
life’s meaning carries with it an excellence in the sense that it succeeds in 
encouraging us as his fellows to engage in the same type of inquiry in our ways 
in turn” (2015: 88). 
I of course would like the book to exhibit both kinds of value, and, moreover, 
to have existential import because it is theoretically powerful. As I said in its 
first few pages, I largely wrote Meaning in Life out of the sense that my life 
would be somewhat more meaningful insofar as I were to make progress 
towards understanding the nature of meaning (2013: 1-3; see also 13, 249). 
Although Yamaguchi thinks that the book can have existential significance 
without having a theoretical one, for me the former depends crucially on the 
latter.  
So, the question becomes whether the appeal to intuition undercuts the 
project of defending a theory of what constitutes meaning in life that has a 
universal scope. It had better not, or else an enormous range of philosophical 
projects are doomed, including theorization about morality, well-being, 
reference, personal identity, causation and much, much else. As I note in the 
book, even philosophical theories of justification invariably appeal to intuitions 
about what is justified and what is not (2013: 8n8). How else is one to evaluate a 
purportedly maximally general principle except by appeal to what is both more 
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particular and less controversial than it?  
And note that Yamaguchi himself is naturally read as appealing to intuition, 
not about meaning, but about justification. When he says that someone who has 
a different intuition about meaning makes my appeal to intuition about meaning 
unjustified as a way to defend any universally binding claim, he is himself 
appealing to an intuition about the nature of justification. But if intuitions about 
what is justified or unjustified are philosophically sound, then so are intuitions 
about what is meaningful or not. 
Beyond this dialectical, “partners in guilt” argument against Yamaguchi, I 
note several reasons to think that Yamaguchi’s intuition about the lack of 
justification is what is in fact unjustified, not my appeal to intuitions about 
meaning. First off, it is important to note that it is not relevant merely to point 
out that someone says (Yamaguchi 2015: 75) something counter to an intuition. 
After all, one could say that plants are self-conscious without thinking that, 
where only the latter would be pertinent to ascertaining justified belief. 
Furthermore, it is not even relevant merely to note that someone could judge 
(Yamaguchi 2015: 78) something counter to an intuition or that there might be 
such a person (Yamaguchi 2015: 84). A deaf person could judge a piece of music 
not to be beautiful, there might be a person on drugs who denies that jumping off 
a cliff would damage his health, and a layperson could fail to judge there to be a 
proton spiralling off upon a collision of particles in a cloud chamber. However, 
these possibilities would provide no epistemic reason for one who hears to doubt 
that a piece of music is beautiful, for one who is sober to doubt that health 
would be risked upon jumping off a cliff, or for a physicist to doubt that there is 
a proton in the cloud chamber.  
At best, the relevant case would be one in which someone who is competent 
to judge issues of meaning in life actually judges something contrary to an 
intuition I posit. Now, is there in fact such a person who sincerely believes that 
taking pleasure in harming other innocent people confers meaning on his life 
(Yamaguchi 2015: 75-76)? Supposing he understands what talk of “meaning in 
life” means, it is doubtful; it is more likely that a person would think that his 
own happiness matters more than meaningfulness than that he would think that 
meaningfulness is constituted by taking pleasure in harming innocents.  
Suppose, however, that Yamaguchi were to succeed in finding someone who 
truly believes that meaning in his life would be enhanced by taking pleasure in 
causing others pain. What then?  
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Here, the deep point in reply would be that I am not seeking to evaluate 
theories merely on the basis of any intuitions taken as ultimate or fixed. If 
someone thinks that taking pleasure in harming others is meaningful, then I 
would seek out some other, ideally stronger intuitions that he has, and make the 
case that they support a certain, more general principle (or cluster of them) that 
gives him reason to revise his intuition about harming others.6  
In short, my epistemic aim is not to find a theory that entails and plausibly 
explains all extant intuitions of a given interlocutor, but is rather to find one (or 
a group) that best accounts for intuitions held after the process of reflecting 
theoretically on them. And since this process, which will take many decades, has 
begun in earnest only fairly recently amongst philosophers with regard to 
meaning in life, I remain optimistic about the prospect of convergence.  
Finally, note that by “convergence” I do not mean unanimous agreement 
about a narrowly defined theory. Instead, I mean something like what is 
sometimes encountered in science, where a very large majority of experts agree 
that certain theoretical options are plausible or not and such substantial 
agreement (but not full-blown consensus) is strong evidence for views with a 
universal scope. Beliefs in phlogiston, a flat earth and the plum pudding model 
of the atom are false for anyone regardless of when and where she has lived, 
whereas beliefs in some kind of process of natural selection and some version of 
quantum mechanics are true for all societies. These judgments of which beliefs 
are universally true and false are justified by virtue of what most contemporary 
scientists have come to hold. And I seek out something similar when it comes to 
beliefs about what is and is not meaningful; here, too, what most systematic 
enquirers have come to hold about this subject matter could provide strong 
evidence for claims with a universal scope, e.g., that taking pleasure in causing 
pain to another innocent person cannot confer meaning on one’s life.  
Tartaglia’s major reason for being sceptical about the prospect of being able 
to justify any universal claims about meaning differs from Yamaguchi’s. 
According to him, the theory of linguistic reference that I occasionally invoke in 
the book undercuts the ability to ground any claims about meaning with a 
universal scope.  
This theory is the sort of causal account of reference that Saul Kripke and 
                                                     
6 Note that this is how I would also deal with those who are inclined to judge Hitler to have lead a 
meaningful life, which judgment Tartaglia takes to be evidence of the utter indeterminacy of the 
analytic approach (2015: 103-104). 
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Hilary Putnam developed in the context of proper names and mass nouns. Very 
roughly, on their view, a certain term refers to a particular object or property in 
the world if someone once dubbed it with the term and others now intend to use 
the term to pick out the thing initially dubbed. The view naturally underwrites a 
objective or realist approach to science, as the nature of the thing dubbed is 
mind-independent and something to be discovered over time through empirical 
means.  
A number of philosophers, particularly associated with Cornell, have 
employed this theory of reference to develop an objective account of morality. 
For them, a term such as “wrongness” refers to certain kinds of behaviour, 
where the nature of that behaviour is likewise mind-independent and something 
to be apprehended through a posteriori enquiry. At times in the book, I invoked 
this kind of approach to make sense of how it might be possible for both 
morality and meaning to be objective.  
Suggesting how morality and meaning plausibly could be objective differs 
from providing substantial evidence that they are objective in the way I suggest. 
Tartaglia remarks that I offer “very little in way of justification” (2015: 106; see 
also Kukita 2015: 213) for the realist views proposed, but that was intentional on 
my part; as I said in the book, I wanted to avoid complicated metaphysical and 
meta-ethical debates, so as to focus squarely on meaning (Metz 2013: 7, 22n5, 
170, 172; see also 111, 120, 134, 243). I did not mean to suggest that I had 
provided conclusive reason to accept realist accounts of morality and meaning. 
Instead, my specific limited aims were, first, to demonstrate how a naturalist 
might on the face of it be able to account for an invariant morality, i.e., to show 
that it is not obvious that only God could ground one (2013: 91-96), and, second, 
to give pause to those who adhere to subjectivism because they cannot see how 
any sort of objective value would be possible apart from God (2013: 170-172). 
Tartaglia maintains that the sort of objectivity that could be grounded by a 
causal theory of reference is not one that would suit my purposes, which include 
identifying some claims about meaning that are true for all human persons. If 
different societies used terms such as “meaningful” to refer to different patterns 
of behaviour, then, by the causal theory, there would be mind-independent facts 
about the nature of these patterns, but the patterns would not be uniform across 
all societies. There would be objectivity but without universality. 
Elsewhere, in a debate with Allen Wood, I have myself argued that value 
realists who seek out claims with a universal scope must address the sort of 
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possibility that Tartaglia raises (Metz 2007: 369-372). I also spoke of the issue 
in Meaning in Life, in the context of a universal morality (2013: 95). There, I 
noted that naturalistic moral realists could plausibly draw on sociobiological 
accounts of the origin moral norms to explain why all human societies would 
use their respective terms for morality to refer to the same cluster of behavioural 
properties. The naturalistic realist about meaning who invokes a causal theory of 
reference owes a similar kind of explanation.  
Alas, I lack a convincing one at present; however, one might readily emerge 
from my theoretical account of the nature of meaning. If I am correct that great 
meaning, i.e., that which warrants substantial pride and admiration, comes from 
positive engagement with the fundamental conditions of human life, i.e., 
conditions responsible for much else about major dimensions of human 
existence, such as reasoning and relating, then it is reasonable to suspect that 
meaning-talk in all human societies would refer to such properties; for if it 
referred to something other than these properties, humans would have been 
much less likely to maintain themselves over time. I suggested this sort of 
strategy in the final chapter of the book: “What would have facilitated survival 
and flourishing are judging behaviour to be worthy of great esteem insofar as it 
exhibited, roughly, respect for reasoning and sharing and judging behaviour to 
be worthy of great shame to the extent that it has been degrading of the 
fundamental conditions of human life” (Metz 2013: 244).  
 
3. Giving Supernaturalism Its Due  
 
Although I am a naturalist about what makes life meaningful, I take 
supernaturalism, the view that a spiritual dimension is necessary for life to be 
meaningful, seriously, and aimed in the book to give it a fair shake. The entire 
second (and longest) part of Meaning in Life is devoted to critically exploring 
God-based and soul-based accounts of what constitutes meaning in life. In 3.1 
below, I consider the view that in the book I missed an important rationale for 
thinking that life would be meaningless without immortality, perhaps of an 
ensouled kind. In 3.2, I address objections to my argument against the view that 
God’s purpose could constitute meaning since that view fails to cohere with the 
best rationale for thinking that God alone could do so. Finally, in 3.3 I respond 
to criticisms of my argument against any supernaturalism about meaning, 
according to which adherents to it typically exhibit incoherent beliefs in doing 
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so.  
 
3.1. How Might Death Undercut Meaning in Life?  
  
In Meaning in Life, I sought to unify all the major arguments for thinking 
that immortality is necessary for meaning in life, at least insofar as they are 
fairly promising. Specifically, I contended that they ultimately rely on what I 
called the “perfection thesis”, the claim that engagement with a maximally 
conceivable (or possible) value is necessary for a life to be meaningful. For 
example, the suggestion that life would be meaningless insofar as the wicked 
were to flourish and the upright were to suffer rests upon the claim that ideal 
justice is necessary for meaning. Similarly, the idea that one’s life would be 
meaningless if one were not to enjoy God forever in Heaven supposes that a 
perfect being is essential.  
Fumitake Yoshizawa contends that there is another prima facie strong 
argument for an immortality requirement for life’s meaning that I did not 
address and that does not appear to depend on the perfection thesis. He 
maintains that one might be motivated to hold the immortality requirement, not 
because one seeks a perfect value in an eternal afterlife, but rather because one 
wants an imperfect value not to end. And he thinks this is in fact the best way to 
understand Tolstoy, who “finds that all valuable things for him will be ‘lost’ 
because they will die or disappear. And because of this fact, he feels sorrow and 
loses his zest for life. Then, he claims that his life is meaningless” (Yoshizawa 
2015: 144).  
I find insightful Yoshizawa’s suggestions, first, that there is a difference 
between thinking that life would be meaningless in the absence of a perfect 
value and thinking that it would be so if an imperfect value were to become 
absent, and, second, that the latter view is worth taking seriously. Although he 
ultimately rejects the latter rationale for an immortality requirement as unsound, 
Yoshizawa’s central point is that I cannot claim to have provided a thorough 
rejection of it merely by having argued against the perfection thesis.  
There are occasions when Yoshizawa phrases his argument in a way that 
begs the question against the friend of the immortality requirement. Consider 
this remark: “Metz interprets immortality as a condition for obtaining meaning, 
but in view of the idea that I present, immortality means the negation of the 
death of a person whose life already has meaning” (2015: 134). To say that what 
 254
is problematic about death is that it ends a meaningful life implies that meaning 
is possible without immortality, which is exactly what the friend of the 
immortality requirement denies.  
So, to express the point in a way that would be useful to the adherent to the 
immortality requirement, I suspect one ought to say something like this: life is 
meaningless if and because certain, imperfect activities, relationships or states 
come to an end. Or as Yoshizawa aptly says elsewhere, “immortality can mean 
simply retaining the existence of things with their usual earthly value” (2015: 
139).  
I wonder, though, whether things would in fact retain their “usual earthly 
value” if they never came to an end. A love that lasts forever and an object that 
merits intellectual contemplation for an eternity seem naturally described as 
“perfect” or “ideal”. Yoshizawa is aiming to present “at least one understanding 
of immortality in which the amount of value is not important” (2015: 139), but 
one might reasonably doubt that he has succeeded.  
In reply, Yoshizawa could try to argue that, even if a value that lasted forever 
would indeed be perfect, it would not be the perfection that would best explain 
why death would plausibly make meaning impossible. There is logical space for 
Yoshizawa to make such a move. But is it attractive space? I am afraid that I 
find it difficult to suggest what else might do the explanatory work. To think that 
one’s loving relationships will end, and indeed that one’s beloveds will die, and 
that these facts entail that love fails to confer meaning on one’s life seems best 
explained by the idea that the love is imperfect.  
 
3.2. Could God’s Purpose Be the Source of Life’s Meaning? 
 
I appreciate the power of the claim that life’s meaning is captured by 
fulfilling a purpose that God, as understood in the monotheist tradition, has 
assigned us.7 Where does the higher value of meaning in life come from, a 
value that transcends our physical capacity for pleasure? From a holy being who 
is in a spiritual realm. Why is God necessary for meaning in life? Because 
without God having commanded to us to do some things rather than others, there 
would be no invariant moral rules, or other kinds of objective value, by which to 
abide. What explains the different degrees of meaning in people’s lives? Some 
                                                     
7 The rest of this paragraph is pinched from Metz (2016b).  
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have lived up to God’s commands better than others. What accounts for the 
significance of Nelson Mandela’s and Mother Teresa’s lives in comparison to the 
relative insignificance of a serial killer’s? The former have done much more to 
fulfil God’s commands than has the latter. 
However, in Meaning in Life I ultimately argue against this particular 
God-based theory of meaning in life. In a nutshell, my reasoning is that for God 
to be necessary for any significance in our lives, He must have certain qualities 
that cannot exist in the natural world, these qualities must be qualitatively 
superior to any goods possible in a physical universe, and they must be what 
ground meaning in it. I take a cue from one major strand of perfect being 
theology and propose that, if a God-based theory were true, it would have to be 
so because meaning depends on the existence of a perfect being, where 
perfection requires properties such as atemporal, simple and immutable 
personhood, which is possible only in a spiritual realm. And then I also take a 
cue from oft-expressed concerns about conflict between God’s otherness and 
God’s personality, and note that a perfect being, so conceived, appears to be 
incapable of being purposive. If meaning must come from God, it probably will 
not by virtue of fulfilling a purpose He has assigned us (but rather, I suggest, 
from a mutually loving relationship between us and God). 
Jason Poettcker carefully and accurately recounts this dialectic, and provides 
reason to doubt the two most crucial steps in it. In particular, he maintains that 
the best explanation of why God might be necessary for meaning does not imply 
that God is simple, atemporal or immutable, in the ways I conceive these 
properties, and that, even if it did, God could still be purposive. 
Regarding the latter issue, Poettcker remarks, “There is also a large body of 
literature on God’s relation to time that Metz utterly fails to engage…. To be fair, 
Metz does acknowledge that these responses are out there, but he does not 
engage with them” (2015: 190, 192). I did not in the book aim to provide 
conclusive reason that God’s simplicity and atemporality (for instance) would be 
logically incompatible with purposiveness. I am not a metaphysician, and 
wanted to avoid intricate debates in metaphysics as much as I could, so as to 
focus on meaning (2013: 111, 120, 134, 243). So, I drew upon traditional 
concerns in the literature about how a radically other God could interact us in 
ways that adherents to a purpose theory normally conceive, presenting a 
challenge to the latter to show either that purposiveness can cohere with 
simplicity and atemporality, or that God need not have such properties in order 
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to ground meaning. I aimed to provide a new problem for purpose theory, “the 
most significant” one (2013: 113) that would provide reason to consider 
alternative God-based theories (2013: 118), and did not assert, or mean to 
suggest, that it could not be resolved in the end.  
That said, my concerns are not allayed by the sketches Poettcker has 
provided about how a simple and atemporal God might be able to assign us a 
purpose. Quoting Augustine who claims that God is the source of time, 
Poettcker says, “If God created time then it would not make sense to say that 
God’s decision to create took time. Metz assumes that time would have to exist 
before God created and that creation implies temporality, but these assumptions 
are not adequately supported” (2015: 191). But the “assumptions” are ones of 
definitional analysis. Creating by definition appears to be an event, and an event 
is essentially, if not also by definition, something that takes time. And so I 
believe the burden is on the purpose theorist to explain how an atemporal being 
could do something that takes time, indeed, how one could create time in the 
first place (and not merely our time, as per Eleonore Stump and Norman 
Kretzmann, whom Poettcker cites).  
Poettcker is correct that I have not shown that attempts from the likes of, say, 
William Lane Craig fail, but the main point of my argument was that such 
attempts need to be thoroughly considered by others who wish to defend the 
purpose theory. I above all wanted to make the case that such a metaphysical 
problem has an important bearing on issues of meaning, requires a solution that 
appears difficult to devise, and makes it reasonable to explore non-purposive 
alternatives by those inclined to think that God grounds meaning in life.   
Turning to the other major step, Poettcker also maintains that the purpose 
theorist ultimately need not show that purposiveness and simplicity/atemporality 
are compatible, since God could ground meaning without exhibiting the latter 
properties. Here, again, I did not mean to suggest that I had provided conclusive 
reason to maintain that only a simple/atemporal God could ground meaning; my 
claim was that such a rationale for deeming God to be necessary for meaning is, 
for all I can tell, “more auspicious” and “more promising” than other rationales 
(2013: 110, 112, 120). 
And I continue to think that in light of Poettcker’s alternative suggestions in 
his article. He mentions two that appear to be logically distinct (but that could be 
conjoined). On the one hand, he maintains that God would be a person who 
necessarily has the properties of being powerful, knowledgeable and good 
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(presumably to a maximal degree), whereas anything in nature would have these 
merely accidentally. “Even if we could find instances of goodness, knowledge 
and power in nature, this would not mean that nature is sufficient for meaning if 
meaning in life requires having these qualities essentially” (Poettcker 2015: 
190). 
This is an indeed a position that I did not consider in the book, and I value 
Poettcker’s having advanced it. The key issue is whether essentially exhibiting 
the three classic values is enough to explain why only God could ground 
meaning, even granting, for now, that only God could essentially exhibit them. 
Imagine, now, a physical person who accidentally exhibited goodness, 
knowledge and power, but did so to a superlative degree. By the logic of 
Poettcker’s suggestion, no meaning could come from orienting one’s life 
towards such a being. I find more plausible the idea that some meaning could 
come from doing so, even if more would come from orienting one’s life around 
God.  
Poettcker’s other basic suggestion about why God alone could make our 
lives meaningful is more familiar, and, from my perspective, less promising. It is 
that objective value, one that applies to all human beings independent of their 
mental states, could come only from God. As he puts it, 
 
The good, true, and beautiful do not have the kind of final value that Metz 
argues they do, if they are grounded in nature. Value requires a value giver 
and nature cannot give objective value…. (H)umans cannot maintain or 
sustain the objective value of anything because they are contingent, finite, 
mutable beings…. God is the only being that can give things objective 
value…. (I)f God did not exist, and did not give one a purpose, anything 
else that one directed one’s life toward would not be have final or 
objective value and thus one’s life would be meaningless (2015: 200, 
201).  
 
I addressed this meta-ethical theory not in the chapter addressing arguments 
against purpose theory, on which Poettcker focuses (2013: 98-118), but rather in 
the chapter that critically discusses arguments for it (2013: 77-97).  
In particular, I addressed John Cottingham’s argumentation for thinking that 
only God could ground objective value and hence meaning. I argued that he, 
along with most of those who advance such a view, evince an incoherence in 
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their beliefs, since they claim to know that there is objective value but do not 
claim to know that God exists, even if they have faith that He does (and I also 
sketched a way that nature plausibly could ground objective value). Since 
Poettcker does not take up that rationale, I leave the debate with him here, but 
move on to Nicholas Waghorn, who has thoroughly taken it up.  
 
3.3. Can Supernaturalists Avoid Incoherent Beliefs? 
  
In Meaning in Life I sought to provide a new argument that would provide a 
large majority of who (are inclined to) hold supernaturalism reason not to do so. 
According to the core of this argument, there is a logical inconsistency in 
holding the following three views: (1) I know “If X, then Y” is true; (2) I know 
X obtains; (3) I do not know whether Y obtains. Call these “the three claims”.   
Now, I maintain that most supernaturalists would be committed to an 
instantiation of the three claims.  Specifically, for a majority of those who 
claim to know that supernaturalism is true, it would be the case that they would 
then hold the following version of the three claims: (1*) I know “If meaning 
exists, then God exists” is true; (2*) I know meaning exists; (3*) I do not know 
whether God exists. And I suggest that they ought to drop (1*), the God-based 
theory of life’s meaning, since (2*) and (3*) are much more defensible. 
(1*) is the claim that one has enough epistemic reason for knowledge (which 
I called “conclusive reason” in the book) of a God-based theory of meaning in 
life. (2*) is the default position of most philosophers, including supernaturalists, 
working in the field of meaning in life; a large majority reject nihilism when it 
comes to meaning in individual lives and for what they think is conclusive 
reason (even if many deny that the human race as a whole has a meaning in 
relation to something beyond it). And (3*) is the idea that, even if one has faith 
in God, or some epistemic reason to believe in Him, it is extremely difficult to 
maintain that one has enough (“conclusive”) epistemic reason for knowledge8 
of His existence; many religious believers, even philosophical ones, deny that 
they know God exists.  
In the book, I argued that Cottingham, the field’s current most prominent and 
careful God-based theorist, expresses commitment to all three of these claims, 
                                                     
8 By “conclusive” evidence I did not mean infallible warrant, as Waghorn suspects (2015: 153-157); I 
meant merely that the evidence is weighty enough for knowledge, which is the way I took Cottingham 
to use the term. 
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and I suggested that most other God-based theorists are implicitly committed to 
them. I also generalized the argument to soul-based theories; here, too, few do 
(or reasonably can) claim knowledge that a soul exists, but they do claim to 
know that meaning exists, making it incoherent to claim to know that if meaning 
exists, then a soul exists.  
Unfortunately, those whom I know have spent the most time considering this 
incoherence objection to supernaturalism, including Waghorn, 9  have 
misinterpreted it, in two major ways. There are similarities between the 
objection and other, prominent forms of philosophical thought, and in Meaning 
in Life I did not take the time to forestall conflation between them. In the 
following, I work above all to clarify the nature of my objection, and to urge 
others to confuse it with neither the view that supernaturalists (or naturalists) are 
intending to advance an inference with the three claims, nor the view that 
epistemic closure is essentially at stake with my analysis of them. 
First, Waghorn and others have thought that I understand various participants 
in the debate about the nature of meaning to be advancing an inference via the 
three claims. For example, Waghorn says, “I take the thrust of Metz’ argument to 
be that the evidence for wrongness and for Cottingham’s conditional transmits 
warrant, and hence (I am assuming here) justification, to the proposition that 
God exists” (2015: 152; see also 156, 158-159, 162).  
But that is not, as I understand it, the thrust of my argument. I do not read 
Cottingham as offering an inference for the conclusion that God exists. The 
point of my argument is that Cottingham denies he can provide any inference 
that would underwrite knowledge of God’s existence (and that many other 
supernaturalists would follow suit)! And, further, that this denial is incoherent 
upon claiming to know that meaning exists and that the existence of meaning 
implies God’s existence (and, finally, that one should therefore give up claiming 
to know the latter). My contention is that Cottingham and others accept the three 
claims, which are logically inconsistent, not that he invokes the three claims as a 
collection to draw a conclusion. 
Relatedly, Waghorn misinterprets my claim that a naturalist approach to 
meaning avoids incoherence. Speaking of me, Waghorn says, “I take him here to 
mean that his position satisfies (A*), as he knows that morality exists, he knows 
that morality is a function of natural properties, and so he knows what this 
                                                     
9 As well as Jessica Lerm in correspondence and Tom Angier in a talk given at a launch of Meaning in 
Life. 
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entails: that there are natural properties” (2015: 156). But this is not what I mean. 
I am not seeking to infer that there are natural properties. Instead, I am 
contending that a naturalist instantiation of the three claims is not logically 
inconsistent. One might well not know that a naturalist theory of meaning is true, 
but if one were to assert knowledge of it, one would not contradict other claims 
one would be inclined to make, viz., that meaning exists and natural properties 
exist. 
Second, I do not take myself to be invoking any principle of epistemic 
closure, let alone of epistemic transmission (as per Waghorn 2015: 152). These 
principles assert that one knows something, upon (or in virtue of) knowing 
something else. Along these lines, Waghorn ascribes the following principle to 
me, and bases the rest of his critical discussion on it: “If I know that X obtains, 
and I know that ‘If X, then Y’ is true, then I know that Y” (2015: 151).  
However, I never spoke of such a principle, with Waghorn acknowledging 
that he has “reconstructed” it in light of my comments (2015: 151n1), and I did 
not intend anything like what the principle says. My point is not that 
supernaturalists are committed to knowing something, upon knowing something 
else, whereas in fact, according to me, they do not know. It is rather that 
supernaturalists themselves often enough claim not to know that God exists 
(patent in Cottingham’s case), which is inconsistent when conjoined with the 
claims to know both that supernaturalism is true and that some lives are 
meaningful, which supernaturalists also often enough hold. To avoid the 
inconsistency, I maintain, they ought to drop adherence to supernaturalism, 
while retaining their scepticism about God’s existence and their confidence in 
the existence of meaning in life. 
Perhaps principles of closure and transmission lurk implicitly in the 
incoherence objection, as articulated above, which would license the intricate 
and deep explorations of them in Waghorn’s article. At this stage, however, I do 
not see that I am committed to them.  
Some of Waghorn’s discussion is still relevant, despite my intentions not 
having been clear. In one place, for example, Waghorn suggests that Cottingham 
could avoid incoherence by denying to know that if meaning exists, then God 
exists: “(H)e does not think he knows the conditional, he merely takes a weaker 
attitude toward it, like holding it to be true, or having a certain degree of 
justified belief in it (this is suggested by Cottingham’s claim that he ‘maintains’ 
the conditional, rather than ‘knows’ it)” (2015: 153).  
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Waghorn acknowledges the implication of this move: “Cottingham must 
accept that his arguments for a supernaturalist theory of life’s meaning do not 
conclusively refute alternate views” (2015: 153). Waghorn thinks that 
Cottingham might be satisfied with such a position, but I do not think he, or 
supernaturalists generally, should be. As the field stands, it is hard to believe that 
a new argument would come on the scene to provide evidence of God’s 
existence sufficient for knowledge. Similarly, it is hard to believe that those 
working in the field of meaning in life would encounter a consideration that 
would lead them to deny that the Einsteins and Mandelas of the world have had 
such a value in their lives. That means that, if there is indeed an incoherence, 
supernaturalism has virtually no prospect of being known. It is not merely that 
we lack conclusive evidence for it now; it is that, for all we can tell, the prospect 
of encountering that kind of evidence is slim. 
At another place, Waghorn considers the possibility of avoiding the 
incoherence in the way that Roger Crisp once suggested in correspondence with 
me (cf. 2013: 97n17), namely, by now claiming to know that God exists, 
precisely in light of knowing that a God-based account of meaning is true and 
that meaning exists. In reply to Crisp, I said that such a move is unpromising, 
since it is the God-based account of meaning that is in question. It is a highly 
contested theory in need of argumentation, not a stable premise to be used to 
draw a conclusion about the existence of God. And to this reply, Waghorn has 
two interesting responses.  
First, Waghorn remarks that “surely whether we are unsure of the 
conditional claim is not a problem for Cottingham, as, on Metz’ interpretation, 
the former does take himself to know this” (2015: 160). But it remains a 
problem for Cottingham in particular since he also takes himself not to know 
that God exists. According to his concluding summary of arguments for and 
against theism, Cottingham says, “the evidence from the observable world was 
at best compatible with a claim about its ultimate divine source: although not 
ruling it out, it was not such as to support it either” (2003: 92; see also 
Cottingham 2005: 6-8, 13, 24-25, 47-48, 57-58, 61-62, 118-119, 122-124, 133). 
His commitment to the Pascalian tradition is strong; belief in God for epistemic 
reason is not, nor is ever likely to be, prescribed, but pragmatic considerations 
recommend such belief. It is unlikely that Cottingham would all of a sudden 
proclaim knowledge of God in light of the argument Waghorn and Crisp suggest 
on his behalf.  
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But should he? Waghorn’s second response is that “Cottingham has given us 
arguments to establish that we know this conditional, and so it may be 
unjustified to be unsure of the claim, depending on how successful those 
arguments are” (2015: 160). Waghorn is correct that Cottingham has aimed to 
(or is plausibly reading as having aimed to) provide conclusive evidence of a 
God-based theory of meaning, one that implies that if meaning exists, then God 
exists. And so it is apt for Waghorn to point out that, if choosing with 
thoroughness which of the three claims to let go of, one ought to examine all the 
evidence for and against each of them.  
As things stand amongst most contemporary philosophers working in the 
analytic tradition, objective value need not have its source in God, as per 
Cottingham’s central argument for a God-based theory of meaning, and God’s 
existence looks doubtful in light of the problem of evil and inability to figure 
into the best explanation of comparatively uncontested data. However, there of 
course remains debate about these matters, which involves metaphysics, 
meta-ethics, epistemology and the philosophy of language, all of which were 
well beyond the scope of Meaning in Life, and probably remain beyond the 
scope of my lifetime. Waghorn is of course correct that such investigations 
“cannot be postponed indefinitely” (2015: 159n18) if the debate about 
naturalism and supernaturalism is to be taken further, but that is a project for the 
field more broadly, not for me. I would be content to have shown that 
Cottingham and other supernaturalists must choose between the three claims of 
knowing that if meaning exists, God exists, knowing that meaning exists, and 
not knowing that God exists, and to have noted that, on balance at the moment, 
philosophical opinion counsels letting go of the first claim.  
 
4. Capturing Naturalism 
 
Here I address the contributors insofar as they have provided some reason to 
doubt my favoured naturalist theory of what can make a life meaningful. 
According to it, one’s life can be meaningful in a purely physical universe if 
(roughly) one contours one’s intelligence (of which one kind is emotional) 
towards conditions fundamental to human life. For conditions to be fundamental 
is for them to account for much else of a certain human domain, e.g., for much 
of the course of a particular person’s life or of the way that the human species 
has developed. In the first two subsections, I take up objections that basically 
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apply to my conception of contouring intelligence. Specifically, in 4.1 I tackle 
the claim, inspired by a reading of Buddhism, that the highest meaning would 
not involve a deliberate striving towards a certain, meaningful state of affairs, 
which contrasts with the usual way that I characterize contouring, and in 4.2 I 
respond to the argument that I have not provided enough justification to believe 
that contouring is best understood as non-consequentialist. In 4.3, I reply to 
objections that fundamentality is not the relevant object towards which to 
contour one’s intelligence (supposing one should).  
 
4.1. Is Great Meaning Compatible with Striving?   
 
So far as I have been able to tell, use of terms such as “meaningful”, 
“significant” and the like are fairly peculiar to Western societies. High praise for 
a life in other cultures such as the African and the East Asian tends rather to 
invoke terms such as “wise”, “excellent” or “virtuous”. Despite the differences 
in terminology, there is plausibly overlap conceptually. What both kinds of talk 
probably connote are ways of living that merit substantial esteem or admiration 
or that achieve purposes much higher than those relating to one’s animal self. 
This conceptual common ground makes it apt to engage in cross-cultural 
comparison and evaluation.  
Christopher Ketcham discusses one major strain of Buddhism in light of the 
views salient in Meaning in Life, especially comparing and contrasting it with 
my favoured theory of life’s meaning in terms of contouring one’s intelligence 
towards fundamental conditions of human life. According to Ketcham, there is a 
type of meaning that early Buddhism rates most highly but that the 
fundamentality theory fails to capture, a fascinating point that he makes with 
care. Yu Urata makes a similar point more briefly by invoking the importance of 
what he calls “trans-meaning” in the context of Zen Buddhism.  
Taking up Ketcham first, he describes two different ways of living, a 
pre-enlightenment state and a state of enlightenment. A pre-enlightenment state 
is essentially one in which a person is aware of herself and, especially, what she 
lacks. It is a state in which one is “clinging, grasping, craving ultimately for 
more life” (Ketcham 2015: 118), but also for, say, more meaning in life. 
Consequent to such attachment for something one does not have is suffering or 
dissatisfaction.  
Applying meaning-talk to Buddhism, Ketcham maintains that some meaning 
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is available to those in a pre-enlightenment state, and he is inclined to identify 
much of it with what the fundamentality theory picks out. Specifically, he 
maintains that the “Eightfold Path” towards enlightenment is fairly well 
captured by contouring one’s intelligence towards what is basic to human life. 
Ketcham remarks, “Fundamentality theory emphasizes cognitive reorientation 
(mindfulness), logical decision making (wisdom), and positive orientation to the 
fundamentals of human existence (ethical thoughts; ethical acts). In this both 
theories appear to agree” (2015: 121).  
Although not all pre-enlightenment lives are equal from the standpoint of 
meaning, for Ketcham’s interpretation of Buddhism, none of them can achieve 
the ultimate kind of meaning, which is available only to one who has become 
enlightened. An enlightened person is one who no longer has the “desire to 
possess, and to cling to being and further becoming” (Ketcham 2015: 113). A 
person in such a state does not seek out meaning for herself, and is not one who 
has collected a great amount of meaning in a pre-enlightenment state. Instead, 
she exhibits “the most wondrous idea of meaning of all” (Ketcham 2015: 132) in 
virtue of having transcended concern for her self and instead being focused on 
others. The enlightened one is “no longer concerned with his or her own 
meaning derived from the ethical state of nibbāna, only in acting in ways that 
produce meaning for others” (Ketcham 2015: 132). And so follows the title of 
Ketcham’s article, “Meaning without Ego”. 
Ketcham usually interprets such as a state naturalistically, i.e., as an 
other-regarding orientation that is neither “extra-physical” (2015: 123) nor 
“transcendental” (2015: 118-119), but instead is “purely and solely an ethical 
state” (2015: 118n22). The enlightened person “still lives in this world, but this 
is a person who has shorn the shackles of the need for being and becoming and 
has ended for himself/herself the unsatisfactory desire for rebirth” (2015: 123). 
Turning, now, to Urata, he surveys a wide array of literature in the field of 
psychology, both Western and Japanese, and compares it with key distinctions 
drawn in Meaning in Life. Many of the distinctions found in the psychological 
literature, as Urata conveys it, line up nicely with philosophical ones discussed 
in my book, as he points out. He also presents many of these distinctions 
pictorially, in an insightful, revealing way that highlights their relationships and 
prompts reflection (2015: 221).10  
                                                     
10 For example, I wonder where a loner who tends his own garden, or a person who writes poems that 
she does not share with others, would fit in his schema. 
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Urata rightly notes that I do not use images to convey any ideas, making that 
one point of difference between our work. In addition, as a psychologist he says 
that he works with people’s reports of their experiences and perspectives, largely 
“accepting” them and then working with them to obtain greater meaning, a 
practical standpoint that also differs from my approach. These two differences 
do not indicate any deep incompatibilities, unlike a potential third difference 
Urata notes, which concerns what he calls “trans-meaning”, short for meaning 
that has a transcendental dimension (2015: 222). Quoting another scholar, Urata 
says that it goes beyond plain meaning and consists of “the way of living where 
he or she transcends the dual view of meaning or no meaning, and does not 
quest for ‘why’” (2015: 220), and in a note he indicates that it is an orientation 
prominent in Western mysticism and Zen Buddhism (2015: 220n4; see also 
223).  
Urata’s description of someone who no longer asks “Why?” because she has 
gone beyond the categories of meaning is similar to Ketcham’s description of an 
enlightened person. Both scholars ascribe to Buddhism the view that an 
ultimately meaningful state of awareness is one that no longer thinks in terms of 
meaningfulness or the lack of it.  
In the following, I do not question this interpretation of Buddhism,11 instead 
considering whether it is truly something at odds with the fundamentality theory. 
Note that it is not essential to the fundamentality theory, or indeed most 
naturalist accounts of meaning in the Anglo-American tradition, that an agent 
seek out meaning qua meaning. The thought is not that, in order to live a 
meaningful life, one must think in terms of what would make it fall under the 
description “meaningful”. Instead, one simply ought to act in certain ways that 
are constitutive of meaning, regardless of whether one employs the concept. 
Ketcham and Urata have a deeper point to make, here, however, which is 
that even if the fundamentality theory does not require a focus on the lack of 
meaning in one’s life, it does permit it, which is incompatible with a state of 
enlightenment. Ketcham says that “the difference between Metz’s 
fundamentality theory and early Buddhist thinking is that in this ethical state of 
otherwise than being, ‘meaning in life’ is no longer an issue, and its 
                                                     
11 Though I detect some tensions in Ketcham’s reading of the tradition. For instance, sometimes he 
says that an enlightened person is not merely one who no longer craves to be reborn, but one who has 
escaped an actual cycle of rebirth that was influenced by karma (2015: 125; see also 115). This 
suggests that an enlightened person has a spiritual nature that had been reincarnated but no longer will 
be, which is hard to reconcile with Ketcham’s repudiation of the “extra-physical”. 
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measurement, and accumulation, is no longer an issue” (2015: 131). 
Perhaps, though, one could understand the fundamentality theory to imply 
that, in order to obtain superlative meaning, a person must be utterly absorbed 
by the relevant object, as opposed to be aware of herself and the meaning she 
would accrue upon engaging with it in the right way. Such would plausibly 
count as an intense kind of “contouring” or “positive orientation” of one’s 
intelligence towards fundamentality, e.g., another person’s character in the case 
of love. Western people often deem the most meaningful times in their lives to 
be ones in which they are unaware of themselves or are “experiencing flow”, 
and so there seems to be interesting convergence here with a Buddhist approach. 
However, there is a key respect in which the fundamentality theory and 
Buddhism, or at least some facets of Ketcham’s reading of it, do seem 
incompatible. Even if a person need not, and should not, strive for more 
meaning qua meaning in her life in order to exhibit the superlative sort, she 
would by the fundamentality theory still often need to strive for something. 
Consider those who struggle against injustice, for example. Here, there is 
plausibly still a kind of desire or craving for a state in which, roughly, people’s 
reasoning and relating is not oppressed, exploited or neglected.  
I am not sure what Ketcham would say about this point. Sometimes it 
appears that, for him or for Buddhism, enlightenment means not striving for 
something for oneself, but other times it seems that enlightenment means not 
striving, period. Evidence of the latter in Ketcham’s article is the point that 
striving of any kind brings with it dissatisfaction and suffering, where it appears 
that the latter conditions are what the enlightened person ultimately overcomes 
(2015: 114-117). It is hard for me to see how this approach can be reconciled 
with Ketcham’s description of the enlightened person as one who acts only “in 
ways that produce meaning for others”; for surely such action would involve 
striving and hence frustration, disappointment and loss.  
The difficulty I am raising is one that I have had for a long time in trying to 
understand Buddhism. On the one hand, Buddhism is often understood to 
recommend that one become the sort of person who is not attached to anything 
in this impermanent, changing and uncontrollable world, so as to avoid negative 
feelings and emotions. On the other hand, Buddhism is often understood to 
recommend that one love, or otherwise act for the sake of, others, which appears 
to mean being precisely so attached and hence vulnerable to such negative states. 
It is a tension I see not merely in Ketcham’s article, but in the tradition more 
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generally.  
I could well be misunderstanding the religion, and I would welcome clarity 
about it from those better informed than I. However, insofar as the tension is real 
in it, I favour some attachment that is other-directed and even some negative 
emotional states, say, ones in which one hates injustice or is upset at the loss of a 
loved one (Metz 2013: 142, 183, 220, 233-234; cf. Metz 2014c: 227-228, 230). 
Otherwise, the religion appears to me to be overly concerned with a person’s 
own happiness, at the expense of her meaning in life.  
 
4.2. Is Meaning Consequentialist? 
  
Some carefully developed theories of life’s meaning in the Anglo-American 
tradition are naturally described as “consequentialist”, as their structure mirrors 
what that tradition labels “consequentialism” when it comes to theories of 
morally right action. Just as utilitarians about morality often contend that right 
acts are those that maximize the long-term net balance of well-being over woe in 
the world, so utilitarians about meaning, such as Peter Singer, have held the 
same (or something similar, to the effect that maximal meaning would come 
from such behaviour). And just as perfectionists about morality often contend 
that right acts are those that maximally promote the amount of excellence in the 
universe in the long run (perhaps constrained by rights), so perfectionists about 
meaning, such as Quentin Smith, have held the same. In my book, I objected to 
these kinds of consequentialism about meaning and those with similar, 
teleological accounts of how to engage with final value.  
Mark Wells points out that the kinds of consequentialism that I targeted are 
not representative of all possible forms. In fact, he contends that there are some 
versions of consequentialism that can avoid the counterexamples I made to the 
standard forms of utilitarianism and perfectionism, so that I have not provided 
enough reason to doubt consequentialism as such.  
Contra my claim that the kind of action one performs can be constitutive of 
meaning apart from the results it produces, Wells maintains that a 
consequentialist could deem the action to be a final value to be promoted. 
Against my contention that where final value is produced can be constitutive of 
meaning, Wells argues that a consequentialist can assign weight to the 
distribution of final value. And in contrast to my claim that one’s attitude 
towards final value can be constitutive of meaning, Wells contends that such it is 
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open to a consequentialist to maintain that such an attitude can itself be a 
second-order sort of final value. Wells is correct that these kinds of moves have 
been made in the moral sphere, and so it is reasonable for him to maintain that 
they are similarly available when it comes to life’s meaning.  
However, Wells makes the further, bold claim that for any putatively 
non-consequentialist point about meaning that I might posit, the consequentialist 
can find a way to interpret it in consequentialist terms (2015: 176-178). He says, 
“While particular consequentialist theories remain susceptible to such 
counter-examples, there will always be some consequentialist theory that avoids 
the counter-example and thereby remains extensionally adequate” (2015: 177). I 
do not know whether that is true, but let us suppose that such a “gimmicky” 
approach is indeed available, to use Nozick’s fine term (1974: 29; cf. Nozick 
1981: 684n21). 
Then, I submit that the non-consequentialist would have in fact won the 
debate! To see why the debate would be over at precisely that point, consider the 
moral realm first. There, the issue is what a sheriff should do if, by framing and 
killing one innocent person, he could thereby prevent the killings of several 
more innocent people, or about whether a doctor should kill one innocent patient 
if necessary to harvest his organs and thereby save the lives of four other 
innocents who would die without them. Standard forms of moral 
consequentialism appear to entail that it would be right to kill one in these cases. 
In reply, some moral consequentialists argue that the consequences are 
under-described, and in fact are plausibly expected to be worse should the one 
be killed, making it wrong. Others bite the bullet, maintaining that it would 
indeed be right to kill the one, in light of a powerful teleological theory of 
practical reason. The terms “consequentialist” and “non-consequentialist” (or 
“deontologist”) are aptly used to structure this debate about how to act. 
Although there might in principle be some idiosyncratic moral theory grounded 
upon precepts that inform standard consequentialism that generates the same 
outcome as what we call “deontology”, that would not be central (I do not 
suggest it would be downright irrelevant), since there would be zero 
disagreement about which choices are the right ones to make. 
I suggest something similar about meaning, where much of the issue (though 
not all, on which see 2.1 above) is about how to live. Is there more meaning in a 
life that promotes a cause by working hard for it than by merely writing a 
cheque? Is there more meaning in a life that is, in Susan Wolf’s influential terms, 
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“subjectively attracted” to a worthwhile project than one that were instead bored 
by it? It is these kinds of questions to which most theorists and of course nearly 
all interested laypeople want answers; they want to know whether meaning is 
available to them and how to impart it to their lives. And so “consequentialism” 
and “non-consequentialism/deontology” are aptly used to structure debate about 
that.  
At one point Wells remarks, “The central problem remains that Metz fails to 
motivate his characterization of what it means for a theory to be 
consequentialist” (2015: 172). Implicit in the book was my view that taxonomy 
should be a function of what helps to organize debate about the most important 
issues. I take them to be about how one can live a life that has more meaning in 
it as opposed to less, whereas Wells instead is interested in abstract points about 
whether certain theoretical prescriptions are extensionally equivalent.  
For all Wells has said, he has not yet provided any reason to doubt that 
meaning is adequately captured by the fundamentality theory. Even if some 
other theory could generate the same conclusions as it, and even if, as he points 
out, there would in principle be a way to choose between them on explanatory 
grounds (2015: 177), as things stand, his article does not require me to change 
anything; for he has not, as yet, suggested that a gimmicky consequentialism 
would offer an explanation that plausibly rivals the deontological fundamentality 
theory. Presumably it would not, if it is disconnected from the kind of 
perspectives that were invoked to question the standard, utilitarian and 
perfectionist forms of consequentialism. 
 
4.3. Is Meaning Essentially Fundamental?  
 
In his intricate contribution, David Matheson, like me (2013: 212, 219, 226, 
230-231), runs with the suggestive characterizations of meaningfulness as a 
“deep” or “profound” value that contrasts with more shallow, superficial ones. 
In my work, I do so by appealing to fundamentality, the idea that substantial 
meaning comes from positively orienting one’s rational nature towards causally 
or explanatorily deep conditions of human life, roughly, those that account for 
much else about certain, major dimensions of it. Interestingly, Matheson 
believes that the spatial metaphor of depth (or, conversely, height as per Mintoff 
2008: 81) in fact tells against my fundamentality theory. For him, meaning is 
deep insofar as it is essentially what he calls “extra-dimensional”, i.e., includes 
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some other value while expanding the amount of value overall, a property for 
which my theory fails to account. In the following, after I try to clarify these 
extremely abstract statements of extra-dimensionality and fundamentality, I 
mainly argue, contra Matheson, that meaning is not invariably 
extra-dimensional, which is a good thing, since I provide even more reason than 
he has to think that fundamentality cannot entail that it is. 
According to Matheson, for meaning to be an extra-dimensional value 
means that it is essentially a good that (1) supervenes on (or is constituted by) 
another, logically distinct final good and that (2), upon doing so, realizes more 
final goodness on balance. For example, making a strenuous effort to help others 
and succeeding in making their lives go better is (1*) to exhibit moral worth but 
(2*) of a special sort where the value of meaning is present beyond that of 
morality. For another example, being the first to create a new type of poem 
would be (1#) to exhibit aesthetic value but (2#) of a special sort where the 
value of meaning is present beyond that of the artwork. Matheson provides 
several examples where intuitively meaningful conditions do exhibit these two 
properties, and so it makes sense for him to generalize, i.e., to posit the 
hypothesis that meaning always exhibits them.  
Matheson has two additional reasons for contending that meaning is 
essentially extra-dimensional. One is that if it were, then he would have cashed 
out the spatial metaphor routinely associated with meaning-talk, viz., it would 
count as a “deep” value for being one that enriches some other value, for taking 
some other value deeper. Another is that extra-dimensionality would best 
explain the crises of meaning that people sometimes have. Even when their lives 
exhibit final values such as morality, enquiry and creativity (“the good, the true 
and the beautiful”), they can sensibly doubt whether they are worthwhile when 
the extra-ordinary value provided by meaning is lacking, or perceived to be. 
Before considering whether my fundamentality theory of what makes a life 
(notably) meaningful can capture extra-dimensionality, I first provide reason to 
doubt that it should have to do so. While meaning often exhibits 
extra-dimensionality, it does not always, or so the following cases suggest. They 
are intended to be cases where there is plausibly meaning that does not involve 
“the realization to a certain degree of at least one of the more familiar forms of 
final value” (Matheson 2015: 21).  
First off, consider a young person struck and killed by a drunk driver. 
Afterwards, her family puts signs up at the scene of the accident to warn people 
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that drunk driving kills, and more generally engages in activism by appeal to her 
death. Here, it is plausible to think that her death was not utterly pointless or that 
her life has had some real significance despite its brevity, at least supposing 
drunk driving is reduced as a result of her parents’ efforts. However, it is 
implausible to characterize the meaning here in terms of moral value, or any 
other final good. To be sure, her parents have exhibited moral value, but she did 
not in virtue of her early death, and yet (some of) the meaning has accrued to 
her.  
For a second case, think about grand master chess players (cf. Metz 2013: 
165, 216, 223). It would be reasonable for one to deem one’s life to be 
meaningful for having become a worldwide expert at this game. And yet it is 
hard to name what other final value might be involved. There are clearly certain 
mental capacities actualized, such as memory, analytical reasoning, 
concentration and the like, but these are not “familiar forms of final value”, 
quite unlike the “moral or alethic or aesthetic or hedonic final value” (Matheson 
2015: 22) that Matheson routinely invokes. 
Thirdly, reflect on positive personal relationships, such as marriage (cf. Metz 
2002b: 811, 2013: 204, 228, 249). Think not about why one might stay in a 
marriage, and thereby avoid breaking a vow and hence exhibiting moral disvalue 
that would reduce meaning. Instead, focus on why one might be inclined to get 
married. If there is meaning here, it lies in the willingness to make a promise in 
the first place, i.e. to commit to another person, or in the degree of emotional 
openness and attachment that would lead one to do so. Of course, loyalty and 
love are “final values”, but my point is that they seem so in virtue of their 
meaningfulness, and not some other readily identifiable type of final value such 
as morality, happiness, health, art, knowledge or the like that Matheson 
discusses.12 
In light of the above cases, I am not yet willing to sign onto the view that 
meaning is essentially extra-dimensional. Note that if meaning were often, but 
                                                     
12 Fourth, and with more controversy than the previous cases, consider those who have had a major 
impact on the course of human history, where the influence is negative or neutral. Think about the 
possibility of Genghis Khan’s life having had meaning in it by virtue of so many future people having 
been genetically related to him. Or consider the inclination of some philosophers to be willing to 
ascribe meaning to Adolf Hitler’s life, sometimes simply in virtue of the enormous mess he made and 
the unintended good consequences that came of it in the form of the United Nations, the International 
Criminal Court or the European Union. I am much less confident there is genuine meaning in these 
cases; perhaps, as I have considered elsewhere (Metz 2002b: 803), they are instances of impact or 
what Robert Nozick calls “importance”, in contrast to meaningfulness (1989: 171-178). 
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not always, extra-dimensional, that would probably be enough to capture the 
advantages Matheson suggested, viz., of being able to make sense of not only 
why meaning is plausibly deemed to be something deep, but also why people 
can have personal crises despite the presence of other final values in their lives.  
I suspect Matheson is correct that my fundamentality theory cannot capture 
the claim that meaning is essentially extra-dimensional, but not so much for the 
reasons he provides. At the heart of his analysis is the interpretation of 
fundamentality as being about the conditions of human life as such, not any of 
particular human’s life or human society. His key cases are ones in which one 
weakly promotes something fundamental with regard to human life in general as 
compared to robustly promotes something fundamental to a particular human or 
subset of humans. He claims that since there is intuitively comparable value in 
the pairs of cases, the fundamentality theory cannot account for 
extra-dimensionality insofar as it involves a greater degree of final value overall 
upon the presence of meaning. 
Matheson is not being uncharitable to read my discussion of fundamentality 
in this way, as I in Meaning in Life most often used examples where human life 
as such was the relevant object towards which an individual should contour her 
rationality so as to obtain great meaning. I spoke of supporting reasoning and 
relating as conditions fundamental to the course of a typical human life; I 
addressed reproduction, labour, communication, religion, love and natural 
selection as conditions fundamental to the course of a human society; and I 
characterized knowing about space-time, gravity and causation as about 
conditions fundamental to the human environment.  
However, I did not intend the relevant object to be solely the general; some 
notable meaning could come from positively orienting one’s rational self 
towards fundamental features of particular human beings or societies. There 
were occasions in the book where I pointed this out (e.g., 2013: 216, 226, 228, 
230), but it was not admittedly the dominant motif, given my focus on 
quintessentially meaningful lives such as those of Mandela, Mother Teresa, 
Picasso, Dostoyevsky, Einstein and Darwin. In recent work I have said more 
about what it would mean to relate positively to the fundamental features of a 
subset of humanity such as a person, contending that love of another is 
intuitively meaningful when directed towards his “deep” features, i.e., his 
character or what makes him tick, and not merely his more surface properties 
such as his appearance (Metz 2014d: 104-106).  
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By my actual view, then, one would have to compare the intensity of the 
available contouring of one’s rational self and the degree of expected outcome, 
on the one hand, with the extent of influence, on the other, in order to know how 
best to realize meaning in one’s life. If one could do a lot for the fundamental 
conditions of humanity, or a broad swathe of it, there would be prima facie 
reasons of meaning to do that, even if at the expense of family, as Mandela 
elected to do. If, however, one were not in a position to do a lot for humanity, 
but do could something substantial for the fundamental conditions of the life of 
one’s spouse, considerations of meaning could well counsel the latter.  
What I suspect is the deeper (so to speak) incompatibility between 
extra-dimensionality and fundamentality is that the latter is not always 
intuitively finally good. Trying to be charitable to me, Matheson at one point 
says, “I take it, moreover, that Metz intends the fundamental conditions to be 
fundamentally good ones, or at least not fundamentally bad ones” (2015: 27). 
However, the view in the book, and the view I still hold, is that some 
fundamental conditions are “neutral” or even “bad” but could be sources of 
meaning all the same upon contouring one’s rational nature towards them.  
The best examples are in the realm of knowledge (Metz 2013: esp. 209, 229, 
249). Knowledge about gravity, quarks and light is not about anything good for 
its own sake, but these are properties that are responsible for, or account for, 
much else about the environment in which we live, such that discovering facts 
about them conferred meaning on the lives of natural scientists. And then much 
of the course of human development has been a function of, and explained by, 
neurosis, xenophobia and war, which are also not good for their own sake, but 
revealing facts about them conferred meaning on the lives of social scientists 
(and novelists, too).  
In all, Matheson is probably correct in the final analysis that fundamentality 
cannot capture extra-dimensionality. However, I would at this point invite the 
reader to view these cases of intuitively meaningful kinds of knowledge to be 
further counterexamples to Matheson’s extra-dimensionality thesis, so that one 
should favour fundamentality if one must choose between it and 
extra-dimensionality.  
In his contribution, Minao Kukita also provides reason to question 
fundamentality as exhaustive of great meaning in life, when it comes to poetry. 
Meaning in Life addressed aesthetic themes, as one dimension of the classic 
triad of “the good, the true and the beautiful” in the Western tradition. In that 
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tradition, when trying to differentiate great art from the not so great, it has been 
standard to maintain that the former is about universal themes, topics that 
transcend a particular culture, even if expressed in its terms (cf. Metz 2013: 215, 
230). I objected to that view on the ground that certain universal themes are 
intuitively trivial. As an alternative, I suggested that the relevant sub-set of 
universal themes that are not trivial are those concerning fundamentality, i.e., 
those addressing conditions of human life largely responsible for the course of 
typical human lives. That concept, I proposed, is what best captures themes such 
as character, neurosis, love, morality, family, death, crime, vengeance and the 
like.  
Kukita finds it much too narrow to deem fundamental theme to be a 
necessary condition for great art, particularly in light of the Eastern aesthetic 
tradition. More specifically, he appeals to the Japanese poetic form of haiku to 
suggest that fundamentality is too strict a criterion for art that confers substantial 
meaning on the artist’s life. Kukita’s key remarks are here: 
 
For example, the most famous and popular work of haiku … is simply 
about the sound of a frog jumping into a pond (‘An old pond, the sound of 
a frog jumping into it’). The author, Basho Matsuo, also wrote a piece of 
haiku about the urine of a horse (‘Fleas, lice, a horse urinating near my 
pillow’). According to Metz, these haiku are not about fundamental 
conditions of human existence, and therefore, do not pass as great art…. I 
am afraid that there are many other artworks that are apparently about 
unimportant things but that are nonetheless viewed as great art (2015: 211, 
212). 
 
In the book, I felt on shaky ground when discussing aesthetics, but was there 
particularly concerned that the fundamentality theory could not account well for 
non-representational works (2013: 231). The force of Kukita’s terrific, famous 
examples is that they are representational works, have often been deemed to be 
great, but do not appear to be about something fundamental to the human 
condition.   
The strongest way for me to reply is to contend that excellent haiku in 
general, and the particular instances from Basho, are in fact about fundamental 
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facets of human life.13 A quick perusal of the literature on haiku characterizes it 
as prompting deep emotions and expressing universal themes of human 
existence through simple images. Fundamentality promises to capture the core 
of these ideas.  
Consider the specific instances above. Kukita’s translation of the haiku about 
a horse urinating does not readily express in English what many others have felt 
upon reading the poem, namely, experiences of poverty, irritation, frustration 
and loneliness, all of which are strong motivations in characteristic human life 
and hence influence a wide array of other experiences. And then the haiku about 
the sound of a frog having jumped into a pond prompts awareness of, say, the 
experience of being absorbed by nature. Or it might occasion reflection on 
change or animation, viz., a still and quiet body of water being shifted by the 
movement of a being with an inner life. In short, I suspect that Kukita is not 
giving Basho his due when he says, “(T)he above-mentioned haiku are 
apparently representational and about nothing other than an old pond, a frog, 
flea, lice and a horse urinating” (2015: 212).  
Suppose, however, that I and other interpreters are reading too much into 
these haiku. Or consider that, even if we are not, there are other haiku that are 
indeed about intuitively superficial topics but that are great all the same. I would 
naturally like to be able to inspect alleged specimens of the latter, but suppose, 
for now, that they could be produced. Then, I would propose a weaker position: 
even if being about a fundamental theme is not necessary for a work of art to be 
great and to confer substantial meaning on the artist’s life, it is characteristic of 
great art to be about what is fundamental to the course of human life. Such a 
view, perhaps as extended beyond the beautiful to include the good and the true, 
would, I hope, still be a novel and revealing position.  
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